hand, the candidate is always responsible for the illegal acts of his agent, even though they have not been authorised by him; Felton v. Easthope (a). It is this very point of distinction which forms the ruling principle in election law upon this subject. No change has been introduced into the law respecting agency by the "Corrupt Practices Prevention Act." All persons who would have been considered agents before will still be so considered, and their agency must be established by the same proof. Agency is usually established by the proof of authority to do lawful acts connected with the business of the election; and the candidate is then made responsible for the acts of such accredited agents; and it is then sought to bring in evidence the acts of those persons whom such accredited agents have employed under them; Middlesex, 2 Peck. 31; Ipswich, 1 Lud. 38; 2nd Ipswich, B. & Aust. 605; Newry, P. & K. 157.

The 31st section of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, to which attention has been before drawn in the chapter on "The Election Auditor," requires each candidate to give to the election auditor, in writing, the names of all the persons whom the candidate has appointed to be his agents for election expenses ; and the section goes on to provide that no other than such agents shall have authority to expend any money, or incur any expenses of, or relating to, the election, in the name or on behalf of the candidate." It is not intended by this to limit the responsibility of the candidate to the acts of such authorised agents; what is intended must be this, that it will not be lawful

(a) Rogers on Elections, 259.

for any other persons than these agents for election expenses to spend money on behalf of the candidate at the election, and if any other persons do so spend money it will be an illegal payment within the act. While this act was under discussion in the House of Commons, a clause was proposed to limit the liability of the candidate to the acts of these authorised agents for expenses, and providing that a candidate duly notify ing the appointment of his agents to the election auditor should not have his election avoided, by reason of any illegal acts done by any other person than himself, or his agent or agents named in writing to the election officer, according to the provisions of this act, unless such illegal act shall be proved to have been done by his authority or sanction. This clause was negatived by 114 to 79 (a).

If one of the persons named as an agent for election expenses were to participate in any way in any species of corrupt practice, the election, upon proof of such misconduct, would at once be avoided. This, however, will not often happen; the persons selected as the agents for expenses will probably be respectable men of business, who will hold as much aloof as possible from the lower matters of the election. As is observed by Mr. Rogers: "When bribery is in contemplation, the accredited agent of the candidate, like the candidate himself, is studiously kept in ignorance of what is going on; his employment is strictly limited to what is legal. It would be as reasonable to expect to prove that a candidate had given to an agent written instructions to bribe, as to discover that the persons engaged

(a) 28 July, 1854, 109 Journals, 448.

in giving money to voters were his confidential agents. It seems that the true rule is to hold a candidate responsible for the acts of those whose services he pays for or adopts, without reference to the degree of confidence he may be supposed to have placed in them" (a).

It has been usual, heretofore, in election inquiries, to fix some one or two persons as the principal agents of the candidate, through whom the authority of the other persons employed, and whose acts are impugned, is derived. In order to establish this chain of authority and responsibility, it has been customary to commence by showing that certain persons made the preliminary arrangements for the election,-ordered the printing of addresses, -inserted advertisements in newspapers,-engaged committee rooms and messengers to attend them,-or made the arrangements about the hustings and polling booths, or paid the legal expenses of the election when it was over. It will be seen that by the provisions of the new act, a great portion of these duties will devolve upon the agents for election expenses, and if they carefully abstain from interfering in the canvassing at the election, and confine themselves to the duties of their appointments, there will probably be greater difficulty than before in proving agency. That lower class of agents who transact the dirty work of an election, and when necessary, superintend the bribery, treating, and kidnapping of voters, seldom come in contact with the candidate himself. The mode of connecting them with him has been by showing that they have derived their

(a) Rogers on Elections, 258.

authority to act in the election from the superior agents of the candidate, whose authority, as already mentioned, was proved by the performance of divers legal acts. But as this latter part of the proof may hereafter be wanting, it will become more difficult to connect the parties actually engaged in the corrupt practices with the candidate.

The agency, however, must in all cases be established, and it will usually be done by the proof of a greater number of small matters relating to the election, in which the alleged agents are brought into communication with the candidate himself, or his accredited agents. These matters, however, in order to afford any evidence of agency, ought to be of such a nature as to import that some confidence was thereby placed in the alleged agent.

Canvassing]. The question has often been discussed whether canvassing affords any evidence of agency in the person so employed. In the case of Felton v. Easthope, before cited, Lord Tenterden says: "It is perfectly true, if an agent who may be employed for various purposes to canvass, &c., does, without the knowledge, privity, or approbation of the principal, promise a sum of money, the principal is not liable to be sued under this act for the penalty," &c. Canvassing is here mentioned, as one of the employments in which an agent would probably be engaged; but it can hardly have been intended that a person was to be considered an agent because he was employed to canvass (a). It is usually one of the circumstances proved in order to establish agency.

(a) In the Nottingham case, B. & Arn. 164, Mr. Austin

In the Mitchell case, 1 Luders, 83, it was held, that evidence of canvassing with the sitting member was not sufficient proof of agency. The Norwich committee came to similar decision; P. & K. 576.

In this same case, frequent canvassing in company with the sitting member, together with the payment of a bill for beer consumed at a public house in the interest of the sitting member, was held sufficient to establish agency. See also Cirencester case, 1 Peck. 466.

In estimating what weight should be attached to the fact of canvassing in company with the candidate, a committee would probably inquire whether the alleged agent joined the canvassing party at the request of the candidate, or of his own choice; in this latter case, it would not be just to attach any importance to his presence with the candidate, for the latter can have placed no confidence in the person so joining his party. When, however, it can be shown that a man has been daily, or very frequently in the company of the candidate, with the canvass book in his hand, going from house to house, noting down promises and refusals, and then, it may be, returning to the committee-room with the candidate to reckon up the result of the day's canvass, this would afford very strong prima facie evidence of agency. It would, however, always be open to the explanation, that such person was employed for the purpose of canvassing only, on account of his intimate acquaintance with the persons and residences of the voters, and that the

speaks of the passage above referred to as a loose and imperfect note of an obiter dictum at Nisi Prius."