usually the result of a bargain under which some special areas of interest are allotted as between the respective parties to the arrangement. Such spheres of influence were established: (1) As between Great Britain and Germany, (a) with respect to various parts of the African continent, by agreements made in 1885, 1886, 1890, and 1901 (i); (b) with respect to New Guinea, by an agreement made in 1885 (k); and (c) with respect to the Western Pacific, by a declaration of 1886 (1). (2) As between Great Britain and France, with respect to certain parts of Africa, by declaration and agreements made in 1890, 1891, and 1898 (m). (3) As between Great Britain and Portugal, with respect to certain parts of the African continent, by agreements made in 1890, 1891, 1893, and 1896 (n). (4) As between Great Britain and Italy, with respect to certain parts of East Africa, by protocols of 1891 and 1894 (o). (5) As between Great Britain and the Congo Free State, with respect to certain parts of East and Central Africa, by an agreement of 1894 (p). (6) As between Great Britain and Russia, with respect to the region of the Pamirs, by an agreement made in 1895 (q). But such arrangements confer no territorial rights and impose no responsibility on the State in whose favour they are created, in relation to non-contracting Powers; and although considerations of comity or fear may induce the latter to respect such arrangements, yet this is a matter of policy, and not of law. Nor can such compacts, even if acquiesced in by other States, give rise to any prescriptive right (r).

Spheres of Interest."-Somewhat different as regards their objects are those agreements which allocate certain areas already occupied by States more or less civilised as spheres of influence or interest between Powers, having already interests adjacent thereto; although the line between these and the former is sometimes difficult to draw. Such agreements now exist: (1) As between Great Britain and France, (a) with respect to Siam, by a declaration made in 1896 (s); and (b) with respect to Egypt and Morocco, by an agreement of 1904 (†).

(i) These relate, inter alia, to the coast of Guinea, the coast between Natal and Delagoa Bay, East Africa, South-West Africa, and the region between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika; see Brit. and For. State Papers, vol. 76, p. 772; vol. 77, pp. 1049, 1130; vol. 82, p. 35; and vol. 95, p. 78. By the Peace Treaty of Versailles, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions. (Articles 119-127).

(k) Brit. and For. State Papers, vol. 76, p. 66.

(m) These relate to North Africa, the Upper Niger, and the region east of the Niger; see Brit. and For. State Papers, vol. 82, p. 89; vol. 83, p. 43; vol. 91, pp. 38 and 55.

(n) These relate to the Zambesi and Eastern and Central Africa; Brit. and For. State Papers, vol. 82, p. 337; vol. 83, p. 27; vol. 85, p. 65; vol. 88, p. 5.

(0) Brit. and For. State Papers, vol. 83, p. 19; vol. 86, p. 55. (p) Ibid. vol. 86, p. 19.

(q) Ibid. vol. 87, p. 15.

(r) On the subject generally, Hall, 130; Westlake, i. 139; Taylor, 271. (s) Brit. and For. State Papers, vol. 88, p. 13; Hertslet, Com. Treaties, vol. 24, p. 391.

(t) British Parl. Papers, 1905, ciii. 265.

(2) As between Great Britain and Russia, (a) with respect to certain parts of China, by an agreement made in 1899 (u); and (b) with respect to Persia, by a convention of 1907, which defines the British sphere of interest as being to the east of a line beginning on the Afghan border and ending at Bander Abbas (Art. 2). But such arrangements, again, are merely political, and involve no legal consequences other than those arising out of the compact.

was

The Occupation and Administration by One State of Territory belonging to Another.-Occasionally, too, we find territory which is subject to the joint sovereignty or condominium of two or more Powers. So, under a Convention of 1899, the Soudan has been recognised as being subject to the condominium of Great Britain and Egypt (x). There are also cases in which territory, while remaining nominally subject to the sovereignty and dominion of one State, is nevertheless occupied and administered by another. Thus, in 1878 the island of Cyprus was assigned by Turkey to Great Britain, to be occupied and administered by the latter Power, subject to certain reservations in favour of the Sultan, to the payment of £92,800 out of the net revenue (y), and to the formal sovereignty of Turkey. Again, after 1878 the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were for some time occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, subject to the sovereignty of Turkey (z); but in 1908 this arrangement repudiated, and the provinces formally annexed by the former Power. By an agreement concluded in February, 1909, Turkey agreed to renounce her rights over these provinces in consideration of the payment of an indemnity, the recovery and control over Novi Bazar, and certain other concessions on the part of Austria-Hungary. The annexation was also recognised by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. By a tripartite arrangement subsequently made between Turkey, Bulgaria, and Russia, it was agreed that Bulgaria should pay to Russia a sum of £3,280,000 in satisfaction of various Turkish claims (including her liability on account of the Turkish debt), and that Russia should thereupon cancel a portion (£T.5,250,000) of the debt owing to her by Turkey, in respect of the war indemnity of 1878. By the Peace Treaty of St. Germain-enLaye, of September 10, 1919, Austria renounced all rights and title over these territories in favour of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (a). The international effect of these anomalous forms of control has already been indicated (b). By international arrangement, also, the maintenance of internal peace and order in one country is sometimes committed to the Government of another country, but without any right of occupation. Thus, as the result of the Algeciras Conference, 1906, at which twelve States were represented (including both Great Britain and the United States, although the latter Power did not vote), it was agreed that for five years France should officer the police of four, and Spain of two, of the ports of Morocco; that Spain and

(u) Including the basin of the Yangtse river; see Hertslet, Com. Treaties, vol. 21, p. 798.

(x) Supra, p. 12.

(y) Holland, European Concert, 354.

(z) Both these cases are fully discussed in Westlake, i. 135.

(a) Treaty Ser. No. 11 (1919) [Cmd. 400].

(b) Supra, pp. 56-61.

France together should officer the police of Tangier and Casablanca, subject to an inspector to be appointed by a third Power; but that the police officers so appointed should be responsible both to the Sultan and to the Diplomatic Corps. Other articles relate to the control of the State Bank, the prohibition of contraband, and the opening up of the ports to other States.

THE NAVIGABLE RIVERS OF A STATE; INTER-STATE RIVERS.

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WITH RESPECT TO THE NAVIGATION OF THE RIVER ST. LAWRENCE.

[1826; Phillimore, i. 242 et seq.; Wharton, Digest, i. § 30.]

Controversy.] THE river St. Lawrence has a course of some 750 miles, extending from Lake Ontario to the Atlantic Ocean. The northern shores, both of the river and of the lake from which it issues, are wholly within the territory of Great Britain. The southern shores of the lake, together with the southern shores of the river up to a certain point at which the northern boundary of the United States impinges on the river (lat. 450 N.) are within the territory of the latter country; whilst the southern shores of the remainder of the river, together with the mouth, are within the territory of Great Britain. In 1826 the United States of America put forward a claim to the free navigation of the river throughout its whole course, including those portions which are wholly within the territory of Great Britain. On behalf of this claim it was urged, in effect, that there was a natural right on the part of the inhabitants of the upper banks of a navigable river that they should have free communication with the sea. The arguments on this point were much the same as those which had been previously urged in the negotiations with Spain respecting the navigation of the Mississippi. Here it had been said that, even though the lower portions of that river were within. the exclusive control of another State, yet there was a right on the part of upper riparian dwellers to "innocent passage " through the lower portions of the river for the purpose of reaching the

sea; and that even though this right had been called an

imperfect right," yet it was nevertheless a right, the denial of which would give a title to redress (c). It was also pointed out that Great Britain had herself put forward a similar claim with respect to the navigation of the Mississippi when she had occupied the position of an upper riparian State. Stress was also laid on the importance of the claim as affording to the great and growing population inhabiting the banks on the south side of the river and lakes their only natural outlet to the ocean. It was finally pointed out that the claim was greatly strengthened by the fact that this right of navigation had, prior to the separation from the Mother Country, been the property of all British subjects inhabiting the continent, and had been wrested from France by the common exertions of the Mother Country and her colonies in the war of 1756. The claim, moreover, whilst necessary to the United States, was not one which was likely to prove injurious to Great Britain.

To this contention Great Britain replied, in effect, that such a claim was not warranted either by the principles or practice of the law of nations. The liberty of passage by one nation through the dominions of another was, according to the most eminent writers on international law, a qualified and occasional exception to the paramount rights of property. It was, at the most, only an "imperfect right." The fact that such a right had been conceded by treaty, as regards certain of the great European rivers, in itself went to show that such a right was not a natural right, but one that required to be established by convention. It was further pointed out that such a right of passage, once conceded, must hold good, not only for the purposes of trade in time of peace, but also for hostile purposes in time of war. Finally, it was urged that the United States could not consistently with principle put forward such a claim without being prepared to grant reciprocal rights, in favour of British subjects, to the navigation of the Mississippi and the Hudson, to which access might be had from Canada by land carriage or by canal.

To this argument the United States replied that the St. Lawrence river ought really to be regarded as a strait

(c) Wheaton (Boyd), pp. 299 and 300.

con

necting the ocean with the great inland lakes, the shores of which were inhabited alike by subjects of the United States and Great Britain, and that such a natural channel ought to be equally available for passage by both. There was, moreover, a clear distinction between passage over land and passage over water, for the reason that water passage involved no detriment or inconvenience to the country to which the shores belonged, whilst land passage might be fraught with both. The United States would not shrink from applying the same principle to American rivers, in the event of any connection being effected between them and Upper Canada similar to that which existed between the United States and the St. Lawrence. At the same time the navigation of a river flowing wholly through the territory of one State could not be regarded as governed by the same principles as a river which flowed through the territory of two or more different States. Finally, it was contended that the fact that the free navigation of rivers had been made a matter of convention did not disprove that such a right of navigation was in itself a natural right, which had been restored to its proper position by treaty.

Settlement.] The controversy was provisionally settled by the reciprocity treaty of 1854, which, in effect, conceded to the citizens and inhabitants of the United States a right of navigating the river St. Lawrence and the canals of Canada as a means of communication between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean, subject to the same tolls and assessments as those exacted from British subjects. A similar right of navigation was conferred on British subjects with respect to Lake Michigan, together with the use of the State canals. But this arrangement was made terminable on notice, and was in fact terminated by the United States, in 1866, under a resolution of Congress adopted in 1865. The matter was, however, finally settled by the Treaty of Washington, 1871. This treaty, which is still in force, provides that the navigation of the river St. Lawrence, ascending and descending from the 45th parallel of North latitude, where it ceases to form the boundary between the two countries, from, to, and into the sea, shall for ever remain free and, open for the purposes of commerce to the citizens of the United States, subject