case, the solicitor's fee of twenty dollars will not be allowed. (Coy v. Perkins, 13 Fed. Rep. 111.) It is only where some question of law or fact involved in or leading to the final disposition of the case has been submitted or presented for consideration that the fee of twenty dollars is warranted, as where the court on motion and argument dismisses an appeal for irregularity. (Coy v. Perkins, 13 Fed. Rep. 111; Hayford v. Griffith, 3 Blatchf. 79) If parties waive a jury trial, a docket fee of only ten dollars can be taxed. (Jones v. Schell, 8 Blatchf. 79.) It is allowable in a circuit court when a cause on appeal is on the calendar for hearing, and dismissed for want of security for costs. (Hayford v. Griffith, 3 Blatchf. 79.) A docket fee of twenty dollars is taxable in cases of involuntary but not in cases of voluntary bankruptcy. (Miller v. Scott, 2 Bank. Reg. 86.) If tried before the court, and the petition dismissed, it may be allowed to defendant's attorney, but it cannot be taxed in favor of the attorney of the petitioning creditor. (Davidson v. Coates, 6 Bank. Reg. 304.) So when there is no denial and no contest, it cannot be allowed. (In re Mead, 8 Phila. 174.) Proceedings before a master upon a reference for an interlocutory purpose is neither a trial nor a final hearing, and the docket fee cannot be allowed therefor (Doughty v. Manuf. Co., 4 Fish. 318); nor can a docket fee be allowed upon exceptions to a commissioner's report. (Beck with v. Easton, 4 Ben. 357.) Defendant in a suit in equity dismissed for want of prosecution is not entitled to a docket fee of twenty dollars. (Wigton v. Brainerd, 24 Blatchf. 18; Ryan v. Gould, 32 Fed. Rep. 754; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 684.) A special master in chancery is not a referee, within the meaning of this section providing a docket fee of twenty dollars in certain cases. (Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 684.) Such fee is always taxed in a law case, where there is a final trial before a jury. The court determines who is the prevailing party. (Williams v. Morrison, 32 Fed. Rep. 682.)

Depositions.-The attorney of the prevailing party is entitled to the pay of two dollars and a half for each deposition admitted in evidence, when it is agreed that they

may be read on the trial (Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. Rep. 271), although the witness attended and was sworn and examined (Beckwith v. Easton, 4 Ben. 357); but if the depositions taken and used in the district court are read from the apostils of the circuit court, no fee is taxable in the circuit court. (Dedekam v. Vose, 3 Blatchf. 77.) The cost of taking a deposition de bene esse may be taxed (Fry v. Yeaton, I Cranch C. C. 550); but if the party dispenses with the deposition and examines the witness, the costs of the deposition cannot be taxed (Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Wood. & M. 63); nor will the fees of illegible depositions be allowed. (The Avid, 3 Ben. 434.) The fee for depositions relates to testimony taken out of court under such authority as will entitle it to be read as evidence in court at the trial or hearing. (Troy I. & N. Factory v. Corning, 7 Blatchf. 16.) Courts of the United States will allow the same fees to any one taking a deposition as is allowed by the Revised Statutes to clerks of courts and commissioners (Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. Rep. 271); but a fee for an ex parte affidavit in a proceeding for a preliminary injunction is not allowable. (Stimpson v. Brooks, 3 Blatchf. 456.)

Expenses-Allowance. The statute does not prohibit the allowance of such disbursements as are rendered necessary by the order of court. (Dennis v. Eddy, 12 Blatchf. 95.) So if the rule of court requires papers or briefs to be printed, their expenses may be taxed as costs. (Neff v. Pennoyer, 3 Sawyer, 385; Dennis v. Eddy, 12 Blatchf. 195; Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story, 553.) So the cost of printing the record on appeal to the Supreme Court (Railroad Co. v. The Collector, 96 U. S. 594), or the record preparatory to a final hearing, may be taxed (Jordan v. Agawam Wool. Co., 3 Cliff. 239); but the expense of printing testimony (Hussey v. Bradley, 5 Blatchf. 210; Troy I. & N. Factory v. Corning, 7 Blatchf. 16; Spaulding v. Tucker, 2 Sawy. 50), or a statement of the case for the use of the judges, cannot be taxed as costs. (The Perseverance, 3 Dall. 336.) The cost of copies of assignments appropriate to the case may be taxed (Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Wood. & M. 63), and the amount paid for telegraphic dispatches in the suit is allowable, where by affi

davit it is shown to have been properly and necessarily expended (Hussey v. Bradley, 5 Blatchf. 210); so postage paid on the transmission and return of a commission may be allowed. (Prouty v. Draper, 2 Story, 199.) The expense of a survey may be charged against both parties in equal shares. (Whipple v. Cumberland C. Co., 3 Story, 84.) The expenses of such models as are copies of models in the patent office is allowable (Hussey v. Bradley, 5 Blatchf. 211), and their actual value is taxable (Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Wood. &. M. 63); but not the expense of procuring other models. (Hussey v. Bradley, 5 Blatchf. 210; Woodruff v. Barney, 2 Fish. 244; Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Wood. & M. 63.) So the expense of the model of the infringing machine is not allowable (Parker v. Bigler, 1 Fish. 285); nor is defendant entitled to the cost of procuring a copy of plaintiff's patent. (Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Wood. & M. 63; Woodruff v. Barney, 2 Fish. 244.) Expenditures for copies of pleadings and proofs are not taxable; and in the absence of an agreement to that effect, the expense of reporting argument of plaintiff's counsel on final hearing (Hussey v. Bradley, 5 Blatchf. 210), or the expense of a stenographic reporter, is not taxable as costs. (Bridges v. Sheldon, 18 Blatchf. 507.) This section does not apply to costs for travel and attendance; these are allowed by rule of court. (Nichols v. Brunswick, 3 Cliff. 88; Whipple v. Cumberland C. Co., 3 Story, 84; Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Wood. & M. 63. See Sebring v. Ward, 4 Wash. C. C.; United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. 271.)

$ 293. Fees in revenue cases. -There shall be taxed and paid to every district attorney two per centum upon all moneys collected or realized in any suit or proceeding arising under the revenue laws, and conducted by him, in which the United States is a party, which shall be in lieu of all costs and fees in such proceeding. (Rev. Stats. sec. 825.)

Note. This section applies to cases arising under the internal revenue laws. (U.S. v. Barrels, 2 Bond, 7.) It ap

plies only to cases where the money is collected or realized. (King v. U. S., 99 U. S. 229.) Its provisions are not affected by the act of June 22, 1874. (18 U. S. Stats. 186; U. S. v. One Horse, 7 Ben. 405.) The terms "collected" and realized" are synonymous. The Pacific, Deady, 192) This section establishes a rule of compensation as to the government attorney King v. U. S., 99 U. S. 229), who is entitled to two per cent. on the amount received (U. S. v. Barrels, 2 Bond, 7), unless the claimant procures a remission of the forfeiture. (The Pacific, Deady, 192.) The per centum is in the nature of a contingent upon the collection of the money. (The Pacific, Deady, 192.) In case of a discovery of fraud in another district, he is entitled to percentage only on the proportionate amount received on the seizure in his district. (U. S. v. Barrels, 2 Bond, 7.) In case of a compromise, the taxation may be made after the case is dismissed. (U. S. v. Barrels, 2 Bond, 7) In revenue cases the district attorney, clerk, and marshal may retain their fees out of the moneys collected. (U. S. v. Cigars, 2 Fed. Rep. 494. See United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. 271.)

$294. Fees on bonds, when not allowed. No fee shall accrue to any district attorney on any bond left with him for collection, or in a suit commenced on any bond for the renewal of which provision is made by law, unless the party neglects to apply for such renewal for more than twenty days after the maturity of the bond. (Rev. Stats. sec. 826.)

Note. See United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. 271.

$ 295. Fees for defense of revenue officers.-When a district attorney appears by direction of the secretary or solicitor of the treasury, on behalf of any officer of the revenue in any suit against such officer, for any act done by him, or for the recovery of any money received by him and paid into the treasury in the performance of his

official duty, he shall receive such compensation as may be certified to be proper by the court in which the-suit is brought and approved by the secretary of the treasury. [See sec. 4646.] (Rev. Stats. sec.

827.)

Note. The attorney should be allowed such compensation as should be certified by the court to be reasonable and proper, and approved by the secretary of the treasury. (White v. Arthur, 10 Fed. Rep. 87.) The words "officer of the revenue" mean an officer of the revenue from customs. (Campbell v. James, 18 Blatchf. 186; see Campbell v. James, 3 Fed. Rep. 515; United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. 271.)

$ 296. Clerk's fees.-For issuing and entering every process, commission, summons, capias, execution, warrant, attachment, or other writ, except a writ of venire, or a summons or subpœna for witness, one dollar.

For issuing a writ of summons or subpoena, twenty-five cents.

For filing and entering every declaration, plea, or other paper, ten cents.

For administering an oath or affirmation, except to a juror, ten cents.

For taking an acknowledgment, twenty-five

cents.

For taking and certifying depositions to file, twenty cents for each folio of one hundred words. For a copy of such deposition furnished to a party on request, ten cents a folio.

For entering any return, rule, order, continuance, judgment, decree, or recognizance, or drawing any bond, or making any record, certificate, return, or report, for each folio, fifteen cents.