part of the traffic would injuriously affect all of the residue though many times greater in amount. This is one of the considerations that led to the petition in this case.

By the amendments of March 2, 1889, the further duty of notification of advances and reductions, and the maintenance of joint tariffs, render the practice of changing every day, or several times a day, joint through rates, whether wholly inland or partly inland and partly ocean, an impossibility if these provisions of the statute are to be observed at all. The notification of advances and reductions is intended to precede the time when they take effect, and not to follow after the shipment of the property, when the notification is useless. And an advance upon ten days' notice, or a reduction upon three days' notice, is wholly inconsistent with daily or more frequent changes. These provisions are intended to secure stability in rates, and the Commission has no authority to absolve carriers from their observance.

The exact ground of complaint is the alleged discrimination by the inland carriers, who transport wheat, corn, flour, cotton, tobacco, live stock, dressed meats, and other productions of the interior, in favor of dealers who consign their shipments on through bills directly to foreign ports, and against the dealers in like traffic in the seaboard cities who purchase either for local sale or for subsequent export; the consequences being, as claimed, to give foreign purchasers advantages over home dealers, and to establish prices in foreign markets for the entire products exported, and, to some extent, for the domestic sales as well. The fact that discriminations of the nature charged were made during the period mentioned in the complaint, and the extent to which they were carried, appear in the testimony, and have been before noticed. Substantially the charge of the complaint in respect to discrimination is sustained by the evidence, and it was not justified by the circumstances and conditions shown to exist. The discrimination was actual; it was unjust, and therefore unlawful.

The necessary conclusion is that in making and publishing export tariffs, the rate to the seaboard should be specified and should not discriminate against the inland tariff rate

unless justifiable conditions exist for a difference. It is not shown that such conditions exist at New York, and very clearly they do not exist.

The decision of the Commission is that the order of March 8th, 1888, stand and continue in force as promulgated, and that the several defendants cease and desist from unjustly discriminating in their rates and charges for inland transportation, between traffic consigned on through bills to foreign ports from interior points, and like traffic consigned to the seaboard.

The disposition of this case is confined mainly to the practical aspects of the matters involved. It has not been considered necessary to critically discuss the question whether the Act may not be so interpreted as to apply its provisions to ocean carriage, and to authorize through rates to foreign countries independently of the established inland rate. In the judgment of the Commission the addition of current ocean rates to the fixed inland tariff rate is the only practi-cable method for the export business as a whole, and the only mode to which the regulations of the Act can be effectively applied, especially since the amendments of March 2, 1889.

The Commission believes the policy of this method of making export rates will best protect all interests, and leave no substantial ground upon which to base any complaint for injustice. The welfare of the great body of producers, dealers and carriers will, it is believed, be best promoted by an adherence to this policy, leaving to the wisdom of Congress the question whether the policy should be permanent, or to provide by changes in the statute for whatever exceptional or different methods may be deemed expedient or

necessary.

No. 184.

GEORGE RICE v. THE CINCINNATI, WASHINGTON & BALTIMORE RAILROAD COMPANY; THE CINCINNATI, INDIANAPOLIS, ST. LOUIS & CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY; THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY; THE UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY; AND THE CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. 185.

GEORGE RICE v. THE CINCINNATI, WASHINGTON & BALTIMORE RAILROAD COMPANY; THE OHIO & MISSISSIPPI RAILWAY COMPANY; THE ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY; THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY; THE ATLANTIC & PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, AND THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY.

No. 194.

GEORGE RICE v. THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF PETITIONER FOR SUBPOENAS duces tecum.

Decided July 20, 1889. Opinion Filed. September 20, 1889.

APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM FOR

The production of books, contracts, vouchers, accounts and papers, by JOHN D. Rockefeller,

GEORGE H. VILAS,

JOHN BUSHNELL,

AMBROSE MOGregor,

M. A. ROBINSON,

J. E. TERRILL,

R. M. FRAZIER, General Freight Agent;

THOMAS L. KIMBALL, General Manager;

A. S. VAN KURAN, Freight Auditor;
J. A. MUNROE, General Freight Agent;
W. F. WHITE, Traffic Manager;

S. B. HYNES, General Freight Agent;

H. C. CLEMENTS, Auditor;

THE CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY;

THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY;

MILTON H. SMITH, Vice-President;

JOHN M. CULP, General Freight Agent;

J. H. FLAGLER, President American Cotton Oil Trust;
J. C. Moss, Treasurer

66

ROBERT F. MUNROE, Auditor"

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GEORGE H. WEBSTER, of Armour & Company;

LYMAN KLAPP, President Union Oil Company.

1. In laying down rules upon the subject of what an application shall contain for the compulsory production of books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation, the Commission is governed by the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce and the objects and purposes of this statute, but in connection with these will also consider the practice in the courts of the United States, as well as the rules prescribed by Federal statutes in proceedings which seem to be most nearly analogous to proceedings in which such application to the Commission is made.

2. In proceedings between parties, when such an application is made to the Commission, to compel parties who are not engaged as carriers in interstate commerce, or others who are strangers to the proceeding, to produce books, papers, and documents, the application should be in writing, addressed to the Commission, and should specify, as nearly as may be, the books, papers, or documents for the production of which process is desired, and be accompanied by an affidavit that the books, papers, or documents described are in the possession of the witness or under his control, and should set forth facts which make a prima facie case that these contain evidence that is material and necessary to the party seeking their production in the pending proceeding; and in such a case the prima facie showing that what is required to be produced will be legal evidence for the party demanding it ought to be very clear and full.

3. Where the application is made to compel one who is a party to the proceeding and who is a carrier engaged in interstate commerce to produce its books for the purposes of evidence in a pending proceeding, it is sufficient for the application to indicate in writing in a general way what books of the carrier should be produced, and that there is reason to believe, and that the applicant does believe, that in the course of the hearing they will become of service, on account of the light they will throw upon the questions in controversy in the proceeding and as an

time, until proper changes can be made by the legislative body, than that construction should be resorted to for the accomplishment of purposes only to be appropriately attained through legislation. It is certainly not to be expected that the first attempt to regulate by law the immense transportation interests of this country, with such endless diversities in the conditions of transportation, and such great variety in the character of products to be carried, should be complete in all its parts, or free from some provisions that may produce friction, or, to some extent, perhaps, injurious results. Indeed, the wonder is that a statute of such a character, and for such purposes, could have been framed, as a first experiment, with so comparatively few defects.

A general and careful survey of the export business of the country, and the conditions under which it is carried on, through the various ports, seems to warrant certain deductions which largely simplify the question under consideration. These deductions may be summarized as follows:

The proportion of the export trade to which the exceptional rate is sought to be applied is very small in cumparison with the general transportation business to the seaboard, and relatively small in proportion to the export business itself.

There is no reason to believe, founded upon any evidence in the case, that foreign markets cannot be profitably reached by our surplus products upon a fixed inland tariff rate to the seaboard with the current ocean rate added, but, on the other hand, there is affirmative evidence that no difficulty has been experienced in reaching those markets advantageously upon a rate so made.

The demand for an exceptional export rate is not shown to be founded upon any necessity of the business, but, as would seem, is urged argumentatively by certain railroads on their own account, and has for its object supposed advantages to particular lines rather than the general interest of the public.

The competition of like products through Canadian ports,