Hurni Packing Co. 263 U. S. 167, 68 L. ed., Adv. Ops. p. 45, post, 102, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90 (filed November 12, 1923). Of course, such holdings would lead to the conclusion that the remedy at law was not adequate, because the time limit might expire before the beneficiaries saw fit to commence an action to recover on the policy. Although it is desirable to be in the line with the great weight of authority, the rule adopted in Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, supra, commends itself as just and workable. Under it the beneficiary in a policy retains the right to have a jury determine whether or not he procured insurance by fraud or misrepresentation, and the insurer is fully protected in all the defenses available at the time of the death of the assured. A majority of the court adhere to the rule of the Stevens Case. The demurrer should have been sustained, with leave to answer. Order reversed. NOTE. The effect of death of insured before the end of the contestable period is treated in subd. II. of the annotation following MUTUAL L. Ins. Co. v. HURNI PACKING CO. post, 108, on the general subject of the time when the incontestable clause in a life insurance policy becomes effective. MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY of New York, Plff. in Certiorari, 1. A provision in an insurance policy making it incontestable after the lapse of a specified time does not cease to operate when the insured dies within the time specified, but continues thereafter for the benefit of the beneficiary; and therefore, if contest is not instituted within the time specified, it is too late. [See note on this question beginning on page 108.] -construction of policy method. word "date" is the time specified therein. CERTIORARI to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to review a judgment affirming a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover the amount alleged to be due on a life insurance policy. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. (263 U. S. 167, 68 L. ed., 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90.) Messrs. James M. Beck, Frederick L. Allen, Ralph L. Read, and Guy T. Struble, for plaintiff in certiorari: The two-year contestable period commenced to run either on September 7, 1915, when the policy was actually executed, or on September 13, 1915, when it was delivered and took effect. Homestead F. Ins. Co. v. Ison, 110 Va. 18, 65 S. E. 463; Maggett v. Roberts, 112 N. C. 71, 16 S. E. 919; Coleman v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. 236 Mass. 552, 129 N. E. 288; McMaster v. New York L. Ins. Co. 183 U. S. 25, 46 L. ed. 64, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. The death of the insured matured the policy, and the rights of the parties thereto became fixed at such death and the incontestability clause could not become operative. Cable v. United States L. Ins. Co. 191 U. S. 288, 48 L. ed. 188, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74; Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 20 L. ed. 501; Griesa v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 94 C. C. A. 635, 169 Fed. 509; Riggs v. Union L. Ins. Co. 63 C. C. A. 365, 129 Fed. 207; Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 285 Fed. 570; Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 157 Ark. 499, 248 S. W. 897; Etna L. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 231 U. S. 543, 58 L. ed. 356, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Moore, 231 U. S. 560, 58 L. ed. 367, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191; Mellen v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co. 17 N. Y. 609. Notice by the insurance company denying liability on the policy was a "contest," and prevents the assertion of an estoppel under the incontestability clause. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co. 280 Fed. 18; Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 285 Fed. 570. Messrs. Edwin J. Stason and Charles M. Stilwill, for defendant in certiorari: A provision in a contract of insurance limiting the time in which the insurer may take advantage of certain facts that might otherwise constitute a good defense to its liability on such contract precludes every defense to the policy other than the defenses excepted in the provision itself, including false answers in the application, and even fraud, where the time fixed by the contract is not unreasonably short. 14 R. C. L. 1200; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Austin, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1064, 73 C. C. A. 498, 142 Fed. 398; Arnold v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 228 Fed. 157; Great Western L. Ins. Co. v. Snavely, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1056, 124 C. C. A. 154, 206 Fed. 20; Wright v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 118 N. Y. 237, 6 L.R.A. 731, 16 Am. St. Rep. 749, 23 N. E. 186; Bates v. United L. Ins. Asso. 68 Hun, 144, 22 N. Y. Supp. 626, affirmed in 142 N. Y. 677, 37 N. E. 824; Teeter v. United L. Ins. Asso. 159 N. Y. 411, 54 N. E. 72; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Peeler, Okla. -, 6 A.L.R. 441, 176 Pac. 939; Dibble v. Reliance L. Ins. Co. 170 Cal. 199, 149 Pac. 171, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 34; Prudential L. Ins. Co. v. Lear, 31 App. D. C. 184; Massachusetts Ben. Life Asso. v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 42 L.R.A. 261, 30 S. E. 918; Weil v. Federal L. Ins. Co. 264 Ill. 425, 106 N. E. 246, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 974; Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 204 Ill. 549, 63 L.R.A. 452, 98 Am. St. Rep. 224, 68 N. E. 492; Murray v. State Mut. L. Ins. Co. 22 R. I. 524, 53 L.R.A. 742, 48 Atl. 800; Clement v. New York L. Ins. Co. 101 Tenn. 22, 42 L.R.A. 247, 70 Am. St. Rep. 650, 46 S. W. 561; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, Tex. Civ. App. 156 S. W. 909; Welch v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 108 Iowa, 224, 50 L.R.A. 774, 78 N. W. 853; Citizens' L. Ins. Co. v. McClure, 138 Ky. 138, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1026, 127 S. W. 749; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Buford, 61 Okla. 158, 160 Pac. 928; Flanigan v. Federal L. Ins. Co. 231 Ill. 399, 83 N. E. 178; Indiana Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 192, 101 N. E. 289; Commercial L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 50 Ind. App. 630, 97 N. E. 1018; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 431, 136 Am. St. Rep. 326, 51 So. 61; Reagan v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 189 Mass. 555, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821, 109 Am. St. Rep. 659, 76 N. E. 217, 4 Ann. Cas. 362; Drews v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 79 N. J. L. 398, 75 Atl. 167. The incontestable clause is in reality a waiver, for a consideration, of the right to make defense, and not a limitation. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Peeler, - Okla. 6 A.L.R. 441, 176 Pac. 939; Clement v. New York L. Ins. Co. 101 Tenn. 22, 42 L.R.A. 247, 70 Am. St. Rep. 650, 46 S. W. 561; Commercial L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 50 Ind. App. 630, 97 N. E. 1018. The clause is adopted by insurance companies for the purpose of allaying the apprehensions of the insured, and thus enabling the companies to increase their business. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Austin, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1064, 73 C. C. A. 498, 142 Fed. 398; American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. E. 706; Duvall v. National L. Ins. Co. 28 Idaho, 356, L.R.A.1917E, 333, 154 Pac. 632, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1112; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 431, 136 Am. St. Rep. 326, 51 So. 61. The contestable period is to be computed from the date the policy bears, not from the day of delivery, and the stipulated two-year period ends two years from the former date. 14 R. C. L. 1201; Massachusetts Ben. Life Asso. v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 42 L.R.A. 261, 30 S. E. 918; Anderson v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 164 Cal. 712, 130 Pac. 726, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 903; Harrington v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 21 N. D. 447, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 373, 131 N. W. 246; Meridian L. Ins. Co. v. Milam, 172 Ky. 75, L.R.A.1917B, 103, 188 S. W. 879; Monahan v. Fidelity Mut. L. Ins. Co. 242 Ill. 488, 134 Am. St. Rep. 337, 90 N. E. 213; Wood v. Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 148 Iowa, 400, 126 N. W. 949. "Its date of issue" means the date of execution as stated in the instrument. Commercial Mut. M. Ins. Co. v. Union Mut. Ins. Co. 19 How. 319, 15 L. ed. 636; Wright v. East Riverside Irrig. Dist. 70 C. C. A. 603, 138 Fed. 313; State ex rel. Ray v. Blease, 95 S. C. 403, 79 S. E. 247; Yessler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 308, 25 Pac. 1014; Starr v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116; Turner v. Roseberry Irrig. Dist. 33 Idaho, 760, 198 Pac. 465; Gage v. McCord, 5 Ariz. 227, 51 Pac. 977; Union Ins. Co. v. American F. Ins. Co. 107 Cal. 327, 28 L.R.A. 692, 48 Am. St. Rep. 140, 40 Pac. 431; American Bridge Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Wash. 40, 76 Pac. 534; Wood v. Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 148 Iowa, 400, 126 N. W. 949. "Its date of issue" does not mean the date of the delivery. Kansas Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Coalson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 64, 54 S. W. 388; Stringham v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 44 Or. 447, 75 Pac. 822; Hubbard v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 33 Iowa, 325, 11 Am. Rep. 125. One of the rules to be observed in the interpretation of contracts of this class is that they are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured, and all doubts or ambiguities resolved against the one who prepared the contract. McMaster v. New York L. Ins. Co. 78 Fed. 33; Sheerer v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co. 16 Fed. 720; Mer Rouge State Bank v. Employers' Liability Assur. Co. 270 Fed. 567; Arnold v. Équitable Life Assur. Soc. 228 Fed. 157; First Nat. Bank v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 95 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 563; Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co. 136 U. S. 287, 34 L. ed. 408, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; Kelley v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 109 Fed. 56; Mareck v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 62 Minn. 39, 54 Am. St. Rep. 613, 64 N. W. 68; Kascoutas v. Federal L. Ins. Co. 189 Iowa, 889, 179 N. W. 133; Jones v. Continental Casualty Co. 189 Iowa, 678, 18 A.L.R. 1329, 179 N. W. 203; Boatwright v. American L. Ins. Co. 191 Iowa, 253, 11 A.L.R. 1085, 180 N. W. 321; 5 Joyce, Ins. p. 6112; Goodwin v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Asso. 97 Iowa, 226, 32 L.R.A. 473, 59 Am. St. Rep. 411, 66 N. W. 157; Drews v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 79 N. J. L. 398, 75 Atl. 167; Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 204 Ill. 549, 63 L.R.A. 452, 98 Am. St. Rep. 224, 68 N. E. 492; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 431, 136 Am. St. Rep. 326, 51 So. 61; McKendree v. Southern States L. Ins. Co. 112 S. C. 335, 99 S. E. 806; Woodman of World v. Gilliland, 11 Okla. 384, 67 Pac. 485. If the construction of language in an insurance policy is doubtful, the words, being those of the insurer, are to be taken most strongly against the company, and most favorably to the insured. Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 278, 27 L. ed. 932, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 32 L. ed. 308, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1360; Moulor v. American L. Ins. Co. 111 U. S. 335, 28 L. ed. 447, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; Burkheiser v. Mutual Acci. Asso. 26 L.R.A. 112, 10 C. C. A. 94, 18 U. S. App. 704, 61 Fed. 816; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 32 C. C. A. 180, 59 U. S. App. 499, 89 Fed. 131; Canton Ins. Office v. Woodside, 33 C. C. A. 68, 61 U. S. App. 214, 90 Fed. 301; Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 38 L. ed. 231, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; McMaster v. New York L. Ins. Co. 40 C. C. A. 119, 99 Fed. 856; Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co. 136 U. S. 287, 34 L. ed. 408, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019. The death of the insured within the contestable period does not arrest the running of the so-called short Statute (263 U. S. 167, 68 L. ed. - 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90.) of Limitations adopted by the parties. The insurer must nevertheless take some "affirmative action," either by bringing suit, or by making defense to a suit, within the stipulated time. Black v. Ross, 110 Iowa, 112, 81 N. W. 229; Malone v. Averill, 166 Iowa, 78, 147 N. W. 135; Ackerman v. Hilpert, 108 Iowa, 247, 79 N. W. 90; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 27 C. C. A. 658, 49 U. S. App. 690, 83 Fed. 647; Wright v. Mutual Ben. Life Asso. 118 N. Y. 237, 6 L.R.A. 731, 16 Am. St. Rep. 749, 23 N. E. 186; Ebner v. Ohio State L. Ins. Co. 69 Ind. App. 32, 121 N. E. 315; Prudential L. Ins. Co. v. Lear, 31 App. D. C. 184; Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 171 C. C. A. 357, 260 Fed. 593; American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. E. 706; Hardy v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 180 N. C. 180, 104 S. E. 166; Monahan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 283 Ill. 136, L.R.A.1918D, 1196, 119 N. E. 68; Plotner v. Northwestern Nat. L. Ins. Co. N. D., 183 N. W. 1000; Ramsey v. Old Colony L. Ins. Co. 297 III. 592, 131 N. E. 108. An insurer seeking to contest a policy on the ground of fraud must act with diligence upon discovering the fraud. Ramsey v. Old Colony L. Ins. Co. supra; Clement v. New York L. Ins. Co. 101 Tenn. 22, 42 L.R.A. 247, 70 Am. St. Rep. 650, 46 S. W. 561; Commercial L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 50 Ind. App. 630, 97 N. E. 1018. The insurance company must "contest" the policy by taking some affirmative action, either by making defense to an action brought to recover on the policy, or by an action brought by it to cancel or rescind the contract. Monahan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1918D, 1196, note; Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 171 C. C. A. 357, 260 Fed. 593; 2 Black, Rescission & Cancellation, p. 1155; Ebner v. Ohio State L. Ins. Co. 69 Ind. App. 32, 121 N. E. 315; Massachusetts Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 42 L.R.A. 261, 30 S. E. 918; Indiana Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 192, 101 N. E. 289; Commercial L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 50 Ind. App. 630, 97 N. E. 1018; Wright v. Mutual Ben. Life Asso. 43 Hun, 61; Duvall v. National L. Ins. Co. 28 Idaho, 356, L.R.A.1917E, 333, 154 Pac. 632, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1112; American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. E. 706; Murray v. State Mut. L. Ins. Co. 22 R. I. 524, 53 L.R.A. 742, 48 Atl. 800; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Buford, 61 Okla. 158, 160 Pac. 928; Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa, 451, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 898, 123 N. W. 202; Ramsey v. Old Colony L. Ins. Co. 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. 108; Reagan v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 189 Mass. 555, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821, 109 Am. St. Rep. 659, 76 N. E. 217, 4 Ann. Cas. 362; Teeter v. United L. Ins. Asso. 159 N. Y. 411, 54 N. E. 72. An insurance company is not entitled to claim that the death of the insured within the contestable period stops the running of that period, in the absence of a showing of "special circumstances" which would prevent it from contesting its liability on the policy in an action at law. Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 171 C. C. A. 357, 260 Fed. 593; Greisa v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 94 C. C. A. 635, 169 Fed. 509; Riggs v. Union L. Ins. Co. 63 C. C. A. 365, 129 Fed. 207; Cable v. United States L. Ins. Co. 191 U. S. 288, 48 L. ed. 188, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74; Monahan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 283 Ill. 136, L.R.A.1918D, 1196, 119 N. E. 68; Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 20 L. ed. 501; Ramsey v. Old Colony L. Ins. Co. 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. 108; Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. Omberson, 123 Minn. 285, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 265, 143 N. W. 735. Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action to recover the amount of a life insurance policy issued by the petitioner to Rudolph Hurni. At the conclusion of the evidence the jury found for the plaintiff, respondent here, under the peremptory instruction of the court, and judgment was rendered accordingly. Upon appeal this judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. 280 Fed. 18. There were two trials below. Upon appeal following the first, the court of appeals reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff on the ground of material misrepresentation by the insured. 171 C. C. A. 405, 260 Fed. 641. Pending the second trial plaintiff amended its reply to the answer and alleged for the first time that this defense was barred, under the terms of the pol icy, by defendant's failure to contest within two years. The policy was applied for on September 2, 1915. It was in fact executed on September 7th, but antedated as of August 23, 1915, and was delivered to insured about September 13th. The insured died on July 4, 1917. The application provides that "the applicant upon request may have the policy antedated for a period not to exceed six months." Underneath the heading of the application there was written the direction: "Date "Date policy August 23, 1915; age 47." The testimonium clause, followed by the signatures of the officials, reads: "In witness whereof the company has caused this policy to be executed this 23d day of August, 1915." The policy acknowledges the receipt of the first premium, and provides that a like amount shall be paid "upon each 23d day of August hereafter until the death of the insured." The determination of the case depends upon the meaning of a clause in the policy as follows: "Incontestability. This policy shall be incontestable, except for nonpayment of premiums, provided two years shall have elapsed from its date of issue." The trial court held that the words "its date of issue" were to be construed as referring to the date upon the face of the policy, viz.: August 23, 1915; and this was also the view of the court of appeals. The first action taken by the insurance company to avail itself of the misrepresentation of the insured was on the 24th day of August, 1917, one day beyond the period of two years after the conventional date of the policy. It is contended. on behalf of the insurance company: (1) That the period of incontestability did not begin to run until the delivery of the policy, or, in any event, until its actual execution on September 7th; and (2) that the policy was matured by the death of the insured, and the rights of the parties thereby became fixed, so that the incontestability clause never be came operative, even within the conventional limitation. First. The rule is settled that, in case of ambiguity, that construction of the policy will be adopted which is most favorable to the insured. The construction of language employed Insurance policy-method. is that of the company, and it is consistent with both reason and justice that any fair doubt as to the meaning of its own words should be resolved against it. First Nat. Bank v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 95 U. S. 673, 678, 679, 24 L. ed. 563, 565; Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co. 136 U. S. 287, 297, 34 L. ed. 408, 413, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 462, 38 L. ed. 231, 235, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379. phrases "date." The word "date" is used frequently to designate the actual time when an event takes place; but, as applied to written instruments, its pri- Words and mary signification is the time specified therein. Indeed, this is the meaning which its derivation (datus given) most naturally suggests. In Bement v. Trenton Locomotive & Mach. Mfg. Co. 32 N. J. L. 513, 515, 516, it is said: "The primary signification of the word 'date' is not time in the abstract, nor time taken absolutely, but, as its derivation plainly indicates, time 'given' or specified,time in some way ascertained and fixed; this is the sense in which the word is commonly used. When we speak of the date of a deed, we do not mean the time when it was actually executed, but the time of its execution, as given or stated in the deed itself. The date of an item, or of a charge in a book account, is not necessarily the time when the article charged was, in fact, furnished, but simply the time given or set down in the account, in connection with such charge." This language was used in construing a provision of the New Jersey lien law to the effect that no lien should be enforced unless summons be issued "within one year from the date of the last work done, or materials furnished, in such |