lished, and also their liability to be received in payment of taxes. And this law required the coupon-holder to pay all his taxes in the first instance, and file his coupons in the Court of Appeals, whence they were transmitted to the County Court, where their genuineness, etc., could be tried by a jury, and if found genuine, he was to be refunded the amount he had tendered in payment of his taxes out of the state treasury. This later act was held valid, and a mandamus to compel the treasurer to receive the coupons in payment of the holder's taxes was refused.

"The question now presented is," said Chief Justice Waite, "whether the act of 1882 violates any implied obligation of the state in respect to the remedies that may be employed for the enforcement of its contract, if the collector refuses to take the coupons." And in favor of the law, he said: "It is equally well settled that changes in the forms. of action and modes of proceeding do not amount to an impairment of the obligation of a contract, if an adequate and efficacious remedy is left." Many United States cases were cited, and the changes made in the remedy of the original act by the act of 1882 were pointed out. And it was held that by the act of 1882 a remedy was given substantially equivalent to that in force when the coupons were issued. Justices Field and Harlan, however, dissented in elaborate and well reasoned opinions.

The whole subject was again elaborately considered in the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 270 (1884), and both the former decisions were affirmed,1 namely, that the law of 1882 was invalid as impairing the obligation of the coupon contract as held in 102 U. S. 672, but that a mandamus would not lie against the treasurer to compel him to receive the coupons. Moore v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 338. But it was also held that the collector, being bound to receive the coupons in payment of taxes, had no right to refuse them and collect the tax by distress and sell the tax-payer's property in payment; and if he did, that an action of detinue would lie against him therefor.

1 And see still later, Parsons v. Marye, 21 Fed. Rep. 113 (1885); and a very recent case at Washington, Jan. 1886. Ed.

Chief Justice Waite and Justices Bradley, Miller, and Gray, however, dissented, not on the validity of the law of 1882, but solely on the ground that the suit was in effect. against the state, and therefore was contrary to the eleventh amendment of the Constitution.

§ 627 h. One method of violating the obligation of contracts, when made by a municipal corporation, is that of subsequently so reducing the rate of taxation that a judgment on the contract cannot possibly be collected. But it is now the accepted doctrine that when a state has authorized a municipal corporation to contract, and to exercise the powers of local taxation to the extent necessary to meet its engagements, the power thus given cannot be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied. The state and the corporation, in such cases, are equally bound. And mandamus will lie to compel the corporation to exercise the rights and duties of taxation, which existed when the contract was made. The plaintiff held stock of the city of Charleston, S. C., interest at six per cent. payable quarterly. By subsequent ordinances the city directed its treasurer to retain out of the interest so due all taxes due from the holder to the city. This was held void. It is clear, said Mr. Justice Strong, that the ordinances impaired the obligation of the contract unless there was some implied reservation of a right in the creditor to change its terms, and there is none. The right to make the change does not exist under the taxing power of the state. "A change of the expressed stipulations of a contract, or a relief of a debtor from strict and literal compliance with its requirements, can no more be effected by an exertion of the taxing power than it can be by the exertion of any other power of a state legislature. The constitutional provision against impairing contract obligations is a limitation upon the taxing power, as well as upon all legislation, whatever form it may assume. Indeed, attempted state taxation is the mode most frequently adopted to affect contracts contrary to the constitutional inhibition. It

1 Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278. ED.

most frequently calls for the exercise of our supervisory power.'

"The truth is, states and cities, when they borrow money and contract to repay it with interest, are not acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary individuals. Their contracts have the same meaning as that of similar contracts between private persons. Hence, instead of there being in the undertaking of a state or city to pay a reservation of a sovereign right to withhold payment, the contract should be regarded as an assurance that such a right will not be exercised. A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an absurdity."

"A state may undoubtedly tax any of its creditors within its jurisdiction for the debt due to him, and regulate the amount of the tax by the rate of interest the debt bears, if its promise be left unchanged. A tax thus laid impairs no obligation assumed. It leaves the contract untouched. But until payment of the debt or interest has been made, as stipulated, we think no act of state sovereignty can work an exoneration from what has been promised to the creditor; namely, payment to him, without a violation of the Constitution."

"We hold that no municipality of a state can, by its own ordinances, under the guise of taxation, relieve itself from performing to the letter all that it has expressly promised to its creditors."

"There is no more important provision in the federal Constitution than the one which prohibits states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties of this court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frittered away. Complete effect must be given to it in all its spirit."1 So long as a municipal corporation exists the control of the legislature over the power of taxation delegated to it is restrained to cases where such control does not impair the obligation of 1 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432. And see Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716. ED.

contracts made upon a pledge, expressly or impliedly given, that the power should be exercised for their fulfilment.1

§ 627 i. Whether a state legislature may rightfully so far abolish the existence of a municipal corporation that its creditors can no longer have any legal redress for the payment of their preëxisting claims is not perhaps yet fully settled. Some decisions seem to favor that power. This was distinctly held in the celebrated Memphis case; Meriwether. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880). The city of Memphis was heavily in debt. In 1879 the State of Tennessee repealed the charter of the city, took the immediate control and custody of her public property, and afterward assumed the collection of the taxes levied, and their application to the payment of her indebtedness. This act was held valid; the reasons for which were fully stated by Mr. Justice Field. Justices Strong, Swayne, and Harlan, however, dissented, being of opinion that the act of repeal impaired the obligation of the city's contracts. And other able judges and authors incline to the latter view.3

1 Field, J., in Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358. And see United States v. Mobile, 4 Woods, 536. ED.

2 Wallace v. Trustees, 84 N. C. 164; Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea, 425. ED.

See Milner v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, 632; 1 Dill. on Mun. Corp. § 114, and cases cited. Rader v. South Easterly Road District, 36 N. J. Law, 273. ED.

CHAPTER V.

THE EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

§ 628. In considering the amount and nature of the authority committed by the people of the United States to the national government, we are now brought to an examination of the powers and functions of the Executive department. The provisions of the Constitution which specially concern this department are grouped in Article II., as follows: Section I. declares that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America," and proceeds to describe the manner of choosing the President and VicePresident; the eligibility of persons to those offices; the terms of office; and the proceedings in case of the death, removal, or other disability of the President. Section II. provides that, "The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: But the Congress may by law vest the appointment