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be contrary to reason and justice to say that electors had thrown away their votes, because a majority of the non-electors there present had held up their hands for a disqualified candidate.

With regard to the practice of committees in the trial of petitions alleging corrupt practices, the recent statute bas made no alteration. There is, however, one matter which though alluded to before may as well be here noticed. The sixth section of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, imposes a most serious penalty on persons guilty of corrupt acts, viz. perpetual disfranchisement.

“ Whenever it shall be proved before the revising barrister that any person who is or claims to be placed on the list or register of voters for any county, city, or borough has been convicted of bribery or undue influence at an election, or that judgment has been obtained against any such person for any penal sum hereby made recoverable in respect of the offences of bribery, treating, or undue influence, or either of them, then and in that case such revising barrister shall, in case the name of such person is in the list of voters, expunge the same therefrom, or shall, in case such person is claiming to have his name inserted therein, disallow such claim; and the names of all persons whose names shall be so expunged from the list of voters, and whose claims shall be so disallowed, shall be thereupon inserted in a separate list, to be entitled 'The List of Persons disqualified for Bribery, Treating, or undue Influence,' which lastmentioned list shall be appended to the list or register of voters, and shall be printed and published there with,

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wherever the same shall be or is required to be printed or published.”

This disqualification is perpetual and universal. It is not confined to the place at which the offence was committed, but extends to every county and borough in the United Kingdom. As soon as the conviction or judgment for penalties has been proved before any revising barrister, he is bound to strike the name of the person so affected out of the list of voters, and insert it in “ the List of Persons disqualified for Bribery, Treating, and undue Influence.” A voter who receives entertainment at an election is not liable to this serious disqualification. The vote of such a person may be struck off the poll on a scrutiny, for the fourth section provides that "every voter who shall corruptly accept or take any such meat, drink, entertainment, or provision, shall be incapable of voting at such election, and his vote, if given, shall be utterly void and of none effect." Such voter, however, is not liable to be sued for a penalty in so being entertained, and therefore he would not be disqualified beyond the particular election at which his vote was struck off.

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Since the foregoing pages were published, two cases have been decided in the Courts of law upon

the construction of certain clauses in the “Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1854.”

One of these, Grant v. Guiness (a), turned principally upon the construction of the word agent in the 16th section of that act. This was an action brought by an agent employed at the election (not being an agent for election expenses) to recover the amount of his retainer, and of certain expenses incurred by him on behalf of the defendant who had been a candidate at an election for Barnstaple. The defendant pleaded that no bill had been sent in to him, or to any authorized agent of his, within one month, as required by the 16th section. On the trial the plaintiff failed in establishing certain portions of his demand, and with regard to the remainder, it appeared that the plaintiff had sent in an account of his claims to the agent for election expenses, but none to the candidate or to any one authorized by him to receive the accounts. Two questions were raised before the Court of Common Pleas : 1st, Was the agent for election expenses the proper person, by virtue of that appointment, to receive the account ? 2nd, Was it necessary to send in any account at all of those portions of the plaintiff's demand which the jury had found in his favour? Upon the first point the Court were of opinion that the authorized agent, mentioned in the 16th section, was intended to be a different person from the agent

(a) 25 L.J. C. P. 66; S. C. 17 C. B. 190.

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for election expenses ; or, to speak more correctly, that the appointment of a person as agent for election expenses, did not constitute him agent to receive and send in claims against the candidate to the auditorat the same time there was nothing to prevent the two duties being thrown upon

the same person.

As to the other part of the case, the Court decided, that as to all that part of the demand which fell in within the definition of election expenses, the plaintiff could not recover, inasmuch as he had not sent in his claim to the candidate or to his authorized agent within the proper but as to the residue, he was entitled to

This residue consisted, 1st, of the personal expenses of the candidate himself, which the plaintiff had paid at his request, and of these no account need be sent in within the 22nd section (a); 2ndly, of subscriptions to charities, which the 24th section says are not to be deemed election expenses; and, 3rdly, of the charge for an opinion of counsel as to whether the defendant had a good qualification by estate. This latter item the Court held to be no more applicable to the costs and expenses of this election than those of any other election.

time;

recover.

(a) In a recent edition of a well-known work on the law of elections, it is stated, more than once, that it was decided in the case of Grant v. Guiness, that the expression personal expenses of the candidate included the personal expenses (including railway fare and hotel bill) of his agents. This is altogether a misapprehension as to the point decided. The most full report of the case will be found in the Law Journal, and it is there expressly stated that the items of personal expenditure which were allowed, were the hotel bill, cab, railway, &c., being the personal expenses of the defendant on going down to Barnstaple as a candidate. 25 L.J. C. P. 68, ante, p. 65.

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Considerable difficulty will no doubt be found in interpreting the different sections of this statute. Several agents are spoken of in the different sections, whose duties are not necessarily the same as those solely intrusted to the agent for expenses. The 16th section speaks of agents (a) sending in claims to the agent authorized to receive them, who, as we have seen, is not necessarily the agent for election expenses. The agent mentioned in the 17th section is the same as the authorized agent in the 16th. The 18th section speaks of a candidate or his agent naming a banker, through whom bills should be paid. Nothing is said in the section as to who is to draw the cheques which are to be paid by the auditor. The cheques, when drawn, are to be countersigned by the candidate, or some person on his behalf specially appointed for that purpose. Probably it was intended that any one who had a special authority from the candidate might name the banker on whom the cheques were to be drawn, and that the agent for election expenses was to be the person to draw the cheques; for, by the 31st section, such agents, i.e. for election expenses, are the only persons who have authority to expend any money or incur any expenses of or relating to the election. Considering the penal character of the provisions of this statute, it is much to be regretted that these enactments have not been more distinctly worded.

Again, by the 22nd section, the personal expenses of the candidate and the expenses of advertising in newspapers may be defrayed by the candidate himself,

(a) These are all the persons employed by the candidate in conducting the election.

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