together in the said house, playing for the said valuable thing (or money), at the said game, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided (conclude as in form on page 35). 3 § 637. Evidence - 1. Proof that the Defendant Kept a Gaming House, or Procured or Permitted Gaming in a Building used and Occupied by him or his Agent, is Indispensable. - Positive evidence that the defendant occupied the house is unnecessary. It may be proved by circumstances. A person may own and control a house or place resorted to for gaming without having any knowledge that it is resorted to for that purpose, and he is not in such case the keeper of a gaming-house within the meaning of the statute. To constitute a common gaming-house, it is not necessary that all persons should have access to it; if it is open to persons generally, that is sufficient 3 A person occupying one room only of a house and keeping a faro bank for public resort therein keeps a gaming-house in the sense of the law. It is not necessary that the house should be kept for gain, nor that the defendant should own the building. When the defendant opens his house for the purpose of gambling for money or other valuable things, he keeps a gaming-house though only one or two games have been played there. And .it is a question of fact, to be determined by the jury from the evidence, whether he has actually opened his house for this purpose.7 8 § 638. 2. The Place must be Kept to Game in for Money or Other Valuable Things. The keeping of a house for games of chance, conducted for recreation merely, is not criminal. And it has been held that the keeping of a billiard saloon where persons assemble to play the game of billiards for amusement, even though they bet on the game so far as to determine which of 'State v. Worth, R. M. Charlton Rep., 5. State v. Currier, 23 Me., 45; State v. Cooster, 10 Iowa., 455. ◄ Com. v. Hyde, Thatch. C. C., 19. Rex v. Medlor, 2 Shaw, 36; State v. Lyman, 5 Harring., 510. State v. Haines, 30 Me., 65; State v. Currier, 23 Me., 43; Stevens v. People, 67 Ills., 587. 7 Armstrong . State, 4 Blackf., 247; State v. Cooster, 10 Iowa, 455. the contesting parties shall pay for the use of the table, does not render the house a common gaming-house within the statute; but playing for the drinks around, with the knowledge and permission of the owner, does make him liable for keeping a gaming-house.2 7. GAMING IN A TAVERN. $639. Provisions of the Statute. "Every tavern-keeper, common victualer or other person, keeping or suffering to be kept, in any place occupied by him, any implements such as are used in gaming, in order that the same may, for hire, gain or reward, be used for the purpose of amusement, who suffers any implement of that kind to be used upon any part of his premises, for the purpose of gaming for money or other property, or who suffers any person to play at an unlawful game or sport therein, shall for the first offense be fined one hundred dollars, and for the second offense be fined not less than five hundred dollars and be confined in the county jail not less than six months, and for the third offense shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars and be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years, and in either case he shall forfeit his license, and shall not again be licensed as a tavern-keeper for one year from his conviction."'5 3 Game cocks are not implements used in gaming within the meaning of the statute. Cooladge v. Choate, 11 Met., 79. 'The playing within a store-house leased to the defendant with the tavern but not within the curtilage of the tavern, nor used in any way with it, is not within the statute prohibiting gaming in a tavern. Com. v. Sanders, 5 Leigh, 571. 'R. S., 371, § 128. STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF SUFFERING PERSONS TO PLAY UNLAWFUL GAMES IN A TAVERN. (Commence as in form on page 35) that C. D., on, etc, at, etc., in the said county, then and there being a tavern-keeper, unlawfully did' suffer2 and permit divers, persons to play for money certain unlawful games with cards in his tavern, then and there kept and occupied by him, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided (conclude as in form on page 35). 8. GAMING DECOYS. $640. Provisions of the Statute. "If any one shall, through invitation or device, prevail on any person to visit any room, building, booth, yard, garden, boat or float, kept for the purpose of gambling, or prostitution, or fornication, he shall, on conviction thereof, for the first offense be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, and for the second offense he may be fined not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than three hundred dollars, or may be confined in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.' 996 'The allegations "did for game permit persons to come together to play at a game for money, at and in a house then and there kept by him," Stoltz v. People, 4 Scam., 168; and "being a tavern-keeper duly licensed," permitted persons "to play the game of cards in his said dwelling-house where he was then and there licensed as a tavern-keeper," were cach respectively held sufficient. Com. v. Arnold, 4 Pick., 251. 2 It is not necessary to allege that the gaming was suffered or permitted for gain. Com. v. Cotton, 8 Gray, 488; but see Rex v. Medler, 2 Show, 36; State v. Lyman, 5 Harring., 510. * It is not necessary to state the names of the persons who played. Green v. People, 21 Ills., 125; contra, Ball v. State, 7 Blackf., 242; Sowle v. State, 11 Ind., 492; Davis v. State, 7 Ohio, 204. The words "a certain unlawful game with cards," are a sufficient description of the game. Green v. People, 21 Ills., 125. If the allegation is suffering persons to play at cards and other unlawful games," the words "unlawful games" may be rejected as surplusage. Com. v. Bolkhom, 3 Pick., 281. It should be alleged that the defendant kept or occupied the place where the game was played. Com. v. Bolkhom, 3 Pick., 281. R. S., 372, § 129. STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF DECOYING A PERSON INTO A PLACE KEPT FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAMBLING. (Commence as in form on page 35) that C. D., on, etc., at, etc., in the said county unlawfully through invitation did prevail upon the said A. B. to visit a certain room there situate, then and there kept for the purpose of gambling, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided (conclude as in form on page 35). 9. GAMBLING IN GRAIN, ETC. $641. Provisions of the Statute. "Whoever contracts to have or give to himself or another the option to sell or buy, at a future time, any grain or other commodity, stock of any railroad or other company, or gold, or forestalls the market by spreading false rumors to influence the price of commodities therein, or corners the market, or attempts to do so in relation to any of such commodities, shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or confined in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both; and all contracts made in violation of this section shall be considered gambling contracts and shall be void." STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF MAKING A CONTRACT TO GIVE TO ANOTHER AN OPTION TO BUY GRAIN AT A FUTURE TIME. (Commence as in form on page 35) that C. D., on, etc., at, etc., in the said county, unlawfully did contract with one E. F. to give to the said E. F. the option to buy ten thousand bushels of wheat for the sum of one dollar per bushel at a future time, to wit., on the-day of-A. D., 18—, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided (conclude as in form on page 35). 10. INCEST. §642. Father and Daughter. "If a father shall rudely and licentiously cohabit with his own daughter, the father shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding twenty years. 992 'R. S., 372, § 130. 'Id., 376, § 156. Independent of the statute incest is not an indictable offense. 4 Black. Com., 64; 1 Bish Cr. L., § 502. A father indicted for rape on the person of his daughter may be convicted of incest. Com v. Goodhue, 2 Met., 193. STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF INCEST OF FATHER WITH DAUGHTER. (Commence as in form on page 35) that C. D., on, etc., at, etc., in the said county, feloniously rudely, licențiously and knowingly did' cohabit with one E. F., then being as the said C. D. then and there well knew, his, the said C. D.'s own daughter, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided (conclude as in form on page 35). § 643. Of Relatives. "Persons within the degrees of con sanguinity, within which marriages are declared by law to be incestious and void, who shall intermarry with each other or who shall commit adultery or fornication with each other, or who shall lewdly and lasciviously cohabit with each other, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding ten years.' STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF INCEST OF BROTHER WITH SISTER. 993 (Commence as in form on page 35) that C. D., did on, etc., at, etc., in the said county feloniously, lewdly and lasciviously cohabit with one E. F., then being as the said C. D. then and there well knew, the said C. D.'s own sister of the whole blood, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided (conclude as in form on page 35). § 644. Evidence.-Where the prisoner had been guilty of illicit intercourse with a young woman whom he had always recognized as his daughter, and with whose mother he had lived in reputed wedlock, the charge of incest was held to be established. The admissions of the father that the person with whom he had sexual intercourse was his daughter by a 1 An indictment which charges that the acts were upon the person of A. B., the said A. B. then and there being the daughter of him, the said C. D., etc., sufficiently avers the relationship between the parties. Bergen v. People, 17 Ill., 426. 'An allegation that the defendant knew the relationship is indispensable, the word "unlawfully" not being equivalent to that allegation. Williams v. State, 2 Carter, Ind., 439. 3 R. S., 376, § 157. As to the construction of the statute of Iowa, see State v. Schaunhurst, 34 Iowa, 547. It is sufficient to allege that the defendant knew of the relationship be tween the guilty parties without alleging that they both knew it. Morgan . State, 11 Ala., 289. 'Com. v. Bruce, 6 Penn. Law J., 236. |