on the evidence, that there was no willful default or deceptive intention, or intent to defraud or mislead the public, on the part of the plaintiff. The evidence shows that the plaintiff believed, when he took the reissue, that a sectional pavement could be made of plastic concrete, without interposing anything between the blocks. He may not have experimented as much as he ought to have done before arriving at that conclusion. He may have arrived at it on insufficient and inadequate grounds. Still, if he acted in good faith, it was a mistake. If he made experiments and drew a conclusion from them not wholly baseless, it was not a willful default, although other persons may, from other information, have been of a different opinion, and although other persons would have been slow to draw the same conclusion the plaintiff did from the premises before him. So, too, although the experiments and the conclusion were made and arrived at after the original patent was taken out, in such wise as to destroy the validity of the reissue so far as such conclusion was concerned, it was proper to make the disclaimer in question in order to avoid the effect of inserting in the reissue matter which amounted, if true, to an invention made after the granting of the original patent. The plaintiff states in his affidavit made November 22, 1878, that he has never known any cement pavement constructed in sec. tions formed on the ground for actual use in outdoor work, without the interposition of something while the material was in a plastic state to form or complete the joints. There is nothing in this that is inconsistent with his statement in the same affidavit that he believed, when he took his reissue, that the concrete, in setting, would shrink, and that after one section had been formed another section might be formed of the plastic material directly against and in contact with the one already formed, and the blocks, when completed, would be detached; nor any thing inconsistent with the fair result of the evidence. The experiments on which he rested his belief were not pavements in sections formed on the ground for actual use in outdoor work. As to the conversations with the plaintiff, testified to by witnesses, they are too vague and unreliable to be satisfactory. The fact that the plaintiff in the fall of 1874 laid, in Washington, from 2,000 to 3,000 square feet of concrete pave. ment in sections, without anything being interposed between the blocks, with the intention that it should be a pavement of detached blocks, such as his specification describes, shows that he had not, at that time, abandoned the idea that a pavement of detached blocks could be made in that way. It was not till January, 1875, that it clearly appeared that such pavement was a pavement of adhering blocks and not a pavement of detached blocks. The foregoing observations serve to show that there was no unreasonable neglect or delay in not filing until March 1, 1875, the disclaimer in question. The remaining defense set up in the amended answer is founded on the first subdivision of section 4920 of the Revised Statutes, and is to the effect that, for the purpose of deceiving the public, the description and specification filed by the patentee in the Patent Office, and which is contained in the reissued patent, was made to contain less than the whole truth relative to his alleged invention or discovery, or more than is necessary to produce the desired effect, and that the patent is, therefore, void. This defense fails because, as has been held, there was no purpose of deceiving the public; and also because, the disclaimer being now a part of the specification, the specification is not open to the alleged objection. The defenses set up are overruled as not sustained by the evidence, and a decree to that effect will be entered. [United States Circuit Court-Northern District of New York.] WILLIAMS v. THE BOSTON AND ALBANY RAILROAD COMPANY. 16 O. G., 906. 1. Although the subordinate combinations will not produce a useful result without the addition of other parts necessary to make the complete article (a locomotivelamp), they are nevertheless sufficient to sustain the patent, because, by their co-operation, they contribute to a new result, and may be used in conjunction with such other parts as are ordinarily employed in locomotive head-lights. 2. Alleged anticipations of a patented combination must show not merely the devices or elements themselves, but show them constructed and arranged substantially as in the patent, and having the same mode of operation. 3. Where the defendant employs all the parts in combination covered by the claims of the patent, infringement is not escaped, because others are employed in addition. 4. Mere delay in bringing suit for infringement is not sufficient to establish an abandonment or dedication of the patent. There must be an acquiescence in the appropriation of the right of such character as reasonably to induce the belief that the owner intended to relir quish it to the public use. Messrs. Wetmore & Jenner for complainant. WALLACE, J.: The case of Williams v. The Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg Railroad Company (15 OFFICIAL GAZETTE, 653) is a controlling authority upon many of the questions now presented. In that case the validity of the reissue of complainant's patent was necessarily determined, as was also the novelty of the several combinations claimed so far as this was assailed by the patents then introduced as anticipations. Not only did Judge Blatchford sustain as patentable the entire combination in complainant's organized locomotive-lamp, but also the sub-combinations covered by the several claims in the patent. In the present case, therefore, it must be held that, although the subordinate combinations will not produce a useful result without the addition of other parts necessary to make a locomotive-lamp, they are nevertheless sufficient to sustain the patent, because, by their co-operation, they contribute to a new result, and may be used in conjunction with such other parts as are ordinarily employed in locomotive head-lights. It then becomes necessary to ascertain whether the novelty of any of these combinations is disproved by the patents and devices now relied on as anticipations which were not introduced in the former case. To this end the inquiry is whether the alleged anticipations contain parts constructed and arranged substantially like those of complainant and have the same mode of operation. To illustrate: the first claim is for a combination of the circular hollow wick-tube, perforated air-screen for the exterior current of air, and cap-deflector, substantially as set forth. This claim does not cover the use of these three devices in combination irrespective of the manner of construction and arrangement. The correct rule of construction is one which will give the patentee what he has really invented, so far as is consistent with the language of his description and claim, both of which are to be read together; and when, as in this case, all the parts are conceded in the description to be old, and their efficiency is referred to their peculiarity of construction and arrangement, it is this peculiarity which is the essence of the invention. Applying this rule, it is not contended that the defendant can rely upon any of the alleged antici pations except the English patent of Quincy and Johnson and the lamp of Dyolt, because the others plainly fail to present the complainant's combination. Every claim of the patent except the fifth covers a combination of which the hollow wick-tube and cap-deflector are parts. The fifth claim is for the combination of the hollow wick-tube, lateral oilreservoir, and perforated air-screen for the interior current of air, substantially as set forth. The Quincy and Johnson patent discloses a device called a "blower" interposed between the cap-deflector and hollow wick-tube, which it would seem is a necessary feature in their arrangement as respects each other, and materially affects their mode of operation, and which suffices to distinguish the construction and arrangement of these parts from the complainant's. This patent is, however, in my judgment, an anticipation of the fifth claim of the complainant. The orifices which admit the air for the interior current, together with the interior screen, are equivalents for the complainant's devices, and break up the current of air sufficiently to prevent material flickering of the flame from the pressure of air in the head-light. The differences between the wick-tube and the lateral oil-reservoir of Quincy and Johnson and those of complainant are not substantial. The Dyolt lamp, assuming it to have been perfected like the mode!, does not contain the cap-deflector nor the circular hollow wick-tube of complainant, nor equivalents therefor, and therefore does not anticipate any claim in the patent. The defendant employs all the parts in combination covered by the claims of complainant's patent, and cannot escape liability for infringement because it employs others in addition. The defendant insists that the proofs show that since the complainant acquired his patent he has abandoned or dedicated the same to public use. This defense is not set up in the answer, and there is nothing in the record to apprise the complainant that such an issue was to be raised in the case. This alone is sufficient to deprive the defendant of the right to rely upon this defense. It is proper to say, however, that while the evidence shows such laches on the part of the complainant in enforcing his rights, that upon a motion for a preliminary injunction it is very doubtful if he would not be defeated. It is not sufficient to establish the defense of abandonment or dedication. Mere delay in enforcing equitable rights is not a defense to an action, except in cases where the statutes of limitation apply, or where the party has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for such a length of time that his claim has become stale. There may be an acquiescence by an owner in the use of his property under circumstances which amount to an equitable estoppel against the assertion of his right. The case made here is not one for the application of this doctrine. According to the statement of the complainant he has never permitted it to be doubted that eventually he should enforce his rights under his patent. Neither does mere delay or acquiescence establish an abandonment or dedication of the patent; there must be an acquiescence in the appropriation of the right of such character as reasonably to induce the belief that the owner intended to relinquish it to the public use. Inasmuch as complainant's patent has expired since the bill was filed, the decree will be for an accounting only. [United States Circuit Court-Eastern District of Wisconsin.] KING v. TROSTEL ET AL. Decided April, 1879. 16 O. G., 956. The device covered by the following claim-"As an article of manufacture, the bale B of plasterers' hair, consisting of several bundles, A, containing a bushel each, by weight, inclosed or (incased in paper bags or similar material, united, compressed,, and secured to form a package, substantially as specified"-does not involve invention and is not patentable. Letters Patent No. 152,560, granted June 30, 1874, to Wendell R. King, are void. Messrs. Jenkins, Elliott & Winkler for complainant. DRUMMOND, J.: This is a bill filed by the plaintiff against the defendants to restrain them from manufacturing and selling a kind of bale called "Plasteringhair Bale," which the plaintiff claims to belong to him by virtue of let ters patent issued to him on the 30th day of June, 1874. The plaintiff invented, as he alleges, a peculiar method of putting up plastering-hair in bales so as to constitute it an article of manufacture protected by the patent issued to him. He says in his specification that Heretofore plastering-hair has been packed in a mass, or a certain number of bushels baled together, varying in amount as to the order required, so that when received the retail dealer was compelled to parcel out the same and weigh it to suit his customers. Hair had been previously put up in large bags, barrels, or boxes, so that when it was called for by a customer it had to be taken out of this large package, and, generally being more or less dirty, it was disagreeable to separate one part of the hair from another, and the plaintiff claims that he supplied a desideratum in the trade by putting it up in small parcels and tying or fastening them together so as to constitute what he terms a "bale." It is assumed that the hair is in a proper condition to be packed, and that being so, he describes his mode of packing. He says: I first place a bushel of hair in a paper sack, loosely, or only so far packed as may be readily done by hand. Several of these one-bushel packages are then placed side by side in a baling-press. I use for this purpose the baling-press heretofore patented to me. They are thus compressed forcibly together, so that the bale produced will be a compact, firm bale, occupying only about one-fifth of the original bulk. The paper bags, which still envelop the individual bushels of the bale, keep said bushels separate, and serve at the same time to protect the hair. He claims that when the hair is thus put up in bushels and fastened together in the mode designated, so as to form a bale, it constitutes an article of manufacture, the subject of a patent, and that it is a very convenient mode in which hair can be sold in small parcels, so as to meet a common demand upon dealers. The claim at the end of the specifications is as follows: As an article of manufacture, the bale B of plasterers' hair, consisting of several bundles, A, containing a bushel each, by weight, inclosed or incased in paper bags or similar material, united, compressed, and secured to form a package, substantially as specified. And the question is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a patent for putting plasterers' hair in packages and fastening them together in the manner described so as to constitute a bale. I am of the opinion that he is not. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether, taking the whole package together, compressed in a baling-press which has been patented to him, as he states, it is such an article as the patent law protects, because I do not understand that the bale of the defendants, which is claimed to be an infringement of the plaintiff's patent, has been compressed in the same manner as the bale of the plaintiff, and therefore, strictly speaking, it is not the bale described by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff's patent is construed so as to include any mode of pressure by which the bale is formed out of small packages of plasterers' hair, as his counsel seems to claim, then I think the patent cannot be sustained |