a law impairing the obligation of a contract as well as one found in an ordinary statute. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716.- Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131.

Ex parte

EXPORTS - TAXES. — The tax or excise required on tobacco intended for exportation is constitutional; Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S. 372, affirmed. The decision in Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, stated and explained. — Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504. INFAMOUS PUNISHMENT - FIFTH AMENDMENT. Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, affirmed. "A crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous punishment, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment." Reasons for that judgment summed up. "Of the two kinds of infamy known to the law of England before the Declaration of Independence, the Constitutional Amendment looked to the one founded on the opinions of the people respecting the mode of punishment, rather than to that founded on the construction of the law respecting the future credibility of the delinquent."

The argument by which the soundness of those conclusions has been now impugned is the same as the one submitted then, and has not convinced us that there was any error in the decision. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, and United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, explained.

"We cannot doubt that at the present day imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary, with or without hard labor, is an infamous punishment."

But the most conclusive evidence of the opinion of Congress upon this subject is to be found in the Act of June 17, 1870, c. 133, § 1, where "infamous crimes" are in the most explicit words defined to be those "punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary."Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. 348.

TAXATION OF UNITED STATES PROPERTY. - By the Constitution of the United States, property of the United States is exempt from taxation under the authority of a state.

"Even in the courts of the several states the decided and increasing preponderance of authority is in favor of the absolute exemption of all property of the United States from state taxation." The doctrine has been recognized by the highest courts of Illinois, California, and Kansas, Virginia, Connecticut, Iowa, and Wisconsin. The legislatures of most of the states have affirmed the same principle by inserting in their general tax acts an exemption of property belong

ing to the United States. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 524. The subject is exhaustively discussed by Mr. Justice Gray.- Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT - SUITS AGAINST A STATE.

Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325, and Williams v. Hagood, 98 U. S. 72, affirmed. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, affirmed and applied. The principle of these cases distinguished from that of Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531; Allen v. B. & O. R. R. 114 U. S. 311.

"A broad line of demarcation separates from such cases as the present, in which the decrees require, by affirmative official action on the part of the defendants, the performance of an obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, those in which actions at law or suits in equity are maintained against defendants who, while claiming to act as officers of the state, violate and invade the personal and property rights of the plaintiffs, under color of authority, unconstitutional and void." Of such cases that of United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, is a conspicuous example. See, also, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270; Allen v. B. & O. R. R. 114 U. S. 311. - Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52.

"When a suit is brought in a court of the United States against officers of a state to enforce performance of a contract made by the state, and the controversy is as to the validity and obligation of the contract, and the only remedy sought is the performance of the contract by the state, and the nominal defendants have no personal interest in the subject-matter of the suit, but defend only as representing the state, the state is the real party against whom the relief is sought, and the suit is substantially within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Hagood v. Southern, supra.

INTER-STATE COMMERCE. Act of March 16, 1877, of Tennessee, imposed a tax of $50 per year upon every sleeping-car run over a railroad in Tennessee, and not owned by the railroad upon which it is run. Sleeping-cars owned by a Kentucky corporation were leased by it for transportation purposes to Tennessee railroad corporations, the latter receiving the transit fare, and the former the extra sum paid for sleeping accommodations.

Held, that so far as applied to inter-state transportation of passengers carried over Tennessee railroads, into, out of, or across that state, in sleeping-cars owned by the Kentucky corporation, the statute was void.

"The tax was a unit, for the privilege of the transit of the passenger and all its accessories. The service rendered the passenger was a unit. The car was equally a vehicle of transit as if it had been owned by the railroad company. As such vehicle of transit the car, so far as it was engaged in inter-state commerce, was not taxable by the State of Tennessee. Citing Almy v. California, 24 How. 169; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Ibid. 35; State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Ibid. 232; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, etc.

"The whole subject, in reference to a state tax imposed for selling goods brought into a state for other states, was recently fully considered by this court in Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446,” and see "Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 631, where the cases on that point are collected." Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479, and Wiggin's Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365, distinguished.

Osborne was a local agent, subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the state; the tax was on the general [express] business he carried on; the subject of the tax was not, as here, the act of inter-state transportation. In Ferry Co. v. St. Louis, the tax was imposed upon a ferry keeper living in the state for boats owned and used in carrying passengers from the state across a navigable river to another state. The tax was a license fee imposed by the state in which the boats had their situs. In the case at bar the corporation had no domicil in Tennessee, and the sleeping-cars in question had no situs in that state. Pullman Southern Car Co. v. Gaines, 3 Tenn. Ch. 587 (on the same facts), differed from. — Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 117 U. S. 34; affirmed in Tennessee v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 117 U. S. 51.

INDIANS.

By treaties with the Cherokees the United States have recognized them as a distinct political community, so far independent as to justify and require negotiations with them in that character. - The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U. S. 288.

CHINESE LAUNDRY CASES. "An administration of a municipal ordinance for the carrying on of a lawful business within the corporate limits, violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, if it makes arbitrary and unjust discriminations, founded on differences of race, between persons otherwise in similar circumstances."

"Those subjects of the Emperor of China who have the right to temporarily or permanently reside within the United States are entitled to enjoy the protection guaranteed by the Constitution." Opinion of Sawyer, J., Circuit Court, is in 26 Fed. Rep. 471.

Opinion by Matthews, J. In reference to the petitioner brought here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of California, our jurisdiction is limited to the question, whether he has been denied a right in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

This court differs from the Supreme Court of California upon the real meaning of the ordinances in question. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, explained.

"The ordinance drawn in question in the present case is of a very different character."

The right of municipal bodies to pass ordinances and apply them discussed. Ohio v. Cincinnati Gas - Light, &c. Co. 18 Ohio St. 262; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217.

66

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y. 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; Ex parte, Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Wo Lee v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.

PILOTAGE FEES. Georgia Code, § 1512, relating to pilotage. fees conflicts with Constitution of the United States.

That section and some sections of Rev. Sts. U. S. relating to pilotage fees discussed. Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90.

DOMESTIC WINES. - The act of Georgia known as the "Local Option Law," exempts from its provisions domestic wines, though it prohibits the sale of spirituous liquors, including wines. Held, that it was not competent for a legislature thus to discriminate between wines made in Georgia and the wines of other states and foreign wines. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123. Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. Rep. 865.

REGULATION OF COMMERCE QUARANTINE FEES. The requirement that each vessel passing a quarantine station shall pay a fee fixed by statute, for examination as to her sanitary condition, is a compensation for services rendered the vessel, and is not a tax within the meaning of the Constitution concerning tonnage tax. The system of quarantine laws established by statutes of Louisiana is a rightful exercise of the police power. Morgan Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455.

VIRGINIA COUPON CASES.

Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, was again followed in Norfolk Trust Co. v. Marye, 25 Fed. Rep. 654.

INFAMOUS PUNISHMENT.

The definition given in Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, applied in United States v. Tod, 25 Fed. Rep.

815.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW. An act to prohibit the sale of liquor is not unconstitutional; although liquor dealers charge that its operation will injuriously affect their property and contracts, and vested rights in such an act is under the police power of a state. Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. Rep. 865 (Circ. Ct. No. D. Ga.).

But in State v. Walruff, 26 Fed. Rep. 178, it was held by Judge Brewer that the Kansas prohibition acts, so far as they impaired or rendered valueless the property of persons previously engaged in the manufacture of beer, were unconstitutional.

The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments contain no limitations or restrictions on the powers of the state.

"A state may absolutely prohibit the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. No state supreme court has denied the power, and the Supreme Court of the United States, both before and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, have often and expressly confirmed it." License Cases, 5 How. 504; Beer Co. v. Mass. 97 U. S. 25. Brewer, J., in State of Kansas v. Bradley, 26 Fed. Rep. 289 (Circ. Ct. E. D. Kans.).

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CITIZENSHIP.-The Fourteenth Amendment does not make a resident in a state a citizen of such state, unless he intends by residence therein to become a citizen. — Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. Rep. 337. [Deady, J., Cal.] FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT POLICE POWER. A city ordinance making it an offence for any person to carry on a laundry where clothes are washed for pay within the habitable portion of the city is unconstitutional; such ordinance is not within the police power of a state. In re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep. 611. [Sawyer, J.,

Circ. Ct. Cal.]

CHINESE RESIDENTS.

Rev. Stat. § 5519, so far as it embraces a conspiracy to deprive Chinese residents of a state of the privileges and immunities secured to them by existing treaties, is unconstitutional. In re Baldwin, 27 Fed. Rep. 187.

COUNTERFEITING. Counterfeiting the securities of a foreign nation is an offence against the law of nations within the meaning of section 8. of article I., of the Constitution of the United States. - U. S. v. White, 27 Fed. Rep. 200 (Circ. Ct. Missouri).