suit for dower shall be brought but within ten years from the death of the husband of the dowress, notwithstanding any disability of the dowress or anyone claiming under

her."

When the husband's interest was a mere right of action, the time which would bar the husband will also bar the wife, notwithstanding her coverture; and if the bar against the husband be not complete on his death, the time which has run against him will count as against the widow; for the R. S. O. c. 126, s. 2 (a), which in such case gives her dower in virtue of such right in her husband, limits the period of suit for dower to that within which such right might be enforced.'

'By R. S. O. c. 108, s. 16, no arrears of dower or damages on account of such arrears shall be recovered or obtained by any action or suit for a longer period than six years next before the commencement of such action or suit."

Dower may also be barred by deed of the married woman Bar by deed executed as required by the statutes authorising this mode of bar (b).

The R. S. O. c. 126 s. 5 provides that" a married woman may bar her dower in any lands or hereditaments by joining with her husband in a deed or conveyance thereof in which a release of dower is contained." The R. S. O. c. 127, s. 3 provides for conveyance by a married woman of the age of 21 years of her interest in real estate, and enacts that " she may also, by deed, bar her dower, and any right or inchoate right of dower" (c). It will be observed that c. 126 is silent as

(a) See the Statute in Appx.

(b) See statute in Appx. See also R. S. O. c. 127, ss. 3, 12. And as to conveyance by a married woman of her right to dower of lands of a deceased former husband, see Leith, Real Prop. Stats. p. 237.

(c) Chapter 127, ss. 3 & 12 seem to be taken mainly from the Imperial Act 3 & 4 William IV. c. 74, ss. 77, 78, in which, in consequence of all reference to dower being omitted, doubts were raised whether right to dower could be extinguished: Shelford Stats. 8th ed. p. 371. Possibly this caused the insertion of the dower clause in our Act, or it may have been that the Legislature consider

to the woman being of age. It would seem that in those cases to which c. 126 is applicable c. 127 will not vary its effect as to age, and this conclusion is entirely independent of any argument to be drawn from s. 12 of c. 127; which section, indeed, may afford no argument (a).

'By R. S. O. c. 126, s. 5, (b) “ A married woman may also bar her dower by executing either alone or jointly with other persons, a deed or conveyance to which her husband is not a party containing a release of such dower; but no such deed or conveyance shall be effectual to bar her dower unless made in conformity with the married woman's real estate act, R. S. O. c. 127."'

'Provision is also made by c. 126 (c), for the case of lunacy of the wife, and for the case of the husband having agreed to sell, and retainer by the purchaser of part of the purchase money as indemnity against dower, and for the

ed that c. 126 applied only when the husband was conveying some dowable interest, and the wife joined to release dower, and would not apply where it was the dower only which was being released: Miller v. Wiley, 16 C. P. U. C. 368, 17 C. P. U. C., s. c.; Howard v. Wilson, 9 U. C. R. 450.

(a) Furness v. Mitchell, 3 App. Rep. 510; but see Boustead v. Whitmore, 22 Grant, 222, per Proudfoot, V. C.

(b) There is a difficulty as to the construction of this section arising out of the fact that to conform with c. 127 the husband must be a party, as that Act, s. 3, expressly requires it, and indeed there is nothing else to which there can be conformity. Unless so much of s. 5 as requires conformity is to be rejected, it would appear that the only mode of proceeding would be under s. 4 of c. 127 and to procure a judge's order dispensing with the necessity of the husband being a party. It would seem, however, that section 4 was intended only to apply to cases therein specified, and others ejusdem generis, and not to such a case as mere temporary, though lengthy, absence of the husband. The words "any other cause are to be construed with reference to the context, and the maxim noscitur a sociis applies. The Legislature seems to have erred in referring to c. 127 at all, the language of s. 5 of that Statute is the same as the Con Stat. e. 84, s. 5, and all that the latter Statute required was examination of the wife by the proper official as to her consent to be barred. When the Con. Statute was in force, there was, till 36 V. c. 18, no such provision as above in relation to a judge's order. Probably so much of s. 5 as requires conformity is to be rejected, for it can hardly be that the Legislature is to be understood as saying that a woman might bar by deed to which her husband is not a party, but that the deed should not operate unless he were a party, or a judge dispensed with his being a party.

(c) See the Act in Appendix.

case of the wife having lived apart from her husband for two years under such circumstances as to disentitle her to alimony, in which latter case the Act of 41 Vic. c. 8 applies. The Act of 43 Vic. c. 14, s. 4 (a) extends these pro

visions.'

cured.

'By R.S.O. c. 126, s. 11, where before the 2nd March, 1877 Informalities the husband has conveyed the land, then any deed executed by the wife before that day for the purpose of barring dower, to which deed the husband is not a party is to be deemed effectual notwithstanding the formalities by the Acts then in force were not complied with (b).

The R. S. O. c. 55, alluding to actions for dower, provides as follows:

"No such action shall be hereafter maintained in case the demandant has joined in a deed to convey the lands, or to release her dower therein to a purchaser for value, although the acknowledgment required by law. at the time may not have been made or taken, or though any informality may have occurred or happened in the making, taking or certifying such acknowledgment (c). The acknowledgment and certificate above referred to were those required by Con. Stat. c. 84, under which any married woman may bar her dower by joining with her husband in a deed in which a release of dower is contained, but where the husband is not a party, then an acknowledgment and certificate were required as to absence of coercion. on the part of her husband: a distinction based on no sufficient reason, and which, considering the object of the acknowledgment, should rather have been required where the husband was a party' (d).

'Chapter 55 of the Revised Statutes of Ontario governs proceedings in suits for dower. It authorizes also,

(a) See the section in Appendix.

(b) See also R. S. O. c. 127, ss. 2, 3, 12.

(c) Leith's Real Prop. Statutes as to this section, p. 288.

(d) See remarks of Robinson, C. J., Howard v. Wilson, 9 U. C. R. 450.

Improvements.

Wild land.

Compulsory assignment of dower.

where the property out of which dower is sought is impartible, as a mill, the allotment of an annuity in lieu of dower, and further provides against the right of the widow to the benefit of permanent improvements made after alienation by, or death of, the husband (a).

Section 3 of R. S. O. c. 126 precludes the recovery of dower out of any separate and distinct lot which, at the time of the alienation by, or death of, the husband, if he died seized, was in a state of nature and unimproved by clearing, fencing, &c. The demandant's right to have woodland assigned to her for firewood, and timber for fencing the other portions of land assigned to her of the same lot, is specially reserved. The R. S. O. c. 55, by sections 3 and 21, relieves owners of lands from the uncertainty consequent on a claim for dower not prosecuted by those sections the dowress can be compelled to an assignment of dower, and thus the land not assigned for dower relieved from the claim.'

(a) See remarks on these provisions, and how far they apply if the husband died before 18 May, 1861, and as to dower out of the improvements; Leith's Real Prop. Statutes, p. 247, n. a. 248; and as to improvements and damages; Hodgins v. Hodgins, 13 C. P. U. C. 151, per Draper, C. J.; Linfoot v. Duncombe, 21 C. P. U. C.; Wallace v. Moore, 18 Grant; Doe. Riddell v. Gwinnel, 1 Q. B. 682.

CHAPTER X.

OF ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD.

* S. 140.. Three estates

*OF estates that are less than freehold, there are three sorts: 1. Estates for years; 2. Estates at will; 3. Estates by less than free

sufferance.

hold.

I. An estate for years is a contract for the possession of I. An estate for years. lands or tenements, for some determinate period; and it takes place where a man letteth them to another for the term of a certain number of years, agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee, and the lessee enters thereon. If the lease be but for half a year or a quarter, or any less time, this lessee is respected as a tenant for years, and is styled so in some legal proceedings; a year being the shortest term which the law in this case takes notice of. And this may, not improperly, lead us into a short digression, concerning the division and calculation of time by the English law.

Of the division

* S. 141.

The space of a year is a determinate and well-known period, consisting commonly of 365 days; for, though, in of time. bis*sextile or leap-years it consists properly of 366, yet by the statute 21 Hen. III. the increasing day in the leap-year, Year. together with the preceding day, shall be accounted for one day only. That of a month is more ambiguous: there being, Month. in common use, two ways of calculating months; either as lunar, consisting of twenty-eight days, the supposed revolu- Lunar or tion of the moon, thirteen of which make a year: or, as calendar months of unequal lengths, according to the Julian division in our common almanacs, commencing at the calends of each month, whereof in a year there are only twelve. A month in law is a lunar month, or twenty-eight days, unless otherwise expressed; not only because it is always one uniform period, but because it falls naturally into a quarterly

calendar.