been formed out of his majesty's colonial dominions, not including Paraguay, of which the internal condition is but little known to foreigners, present as tranquil an appearance as any part of Europe or the world. Peru is, in some degree, unsettled, but the tranquillity of that country is secured by the battle of Ayacucho; and the final arrange. ment of its political institutions will not probably be long delayed. Having thus organized their respective governments at home, these states are already beginning to extend their views abroad, and are, at this moment, assembled by their ministers in a congress at Panama, for the purpose of forming among themselves some concerted schemes of action. This great event may be considered as indicating distinctly the consolidation of their several political institutions, and the disappearance of all pre-existing internal dissentions.

The troubles which naturally accompanied the first establishment of these new states having thus subsided, they cannot, in the natural course of events, be expected to return. They were incident to a particular period in the history of the colonies; and this period having passed away, the dangers incident to it have naturally passed away with it. The various epochs in the progress of communities, like the different ages in the life of man, are subject to particular disorders; but, in both cases, those that belong to one period can never be encoun. tered at another. Troubles may doubtless occur in the nations that have been formed out of the Spanish colonies, as in all others; but they will not be hereafter of the same kind with those which were occasioned by the separation from the mother country, and the attempt

to establish an independent national existence. Let it be supposed, however, for argument's sake, that internal dissentions should again arise, equally serious with those which have already arisen and sub. sided; let it be supposed that a second Iturbide shall appear in Mexico, another general Piar in Colombia; that Buenos Ayres or Chili shall again be the theatre of civil war; that a new Pueyrredon should be gained by his majesty's agents; or, finally, in order to exhaust every supposition, however improbable, let it be imagined that Bolivar and Sucre shall belie their noble characters, disappoint the hopes of the world, and turn out Bonapartes and Cromwells, instead of Washingtons; of what advan. tage would the occurrence of these or similar events be to the royalist cause? Or what additional proba. bility would they furnish of a return of the colonies to their allegiance ? If his majesty's government found it impossible to turn to any account the troubles that actually broke out at a time when the state of the colo. nies was yet unsettled, and they had a large military force in the country, would they be able to do it now, when they have not a soldier not under close siege from California to Cape Horn, and when the new governments have acquired consistency and vigour? If Iturbide, when he overthrew the Mexican government, while the royalist party was still imposing, and the prospect of success in the establishment of independence uncertain, did not think of proclaiming the king, would another Iturbide do it now? If the insurbordination of Piar, under the eyes of general Morillo, could not be made the means of reducing Venezuela, would another black insurgent be likely to proye

a better instrument, with no body present to direct and employ him? If Bolivar or Sucre should attempt to establish a military despotism, would it be in the name of the legitimate king, and under the royal Spanish flag? These suppositions, like that of an actual military con. quest of the country, are obviously not merely improbable, but chimerical, and full of inherent contradictions. The time to take advantage of internal dissentions, if ever, was the time when they might have been expected to occur; when they did in fact occur; and when the king had his armies in the country, ready to back a discontented leader. If nothing could be done under all these favourable circumstances, it is vain to expect a better result at present, when every circumstance is of an adverse character.

Finally, such is the strength of public opinion prevailing through out the colonies in favour of inde. pendence, that nothing would be really effected, even by successful attempts to create internal divisions, and to gain over the popular leaders. This is evidently shown by the fate of Pueyrredon, to which I have already alluded. Here was a person holding the supreme executive power in one of the new states, enjoying a high reputation, and apparently possessing great influence, who consented to employ it in endeavouring to bring about a union of the colony, under his govern. ment, with the mother country, in the most plausible way in which it could be done. This colony was precisely the one in which political dissentions had prevailed to the greatest extent, having assumed, for a long period, the shape of actual civil war. The negotiation presented an additional probability of success, from being carried on

under the auspices of one of the most powerful monarchs of Europe in alliance with his Catholic majes. ty. The king had, at that time, one or two considerable armies in America, ready to lend their aid in promoting the intended object.Here was a case, if ever there was or will be one, in which something might be expected from the effect of internal divisions, and from the adhesion of leading characters. What happened? Did Pueyrredon, under all these favourable circum. stances, succeed in bringing back to its allegiance the colony under his government? I have already stated that he did not carry with him a single man. He could not stay in his country. He was crushed at once to the earth by the execration and contempt of the whole American continent; and, in order to escape an ignominious death, was compelled to hide himself in some obscure corner, where he has since died of chagrin and shame. Such is the history of the only considera. ble apostate that has yet been gained from the cause of indepen. dence in America. It proves that whatever may be the merits of the contest, there is a force of public Sentiment arrayed in support of this cause, too strong to be resisted by any individual, however eminent; that nothing can be hoped by Spain from the effect of internal dissentions in the colonies; and that no means, excepting that of actual physical force, will ever bring them, or any part of them, again under the dominion of his Catholic majesty. The impossibility of employing this means with success has already been shown, and is understood to be felt by his majesty's government.

It has sometimes been said, how. ever, that Spain might reasonably

be encouraged in the hope of re. covering her ancient colonies, by the great and sudden revolutions that have occurred in Europe in our own time. The late king of France, after being deprived of his hereditary rights and dominions for twen. ty-five years, finally succeeded in obtaining possession of them. Why may not the king of Spain, in like manner, recover his American possessions, although he should have lost them for an equal length of time? It is understood that this argument from analogy is considered by some persons of great respectability as the principal one that can be urged in favour of the continuance of the war, and it may therefore be proper to give it some attention.

The conquest of the colonies must be effected, if at all, by the aid of means; and the example of the king of France is applicable, in the present instance, only as far as the same means which were employed to place him on the throne, are now at the disposal of the king of Spain for the purpose of recovering his lost possessions in America. What were these means, and how far can they probably be employed, at present, by the Spanish government?

The revolution in the government of France, of which the return of Lewis XVIII. was the natural consequence, was accomplished by the military force of other Euro. pean powers, at a time when the king had not a soldier in the field in his own immediate service. Is it probable that there will be now or ever a similar alliance of these powers, for the purpose of restoring to the king his ancient dominions in America? What was the motive which induced all the sovereigns of Europe to unite in a joint attack

upon the government of Bonaparte! It was no other than the direct interest they had in overthrowing that government, on account of the inconvenience, more or less oppressive, which they all suffered from its continuance. Have they all or any of them any such motive for opposing, at present, the inde. pendence of the Spanish colonies? It is evident that their direct inter. est, as far as they have any in the affair, is on the other side; and that the independence of America, instead of being an inconvenience to them, is rather advantageous than otherwise, as it affords them a greater freedom of intercourse with these vast and wealthy regions than they would enjoy under any colonial system, however liberal. Their interest, therefore, would naturally lead them, considered merely as neutral powers, to take part with the Americans, rather than with the Spanish government. Such of them as possessed extensive and valuable colonies might be supposed, perhaps, to sympathize with Spain in this contest, either because these colonies had actually thrown off their allegiance, or might be expected to do so; and these, if any, are the powers which would have an interest in assisting his Catholic Majesty, or in wishing, at least, for his success. What then has been the policy of the powers thus situa. ted? France and Portugal have just acknowledged the indepen dence of their ancient transatlantic dominions. England and Holland, the only nations now possessing colonies of consequence, have acknowledged the independence of South America. It so happens, therefore, that the four powers, which have or had colonies, are precisely those which have given the most unequivocal proof, that it is

not their intention to deviate from the line of neutrality, by engaging in the war on the side of Spain. If such be the policy of these nations, which alone had some little indirect interest in common with that of his Catholic Majesty, what can be ex. pected from the rest, which have all a pretty strong interest on the other side? There is evidently no probability that they will enter into a great European alliance for the reduction of America, like that which was employed for the overthrow of Bonaparte; nor is it believed that his majesty's govern. ment expect any such co-operation or assistance. It is, therefore, not in their power to take advantage of the same means which were used by the king of France, to obtain possession of his hereditary domi. nions; and his example has, of 'course, no application to the present circumstances of his Catholic Majesty.

I fear that I may have taxed somewhat too severely the attention of your excellency, by the length to which these considerations have been already drawn out; but it is difficult to touch, however concisely, upon the several leading points of so great a question, with out entering into a pretty extensive course of remarks. If the above statement of the grounds upon which the government of the United States have formed their opinion in regard to this question, be at all correct, it follows conclusively, that there is no chance of recovering the colonies, either by actual military force, by the effect of internal dissentions, or by the aid of foreign powers. The object of the war is, therefore, unattainable. What remains, then, but to escape, as soon as possible, from its inconveniences, and to con

clude peace at once? Peace is, of itself, and in all cases, the greatest of blessings, and an almost indispensable condition of all public and private prosperity. The advan. tages, direct and indirect, that would accrue to Spain from making peace at present with the colonies, are, in the opinion of the govern. ment which I have the honour to represent, of even more than ordi. nary value. I fear that I shall exhaust your excellency's patience; but being charged by my govern. ment with the expression of their convictions and wishes upon a subject of such vast magnitude, I should have reason to reproach myself if the effect of their intercession were diminished, and the war protracted, by the omission of any topic that would be likely to have weight with his Catholic Majesty. Allow me, then, my lord duke, to request your attention a little longer, and to state to you, very concisely, as they ap. pear to the government of the United States, the important bene. fits which would result to Spain from the restoration of peace, and the establishment of friendly relations with her ancient colonies.

The immediate inconveniences suffered by Spain from the continuance of the war are far from being inconsiderable, and the cessation of them would constitute, of itself, a very serious advantage. These inconveniences are principally the heavy expense necessary to keep up military and naval establishments adequate to the defence of the West India islands, and the almost entire destruction of the commerce of Spain, by the armed vessels and privateers of the new American states. It is understood that the whole revenue which would accrue from the islands is,

at present, absorbed by the charges of securing them against the danger of an attack. When to this great expense is added that of fitting out, occasionally, at home, expeditions intended for their defence, it is clear that the burthen must be considerable, especially in the present embarrassed state of the finances. The restoration of peace would remove this evil at once, and would, also, give new life to the Spanish commerce, which is now almost destroyed by the American privateers. These enterprising navigators not only cover the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and of the pas sage thence to Spain, but have lately ventured across the Atlantic, and almost blockade, at the present moment, the ports of the Peninsula and the entrance of the Mediterranean. The coasting trade is nearly at an end, and, as far as it is continued, must be carried on under convoy. It is true that the commerce of Spain, under the national flag, has not been, for some years past, very considerable, but the loss of the whole, or the greater part of it, such as it is, is still a serious inconvenience. The desolation of the sea ports, and the fall. ing off in the amount of the customs, show but too clearly the extent of the evil. The duties paid at Cadiz, which, as your excel. lency did me the honour to inform me the other day, were a hundred millions of reals before the commencement of the present troubles, are now, I understand, something less than four. When the inconveniences of this war are thus brought home to the resources of the government, and to the daily life of his majesty's subjects, is it not time to consider whether it af. fords any advantages or hopes to

constitute an adequate compensa. tion for sacrifices of such vast importance?

In addition to these great mis. chiefs, which are actually suffered, and which would be removed by the termination of the war, there is another, perhaps still more serious, impending in immediate prospect, which, in the opinion of the government of the United States, nothing but a speedy restoration of peace can avert-I mean the loss of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. These possessions are, for all purposes of revenue, already in a great measure lost; the whole amount of receipts drawn from them, be. ing, as is understood, exhausted by the charges of their defence. The continuance of the war for two or three years longer, perhaps for one, must, in all human probability, occasion their complete alienation, in one form or another. Hostilities being now at an end on the conti. nent, and the new states being compelled, by the refusal of Spain, to make peace, to keep up their mili. tary and naval establishments, they must, of course, employ them upon some active service. The Spanish islands present the most natural and advantageous point for attack, and will, of course, be attempted. Without intending to disparage the valour of his majesty's armies on this station, still less the talent and efficiency of the governor general, an officer of whom the government of the United States have reason to speak in the highest terms of respect and estimation, I may add, that it can hardly be doubted, considering the nature of the popula tion of the islands, and their vicini. ty to the continent, that an attack would result either in their immediate conquest by the new states, or