for passage at the commencement of each year, and to cause such rates to be posted up in all their stations upon certain penalties. This statute was held to be valid even in its application to railroads which extend beyond the boundaries of the state and which carry on an interstate traffic. It was declared not to be a regulation of commerce at all, but to be a matter of police regulation. "It is not everything that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution." From these two decisions, which are easily and plainly reconcilable, it is possible, if not probable, that very many measures, which at first blush might be regarded as regulations of commerce, will be treated as mere regulations of police, and therefore within the authority of the state legislatures. course. § 373 d. The nature and effect of the national power over interstate commerce has been still further defined, and its limits still more accurately fixed, in a decision but just pronounced. The power to regulate commerce, it is said, was designed to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse against discriminating state legislation. It was not intended to interfere with private contracts, valid when made and not designed to create impediments to such interCongress authorized the construction of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi River at the city of Dubuque. This bridge rendered entirely useless a contract which had been previously made between a railroad company and an elevator company, by virtue of which all grain brought to that city by the railroad, for the purpose of shipment to points beyond, was to be received by and stored in the elevator at a stipulated rate of compensation. By means of the bridge the cars were able to cross the river without breaking bulk, and there was no longer any necessity for handling and transshipping the grain at the elevator. The Supreme Court held that, under the power given to regulate commerce among the states, Congress could authorize the construction of the bridge; but this exercise of the power had produced no effect upon the contract; that remained in full force, notwithstanding the erection of the bridge had rendered its observance useless to one of the contracting parties.1 § 373 e.2 Tax on Manufactures. This subject was much considered in the late case of Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. Welton sold in Missouri sewing-machines manufactured without that state. He had no license, as a statute of that state required, and was accordingly arrested and fined. The Supreme Court of the state affirmed that judg ment. The first section of the statute in question enacts that "Whoever shall deal in the selling of patent or other medicines, goods, wares, or merchandise, except books, charts, maps, and stationery, which are not the growth, produce, or manufacture of this state, by going from place to place to sell the same, is declared to be a peddler." Other sections prohibit peddling without a license, and provide a penalty. No license is required in selling from place to place the growth, produce, or manufactures of the state. The state statute was held unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Field, in his opinion, said: "The license charge exacted is sought to be maintained as a tax upon a calling. This license tax is, in effect, a tax upon the goods. Commerce is a term of the largest import. It comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all its forms, including the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens of our country and the citizens or subjects of other countries, and between the citizens of different states. The power to regulate it embraces all the instruments by which such commerce may be conducted. "It would be premature to state any rule which would be universal in its application to determine when the commercial power of the federal government over a commodity has ceased and the power of the state has commenced. It is sufficient now to hold that the commercial power continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign character." 1 Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584, 589. 2 This and the following sections, to § 374, were added by the editor. § 373 f. Tax on Passengers. -State laws taxing foreign passengers are also invalid. In the recent case of Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259,1 Miller, J., in an interesting opinion on the right to tax passengers, said: “If it is apparent that the object of this statute, as judged by that criterion [viz., its natural and reasonable effect], is to compel the owners of vessels to pay a sum of money for senger brought by them from a foreign shore and landed at the port of New York, it is as much a tax on passengers, if collected from them, or a tax on the vessel or owners, for the exercise of the right of landing their passengers in that city, as was the statute held void in the Passenger Cases." every pas Attention was then called to the manner of the decision of the Passenger Cases, and the hope was expressed that the present court may be more unanimously agreed. "Commerce," said the learned judge, "means trade, and it means intercourse. It means commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations, in all its branches. includes navigation, as the principal means by which foreign intercourse is effected. To regulate this trade and intercourse is to prescribe the rules by which it shall be conducted." The "Laws governing the transportation of passengers from Liverpool to New York are regulations of commerce. authority under which New York claims to act is her police power." "Whatever may be the nature and extent of that power, where not otherwise restricted, no definition of it, and no urgency for its use, can authorize a state to exercise it in regard to a subject-matter which has been confided exclusively to the discretion of Congress by the Constitution.” "It is clear, from the nature of our complex form of government, that, whenever the statute of a state invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States, it is void, no matter under what 1 And see Edye v. Robertson, 18 Fed. Rep. 135; Kaeiser v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. Ib. 151; Louisville &c. R. R. v. Tennessee R. R. 19 Ib. 679; III. Cent. R. R. v. Stone, 20 Ib. 468; Cole v. Johnson, 10 Daly, 258. ED. class of powers it may fall, or how closely allied to powers conceded to belong to the states." "It is argued that there is a neutral ground in the regulation of commerce which may be occupied by the states so long as they do not interfere with Congress. This doctrine has never been agreed to in this court without dissent. However, this matter of the transportation of passengers requires exclusive action by Congress. The subject is of international concern. The system ought to be uniform as applied to all the ports of the country." "We are of opinion that this whole subject has been confided to Congress by the Constitution; that Congress can more appropriately and with more acceptance exercise it than any other body known to our law, state or national; that by providing a system of laws in these matters, applicable to all ports and to all vessels, a serious question, which has long been matter of contest and complaint, may be effectually and satisfactorily settled."1 -- § 373 g. Liability for Marine Torts. In Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, it was declared that a statute of Indiana concerning liability for injuries caused by "marine torts (i. e. tort on the Ohio River) does not interfere with the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Mr. Justice Field, in his opinion, says: "In all the cases [where the statute was held to interfere with the power of Congress] the legislation condemned operated directly upon commerce, either by way of tax upon its business, license upon its pursuit in particular channels, or conditions for carrying it on." Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How. 421. The statute in this case "in no respect interferes with any regulations for the navigation and use of vessels. It only declares a general principle respecting the liability of all persons within the jurisdiction of the state for torts resulting in the death of parties injured." “General legislation of this kind, prescribing the liabilities or duties of citizens of a state, without distinction as to 1 See also Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275. ED. pursuit or calling, is not open to any valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." "And it may be said, generally, that the legislation of a state, not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties, and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly and remotely affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or water, or engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or in any other pursuit." § 373 h. Survey of Steamers. The act of the legislature of Louisiana, approved March 6, 1869, in relation to the survey of the hatches of every sea-going steamer arriving at New Orleans, and of the damaged goods coming on board of her, etc., being a regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, is in violation of the Constitution of the United States and therefore void.1 § 373 i. Wharfage Fees. The power of states, or of towns and cities acting under state authority, to regulate the use of wharves on navigable waters, and impose charges for such use, has been often declared. In the late case of Packet Co. v. Keokuk,2 it was said by Strong, J., "The principal question presented by the record of this case is, whether a municipal corporation of a state, having by the law of its organization an exclusive right to make wharves, collect wharfage, and regulate wharfage rates, can, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, charge and collect wharfage proportioned to the tonnage of the vessels from the owners of enrolled and licensed steamboats mooring and landing at the wharves constructed on the banks of a navigable river." "If the charge is clearly a duty, a tax, or burden, which in its essence is a contribution claimed for the privilege of entering the port of Keokuk, or remaining in it, or depart 1 Foster v. Master and Wardens of the Port of New Orleans, 94 U. S. 246. ED. 2 95 U. S. 80; affirmed in Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423. ED. |