tion expense, make no charge for such service; but if it does this it must treat all alike at that depot, and must not show preference to some over others in rendering the same service. In receiving, delivering, and carrying such freight every carrier is indeed a servant of the public and must treat all fairly and alike; but it is also a business corporation, and in managing its affairs and in meeting the exigencies of its traffic the statute requires that it shall abstain from such methods only as violate its provisions. In all other respects the statute leaves it untrammeled to conduct its own business as its owners may deem best in accommodating the public. A depot warehouse is a convenience of which it may avail itself or not as it may determine the accommodation of its traffic requires at a particular station, or it may make personal delivery of freight to every consignee at that station, or receive at his place of business freight from every shipper at that station, provided in doing so that it treats all fairly and alike and makes no extortionate charge for the service rendered. These are the absolute and undeniable rights of a carrier under the law.

The rate for transportation from the points named to Ionia and Grand Rapids is the same, and Grand Rapids is thirtythree miles further from these points of origin of the freight than Ionia, and in reaching Grand Rapids the freight passes by Ionia over defendant's line. The rates to Ionia from these eastern points of origin are made the same by the defendant and its rival and competing line, the Detroit, Lansing & Northern Railroad; and at Grand Rapids the rates from these eastern points are made the same by the defendant and its rival and competing lines, the Detroit, Lansing & Northern Railroad and the Michigan Central Railroad. The distance on freight from Boston to Ionia, whether it comes over the line of the defendant and its connecting lines or whether it comes over the Detroit, Lansing & Northern and its connecting lines, is practically the same; and this is true in the distance on freight from New York to Ionia; and it is also equally true in the distance on freight from Philadelphia to Ionia over the lines of these carriers. The relative distance

from each of these eastern points to Grand Rapids by the respective lines of these three railroads is about the same. The statement of these facts accounts for the rates being the same from these eastern cities to Grand Rapids and Ionia. They are made so by these carriers on account of their relative location at the end of a long haul of freight and upon a · principle of grouping rates which exists in many portions of the country. If this was all there was in this case it would present no difficulty.

The difficulty in the case arises from the fact that at Grand Rapids the defendant receives its freight from shippers and delivers its freight to consignees at their several places of business by means of a line of drays free of charge, while it does not render a like service for shippers at Ionia. It justifies this upon the ground that its depot is about 2,200 yards from the business portion of Grand Rapids, while its depot at Ionia is only about 220 yards from the business portion of that city; and its competitors at Grand Rapids, the Michigan Central and the Detroit, Lansing & Northern Railroad Companies, have their depots near the centre of the ' business portion of Grand Rapids. The estimated cost of such delivery by drays would be the same at Ionia as at Grand Rapids, and is two cents per hundred pounds. The claim made, nominally by petitioners, but which, as already appears, is really by the defendant's competitor, the Michigan Central Railroad Company, is that this is equivalent to a cut of two cents per hundred pounds in the transportation rate in favor of Grand Rapids over Ionia, and is an unlawful preference and is an undue and unreasonable prejudice to Ionia. The defendant, on the other hand, attempts to justify it by the exceptional circumstances and conditions at Grand Rapids which do not exist at Ionia, and that it is an expense borne by it in the transportation of its traffic to and from Grand Rapids and rendered necessary there and not rendered necessary at Ionia, and that there is slight competition between Ionia and Grand Rapids, and that this works no prejudice to Ionia or its business, and is no violation of the statute.

The rule that generally prevails in the United States in the absence of some usage to the contrary is that railway companies, as a matter of convenience, deliver their freight to consignees and receive their freight from shippers at their depot warehouses. To this general rule, however, there are many well recognized exceptions. In the case of freight in carload lots it is often delivered in cars on tracks; or if it be grain, in an elevator; or if it be coal, in bins arranged for that purpose; or sometimes on side tracks on the premises of consignees; or, again, at shipside; and so in many other instances that might be named.

A delivery or receipt of freight such as is here made by the defendant at Grand Rapids is made by railway carriers at other exceptional stations in the State of Michigan and by railway carriers at exceptional stations in other States of the Union. Its origin, as a rule, is found in the fact that one carrier is unable to locate its depot otherwise than at a long distance from the business portion of a city or town, while other carriers have succeeded in establishing their depots near to or in the business portion of such city, or town. The carrier whose depot is thus located at the greater distance resorts to this expensive method of transporting its traffic and equalizing its terminal facilities, as far as this may be done in this manner, with those of its competitors in transporting freight to and from that town or city, as the case may be. Ordinarily other carriers adopt the same method of doing business at such city or town by way of competition. Such a service is not a terminal charge upon the shipper, for no separate charge as such is made against him for it; it is a part of the cost of transportation; it is an expense incurred by the carrier for the transportation of traffic and to equalize its facilities in receiving and delivering freight under exceptional circumstances, and conditions which do not admit of being made with fairness and justice to the carrier and the public in the prosecution of its business in any other manner. Nor is it a preference of one shipper or consignee over another at the station where it is done, because it is done for all alike at that station.

Terminal charges, as such, usually consist of switching, lighterage or trackage charges. Where these exist and are exceptional, as, for example, on shipments by rail from or to the harbor of New York, they are deducted in the shape of an arbitrary from the transportation rate, as part of the cost of transportation, before the balance of the transportation rate is divided among the carriers; and this imposes no additional charge upon the shipper or consignee. At Buffalo such terminal charges, on the other hand, enter into the division of the transportation rate among the carriers. Bridge tolls are in like manner often deducted as arbitraries from the transportation rate before the balance of the rate is divided among the carriers. But at stations generally where terminal charges exist in the shape of switching or trackage charges these are made separable from and in addition to the transportation rate. The watchful eye of the statute is seen, however, in requiring that all these terminal charges and methods, no matter how made, must be reasonable and just. The statute expressly requires that these, as well as the transportation rate, shall be separately stated in the schedules printed by the carrier and posted for public information, and in emphatic terms declares that neither must be made the means of any unjust discrimination or unlawful preference, or undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage to any person, locality or traffic. A charge for storage, where this is made, is also a terminal charge, but this occurs only under exceptional circumstances, and, as such, is a very small item of expense. Freight in car-load lots, as a rule, is loaded by the shipper and unloaded by the consignee, and in less than car-load lots is loaded and unloaded by the carrier free of charge; so that there is no charge made for receiving and handling the freight in loading and unloading.

A transportation expense borne by the carrier alone to enable it to reach the point or points where freight is to be delivered or received, under the exceptional circumstances and conditions named at Grand Rapids in this proceeding, is different from a terminal charge imposed upon the shipper or consignee. Exactly what expenses as distinguished from

terminal charges the exigencies of traffic may require of a carrier for the transportation of its traffic along its line, is dependent upon a variety of considerations. These may and do occasionally vary at different stations where the circumstances and conditions surrounding the business are not of an exceptional character. At a station where the circumstances and conditions surrounding the transportation of the traffic are of a very exceptional character, it is obvious that these expenses may vary still more greatly, and may fairly assume many forms found necessary for the transportation and accommodation of the traffic. The law, however, is plain and inexorable that no carrier can make any such expense a device for an unlawful preference or of an undue or unreasonable prejudice to one shipper over another, or to one locality over another, or to one kind of business over another, either in itself or in connection with the transportation service done.

The method of incurring this transportation expense at Grand Rapids was adopted by the defendant about twentyfive years ago, long before the Michigan Central or the Detroit, Lansing & Northern Railroad had reached that city, and has continued ever since. It did not originate in any competition with them, but commenced, and until the time of their competition with the defendant, continued purely as a transportation expense incurred by the defendant at Grand Rapids. The evidence does not show with particularity whether it originated in the fact that the defendant regarded it as less onerous than to incur the expense of constructing and maintaining an extension of its railroad to a point in the business portion of the city and establishing grounds and buildings there; or to avoid the expense of constructing and maintaining side tracks in various portions of the city; or whether it was deemed a facility that was best under all the circumstances for treating all shippers at Grand Rapids, large and small, equally and alike; or whether it was preferable to the defendant instead of incurring the liability arising from having the freight stored in its warehouses. But it is evident that some or all of these considerations could have had, and doubtless did have, their weight with the defend