and provisions. In two years' time import carriage fell off from 33.1 to 26.8 per cent.; export carriage, from 37.7 to 29.8 per cent. Necessarily, shipbuilding largely declined. Practically, our shipping back was broken. British iron steamers took the places of American wooden sailing ships. The greedy owners overloaded their "tramps," and many never reached Europe. Our ships applied for entrance to the "French Lloyds" or Bureau Veritas Register, and deserted the British Lloyds entirely. For continental Europe, the "Veritas" had long been a standard register book. Ships of all nations got justice in surveys and classification in it. It was ever an independent authority and never the tool of government for the carrying out of a policy — until after France adopted the bounty system, and now the "Veritas" is a French book, though honest in its international work. In fact, this unfair conduct of the British Lloyds resulted in almost all the nations of Europe establishing marine registers of their own, while the arbitrary management of Lloyds has brought into existence a second register book in England itself, for the second time.

A few years before this movement of Lloyds, to drive our shipping out of use in our own trade (an American register book having no standing with British merchants), the export of California grain to Europe had begun, and was year by year fast increasing. Securing characters in "Veritas," our ships betook themselves to this new trade. The British could not follow them into it with iron steam "tramps," and they had to tolerate American vessels the very same they virtually rejected from their Lloyds book- until they could build iron sailing ships. Meanwhile, their underwriters covered cargoes in these rejected ships, making a virtue of necessity.1 More astonishing still, when the Lloyds rescinded their subtle rule in 1876, they actually invited our owners to bring back their ships. This was not done, however, and to-day an American wooden ship is scarcely to be found in their register book. We have an American book The "RECORD"- this and the "Veritas," receive, as they deserve, the patronage of American owners.

1 We shall see later on how the British managed to drive our perfect ships out of California trade.

our

Our Remissness. While these events were passing vessels being driven off the ocean - what did Congress do about it? Nothing at all. Our shipping interest was outrageously treated; reciprocity promises were disregarded; national rights were violated, for justice to our shipping is one of these; but not a finger of Government moved in defense. No Madison, no Monroe was there! The Administration did collect some "Alabama claims," but not a word did it ever say to England about the indefensible attack of Lloyds, and our equitable claims for the capture of our carrying trade. This was not the kind of government intended by our "closer Union" and the Constitution, or the sort to become much of a "world power" think of a world power without a marine, and an ample navy to defend its rights! willing and ever ready to secure those rights by

"The dark menace of the distant war."

Again, think of a "world power" whose administrations put off the "shipping question" for decade after decade, hesitating to reform a ruinous policy in deference to foreign sentiment, virtually leaving it to our rivals whether or not an American marine shall navigate the seas again in fact, whether or not the courage shall be mustered to dismiss the foreign, and employ the American ship!

CHAPTER XX.

THE DEVIOUS WAYS OF BRITISH SHIP PROTECTION.

Condemnation of Reciprocity. From their conduct of late, it is manifest that all foreign navigating nations have determined to depend in future upon the principle of self-defense for the existence and employment of their shipping. January 30th last, the Premier of New Zealand announced that the Government of that Colony was prepared to give preferential treatment in the shape of rebate duty to British goods, carried in British ships. Other Australian colonies are desirous of securing marines of their own, but not one of them has ever sought "reciprocity" as a means to the end. The world seems to know that the protective principle alone can build up any interest or industry. It is therefore clear that progress demands the condemnation of Reciprocity, and, for ourselves, the annulment of every convention that binds us to open our ports to any nation that would destroy our shipping to make a place for their own.

Continuing our studies of British ship protection, and its relation to the wasting of our marine, the following instance will be found instructive:

Illustration of Lloyds Protective Power. On the first of January, 1850, the British Act of 1849, permitting the nationalization of foreign-built ships, came into force. The shipping interest in control of Lloyds disapproved this act, believing that it would reduce British freights. Moreover, that it would encourage American shipbuilding, and perhaps increase American shipowning. Therefore they would invoke Lloyds protection. It has been assumed by some economists that the British immediately, on the act coming into force, began the purchase of our vessels, but they did not, because Lloyds inspectors condemned locust wood for treenails in high-class ships. Any British owner

wishing to avail himself of the "free-ship" act, by buying American-built vessels, was compelled to re-treenail them with English oak or submit to a low class in Lloyds Register. This meant higher insurance rates, both on hulls and cargoes. The substitution required would cost about 20 per cent. of the price of a new vessel in the "States," and really decrease her intrinsic value. This arbitrary and unfair inspection lasted until 1854, when rules for iron shipbuilding were first made; after that, the surveyors getting fresh directions, locust treenails passed all right- no others were better. Our statistics of vessels "sold abroad" corroborate the foregoing facts, so we insert a short table.

We have always sold abroad more or less tonnage, chiefly to backward or non-shipbuilding nations, sales occurring most in "dull times." We sold more tonnage in the period of 1826-29, and nearly as much in the four years before the Act of 1849 as during the four years after it.

From this act one might suppose the ship market abroad to have doubled in extent. It would have doubled, had not the Lloyds policy prevented.

After the rules for iron shipbuilding were made in 1854, the Lloyds found it convenient to accommodate British purchasers of American ships (who had been chartering all along), so the rule for fastening was construed aright, and sales were effected thenceforth. These were kept in check, however, by other unjust discriminations, and by the custom of chartering for single cargoes. By this course, prices for American vessels ruled low; after one became British property, however, some trifling changes might be made, a survey demanded, and the class advanced, depending on the good will of the Committee.

While a few ships were specially built for British owners, the greater number sold to them before the Civil War had been in use. After a while our owners wearied of the handicapped competition created by Lloyds discriminative policies, and seeing that our Government was not likely to procure fair play, many of them sold their vessels "foreign" and quit the sea. These were the days of "cheap ships," but only foreigners bought them.

Here is recent evidence of Lloyds protective power:

"Belfast, Nov. 18, 1900. A lot of 700 tons of ship plates, made by the Lukens Company, of Pennsylvania, have been rejected by the consignees. It is said that the plates failed to reach the requirements of Lloyds surveyors."

Thus are British plate-makers to be protected against American manufacturers. No tariff is necessary. No tariff is necessary. And the rejected plates, sold after condemnation, having the merit of "cheapness," may be used all the same.

Our Government informed of Lloyds Impositions. Our Government has been advised of the impositions of the Lloyds. Our consuls abroad have often reported upon the situation. We will quote from a single letter of U. S. Consul Morey, of Ceylon, written about twelve years ago:

"To my knowledge, for a period of twelve years, and in a great measure even to the present day, beautiful and stanch American vessels have been unemployed in foreign ports, or accepted of freights too low to much more than pay expenses, while crank old foreign crafts, just at the tail end of a high class and prone to damaging their cargoes, have loaded for the United States at high rates with cargo bought with American money on American orders, and simply on the plea that being classed at Lloyds the rates of insurance were largely in their favor.

"How much our own merchants were to blame for this, inasmuch as they allowed their goods to be insured in foreign offices instead of their own, I am not prepared to say; but I know that as soon as invoices began to contain the clause Insurance provided for in America,' our ships were sometimes able to pick up some of these freights."

Other consuls in different ports have written our State Department of the existence of rings or trusts that prevent our