a more comprehenfive view, and warn you in the most folemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally. 59. This fpirit, unfortunately, is infeparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest paffions of the human mind. It exifts under different fhapes in all governments; more or lefs ftifled, controled, or repreffed; but in thofe of the popular form, it is feen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy. 60. The alternate domination of one faction over another, fharpened by the fpirit of revenge, natural to party diffention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful defpotifm. 61. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent defpotifm. The diforders and miferies, which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity and repofe in the abfolute power of an individual; 62. And fooner or later the chief of fome prevailing faction more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty. 63. Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which, nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight) the common and continual mischiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wife people to difcourage and restrain it. 64. It ferves always to diftract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill founded jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part against another, foments, occafionally, riot and infurrection. 65. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated accefs to the government itfelf through the channels of party paffions. Thus the policy and will of one country are fubjected to the policy and will of another. 66. There is an opinion that parties in free countries are ufeful checks on the administration of the government, and ferve to keep alive the fpirit of liberty. This within certain Amits is probably true, and in governments of a monarchi al cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor on the fpirit of party. 67. But in thofe of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every falutary purpose. 68. And there being conftant danger of excefs, the ef fort ought to be by force of public opinion, to mitigate and affuage it. A fire not to be quenched; it demands uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, left, instead of warning, it should confume. 69. It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country, fhould infpire caution, in those entrusted with its adminiftration, to confine themselves within their respective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach on another. 70. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotifm. A juft estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fat isfy us of the truth of this pofition. 71. The neceffity of reciprocal checks in the exercife of the political power; by dividing and diftributing it into different depofitories, and conftituting each the guardian of the public weal, against invafions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; fome of them in our country and under our own eyes. 72. To preferve them must be as neceffary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the conftitutional powers be in any particu lar wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the conftitution defignates. 73. But let there be no change by ufurpation; for though this, in one inftance, may be the inftrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are deftroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or tranfient benefit which the ufe can at any time yield. 74. Of all the difpofitions and habits which lead to political profperity, religion and morality are indispensable fup ports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotifm, who would labor to fubvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. 75. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it fimply be asked, where is the fecurity for property, for reputation, for life, if the fenfe of religious obligation defert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? 76. And let us with caution indulge the fuppofition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded of the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure; reason and experience both .forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclufion of religious principle. 77. It is fubftantially true, that virtue or morality is a neceffary fpring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or lefs force, to every fpecies of free government. Who, that is a fincere friend to it, can look with indifference on attempts to fhake the foundation of the fabric? 78. Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, inftitutions for the general diffufion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is effential that public opinion fhould be enlightened. 79. As a very important fource of ftrength and fecurity, cherish public credit. One method of preferving it, is to use it as fparingly as poffible; avoiding occafions of expenfe by cultivating peace, but remembering alfo, that timely disbursements to prepare for dangers, frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; 80. Avoiding, likewife, the accumulation of debt, not only by fhunning occafions of expenfe, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to difcharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occafioned, not ungenerously throwing on pofterity the burthen which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is neceffary that public opinion fhould cooperate. 81. To facilitate to them the performance of their dúty, it is effential that you should practically bear in mind that towards the payment of debts there must be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; and none can be de vised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleas ant; 82. That the intrinfic embarraffment infeparable from the selection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be a decifive motive for a candid conftruction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiefcence in the measures for obtaining revenue which the public exigences may at any time dictate. 83. Obferve good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and (at no diftant period) a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted juftice and benevolence. 84. Who can doubt that in the courfe of time and things, the fruits of fuch a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be loft by a fleady adherence to it? Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with virtue? The exper iment, at least, is recommended by every fentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas, is it rendered impoffible by its vices ? 85. In the execution of fuch a plan, nothing is more effential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and paffionate attachments for others fhould be excluded; and that in the place of them, juft and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. 86. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondnefs, is in fome degree a flave. It is a flave to its animofity or its affection, either of which is fufficient to lead it aftray from its duty and its intereft. 87. Antipathy in one nation against another, difpofes each more readily to offer infult and injury, to lay hold of flight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and untractable, when accidental or trifling occafions of difpute occur. 88. Hence frequent collifions, obftinate, envenomed and bloody contefts. The nation, prompted by ill will and refentment, fometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government fometimes participates in the national propenfity, and adopts through paffion, what reafon would reject; 89. At other times, it makes the animofity of the nation fubfervient to projects of hoftility instigated by pride, ambition, and other finifter and pernicious motives. The peace often, fometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations has been the victim. 90. So likewife, a paffionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illufion of an imaginary common intereft, in cafes where no real common interest exifts, and infufing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or juftification. 91. It leads, alfo, to conceffions to the favorite nation, of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the conceffions; by unneceffarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealoufy, ill will, and a difpofition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld : 92. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facilįty to betray, or facrifice the interefts of their own country, without odium, fometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous fenfe of obligation a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the bafe or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. 93. As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, fuch attachments are particularly alarming to the tru ly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domeftic factions, to practice the arts of feduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils; fuch an attachment of F |