fear, delivers the same to the one making the demand. Rex v. Edwards, 6 Car. & P. 521, 1 Moody & R. 257. These cases are cited and commented upon with approval in 1 Wharton's Criminal Law, 10th ed. 749, and 2 Russell on Crimes, 112. In the case of Harris v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 279, 22 S. W. 1037, the facts shown were that a policeman accosted two women returning from work after dark, and at the point of his pistol placed them under arrest; they protested that they had done nothing; the policeman then offered to release them if they would pay him money. One of the women paid him $1, all of the money she had; the other woman had no money. Both were then compelled to go, at the point of the pistol, to a lonely spot, where he ravished one of the women. In passing along the road and paths to this place they met several persons, but through fear of personal violence neither of the women made any outcry. Held, that the force and fear shown was sufficient to support a charge of robbery as well as one of rape. We have been unable to find any recent case involving facts similar to those here related, but on the authority of the cases cited, and giving a reasonable application to the elements of the crime, we see no reason why a short separation of the accused and the perpelling act by son robbed, who was still laboring under apprehension and fear of personal violence, should make the case any different from one where there was no such separation. Robbery-com another. The accused further insists that his rights were prejudiced by the court's refusal to permit him to prove in greater detail that for nineteen days and nights before the commission of the offense charged he was in a worried and disturbed state of mind, culminating in the assault upon the doctor, which the accused claims was made not for the purpose of robbing him, but for the purpose of ascertaining from the doctor himself whether the statements made by the wife of the accused were true; that he suspected that she had not fully disclosed all that had taken place between her and the doctor; and that the showing of this condition of mind would tend to prove that his motive was not robbery. Ordinarily, it is not reversible error for the court to limit the extent and scope of the examination of witnesses touching remote details of facts and circumstances leading up to the commission of the offense, where the facts sought amount to nothing more than uncertain or conjectural explanations of the motives of the accused. 10 R. C. L. 926. The taking of something of value from another, by means of force or fear of injury, is tutes. the gist of the of- what constifense of robbery; whether the motives leading up to the assault grew out of avarice, revenge, or curiosity is immaterial. None of these motives would justify robbery, or change the degree of the offense, or operate to mitigate the punishment therefor. In homicide. cases the state of mind, or the motives of the accused, leading up to the assault, are often material as explanatory of the question of malice or premeditation, but we can see no reason why any motive not explanatory of a design to rob would have any bearing on a robbery case. If the doctor made a felonious assault upon the wife of the accused, as accused claims he did, such conduct was indeed reprehensible. Even so, that would not justify the injured husband in collecting unliquidated damages at the point of a pistol to compensate him for such forcible collecfelonious assault. tion of claim. Many courts have held that the taking and retention of the property of another for the purpose of paying or securing the payment of a debt would not necessarily constitute larceny or robbery. This is argued pro and con in People v. Smith, 5 (Okla. Crim. Rep. -, 212 Pac. 612.) Park. Crim. Rep. 490; Com. v. Stebbins, 8 Gray, 492. We refuse, however, to extend this somewhat mooted doctrine so as to cover cases where the taking of the property is for the purpose of forcibly collecting uncertain unliquidated damages for an alleged criminal assault. To hold otherwise would amount to an invitation to those aggrieved by the criminal acts of others to assume the functions of judge, jury, and sheriff to violently and forcibly compensate themselves for the injury or assumed injury inflicted, to any extent deemed adequate by the aggrieved person alone, and that such violence would amount to no more than a mere trespass or simple assault. By his own admissions, the accused by deception arranged for this interview with the doctor, and the doctor at the point of a pistol agreed to compensate the accused for the injury, suspected or real, to the latter's wife; early in the controversy the cupidity of the accused became apparent. But "the jingling of the guinea helps the hurt that honor feels." The offer to pay, or the forced agreement to pay, money to right this real or fancied wrong, had a very soothing effect on the worried mind of the accused. We think that all the physical facts shown, and the circumstances surrounding them, justified the jury in finding that the doctor surrendered at least a portion of this property under fear of imminent violence, Evidence-suffiand that the charge of robbery in the first degree was supported by the evidence. ciency. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. Matson, P. J., and Doyle, J., con cur. ANNOTATION. Robbery or assault to commit robbery as affected by intent to collect debt or claim. This annotation supplements one on the same question in 13 A.L.R. 151. The accepted doctrine that a charge of robbery or assault for robbery will fail where the intent of the defendant was to collect a debt (see 13 A.L.R. 151) is sustained by the later decision of State v. Culpepper (1922) 293 Mo. 249, 238 S. W. 801. In that case, where the defendant, who claimed the prosecuting witness owed him money which he could not collect, induced the witness, who denied that he owed the debt, to come into his (the defendant's) house, and there, by threats of violence, which the witness believed and which the defendant had the means of carrying out, compelled the witness to write a check for the amount claimed, the court held that, if the witness owed the defendant money, or if the defendant believed he owed him, the defendant was not guilty of robbery, since the animus furandi was wanting, and an instruction substantially following the form. of the instruction to which the defendant was held entitled in State v. Brown (1891) 104 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 406, set out in 13 A.L.R. 153, should have been given. But the reported case (TIPTON V. STATE, ante, 1074) refuses to extend the rule that the forcible taking and retention of property of another for the purpose of paying a debt might not be deemed robbery, to a case where the forcible taking is for the purpose of collecting uncertain unliquidated damages as compensation for an alleged felonious assault on the taker's wife, holding that in such case the forcible taking may constitute robbery. The court points out that any other holding would amount to an invitation to one aggrieved by the criminal acts of another to assume the functions of judge, jury, and sheriff, in order to be compensated for the injury or assumed injury to any extent which he himself deems adequate. 1. The killing of a strike breaker in a bunk house on mining property by the throwing of a bomb by a striker may be found to be during hours of employment within the Workmen's Compensation Act, although it was during the night after the day's work had ceased, if it was necessary to house him in the bunk house to keep him employed. [See note on this question beginning on page 1085.] - conclusiveness of finding. 2. The court is bound by a finding of the workmen's compensation board that an injury occurred during hours of employment, if there is evidence to support it. [See 28 R. C. L. 828; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1600; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1872.] APPEAL by insurer from an order of the Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny County (Kline, J.) affirming an award of the Compensation Board in favor of claimant, in a proceeding by her under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover compensation for the death of her husband. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion Mr. Harry J. Nesbit, for appellant: Where the vital point is sought to be inferred from certain basic or underlying facts which are said to have been proved, the question whether or not there is evidence to support them is one of law and may be reviewed; but if such evidence appears, the finding is one of fact, and is not the subject of review. Stahl v. Watson Coal Co. 268 Pa. 452, 112 Atl. 14; Rodman v. Smedley, 276 Pa. 296, 120 Atl. 266; Watson v. Lehigh Valley Coal & Nav. Co. 273 Pa. 251, 116 Atl. 889; Callihan v. Montgomery, 272 Pa. 56, 115 Atl. 889; Davis v. P. R. R. 80 Pa. Super. Ct. 343; of the court. Grobunskie v. Shipman Koal Co. 80 Mr. R. J. Lucksha, for appellee: Shickley v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & I. Co. 274 Pa. 360, 118 Atl. 255; Callihan v. Montgomery, 272 Pa. 56, 115 Atl. 889; Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Atl. 458. The relation of employer and employee is not to be determined from the exact time the whistle blows or the gong sounds, but is presumed to (278 Pa. 552, 123 Atl. 505.) start before and to continue after the regular day's work, during such period as the employee is surrounded by the risks of his employment. Such relation may even continue after the employee is on his way home and off the employer's premises. Logan v. Pot Ridge Coal Co. 79 Pa. Super. Ct. 421; Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co. 259 Pa. 578, L.R.A.1918F, 888, 103 Atl. 351; Lane v. Horn & H. Bkg. Co. 261 Pa. 329, 13 A.L.R. 963, 104 Atl. 615, 17 N. C. C. A. 998; Blouss v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 95; Spizzirri v. Krouse, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 476; Hale v. Savage Fire Brick Co. 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 454; Granville v. Scranton Coal Co. 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 335; Schott v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 582; Gurski v. Susquehanna Coal Co. 262 Pa. 1, 104 Atl. 801; Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co. 263 Pa. 120, 106 Atl. 196; Knorr v. Central R. Co. 268 Pa. 172, 110 Atl. 797; Strohl v. Eastern Pennsylvania R. Co. 270 Pa. 132, 113 Atl. 62; Chase v. Emery Mfg. Co. 271 Pa. 265, 113 Atl. 840; Callihan v. Montgomery, 272 Pa. 56, 115 Atl. 889; Maguire v. James Lees & Sons Co. 273 Pa. 85, 116 Atl. 679; Carlin v. Coxe Bros. & Co. 274 Pa. 38, 117 Atl. 405; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Ryan, 82 Tex. 565, 18 S. W. 219; Sanders v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co. 97 S. C. 50, 81 S. E. 283. Sadler, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal is brought to review an award of the Workmen's Compensation Board, approved by the court below. Payment is resisted by the insurance carrier of defendant company, because, as alleged, the accident did not occur in the course of deceased's employment, and was therefore not within the terms of the act, as held in the first instance by the referee. The controlling facts found are practically without dispute, and the question for consideration is whether the law has been properly applied to them. In 1921, a general strike was in force throughout the bituminous coal fields of western Pennsylvania. This resulted in the closing of defendant's mine in May of that year. It was reopened, in part, in 1922, the number of employees being re duced from sixty-five to seventeen, as a result of local conditions. Malky, with seven others, coming from Natrona, and other points, about 18 miles distant, applied for work, and was engaged by the weighmaster, the expense of the trip to the mine being paid by the company. They arrived April 22, and from that time until the accident on the 28th remained continuously upon the property-with the exception of one Vosnak, who, under escort, went home to secure the services of an additional man, and returned with him. Lodgings were temporarily furnished in a part of the office building, but shortly afterward the defendant, at its cost, constructed a bunk house for their use upon the premises, about 20 feet from the opening of the mine. Provisions were ordered for the men, though it was intended to charge them with the expense thus incurred at pay day. A watchman was supplied to prevent interference by outsiders. The referee found the miners were free to go to adjacent towns to live, but, as said on appeal from his ruling, "it was impossible, due to the circumstances then existing, for the men to secure board and lodging in the village near to the mine." On April 28, the shanty was occupied for the first time by the imported men, whose actual labor in digging coal had ended at 4, and was not to be resumed until 7 the following day. A bomb was thrown through the window during the night, and Malky, with two others, was killed by the explosion which followed. Compensation was denied tioned, on the theory that the presby the referee, as already menence of the men when injured was not required by the nature of their employment, but it was allowed by the board on appeal. The injury did occur on the mining property, and the fact that it was caused by the acts of strikers is immaterial, if the other elements necessary to a recovery appear. Baum v. Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 516, 6 A.L.R. 1242, 123 N. E. 625. "The provision [of Act June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736) art. 3, § 301] is broad enough to include every injury received on the premises of the employer, during the hours of employment, so long as the nature of the employment demands the employee's presence there, regardless of whether his presence at the particular place where the injury occurred is actually required, if there is nothing to prove a virtual abandonment of the course of his employment by the injured person, or that, at the time of the accident, he was engaged in something wholly foreign thereto." Callihan v. Montgomery, 272 Pa. 56, 63, 115 Atl. 891. The "hours of employment" are not confined to the period for which wages are paid, but may extend beyond that time. Thus compensation has been allowed where the injury was inflicted before the beginning of the regular work (Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co. 259 Pa. 578, L.R.A.1918F, 888, 103 Atl. 351; Tolan v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & I. Co. 270 Pa. 12, 113 Atl. 67), after it had ended (Carlin v. Coxe Bros. & Co. 274 Pa. 38, 117 Atl. 405), or during intervening hours of rest (Hale v. Savage Fire Brick Co. 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 454; Blouss v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 95; Granville v. Scranton Coal Co. 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 335). And the employment does not end until a reasonable opportunity for departure from the working place has been afforded, which may cover the period required for transportation home. Knorr v. Central R. Co. 268 Pa. 172, 110 Atl. 797; Logan v. Pot Ridge Coal Co. 79 Pa. Super. Ct. 421. It is a question of fact up to what point the relation of master and servant may be said to continue after the employee has ceased actual labor. This is a matter which is primarily for the pensation-con- referee or board to clusiveness of determine, and, if there is evidence supporting a finding made, the con Workmen's com finding. clusion reached will be sustained, for it is not our province to weigh conflicting testimony, or to decide what inferences should be drawn therefrom. Rodman v. Smedley, 276 Pa. 296, 120 Atl. 266. Was the board justified in holding the deceased to be in the course of employment when killed? As observed, the actual hours of physical work for which one is engaged to serve is not necessarily controlling. It must be determined, from all the facts and circumstances, whether the employee's presence on the premises was required by the nature of his service, for, unless this appears, compensation is not permissible, though the injury occurs on property controlled and used by the employer in his business. Rotolo v. Punxsutawney Furnace Co. 277 Pa. 70, 120 Atl. 704. In this instance, the board found lodging elsewhere impracticable, because of the feeling engendered by the strike. If, therefore, the performance of the work contemplated was to be accomplished, it became necessary to keep the deceased on the ground. Further, to assure the continuance of the operations, it was requisite that outside interference be prevented, for efforts to have the strike breakers abandon their tasks were naturally to be expected, if the miners went at large. In order that work could be carried on, the employer desired to control the movements of his men during the entire twentyfour hours, and, to insure a supply of necessary labor, the holding of the workmen, in their off time, at a point to which access by others was at least made difficult, was required. As said by the court below: "The conclusion is inevitable that the defendant was fully aware that if the union men, whom they were taken there to supplant, by virtue of the strike, were permitted to talk to the employees, they would leave their employment, either as a result of persuasion or intimidation, and the company would be less able to operate its mine; to obviate this contingency, the men were confined to |