The Weakness of Judge Jay. It was supposed Judge Jay was a man of nerve, as well as of learning, but in this he disappointed the country. Mr. Nicholas, of Va., in an able speech criticising the Treaty, said:

"It will not be understood that I suppose it was in Mr. Jay's power to make his own terms, but I complain of his treating at all on the terms he did. It is said that it was not in his power to extort what he wished, but I complain that he yielded to the extortion of Great Britain. What has he left her to ask, what has he not surrendered? While professing, as the Treaty does, that there were important points of our commerce left for future negotiation, why bind us to continue to Great Britain the fullest share of our commercial privileges? If the Treaty had been the most complete and satisfactory, would it not be necessary to leave something to enforce its execution? What weapons have we that can reach her? The Treaty makes war indispensable, as the only redress of injuries,1 and how will war from the United States reach Great Britain? It was certainly improper to give up all power of restricting her commerce until the same instrument contained the fullest satisfaction as to our own. It was improper to give up all the power of seizing on the debts of her subjects, for this, when the power of restricting her commerce was bartered for equal privileges, would be the only means of maintaining respect. . . . On the whole, having fully satisfied myself of the obligation to examine the operation of this Treaty, and to weigh well its effects before I give it my aid, I must determine that I scarcely see one interest of the United States promoted by it, while, on the other hand, it has established Great Britain in that dominant situation which she is too apt to make use of. All our powers are sacred trusts, and how it is possible for any gentleman who thinks the execution of this Treaty among them to give it his assent, is to me inconceivable."

British Preponderance Preconcerted. In a thorough manner Mr. Giles, of Va., took up and considered each of the many articles of the Treaty. Of the 10th he said :

1 This was well exemplified in a few years afterward. Entire freedom from this Treaty came with the war of 1812.

"This article also had assumed the resemblance of reciprocity; but no reciprocity in fact," the British having much money and large investments in America, while the people here had only slight interests in England.

Of the 12th article he remarked :

"The 12th is the first of the commercial articles. This is suspended. It was intended to regulate the trade between the United States and the British West Indies; so far, therefore, as it permitted that trade to be carried on, it was intended as a concession to the United States; the rigid restrictions accompanying the concession, however, rendered it so paltry that the Senate rejected the concession, although the Envoy had accepted it. But in what situation has the rejection left the United States? They are now engaged in a commercial treaty with Great Britain, in which they have surrendered almost every commercial advantage they had to bestow, and are still wholly excluded from the West India trade. He had always understood that the West India trade was the great object of commercial negotiation with Great Britain, but now that is formally relinquished. It may be said, that further negotiations upon this subject are promised; but what inducement will Great Britain have to relax her colonial regulations, provided this Treaty should be carried into effect? She had already without this relaxation placed the commerce between the two countries precisely upon the footing she wished; and the United States have yielded every commercial advantage which might have been exchanged for that relaxation."

The British had it fixed by this article that American vessels "not being above the burthen of seventy tons" (or fifty of our present measurement) might trade to the West Indies and return, "landing their cargoes in the United States only." The limitation of size in our vessels was intended as a handicap for the protection of British ships, which were generally three or more times the tonnage named, and therefore able to carry cheaper than craft so much smaller. Under this restriction the little trade and transportation that we might secure would not hurt the British shipping interest, while, possibly, it might silence the complaints of our own. Again we were to "prohibit and

restrain the carrying any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton in American vessels, either from His Majesty's islands or from the United States to any part of the world except the United States." This article was to be in force, not simply twelve years, like the other commercial articles, but during the war against the French, and for two years beyond the signing of articles of peace a period of twenty-two years. Verily, the Jay Treaty deserved denunciation.1

"The 13th article contained regulations for the East India trade. This has been held up as an apology for the commercial defects of the Treaty, and as securing to the United States a right which before was a courtesy (on the part of the Governor of India). He believed this was a better security than a treaty right, being founded on the interest of the parties. ... But the prohibition of the exportation of East India articles to Europe in American bottoms is a restriction that does not now exist.

"The 15th article is highly objectionable it authorizes Great Britain to equalize duties, etc. There is no real equivalent in it. We take one third of the surplus manufactures of Great Britain. On this ground the discrimination in favor of American over British bottoms has been built, and the growth of American shipping has very considerably increased in consequence of this policy. Our experience, therefore, is bartered away without even the probable calculation of countervailing advantage. . . . It is remarkable, from the whole complexion of the Treaty, that the advantages gained by Great Britain consist in restrictions imposed upon the United States, as if her object was to restrain the United States in the exercise of their rights of sovereignty.'

"The twenty-third article was that in which he expected to have found some provisions for the protection of American seamen against British impressments; instead of this humane and salutary provision, he found that the officers and crews of those

1 As to consequences of the rejection of Article XII., Macgregor says: "In respect to American trade with the West Indies, the ports of the latter were open to United States' vessels on the payment of differential duties, from 1795 to 1807."

very ships of war, engaged in the unauthorized impressments are to be hospitably received in the ports of the United States. Strange substitute this, for the protection of American seamen ! The British have been impressing our seamen since the signing of this very treaty, and the House is called upon to make provisions for effectuating a Treaty of Amity' with the nation committing these wrongs! . . . Now we are told, if the House should exercise its Constitutional check, a dissolution of the Government would necessarily ensue. This conclusion seemed

to him without foundation."

6

British Interference and Influence. He remarked that “the treaty had originated from an intimation of Lord Grenville, the British signatory. This had always excited his apprehension; it was commenced against the known sense of the House of Representatives, and every step of its progression seemed to have been marked with peculiar coercion. When a British Minister undertakes to declare that the motive for the revocation of the hostile order (6th November, 1793) was to take away every pretext from evil-disposed persons' among us, who, according to the intelligence he had received, were endeavoring to irritate our people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own Government, and to assign the same reason for refraining from giving that opposition to some exceptionable measures of our Government, which he might otherwise have done; and when the United States so far listened to this language as immediately to enter into negotiation upon the subject, his apprehensions of British interference and British influence were strongly excited, particularly when the British Minister seems to make common cause between the two Governments against what he is pleased to call evil-disposed persons.'

"Gentlemen had often said, show us the danger of British interference of British influence. The Treaty itself contained the evidence. The Treaty itself corresponded with what he considered the object of the British Minister in giving the invitation to it. He found it in the following particular instances: Before the Treaty, the right of laying a special, as well as a general, embargo existed in the United States; the right of laying a special embargo upon British vessels is surrendered. Before

the Treaty, the right of sequestration existed, and the exercise of it was proposed; this right, so far as it respects Great Britain, is forever surrendered. Before the Treaty, the right of discriminating against British goods in favor of those of other nations existed, and the exercise of it was proposed; this right is surrendered. Before the Treaty, the right of suspending commercial intercourse with Great Britain existed, and was proposed to be exercised; the exercise of that right is stipulated against for a limited time. All these are restrictions of the exercise of the rights of National sovereignty, and seemed to him complete evidence of British interference."

He pronounced the Jay Treaty a torch of discord thrown into the United States. But Judge Jay has not been the only American diplomat who has had to handle the ivy oak of old England and to be poisoned by its touch.