are correct in assuming that he should be paid for the first 40 hours worked during the week December 20 to 26 or whether you may pay him the largest payment possible for any 40 hours worked during that week.

Section 301 (a) of the Dual Compensation Act, approved August 19, 1964, Public Law 88-448, 78 Stat. 488, 5 U.S.C. 3105, provides:

Except as provided by subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section, civilian personnel shall not be entitled to receive basic compensation from more than one civilian office for more than an aggregate of forty hours of work in any one calendar week (Sunday through Saturday).

That section places a restriction upon the number of hours of basic compensation a civilian employee may be paid for work in any calendar week if he is employed in more than one civilian office. It does not limit payment to the first 40 hours worked. Therefore, the employee should be allowed the maximum basic compensation benefits regardless of the sequence in which the different rates of compensation are earned.

The act contains no specific restriction concerning the payment of overtime compensation. H. Rept. No. 890, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., contains the following explanation of section 301 (a) at page 12:

The prohibition is on the receipt of basic compensation and will not affect the receipt of otherwise properly earned overtime compensation for work in one position in excess of the hours required for overtime compensation.

Since the provision in question places a restriction upon the receipt of basic compensation and not upon the receipt of overtime compensation Mr. West was properly paid the overtime compensation he earned for work in excess of 40 hours in his position with the Agricultural Marketing Service. Regarding the amount of basic compensation to be paid him for the week of December 13 to 19 we believe that Mr. West should be allowed the maximum amount possible regardless of the sequence in which the different rates of compensation were earned and regardless of the overtime compensation earned in one position. We do not believe that payment of compensation for all of the basic 40 hours Mr. West worked in the Agricultural Marketing Service position is necessary to qualify him for overtime compensation since he did in fact qualify for such compensation by working in excess of 40 hours during the week in question in that position.

In order to give Mr. West the greatest benefit in basic compensation it appears that he should be allowed 1134 hours at the $1.93 rate and 2814 hours at the $1.89 rate for the week of December 13 to 19. In addition, he properly was paid overtime compensation for the 8 hours of work in excess of 40 performed in the second position. For the week of December 20 to 26, Mr. West should be allowed basic com

pensation for 3214 hours at the $1.93 rate and 734 hours at the $1.89 rate.

The voucher which is returned herewith may be certified for payment in accordance with the above.

[B-106776]

Public Lands-Interagency Loans, Transfers, Etc.-Damages, Restoration, Etc.-Authority

Damages to roads in a national park recreation area resulting from use by the Department of the Army for military maneuvers come within the principle that one executive department may not be reimbursed for the use of real property used or damaged by another department, and, even though the use permits require restoration of the property or payment of damages, the authority vested in the Secretary of the Interior to administer the national parks does not authorize the imposition of conditions contrary to the principle governing the use of property by another department, and, therefore, the Department of the Army may not reimburse the Department of the Interior for the damages nor restore the roads at its expense.

To the Secretary of the Army, May 7, 1965:

Letter dated April 1, 1965, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (I & L) (Installations), requests a decision as to whether the Department of the Army (Army), may reimburse the National Park Service, Department of the Interior, in the proposed amount of $20,000 for damages to park roads in the Lake Mead National Park Recreation Area, or restore such roads at its own expense without transfer of funds. The damages were caused by military maneuvers conducted there from May 15 to 31, 1964, under written permit which provided for payment of damages or restoration.

The authority of your Department to make the transfer of funds has been questioned in view of our decision of January 24, 1952, 31 Comp. Gen. 329, which was sustained on reconsideration (October 10, 1952), in 32 Comp. Gen. 179.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary expresses the view that the use of the Lake Mead Recreation Area can be distinguished from the use involved in our decision cited above. He states that in that case we held that the appropriation act involved (65 Stat. 426), which specifically included authority to make payment for use or repair of private property, indicated an intent of Congress not to include public property but points out that in the present case the applicable appropriation act (77 Stat. 256) contains no such "limitation." He further states that in the former case the only agreement for payment appears to have consisted of a provision in an interdepartmental policy agreement that the Army would budget for restoration money. However, he notes that in the present case, the Special Use Permit, in the form of a con

tract on the same standard form used for permits to private persons, was signed by the Superintendent of the Recreation Area as issuer and by an authorized representative of the Army as permittee and that the permit was expressly subject to a provision for payment of damages and a provision for restoration of any property which it damaged or destroyed.

We are informed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary that it would be both difficult and expensive to obtain sufficient lands to conduct a large scale military maneuver if lands under the control of other departments particularly public domain lands, national park lands and national forest lands are not made available for military use. He states that the Army is currently using extensive areas of such lands under permits requiring restoration or payment of damages; and that continued or future permission to use such Government lands for defense purposes will without doubt be seriously restricted if such conditions cannot be legally performed.

In 31 Comp. Gen. 329, we held-quoting from the syllabus-that: While rule prohibiting replacements or repairs to property generally no longer applies to personal property loans between Government agencies under certain conditions, when loans are made pursuant to 31 U.S. Code 686 authorizing and requiring payment for personal property transferred from one agency to another, no such authority exists authorizing similar action with respect to real property, so that the Department of the Army may not reimburse the Department of Agriculture for the cost of restoring national forest lands damaged by Army personnel during military operations.

We do not agree that the use of the Lake Mead Recreation Area can be distinguished from the use involved in the above-cited decision. It was mentioned in the cited decision that since there was specific authority contained in the appropriation involved for the Army to make payments for the "use and repair of private property utilized in such [field] exercises," it would appear that the Congress did not intend the expenditures of funds for similar use and occupancy of public property. However, that statement was made immediately following our statement therein to the effect that no appropriation of the Army had been cited or found that might be considered as available for expenditures for the purpose in question. We did not suggest however, or intend to imply that the specific authority to make payments for the repair of private property was-as indicated in the Deputy Assistant Secretary's letter-a limitation, and that had the appropriation involved not specifically so provided it could have been used to pay for repair of public property under the control of another Government agency. In other words, the fact that an appropriation does not specifically provide that the funds made available therein may be used to pay for repairs to private property does not, in and of itself,

make the appropriation available to repair or restore public property under the control of another Government agency.

Concerning the conditions imposed on the Army by the Special Use Permit issued by the Park Service requiring payment of damages or restoration of the property, in the above-cited decision of October 10, 1952, 32 Comp. Gen. 179, we held that quoting from the syllabus—

The laws governing the establishment and administration of national forests which authorize and require the Secretary of Agriculture to protect and preserve such resources do not permit the Secretary to impose conditions upon the use of forest lands by Federal agencies which are contrary to the established principle that an executive department may not be reimbursed for the use or depreciation of real property loaned, used, or damaged by another department, and, therefore, the Department of Agriculture may not charge the Department of the Army for the use of or for the restoration costs of national forest lands damaged during military training operations. [Italics supplied.]

What was said in 32 Comp. Gen. 179 would be for application in the instant case. That is to say while the Secretary of the Interior is charged with the duty of administering National Parks (16 U.S.C. 1) and is authorized to issue permits for the use of land for the accommodation of visitors (16 U.S.C. 3), these provisions of law do not authorize or permit the Secretary to impose conditions which are contrary to the established principle that an executive department may not be reimbursed for the use or depreciation of real property loaned, used or damaged by another department. See 10 Comp. Gen. 288.

In view of the foregoing, you are advised that the Department of the Army may not reimburse the National Park Service for damages to park roads in the Lake Mead National Recreation Area caused by military maneuvers or restore such roads at its own expense without transfer of funds.

[B-156161]

Appropriations-Fiscal Year- Availability Beyond-Year-End

Buying

Printing requisitions for sales promotion material submitted to the Government Printing Office (GPO) near the end of a fiscal year without any copy may not be regarded as material required to replace stock or as meeting a bona fide need of the fiscal year for lawfully obligating the appropriation available at the time of issuance because "stock" in such cases refers generally to readily available common use standard items rather than to materials which are especially created for a particular purpose and which require a lengthy period for creation, and further the fact that the copy was not furnished to GPO until seven months after the fiscal year precludes such requisitions from being considered firm and complete orders when issued; therefore, the requisitions are not lawful obligations of the particular fiscal year and such appropriations may not be charged with the printing costs.

To Betty F. Leatherman, Department of Commerce, May 11, 1965: Your letter of April 14, 1965, presented for our consideration the question whether Government Printing Office invoice No. 955, dated

March 18, 1965, in the amount of $1,500, attached thereto, and similar forthcoming invoices covering the printing of certain sales promotion materials for the U.S. Travel Service, may be paid from fiscal year 1964 funds of that agency.

The record before our Office shows that the U.S. Travel Service (hereinafter referred to as USTS) attempted to obligate $176,536 of fiscal year 1964 funds for the printing of the sales promotion materials here in question by issuing printing requisitions numbered 1678 through 1687 to the Government Printing Office under date of June 16, 1964. At that date, such materials could not even be printed, much less used, before the expiration of fiscal year 1964, hence the question arises as to the legality of such attempted obligation.

In connection with printing requisitions issued near the end of a fiscal year, we stated in our circular letter to the heads of all Government agencies, dated September 3, 1941, A-44006, published at 21 Comp. Gen. 1159, as follows:

It has come to the attention of this Office that many requisitions for printing and binding have been prepared and transmitted to the Government Printing Office during the latter part of each fiscal year manifestly for the sole purpose of obligating an expiring current appropriation, as such services could not possibly have been obtained in time, nor were they of a character, to supply the needs of the fiscal year in which the requisitions were issued.

In a number of cases such requisitions have borne notations to the effect that manuscript and illustrations will follow, and requests have frequently been made by the requisitioning offices, simultaneously with the submission of requisitions or immediately thereafter, for the return of documents which were transmitted with the requisitions in order that they could be further edited or revised. In such instances it is not generally possible for the Government Printing Office to estimate the cost of the job to be performed or to begin work thereon, and the only objective accomplished by presenting requisitions under such circumstances is the improper obligation of a current fiscal year appropriation.

The general rule for lawfully obligating a fiscal year appropriation is that the supplies or services are intended to serve a bona fide need of the fiscal year in which the need arises or to replace stock used in such fiscal year. A requisition

improperly issued will not obligate the appropriation current at the time the requisition is issued, and ordinarily where a requisition is issued during one fiscal year and the services are not performed or required until the succeeding fiscal year the appropriation current at the time the services are rendered is properly chargeable with the cost.

The action of the USTS in this instance falls squarely within the example cited in our circular letter, and, hence, constitutes a prima facie invalid attempt to obligate fiscal year 1964 funds. However, attached to your letter is a memorandum from Mr. John W. Black, Acting Director of USTS, attempting to justify the obligation and use of fiscal year 1964 funds for the printing here in question.

The memorandum states that USTS, as part of its regular programs, requested and obtained from Congress funds for the creation and production of sales promotion materials in fiscal year 1964. However, due to a delay in selecting a new sales promotion agency, a