ment of money only; and in order that a person contributing any money towards the expenses of the election should become liable to the penalties of bribery, he must know that the money is to be spent, or is in repayment of money that has been spent in bribery; or he must have contributed the money that it should be applied in bribery. Money advanced to pay voters after an election will be as much bribery as money contributed to reward voters on a distinct corrupt understanding before the election. If the mode in which the money is intended to be spent, or has been spent, amounts to bribery within the statute, the advancing it for such a purpose will also be bribery. It is by no means an uncommon practice for a candidate to pay a large sum of money into the hands of two or three persons, or into the hands of a banker, with permission to certain persons to draw upon such sum of money. This occurs most frequently at elections where it is considered expedient that a candidate should know as little as possible of the means used to procure his return. Were the money so paid in to be expended wholly or partly in bribery, would such candidate be guilty of bribery within the statute? Such conduct would be very suspicious to say the least. A jury, if nothing more was proved against him, would probably acquit him on a charge of misdemeanor, and might not find him liable to a penalty in a penal action; but before a committee of the House of Commons his seat would be in great jeopardy. If money, so paid, were illegally applied, the persons drawing out the money would no doubt be considered the agents of the candidate. And unless the candidate gave to the election auditor a particular account of the way in which such money had been applied (a), a strong presumption would be raised that he had given permission to apply such money in any way, legal or illegal, that might best secure his election. Hitherto we have been considering bribery as the act of the corrupter; but it may exist equally on the part of the voter. Sect. 3. The following persons are also to be deemed guilty of bribery : 1. Every voter who shall, before or during any election, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, receive, agree, or contract for any money, gift, loan, or valuable consideration, office, place, or employment, for himself or for any other person, for voting or agreeing to vote, or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting at any election. 2. Every person who shall, after any election, directly or indirectly, by himself, or by any other person on his behalf, receive any money or valuable consideration on account of any person having voted or refrained from voting, or having induced any other person to vote, or to refrain from voting at any election. Every person so offending will be guilty of a misdemeanor and liable also to forfeit the sum of ten pounds in penal action (b). (a) Ante, p. 65. (b) It will be seen that this third section does not make the "asking" for a bribe an act of bribery; it was so under the 2 Geo. 2, c. 24. The present statute, while it makes the offer of a bribe to a voter an act of bribery, which it was not before, removes the asking for a bribe from the statutory definition of the offence. The first part of this section contemplates those more corrupt cases of bribery, where there is a bargain, contract, or understanding on the part of the voter that he is to receive some reward, either before or after he has voted, on account of the way he may exercise his franchise at the election. There is little to be added on this subject to what has been previously said. Whatever it is corrupt on the part of one man to give, it is corrupt on the part of another to take. The acceptance of colourable employment by a voter, though nothing was said as to his vote at the time he was engaged, will amount to bribery on his part. So also the acceptance of money previous to the election by a voter, who had already promised his vote free from any corrupt motive, would no doubt be considered a bribe by a committee of the House of Commons. Chatham, 1853 (a). The mind of the voter ought to be free from bias until the last moment of giving or withholding his vote; Allen v. Hearn, 1 T. R. 56. It is on petitions praying a scrutiny that the question of bribery as affecting the voter is most frequently considered. Wagers with voters on the result of an election have frequently been held to invalidate their votes, even when no corrupt intention appeared, either on the part of the voter, or the party betting with him; New Windsor (b), Worcester (c). In the case of Allen Hearn, Buller, J. observed, "If you put the case of a wager between a voter and another person who is not one, it is a palpable bribe." Some committees, on (a) 2 P. R. & D. 35. (b) K. & O. 191, 193, 194, 195. the other hand, have refused to strike off a yoter from the poll, on account of his having made a wager on the election, unless a corrupt intention appeared. Youghal, F. & F. 404; Monmouth, K. & O. 416 (a). Were a voter to receive reward just before he voted, or immediately after he voted, there seems to be little doubt that he would be liable to an indictment, although no positive evidence could be produced of any previous agreement. A strong opinion was expressed by a very learned judge upon this question in a recent case of Rex v. Thwaites (b). This was a rule calling upon J. Thwaites to shew cause why a quo warranto information should not be exhibited against him, one ground being that many of the persons who had voted for him had been bribed to induce them so to vote. It appeared from the affidavits that several of the burgesses, as soon as they had voted for Thwaites, received from his agent tickets, which they were directed to take to an inn. When they arrived at the inn, they were shown into a room where an agent of Thwaites gave them, upon their presenting the tickets, the sum of 2s. 6d., and also one or two 4d. tickets for ale and spirits. It was contended, on the part of the defendant, that these men were not bribed, because it must be assumed that there was no previous corrupt contract or agreement, that no inducement had been held out before the votes were given, for none was stated in the affidavits, and that to constitute bribery, under the (a) Rogers on Elections, 253; Clerk on Elect. Com. 104. (b) 22 L. J. Q. B. 238; S. C. 1 E. & B. 704. Municipal Corporation Act (a), (5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 54,) there must have been a corrupt contract; and the case of Lord Huntingtower v. Gardiner, 1 B. & C. 297, was relied upon to show that there was no bribery without a previous agreement to pay. Lord Campbell, C. J., observed in the course of the argument, "The giving and receiving of the ticket is evidence, from which a previous agreement might be inferred. We cannot assume that there was no previous agreement." The rule was afterwards discharged. Lord Campbell, C. J. said, "I am of opinion that this rule. ought to be discharged. If it turned on the objection as regards the charge of bribery, I should have thought the rule ought to have been absolute, because there is evidence from which the jury would be justified in finding that there had been a previous agreement that 28. 6d. was to be received, and that upon such agreement the votes were given; but if all the votes objected to on that ground be struck off, Thwaites still has a majority." This was the view taken by the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench, in a case depending on a statute in which the payment of money after an election, on account of a person having voted, was not forbidden. The second division of the third statute is passed expressly to prohibit a voter from receiving money for his vote after an election. It has already been pointed (a) This section defines bribery as "the asking, taking, agreeing for, or contracting for reward to give or forbear to give a vote." These words are the same as those in 2 Geo. 2, c. 24, and neither act contains the words, "or for having voted." |