is over, especially when the contract, whether it was proper at the time of its inception or not has been in effect for 3 months without complaint." [Italics supplied.] (Cong. Record, July 1, 1943, page 7026).

Mr. KEEFE. *

The attitude of the Senate conferees very clearly was that we as a Congress should endeavor to see if we could not stabilize conditions at least for the duration and allow these bargaining rights under existing contracts to remain as they are, provided they have been in existence for a period of 3 months without a complaint being filed. As to any future contract, if a complaint is filed within 90 days after its posting in the plant affected then as a matter of course the N. L. R. B. will have jurisdiction to order an election. It relates only to placing those existing contracts in status quo. If you vote for the committee amendment you are voting to freeze the contracts that have been in existence for a period of 3 months or more without a complaint being registered against them. That is all there is to it. * (Cong. Record, July 1, 1943, page 7027).

Mr. MCCARRAN. *

It was the desire of the Committee on Appropriations to stabilize labor conditions for the duration of the war. Many views have been expressed, some laying blame on the National Labor Relations Board, and others laying blame elsewhere. We believe that when agreements are now in existence, regardless of whom the agreements may favor, the agreements should be frozen, if I may use that term, or at least stabilized, for the duration of the war, and not disrupted by confusion, misunderstanding, elections, or what not. (Cong. Record, July 2, 1943, page 7103).

Mr. TAFT. * * * I believe that for this year at least-and this is good for only a year—we might well adopt the principle of stabilization of union control in the plants where particular unions are now in control. I do not believe any policy would contribute as strongly toward the prevention of strikes-and the most liberal source of strikes is interunion disputes-as would the adoption of this kind of an amendment. (Cong. Record, July 2, 1943, page 7108). Mr. HAWKES. * this provision would apply to more than merely the Kaiser shipyards. It would apply to labor situations all over the country. In my opinion, for the period of 1 year, it would aid in maintaining peace in labor relations. (Cong. Record, July 2, 1943, page 7108).

Mr. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, the Kaiser Shipyard is not involved in the pending question any more than is any other plant in the United States. The C. I O. is not involved, and the A. F. of L. is not involved. No particular union is involved, as will be seen if Senators will read the language of the provision

*

*

What is a complaint case? It has been developed before the Senate Appropriations Committee that a complaint case is a case filed by the National Labor Relations Board. In other words, the National Labor Relations Board may not file complaint case after complaint case and keep a plant in turmoil when it has had notice of an election and an agreement under which the plant is operating. If such a complaint case arises more than 3 months after the agreement has been entered into, then the National Labor Relations Board is preIcluded by this amendment from filing the complaint case. There is no question

about that.

The purpose of this provision is to stabilize labor relations. Whether the C. I. O. or the A. F. of L. has the plant makes no difference to the Appropriations Committee of the Senate or to the Senate. Whatever has been done is done. This amendment would not permit the National Labor Relations Board to hold a case for more than 3 months and then say, "We will order another election." That is all there is to the amendment. (Cong. Record, July 2, 1943, page 7108).

From the above statements of the proponents of the rider there would appear to be no room for doubt that in conformity with its stated purpose of accomplishing stabilization of labor relations, the Congress intended that existing agreements shall remain in effect and not be the subject of inquiry in proceedings by the National Labor Relations Board during the fiscal year 1944, regardless of the nature of the unfair labor practice that may be in issue in a particular case.

Touching as it does upon an important phase of the basic jurisdiction of the Board, careful consideration has been given to the view expressed in the submission, but, under the circumstances, I am constrained to conclude that the current appropriation of the Board is not available for use in connection with a complaint case under section 8 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act where there is involved an agreement between management and labor which has been in existence for three months or longer without charges being filed with the Board. To hold otherwise would be to read into the provision an exception which is not there and which, from the extensive discussion of the matter, would have been inserted in the law if it had been the intention of the Congress that such exception should be made.

The enclosures transmitted with your letter are returned herewith.

(B-37512)

OATHS OF OFFICE—ALIENS APPOINTED TO GOVERNMENT POSITIONS Aliens appointed as professors and instructors at the United States Naval Academy under the authority in section 205 of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1944, to employ nationals of those countries allied with the United States in the prosecution of the war, are not exempt from the requirements of section 1757, Revised Statutes, that persons appointed to offices of honor or profit take the oath prescribed therein.

Comptroller General Warren to the Secretary of the Navy, October 22, 1943: I have your letter of October 5, 1943, ref. JAG: J: HJM: ac, SO9 19 100, as follows:

The Act of August 29, 1916, as amended (34 U. S. C. 1071), authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to employ at the U. S. Naval Academy professors and instructors for the instruction of midshipmen. Heretofore it has been required that appointees be citizens of the United States. The best qualified applicants for appointment as instructors in the Department of Physical Training, particularly fencing masters, and also in the Department of Foreign Languages, are frequently not citizens of the United States. There is no general provision of law prohibiting the appointment of aliens to positions as professors and instructors at the Naval Academy, but Section 205 of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1944 (Public Law 90-78th Cong.), prevents such appointments except in cases of citizens who (a) are persons in the service of the United States on June 26, 1943, who, being eligible for citizenship, had filed declarations of intention to become citizens prior to that date or (b) nationals of those countries allied with the United States in the prosecution of the war.

Section 1757, Revised Statutes, as amended (5 U. S. C. 16), provides a form of oath to be taken by all persons appointed to any office of honor or profit. In view of the fact that certain aliens may now be appointed as professors and instructors at the Naval Academy and that the requirement in the above-mentioned law for the taking of an oath may be inappropriate in many cases a decision is requested as to whether an applicant for appointment to the position of professor or instructor at the Naval Academy must take the oath provided in Section 1757, Revised Statutes, as amended, before qualifying for appointment.

Section 1757, Revised Statutes, as amended (5 U. S. Code 16), provides:

Oath of office.

The oath to be taken by any person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit either in the civil, military, or naval service, except the President of the United States shall be as follows: "I, A B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God." This section shall not affect the oaths prescribed on May 13, 1884, in relation to the performance of duties in special or particular subordinate offices and employments. (R. S. § 1757; May 13, 1848, ch. 46, §§ 2, 3, 23 Stat. 22.)

In decision of February 26, 1932, 11 Comp. Gen. 327, 330, involving aliens employed in the Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture, it was stated:

The requirement of section 1757, supra, is mandatory and admits of no exception unless specifically authorized by statute. The provisions of section 1758, Revised Statutes, are permissible and do not limit, or create any exception to, the mandatory provisions of the preceding section. In other words, there may be, and are, situations in which the appointees are required to take the oath of office under section 1757, Revised Statutes, but are not in a position to execute it before the officers named in section 1758, Revised Statutes. In such cases the required oath may be taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths generally at the place where the oath is taken. There has not been overlooked in this connection the opinion of the Attorney General rendered January 3, 1902, 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 608, construing section 1756, Revised Statutes, notwithstanding its repeal by the act of May 13, 1884, 23 Stat. 22.

As appointments under section 3 (a) of the act of June 5, 1930, supra, are to be made by the head of the department, it follows that such appointees are officers within the purview of section 1757, Revised Statutes, and they must, therefore, take the oath prescribed by that section. See 10 Comp. Gen. 394.

See, also, 10 Comp. Gen. 544.

As professors at the Naval Academy are appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, they properly are to be considered as being appointed to an office of honor or profit within the meaning of section 1757, Revised Statutes. See 6 Comp. Gen. 112, and the court decisions therein cited. While the appropriation provision under consideration specifically authorizes the employment of nationals of those countries which are allied with the United States in the prosecution of the war, neither that statute nor any other exempts them from the requirement to take the oath of office prescribed by section 1757, Revised Statutes. Cf. the act of April 18, 1930, 46 Stat. 189, exempting foreign counsel employed by the Attorney General in special cases from the requirement to take the oath of office; also, 5 U. S. C. 315.

Accordingly, your question must be, and is, answered in the affirm

ative.

(B-34786)

TRANSPORTATION-DEPENDENTS-NAVY ENLISTED MAN-SICKNESS PRECLUDING TRAVEL TO NEW STATION UNTIL AFTER ANOTHER CHANGE OF STATION

Where, due to sickness, the dependent wife of a Navy enlisted man was precluded from traveling to his new permanent station prior to receipt of an order involving another permanent change of station, which latter order was issued more than sixty days after the first order, payment of travel expenses of the dependent is limited, under section 12 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 and Navy Travel Instructions, to the commercial cost of transportation from the last permanent station to the ultimate new station. Assistant Comptroller General Yates to the Secretary of the Navy, October 23, 1943:

I have your letter of May 26, 1943, as follows:

There is transmitted herewith travel expense claim of George E. Isaac, Chief commissary steward, U. S. Navy, covering transportation of his dependent wife from San Diego, California, to Norfolk, Virginia, by privately owned automobile, which travel was completed on March 19, 1943, together with letter of Chief of Naval Personnel, dated May 21, 1943.

It appears from the enclosure that travel of Isaac's dependent wife from San Diego to Norfolk was not possible of performance by her at the time or within sixty days after the home port of the U. S. S. Moffett was changed from San Diego to Norfolk on September 25, 1940, due to her physical condition as stated in the enclosed first endorsement of May 11, 1943, from the Medical Officer in Command, U. S. Naval Hospital, San Diego, California.

Article 2505-13 (b), U. S. Navy Travel Instructions, provided, relative to the transportation of dependents involving subsequent change of station prior to travel, as follows:

"(b) When the time between the effective date of the first order and the issue of the second order is more than 60 days and the dependents have not traveled on the first order, transportation is authorized only on the basis of travel from the first new station to the final new station."

This provision in Navy Travel Instructions is based on the ruling of the Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury of December 4, 1920 (27 Comp. Dec. 510), as stated in the enclosure.

In connection with the foregoing, your decision is requested on the question as to whether or not exceptions may be made to the general rule, as stated above, where medical evidence is submitted showing the inability of the dependents to perform travel during the specified time in cases where subsequent changes of stations are made prior to performance of travel by the dependents on the first change of station.

Your further decision is requested as to whether or not the enclosed claim of Isaac's may be paid by the Navy Department.

The decision of December 4, 1920, 27 Comp. Dec. 510, wherein a limit of 60 days was fixed within which the transportation in kind could be furnished dependents of officers was reviewed in decision of October 4, 1927, to the Secretary of War, 7 Comp. Gen. 255, and it was stated in that decision, quoting from the syllabus:

Transportation of the specified dependents of an officer of the Army under the acts of May 18, 1920, 41 Stat. 604, and June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 631, is authorized not exceeding the cost of transportation from the officer's old to his new station under the orders directing the permanent change of station which give him the right to transportation of his dependents; and the basis for the issuance of transportation, or payment of commercial costs, may not be extended to include prior "old" stations of the officer.

Section 12 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 359, 364, provides:

When any officer, warrant officer, or enlisted man above the fourth grade, having dependents as defined in section 4 hereof, is ordered to make a permanent change of station, the United States shall furnish transportation in kind from funds appropriated for the transportation of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Public Health Service to his new station for such dependents: Provided, That for persons in the naval service the term "permanent station" as used in this section shall be interpreted to mean a shore station or the home yard or home port of the vessel to which the person concerned may be ordered; and a duly authorized change in home yard or home port of such vessel shall be deemed a change of station. Provided further, That if the cost of such transportation exceeds that for transportation from the old to the new station, the excess cost shall be paid to the United States by the officer, warrant officer, or enlisted man concerned: * * And provided further, That in lieu of transportation in kind authorized by this section for dependents, the President may authorize the payment in money of amounts equal to such commercial transportation costs for the whole or such part of the travel for which transportation in kind is not furnished when such travel shall have been completed.

*

It is significant that the transportation authorized to be furnished in kind by the above act is "to his new station", with the same same restriction as in the act of May 18, 1920, 41 Stat. 604, that if the cost of such transportation exceeds that for transportation "from the old to the new station" the excess shall be paid to the United States by the officer, warrant officer, or enlisted man concerned. Furthermore, as in the 1922 act, 42 Stat. 631, the commercial cost of transportation which may be paid is in lieu of the transportation authorized by such section to be furnished in kind. Inasmuch as the transportation authorized to be furnished is limited by the law to that from the old to the new station, and for the reasons stated in the prior cited decisions, there is perceived no proper basis for exceptions to the general rule, which has been followed for more than 20 years, where due to sickness, the dependents are precluded from traveling to the last new station prior to receipt of a subsequent order involving another permanent change of station.

It appears the claimant in the present case was attached to the U. S. S. Moffett when the home port of that vessel was changed from San Diego, California, to Norfolk, Virginia, on September 25, 1940; that on February 13, 1941, he was transferred from the U. S. S. Moffett to Naval Mobile Base Hospital No. One, home port New York, and that by orders of August 1, 1942, he was transferred to the U. S. S. Weehawken with home port at Norfolk, Virginia. His dependent wife was located at San Diego, California, on the effective date of each of these transfers, and completed travel to Norfolk, Virginia, on March 19, 1943, more than 2 years after change of home port of the U. S. S. Moffett from San Diego, to Norfolk. It is stated