committee refused to allow it to be put. Marshall's case, 2nd Lancaster, 18th May, 1848, Min. (a).

When a witness is called with regard to one vote, he ought not then to be cross-examined as to matters affecting another vote. Shaftesbury, F. & F. 370. Held, "that no question could be put in cross-examination which might tend to vitiate or substantiate any other vote in the objected lists." Great Marlow, Bar. & Aust. 49; Wigan, ib. 140; Lyme Regis, ib. 521, 525. A witness called to support an objection to a vote was allowed to be cross-examined as to facts relating to his own vote, for the purpose of discrediting him. Lyme, Bar. & Aust. 459-468.

In a case where a witness had been so cross-examined as to his own vote, with a view to discredit him, the committee allowed his admissions to be read in evidence against him when his own vote was under consideration. Wardle's case, Wigan, Bar. & Aust. 139; Galway, P. & K. 521.

Unless this is agreed to by the other side, this does not seem to be a correct mode of proceeding. The inquiry into each vote is as it were a separate suit, and though the voter is considered a party to the suit, it is only when his own vote is under consideration.

It is usual to require one class of objections to be concluded before another is entered upon. In the Great Marlow case, Bar. & Aust. 98, the committee decided "that one class of objections be exhausted or abandoned before counsel proceed to another class." In the Wigan, Bar. & Aust. 159, the same rule was acted upon; the committee had in this case passed a

(a) 1 P. R. & D. 155.

preliminary resolution to that effect. So likewise in the Nottingham case, Bar. & Arn. 137, the committee passed a preliminary resolution, " that with respect to objected votes the committee expect counsel to exhaust one class of objections before proceeding to another." In the 1st Harwich, 1851, Printed Minutes, 31, the committee acted on this rule.

It happens sometimes that a voter is objected to on several different grounds, and that his name is inserted in different lists, according to the particular class of objection.

This is not an expedient course, for if the committee insist on concluding one list before entering upon another, some of the objections to the voter could not have been heard at the time they decided to retain his name on the poll. In the Kinsale case, 1848, Printed Minutes, 194, an objection was taken to a voter that he had been bribed by the payment of his rates; the objection was heard, and the committee decided to retain the vote. The petitioner's counsel then proposed to pass from that class of bribery by payment of rates, and to attack the same voter on the ground of non-payment of rates. The committee resolved, "That the committee having decided to retain the vote upon the poll, they could not enter into any further objection to it, and they requested to be put into possession of every objection to a vote before they were called upon to decide upon the validity of the same." In one case, where the different objections were in separate classes, the committee postponed their decision until the other class was entered upon. Part's case, Wigan, Bar. & Aust. 163.

It is the usual practice, in cases of scrutiny, for the

parties to give notice to the other side as to what particular cases they intend to proceed with from day to day; this is entirely a matter of arrangement between the parties, and if the list given in one day is not then exhausted, they are not precluded from giving in different names on the following day, subject always to the rule that one class must be exhausted before another is begun. Wigan, Bar. & Aust. 159; see also 1st Harwich, 1851, p. 26; Longford, F. & F. 221.

In the Bedford case, F. & F. 432, the chairman requested that a list of the ten voters whom the petitioners intended first to attack should be given to the agent of the sitting member, and that a copy of the list should be given to the committee, which was accordingly done. A similar order was made in the

Dublin case (a).

In the Ipswich case, F. & F. 292, where the parties differed as to the interpretation to be put upon the notice as to the cases to be proceeded with, the committee refused to interfere to put a construction on a notice ambiguously worded, passing between the parties for their mutual convenience.

In the 2nd Lancaster, 1848, a great number of voters were objected to on each side for having been in the receipt of parochial relief. The counsel for the sitting member applied for an adjournment, that the parties might revise their respective lists; this was agreed to by the other side, and sanctioned by the committee. A great number of cases were, in consequence, abandoned on each side when the committee re-assembled.

Re-opening Case.] Where an objection to a vote (a) 1 P. R. & D. 196.

had been partly gone into, and through a misapprehen sion with regard to certain facts the counsel abandoned the objection, the committee, who in consequence of their immediately adjourning had come to no formal conclusion on the vote, allowed the objection to be reopened and proceeded with. Marlow, Bar. & Aust. 52. See Dundalk, 1 P. R. & D. 96.

Postponement of Cases.] The counsel in support of the vote, at the close of the case against the vote, applied to the committee to have the further consideration of the case postponed on account of the absence of a necessary witness, who had been in attendance on the previous day, but who was not then present. The committee refused the application. 1st Harwich, 1851, p. 175. Similar application refused, ib. p. 226.

In the Reading case, F. & F. 553, the committee adjourned the consideration of a vote to enable the petitioners to procure evidence in support of it.

In the Monmouth case, K. & O. 412, the committee having decided that the evidence should be confined to those witnesses who were examined before the revising barrister, they acceded to an application that the further consideration of the vote should be deferred until those witnesses were produced.

In general, committees are very unwilling to grant an adjournment or postponement of a case, when the occasion for it arises from the default of the parties themselves (a); there is not, however, the same objection to granting the postponement of a particular case, or class of cases, as there is to the adjournment of the committee, as the committee may in the former case proceed with other votes.

(a) Practice, ante, p. 352.

When an unexpected decision has been come to upon some particular vote, committees have often allowed the remainder of the class to be postponed, in order that the parties may consider what course they will adopt; or that they may be able to strengthen the other cases in the class which are affected by the decision. Longford, P. & K. 179; Shaftesbury, F. & F. 365; Bedford, P. & K. 147; refused in New Sarum, P. & K. 260.

When the petitioner has been placed in a majority, the sitting member then reduces the petitioner's poll, and they so continue alternis vicibus, to strike off votes until one is exhausted. Petersfield, P. & K. 46; Wigan, Bar. & Aust. 230.

When two candidates petition against two sitting members, it is not necessary that they should be placed in a majority above both the sitting members before the poll of the latter is attacked. Wigan, Bar. & Aust. 231. The chairman, in this case, refused to interfere, saying that the committee would leave the matter in the hands of counsel. See Kingston-on-Hull, F. & F.

562.

If, at any time, the sitting member withdraws from the inquiry, the petitioner must continue to strike off votes until the person for whom the seat is claimed is in a majority. A committee will not allow the peti tioner to proceed to strike off votes which are objected to, after the majority has been obtained by him. Monaghan, K. & O. 43. In the Carlow County case, K. & O. 471, the committee refused to continue the scrutiny after the petitioners had established a majority in their favour, the defence of the seat having been abandoned.