riorated during that period. We were looking for the reasons for that.

One of them, of course, is that when you go from a system where authority is held at full committee to a system where all the authority is given to the subcommittees, you spread the work out and you don't have as many first-rate experts writing the legislation. Inevitably, the quality of the legislation, the use of proper language, and the use of those words that need to be used declines. But I think that is in keeping with what Joe has said.

Mr. UDALL. Let me say something in response to that. The Fort Union coal sale that Secretary Watt got in trouble with, it was that sale or that action which illustrated a lot of things to me, including the point I have tried to make here this morning that sometimes you don't have a neat, clean solution that takes two paragraphs and does it all, and you don't have to worry about it any more.

This sets up a time. Secretary Watt was prevented from acting by the action of the committee. He got busy to demonstrate in the 90 days or whatever kind of delay we were going to have that the coal sales were good, and he appointed this commission which had the composition of the different kinds of people, as you recall.

This came out of our veto, of our action under the Federal Land Management Policy, to say:

Look, Secretary Watt, we think you were wrong. Hold off. And in the meantime we will hold some hearings and maybe agree with you that the action was all right. In the meantime, you better get busy and give us a better justification for selling all this coal while coal prices are in a rock-bottom situation.

That is why I think we may want to craft different tools for different situations.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Derrick?

Mr. DERRICK. I am sorry I missed your presentation.

I think all you need to do is look at the court system to see what happened when the courts gained the right of administrative review. It just absolutely bogged them down. We have had an increase, increase, increase.

I know Clement Haynesworth-I remember having a long discussion with him about it. He was on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond. He said what happened is they spent all of their time reviewing these administrative decisions and didn't have an opportunity to get down to those substantive areas that the court was originally intended to consider.

I have always opposed the legislative veto, primarily for one reason. You know, the legislative process must come to an end at some point, and I think all you do with the legislative veto is that you give special interest groups or others another whack at it. And it seems to me we give enough whacks before it gets to that point. This body, as bogged down as it is now, with some 150-odd committees and subcommittees, the last thing we need is another situation such as this which may well be the straw that broke the camel's back, if you don't think it is already broken.

Mr. UDALL. There is a scholar named Patrick Moynihan from New York who did a nice little piece not too long ago. The titleonly Moynihan has these titles-the title was "Reactive Government." And he pointed out how Congress creates more subcommittees and staff, and that forces the Executive to hire a lot more

people to interpret them, and that focuses on the court system, and they have to do some things. And we would all do well to slow down. He charts that going back to the early part of this century, how the system has worked.

I got in trouble with the Nixon administration by pointing out that Franklin Roosevelt at the height of World War II, with 15 million men in uniform, had fewer people on the total White House payroll, including clerks, cooks, bartenders. And they keep adding more and more staff. Henry Kissinger, in the National Security Council, had more people in that one little piece of the White House operation than Roosevelt did for the whole ball of wax in World War II.

Mr. DERRICK. I think Gillis' point is so well taken. You get to be operating like a city council, almost.

Mr. MOAKLEY. I am constantly amazed when people think that a body that has trouble passing 700 laws a year can oversee 7,000 rules and regulations. That is what it really boils down to-being responsible for every regulation that emanates from every regulatory agency.

Mr. UDALL. You remember Jimmy Carter ordered each member of his Cabinet to read every single regulation promulgated within a week of the time it was promulgated. These guys found out there was no time to sleep, particularly at HUD and HEW.

Mr. BEILENSON. I have no questions.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mo, once again, thank you very much for your appearance.

Mr. UDALL. Good luck on this. I will work with you as best I can. Mr. MOAKLEY. We appreciate it very much.

The committee will now hear the panel: Dean Joseph Cooper, Rice University; Dr. Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service; Dr. Charles O. Jones, University of Virginia; Dr. Morris Ogul, chairman, department of political science, University of Pittsburgh; and Dr. Norman Ornstein, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Gentlemen, we do have a time constraint, if you can keep your statement within or about 5 minutes. Your entire statements will appear in full in the record.

Prior to this, I would like unanimous consent to enter into the record the Congressional Research Review, fall of 1983, dealing with the legislative veto after Chadha.

[The information referred to follows:]

Congressional Life After Chadha: Searching for an Institutional Response

As the dust settles from the initial explosive impact of the Supreme Court's June 23 decision in INS v. Chadha, declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional, it has become apparent that the ruling does not presage the political cataclysm for Congress forecast by media pundits and other instant analysts. Sober reflection makes clear that presidential power is not permanently enhanced at the expense of Congress. The legislative branch is not disabled from constitutionally constraining executive actions or asserting its lawful prerogatives.

But while the Court has not effected a fundamental reallocation of constitutional powers, a problem of equal moment has been created by the sudden dismantling of a host of delicate, often hard-won interbranch accommodations. In recent years many of those political "treaties" have become the basis for working relationships between Congress and the Executive in a number of sensitive areas of continuing political and public concern. Thus it may be somewhat simplistic to suggest, as some have done, that "all" Congress has to do is to be more guarded in making statutory delegations. Nor is it useful to catalog the available congressional resources-its substantial authority through authorizing legislation, the appropriations process, the Senate power over presidential appointments and treaties, the oversight process, the power to alter the standards of judicial review, and its ultimate power to impeach executive branch officials-thereby implying that solutions are readily at hand. There is now, as there has always been, an ample supply of effective weapons available in the legislative arsenal. The difficult questions remain, as always, in the effort to determine which weapon, or combination of them, is appropriate to a particular set of circumstances.

As in the past, the congressional response will be shaped by decades of habit, the practicalities of the legislative process, and the exigencies of the moment. Chadha complicates matters by its abrupt and unexpected creation of potential power vacuums in a multitude of fragile policy areas. Administration officials thus far have been restrained and circumspect in their public reactions to the decision. But it would not appear too cynical to observe that in times of crisis and conflict, perceived political advantage is likely to be tested. Interbranch policy disputes over the commitment of armed forces to a variety of hot spots around the globe, the management of the public lands, and containment of budget deficits may be

viewed as crises-in-waiting. Past accommodations in these and other areas, put asunder by Chadha, are now legally unavailable to temper or avoid serious conflict. The challenge for Congress in the immediate future, then, is to fill those voids expeditiously and in a manner that facilitates the effective functioning of the legislative and administra tive decisionmaking processes.

The Chadha Decision

The legislative veto is a term used to describe a statutory provision designed to permit one or both Houses of Congress, or even a committee, to approve or disapprove an action of the President or an administrative agency under authority delegated by the statute. Under such statutes the President is afforded no opportunity to veto the congressional action. Since 1932 about 210 laws containing some 320 separate veto provisions have been enacted, most within the last decade. Over 120 statutes, each with one or more veto provisions, remain on the books.

In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court effectively declared all such provisions unconstitutional. Although the substantive ruling with respect to the statute challenged in that case a provision that allowed one House to overturn an Attorney General's decision to suspend the deportation of an alien-was not unexpected, the sweeping nature of the Court's rationale surprised many. The significance of the ruling is captured in Justice Powell's observation in his concurring opinion that the Court's decision "apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause."*

Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, acknowledged the widespread usage of the veto device and the view of many that it constitutes a "useful political invention," but found that such considerations had to bow to the clear constitutional mandate of bicameral consideration and presentment to the President of all exercises of legislative power. These constitutional requirements, the Chief Jus tice stated, represent the Framers' decision "that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure." Whether an action is an exercise of legislative power will depend on its purpose and effect. Here the Court provided a broad, all-embracing definition: where legislative action has "the purpose and effect of altering legal rights, duties and relations of persons... outside the legislative branch" it must be effected through the constitutionally mandated lawmaking process. Thus only those legislative actions specifically excepted by the Constitution, such as impeachment and the Senate au