is in the hands of a receiver of a State court, may appear in such court and remove the cause where attachments are filed on its property. (Second Nat. Bank v. N. Y. Silk Manuf. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 532.) If a foreign corporation appears and removes a suit, it is too late to except to the process by which it is brought into the State court, or that not being an inhabitant, or found within the district, the suit could not have been commenced in this court. (Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 212.) Where a citizen of the State joined with a foreign insurance company to recover from a non-resident corporation for a total loss by negligence, the suit is not removable. (First Pres. Soc. v. Goodrich T. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 257; 10 Biss. 312.

Assignees.—A suit may be removed although it is brought by the assignee of a chose in action (Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Barclay v. Commissioners, 1 Woods, 254; but see Ayers v. Western R. R. Corp., 32 How. Pr. 351; New Orleans C. & B. Co. v. Recorder, 27 La. An. 291; Colcord v. Wall, 2 Miles, 459), in his own name and in pursuance of a State law (Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 6 Wall. 134; but see Anderson v. Manuf. Bank, 14 Abb. Pr. 436); or by the assignee of a contract to recover damages for its breach (Barney v. Globe Bank, 5 Blatchf. 107); but a defendant cannot acquire the right to a removal by the purchase of the interests of his co-defendants (Temple v. Smith, 4 Fed. Rep. 392); but a deferdant may remove a suit brought against him by an assignee, the assignee being the citizen of another State, though the assignor in whose favor the debt was contracted belongs to the same State as defendant. (Waterbury v. City of Laredo, 3 Woods, 371; Leutz v. Butterfield, 7 Daly, 24.) Where a citizen transfers mortgage notes to a foreigner, for the purpose of giving jurisdiction, not accompanied with an agreement for a retransfer, the circuit court will take jurisdiction of the cause when removed (Marion v. Ellis, 10 Fed. Rep. 410); and so as to the transfer of lands (De Laveaga v. Williams, 6 Sawy. 573); and the fact that the motive was to bring the suit will not impair the right of action. (Foot v. Town of Hancock, 15 Blatchf. 343.) A bona fide conveyance of property in controversy, for

the express purpose of conferring jurisdiction, is no ground for remanding a cause to the State court. (Hoyt v. Wright, 4 Fed. Rep. 168; 2 McCrary, 222.) So the right to sue is not invalidated by the fact that the note was transferred for the purpose of giving the court jurisdiction (Lanning v. Lockett, 11 Fed. Rep. 814; 4 Woods, 455; S. C., 10 Fed. Rep. 451); but a transfer mala fide in one State to the citizens of another will not enable the grantee to maintain ejectment in the United States court. (Greenwalt v. Tucker, 10 Fed. Rep. 884; 3 McCrary, 450.) The circuit court has no jurisdiction where the nominal parties have been made parties collusively to bring the controversy within its jurisdiction. (Marion v. Ellis, 9 Fed. Rep. 367; see Hawes v. Contra Costa W. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 93, note.) Where parties convey land to a stranger, a citizen of another State, without his knowledge and without consideration, for the purpose of creating jurisdiction in the United States courts, the transaction was only colorable and collusive, and the suit must be dismissed. (Coffin v. Haggin, 11 Fed. Rep. 219; 7 Sawy. 509.) A plaintiff brought into the controversy by assignment, merely that he may acquire a standing to enable him to prosecute in the interest of the original party, is improperly and collusively made a party to the suit, (Fountain v. Town of Angelica, 12 Fed. Rep. 8; 20 Blatchf. 348.) The sections of the Act of March 3, 1875, should be construed together, and the remedy should not be allowed where the plaintiff is assignee, unless the assignee might have brought suit in the Federal court. (Berger v. Douglas Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 23; but see Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387; Green v. Custard, 23 How. 484.)

Nominal parties.-The non-joinder of nominal or unnecessary parties will not defeat the right to a removal. (Wood v. Davis, 18 How. 467; Ward v. Arredondo, 1 Paine, 410; Arapahoe Co. v. Kansas P. R. Co., 4 Dill. 277; Edgerton v. Gilpin, 3 Woods, 277; Fisk v. Chicago, R. Í. & P. R. Co., 53 Barb. 472; Mayor etc. v. Cummins, 47 Ga. 321; Calloway v. Ore Knob Co., 74 N. C. 200.) They are not to be treated as parties, although made parties to the suit. (Livingston v. Gibson, 4 Johns. Ch.‍94;

James v. Thurston, 6 R. I. 428.) So if a citizen of the State where suit is brought is not a necessary party, and his presence is not essential, the non resident defendant may remove, although the former does not unite in the petition (Hatch v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 105; Ex parte Girard, 3 Wall. Jr. 263; Hadley v. Dunlap, 10 Ohio St. 1; Livingston v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 94; contra, Wilson v. Blodget, 4 McLean, 363); and where all the defendants join but one, and that one is an unneces sary party, the cause may be removed. (Cooke v. Seligman, 7 Fed. Rep. 263; 17 Blatchf. 452.) So if a plaintiff is a citizen of another State, he may remove the cause if some of the defendants, citizens of another State, are merely nominal parties. (Akerly v. Vilas, Biss. 110; see Sands v. Smith, 1 Dill. 290.) The right to a removal is not affected by the fact that a defendant, a citizen of the same State, is a proper but not an indispensable party to a separable controversy. (Barney v. Latham, 2 Morr. Trans. 638.) Where the real party to a controversy is clearly entitled to have his rights passed upon by the courts of the United States, he is entitled to remove, although the nominal party has no such right. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.) So where a landlord, the real owner, assumes the defense, he makes himself a party, and being the real defendant may remove the cause if he be a citizen of a State other than that of the plaintiff. (Greene v. Klinger, 10 Fed. Rep. 689.) And when a tenant in possession disclaims title, she may have her landlord substituted as defendant (State v. Lewis, 12 Fed. Rep. 1); but it is otherwise if the tenant does not disclaim, which all must join. (Allin v. Robinson, 1 Dill. 119. And an alien, a real party in interest, may remove a suit brought against him by the State. (State v. Lewis, 12 Fed. Rep. 1; State v. Texas Pac. R. R. Co., 3 Woods, 308.) Though the nominal party be a party on the record, yet it will not defeat the right of the real party in interest to remove and have the cause determined in the Federal court. (Greene v. Klinger, 10 Fed. Rep. 689; Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205.) So in ejectment the sole owner may remove, although his grantor, a citizen of the same State as plaintiff, is a party. (Calloway v. Ore Knob Co., 74 N. C. 200.) If the only relief prayed in a

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suit against a corporation and its officers is by injunction, the officers are merely nominal parties (Hatch v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 105); so of a suit to enjoin the execution of a lease. (Pond v. Sibley, 7 Fed. Rep. 129; 19 Blatchf. 189; Nat. Bank of Lyndon v. Wells Riv. Manuf'g Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 750.) They are not such necessary parties to a suit involving title to lands as to prevent a removal. (Nat. Bank of Lyndon v. Wells Riv. Manuf'g Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 750; Pond v. Sibley, 7 Fed. Rep. 129; 19 Blatchf. 189.) Officers joined as defendants in equity, but as to whom no relief is prayed, are nominal parties, such as will not defeat the right to a removal. (Fisk v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 105.) Where a non-resident stockholder of a banking corporation does not unite in the application, the corporation cannot be heard to complain; the objection can only be assigned as error to the party himself. (Danville Bk. & T. Co. v. Parks, 88 Ill. 179.) State and county officers are not necessary parties to a controversy relating to the validity of bonds. (Town of Aroma v. Auditor, 2 Fed. Rep. 33.) Citizenship of nominal parties, or of aliens who do not constitute the entire party on one side, will not give a right to removal (Hervey v. Illinois etc. R. Co., 7 Biss. 103; Arapahoe Co. v. Kansas & P. R. Co., 4 Dill. 277); but the fact that defendants are named who have not been served, or have not appeared, who are citizens of the same State as plaintiff, will not defeat the right to a removal. (Ex parte Girard, 3 Wall. Jr. 263.) A substituted party comes into a suit subject to all the disabilities of him whose place he takes, so far as concerns the right of removal of the cause. (Cable v. Ellis, 110 U. S. 389; Houston etc. R. Co. v. Shirley, 111 U. S. 358; Jefferson v. Driver, 117 U. S. 272. And see Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61; Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U. S. 236.)

Inseparable controversy. The controversy must be wholly between citizens of different States to give the right to remove. (Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336; Bybee v. Hawkett, 5 Fed. Rep. 1; 6 Sawy. 593; Carraher v. Brennan, 7 Biss. 497; Arapahoe Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Dill. 277; Burch v. Davenport etc. R. Co., 46 Jowa, 449.) Congress did not intend to confer a right where a

citizen of a State other than that in which suit is brought is united with one who is a citizen of the latter State (Karns v. Atlantic & Ohio R. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 309; Chicago v. Gage, 6 Biss. 457; Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336); so in a bill to foreclose a mortgage (Donohue v. Mariposa L. & M. Co., 5 Sawy. 63; see Burch v. Davenport & St. P. R. Co., 46 Iowa, 449); or to redeem from a mortgage sale. (Miller v. Finn, 1 Neb. 254; Ryan v. Young, 11 Chic. L. N. 353.) So the purchaser of an equity of redemption cannot remove if mortgagor and mortgagee are citizens of the same State (First Nat. Bank v. King W. I. Co., 2 Cent. L. J. 505); and so where a judgment creditor intervenes. (Ayers v. Chicago, 101 U, S. 184.) Where the suit embraces a single individual controversy, one party cannot remove if the other party consists of residents and non-residents (Price v. Foreman, 12 Fed. Rep. 801; 11 Biss. 328); so of a bill for a specific performance (Tyler v. Haggerty, 10 Chic. L. N. 100); or a bill to dissolve a corporation (Taylor v. Rockefeller, 35 Leg. Int. 284); or where the owner elects to bring an action for a conversion (Patterson v. Chapman, 13 Blatchf. 395); or if, in the contest of a will, or in a suit to annul a will, necessary parties joined are residents or non-residents. (Re Frazer, 10 Chic. L. N. 390; see Price v. Foreman, 12 Fed. Rep. 801; 11 Biss. 328.) If a stockholder disputes the rights of both claimants, and one is a citizen of another State, the case cannot be removed. (Bailey v. N. Y. Sav. Bank, 2 Fed. Rep. 14; 18 Blatchf. 77.) A suit to recover land where the real parties are claimants, and damages are demanded of non-residents,

cannot be removed. (Corbin v. Van Brunt, 4 Morr, Trans. 818.) If substantial relief is asked against a party who is a citizen of the same State as plaintiff, the cause cannot be removed. (Latham v. Barney, 10 Chic. L. N. 11.) Where non-residents sued out attachments, and these were followed by other attachments by resident creditors, the non-residents cannot remove the cause, (Bates v. Days, 11 Fed. Rep. 529; 3 McCrary, 616.) Where less than all the plaintiffs or defendants seek to remove, they must be citizens of different States, and the contro. versy must be wholly between them (Hervey v. Illinois M. R. Co., 7 Biss. 103); for unless the original contro