the development of what has been called the "concert of Europe" (n), in virtue of which the Great Powers of Europe, acting in association with each other, but sometimes also with the co-operation of other States, have assumed the function of regulating the international position of minor States, as well as of dealing with other questions which in default of regulation might have given rise to conflict. So, by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, 1815, Switzerland was made a permanently neutral State, and freedom of navigation established as regards the great European rivers, with the exception of the Danube. Belgium was also made a permanently neutral State by the Treaty of London, 1831; and Luxemburg by the Treaty of London, 1867. By the Treaty of Paris, 1856, Turkey was formally admitted to the public law of Europe," and an attempt was made to regulate the status of Turkey and that of her tributary principalities, as well as the navigation of the Black Sea and the Straits; whilst the navigation of the Danube was also brought under European control (o). By the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, a new attempt was made to settle the difficulties arising out of the Eastern question." Servia and Roumania were made independent States; Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of Turkey, whilst the province of Roumelia (p) was endowed with administrative autonomy; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied by Austria-Hungary, but to remain under the sovereignty of Turkey (q); the independence of Montenegro, already recognised by some Powers, was recognised by Great Britain and Turkey; the boundaries of Servia and Montenegro were extended and a reapportionment of territory made as regards Roumania; subject to a common proviso in favour of the freedom of religious observance in all these States. By a convention of 1881 the Great Powers also defined the limits of an enlargement of territory which had been previously decreed in favour of Greece under the Treaty of 1878 (r). By the Final Act of the West African Congress at Berlin, 1885, which was signed not only by the Great Powers of Europe, but also by the United States of America, and by various minor Powers, freedom of commerce within the basin of the Congo and freedom of navigation both of the Congo and Niger were established; the transport of slaves was prohibited; provision was also made for the neutralisation of the territory of the Congo Free State; whilst certain new rules were laid down with respect to the obligations incident to the occupation of new territory on the coasts of Africa. This Act has been abrogated by the Convention of St. Germain of September 10, 1919, which renews and strengthens the above provisions for commercial equality and suppression of the slave trade (s). By the Treaty of Constantinople, 1888, provision was made for the free navigation and permanent neutralisation of the Suez Canal. By the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, Turkey has renounced in favour of Great Britain

(n) For a more detailed account see Lawrence, Essays, p. 208 et seq.; also Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question.

(0) Holland, ibid. 248; and Taylor, 119.

(p) Soon afterwards united with Bulgaria.

(q) But see pp. 56, 118, infra.

(r) Taylor, p. 125.

(s) Treaty Ser. (1919) No. 18 [Cmd. 447], infra, p. 110.

the powers conferred upon the Sultan by the Treaty of Constantinople (t). By the Brussels Conference, 1890, certain common measures were agreed upon for the suppression of the African slave trade, and certain restrictions were imposed on the trade in spirituous liquors as regards certain parts of the African continent. The latter restrictions were revised by the Convention of Brussels of November 3, 1906, but abrogated by the Convention of St. Germain of September 10, 1919, by which "trade spirits are prohibited throughout the continent, except in Algiers, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Africa. and Tunis (u).

(3) International Co-operation.-Finally, with the ever-increasing closeness of the connection between State and State, there has sprung up a tendency on the part of States to associate themselves together for the purpose of the joint regulation and management of certain common interests. Such interests relate for the most part, although not exclusively, to matters of economic concern; such as postal and telegraphic communication, the protection of industrial property and copyright, transport, weights and measures, official publications, sanitation, opium, white-slave traffic, and the like. Thus, by a convention originally entered into in 1874, but which is subject to revision by a congress held every five years, a Postal Union was established for the purpose of facilitating postal intercourse between States; this union has an international office at Berne; and now includes over fifty States, a large number of colonies and dependencies having also separate representation (x). A similar union for facilitating telegraphic communication was established by a convention originally entered into in 1875, although since revised; this union also has an international office at Berne, and a membership of thirtyone States, besides a large number of colonies and dependencies (y). By an international convention concluded in 1883, a similar union was established for the protection of industrial property, including patents, trade-marks, and designs; this union also has an international office at Berne, and includes some twenty of the more important States. By an international convention concluded in 1886, and ratified in 1887, a similar union was established for the protection of copyright in works of literature and art; this union also has a central office at Berne. All but Norway and Sweden are parties to the amending convention known as the Additional Act of Paris, 1896. An amended convention, which enlarges considerably the scope of the previous conventions, was signed at Berlin, in November 1908, by the representatives of thirteen States, and ratified by protocol signed on March 20, 1914 (z). By a convention entered into at Brussels in 1902, to which all the Great Powers of Europe, as well as various minor Powers, are parties, a Sugar Union was established for the purpose of securing and supervising the abolition of bounties on the

(t) Treaty Ser. (1920), No. 11, Art. 109 [Cmd. 964], infra, p. 154.

(u) Treaty Ser. (1919), No. 19 [Cmd. 478]. A useful summary of these and other great international compacts will be found in Oppenheim, i. 705.

(x) Fifty-one States were parties to the Universal Postal Convention of 1897; see Hertslet, Com. Tr. 21, 484. (y) See Hertslet, Com. Tr. 14, 95; 24, 495.

(z) See Hertslet, Com. Tr. 17, 569.

production and export of sugar (a). Other forms of international co-operation also exist with respect to the slave trade (b), and the regulation of fisheries outside territorial waters (c); whilst co-operation in judicial matters is secured by a series of extradition treaties made between particular States (d). The international functions of the bureau established by the convention of 1907 relating to the "pacific settlement of international disputes." will be considered hereafter (e). Although many of these matters lie outside the domain of international law, yet the gradual formation of a habit of co-operation between States, in relation to matters of common interest, constitutes an important factor in the development of an international organisation of society.

Contrast between International Law and State Law.-A body of rules such as that which has been described must necessarily differ in many respects from State law. As between States which are independent and legally equal there can, of course, be no common law-making body having power to bind them by its decrees; nor is there any common tribunal having authority to interpret and apply law as between the parties at variance; nor is there any common executive having power at once to compel resort to the tribunals and to give effect to their judgments (f). For this reason international law is not only less imperative and less explicit than State law, but it also lacks, not, indeed, all coercive force, but that particular coercive force which lies behind State law. Hence the rules that go to make up international law do not, it must be admitted, conform to that type of law with which we are now most familiar. International law stands, in fact, to States in much the same relation as the early State law did towards the clans and families that then composed the State. It is law in the course of making, and possibly destined when full grown to become law in the most complete sense of that term; in the sense, that is, of rules of conduct explicitly stated, duly applied, and adequately enforced by some external authority. But apart from this, and viewing the system as it now obtains, it would seem that, on any rational view of law, whether reached by the methods of history or the process of analysis, international law must rank with "law" rather than with "morality." And this for the reasons that the rules which it embodies are in their nature not optional but compulsive, resting in the last resort on force, even though that force is exerted through the irregular action of society rather than through some definite and authorised body; that within the range of those "legal," as distinct from "political," relations, with which it professes to deal, its rules are accepted as law by States, and are appealed to in that character by the contesting parties; and, finally, that its rules have been elaborated by a course of legal reasoning, and

(a) For a summary of these and other unions, such as the Latin Monetary Union, the Railway Traffic Union, the Customs Tariff Union, see Ency. of Laws of England, vii. 17; also Oppenheim, i. 751; and as to the Sugar Union, Westlake, i. 310. (b) Infra, p. 303.

(c) Infra, p. 165.

(d) Infra, p. 249.
(e) Infra, p. 35.

(f) These differences are well put in the judgment in West Rand Central G. M. Co. v. Rex [1905], 2 K. B., at p. 401.

are applied in a legal manner (g). It thus not merely operates as law, but it also stands clearly marked off from what is known as "international morality," by a radical difference both in the nature of its rules and its sanctions (h). That it is often ill-defined—that it is sometimes even set at naught by powerful States-does not appear to distinguish it effectually from the law that obtains in jurisdictions with which we are more familiar. Meanwhile the course of international affairs suggests that this body of rules is likely to become in the future at once more explicit and more directly imperative; that it will ultimately come to be declared on doubtful points, and even altered where alteration is necessary, by the joint declaration of the great body of civilised States periodically assembled in congress; and that its rules will be applied, at any rate in matters not affecting national status or national honour, by purely international tribunals. The jurisdiction of these tribunals, at first voluntary, will probably end by becoming compulsory; and their judgments will probably come to be enforced, not, indeed, by armed force, but by precluding subjects of a recalcitrant State from suing in the courts of other States, or, perhaps, by a total suspension on the part of other States of diplomatic relations with the offending Power. The trade "boycott," as applied in China and Turkey, suggests a new form of international sanction, equally available for breaches of comity or violations of law, which may in the future prove of some importance in international affairs. See "Le Boycottage," by M. Pinon, Revue des Deux Mondes, May, 1909.

N.B. These observations must now be read subject to the new situation created by the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. They have been retained in their original form as showing that Dr. Pitt Cobbett was in line with such jurists as Maine, Westlake, Pollock, Vinogradoff and Oppenheim. His suggestion of a trade "boycott as a sanction has been adopted in the economic sanction provided in Article 16 of the Covenant.

THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ENGLISH LAW, AND THE QUESTION OF TREATIES.

Case.]

THE WEST RAND CENTRAL GOLD MINING
COMPANY, LTD. v. REX.

[L. R. [1905] 2 K. B. 391.]

THIS was a petition of right, in which the suppliants, a company registered in England, but owning and working a goldmine in the Transvaal Colony, sought relief against the Crown

(g) See Hall, 13.

(h) See Pollock, Oxford Lectures,

under the following circumstances: Prior to the outbreak of war between Great Britain and the late South African Republic, two parcels of gold, the property of the suppliants, were seized by the officials of the Republic and appropriated to its use. The Government was, according to the then law of the Republic, under a liability to return the gold or its value; but this obligation was never discharged. Soon after the seizure war broke out between Great Britain and the Republic, with the result that the latter was conquered, and its territory annexed, and incorporated in the dominions of the Crown (i). It was claimed that by reason of such conquest and annexation the obligations of the Government of the Republic with respect to the gold seized had devolved on the Crown. More particularly it was contended (1) that it is a rule of international law that when one civilised State after conquest annexes another, the former, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, becomes bound by the obligations of the latter, save as regards liabilities incurred for the purposes of the war; (2) that international law constitutes a part of the common law of England; and (3) that the English Courts had in fact recognised and adopted the rule of transmission of obligations by virtue of conquest and annexation (k). On demurrer by the Crown, it was held by the Court (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Wills and Kennedy, JJ.) that the petition disclosed no right on the part of the suppliants which could be enforced against the Crown in any municipal Court.

Judgment.] The Court, in its judgment, which was delivered by Lord Alverstone, C.J., altogether declined to accede to the proposition that, even by international law, the sovereign of a conquering State was liable for the obligations of the conquered, except in so far as he might negative such liability by express stipu lation. The assumption of such obligations was, in fact, entirely a matter of discretion for the conqueror. Many such liabilities must necessarily be unknown at the time of conquest, and such a rule might entail upon a conqueror an assumption of all the liabilities of a State otherwise insolvent. It was true that the conqueror might undertake certain liabilities by convention, and good faith would then require that this should be observed.

(i) This by proclamation of the 1st (k) Pp. 395-397. of September, 1900.