distinguishes the act of 1867, which says "at any time before the first hearing or trial," the act of 1875, saying "before or at the term in which a trial could be had." The words of the act, "then pending," means the first trial after the right of removal attaches, subsequently to the passage of the act (Hoadley v. San Francisco, 3 Sawy. 553); and the application is in time if made at the first term of the court thereafter. (Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Baker v. Patterson, 4 Dill. 562; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 3 Sawy. 553; Andrews v. Garrett, 2 Cent. L. J. 797; M. & M. Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 13 Blatchf. 218; Crane v. Reeder, 15 Alb. L. J. 103.) A case pending in the State supreme court at the time of the passage of the act, and which was remanded for further proceedings, stands like a new cause, and the right of removal may be claimed at or before the term at which it can be tried. (Pettilon v. Noble, 7 Biss. 449.) Causes which might have been tried before but were not, and which were pending for trial when the act went into operation, as well as causes once tried but in which a new trial had been ordered, and which were pending ready for trial when the act took effect, are removable if the application therefor be made within the time required in the act (Crane v. Reeder, 15 Alb. L. J. 103; U. S. Circuit Court denying S. C., 28 Mich. 527; Andrews v. Garrett, 3 Cent. L. J. 797; S. C., Chic. L. N. 132; Mer. & Manuf. Bank v. Wheeler, 3 Cent. L. J. 13; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 8 Chic. L. N. 134; see Sims v. Sims, 17 Blatchf. 369; Ames v. Colo. Cent. R. R. Co., 4 Dill. 251; S. C., 4 Cent. L. J. 199); but where a cause was pending when the Act of 1875 was passed, and was tried in 1878, and afterward, on appeal, a new trial was granted, a petition for removal thereafter was not in time. (Newdecker v. Rosenbaum, 11 The Reporter, 254.) The transfer of a cause from the State to a Federal court does not vacate what has been done in the State court previous to removal; and what has been decided in the State court is res adjudicata, and cannot be reviewed. (King v. Worthington, 25 Alb. L. J. 15.)

Ancillary proceedings.-A suit brought to enjoin a suit at law is only ancillary (The Cortes Co. v. Thann

hauser, 9 Fed. Rep. 226; 21 Blatchf. 552; Chittenden v. State, 9 Fed. Rep. 226; 20 Blatchf. 59; Clark v. Opdyke, 17 N. Y. Supr. 383); so proceedings in garnishment are ancillary. (Pratt v. Albright, 9 Fed. Rep. 634; 10 Biss. 511.) Proceedings in garnishment process are ancillary, and garnishees are not parties to the suit. (Cook v. Whitney, 3 Woods, 715.) The rights of applying creditors are merely incidental to the action, and the court will exercise jurisdiction over them. (N. Y. Silk Manuf. Co. v. Second Nat. Bank, 10 Fed. Rep. 204.) If supplementary proceedings are inseparably connected with the original judg ment or decree, they cannot be removed; but it is otherwise where they are a mere mode of procedure or relief, involving an independent controversy with new or different parties. (Buford v. Strother, 10 Fed. Rep. 406; 3 McCrary, 253; see Webber v. Humphreys, 5 Dill. 223; Chapman v. Barger, 4 Dill. 557.) Where judgment was obtained against three defendants jointly, one of whom was a resident, to show cause why they should not be bound by the judgment, it is not a new action, but further proceedings in an old one. (Fairchild v. Durand, 8 Abb. Pr. 305.) If a person has only an incidental interest growing out of the litigation, he cannot remove. (Ellis v. Sisson, 11 Fed. Rep. 353; 11 Biss. 187.)

Corporations created by congressional legislation. This section applies only to a case in which the corporation, or a member thereof, was sole defendant. (Hazard v. Durand, 9 R. I. 609; held otherwise, Fisk v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; S. C., 8 Blatchf. 299.) It does not apply to corporations created by foreign governments or by the several States (Jones v. Oceanic St. Nav. Co., 11 Blatchf, 406), nor to national banks (Jones v. Oceanic St. Nav. Co., 11 Blatchf. 406); it expressly excludes national banks, but not so as to deprive them of the right of removal if their cause is within any other act relating to removals. (Chatham Nat. Bank v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of West Va., 1 Hun, 702; Ludlow v. Kidd, 3 Ohio, 48.) For jurisdictional purposes they are deemed citizens of the State in which they are located and have their place of business (Chatham Nat. Bank v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of West Va., 1 Hun, 702; Cook v. State Nat.

Bank, 52 N. Y. 96; Davis v. Cook, 9 Nev. 134; Manuf. Nat. Bank v. Baack, 2 Abb. U. S. 232; S. C., 8 Blatchf. 107; see Ludlow v. Kidd, 3 Ohio, 48); but neither under the Revised Statutes nor under the National Banking Act have receivers of national banks, as such, the right to remove causes. (Bird's Ex'rs v. Cockrem, 2 Woods, 32.) If a suit is brought against a banking company, it has no right to remove. (Pettilon v. Noble, 7 Biss. 449.) Under this act a corporation seeking a removal must show that it was organized under the laws of the United States, or that it is a defense arising under the Federal Constitution, or under some law or treaty of the United States. (Northern Line P. Co. v. Benninger, 70 Ill. 571.) The fact that it was organized under the laws of the United States is not alone sufficient. (Magee v. Union Pacific R. Co., 2 Sawy. 447; contra, Turton v. Union Pacific R. Co., 3 Dill. 366; see Bauman v. Union Pacific R. Co., 3 Dill. 367.) Proceedings for removal may be instituted by the corporation or by any member thereof. (Fisk v. Union Pacific R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362.) Where a member petitions, he must be one who was a member when suit was commenced (Fisk v. Union Pacific R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362); and ownership of stock is necessary to membership. (Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; see Burke v. Flood, 6 Sawy. 220; S. C., 1 Fed. Rep. 541; Hawes v. Contra Costa W. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 93, note. A member not otherwise a party than as a member cannot remove the cause without consent of the corporation (Gard v. Durant, 4 Cliff. 113); and all must join in the petition (Gard v. Durant, 4 Cliff. 113); but each, or as many as may see fit, may petition without waiting for the others. (Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 8 Blatchf. 243.) The petition must state that the corporation or member thereof has a defense arising under and by virtue of the Constitution, a treaty, or a law of the United States, but the matter thereof need not be stated (Jones v. Oceanic St. Nav. Co., 11 Blatchf. 406; The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Dennistoun v. Draper, 5 Blatchf. 336; Clark v. Opdyke, 17 N. Y. Supr. 383; Magee v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2 Sawy. 447); and if it says the defense arises under an act of Congress, it is sufficient. (Jones v. Oceanic St. Nav. Co., 11 Blatchf. 406.) The particular part of the

Constitution or the act of Congress need not be set up. (Cain v. Texas Pac. R. Co., 3 Cent. L. J. 12.) A suit under this section may be removed at any time before trial or final hearing. (Ely v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 36 Leg. Int. 164.) The word "suit" embraces a suit brought by a state as well as by an individual. (Texas v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 3 Woods, 308.) If the corporation is created by the laws of the State it cannot remove the cause. (Copeland v. M. & C. R. Co., 3 Woods, 651; see Terry v. Insurance Co., 3 Dill. 408.) There is nothing to prevent an insolvent corporation, whose property is in the hands of a receiver, appearing in an attachment suit to remove the cause. (Second Nat. Bank v. N. Y. Silk Manuf. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 532.) The existence of a suit by stockholders does not affect the right to remove. (Scott v. Clinton & S. R. Co., 6 Biss. 520.) A suit commenced in the territorial court cannot be removed after such Territory has been admitted as a State (Ames v. Colorado Cent. R. Co., 4 Dill. 260); nor a proceeding under a local statute which cannot be litigated in a Federal court. (Lehigh Co. v. Central R. Co., 4 W. N. 187.) Cases in a court of original jurisdiction, but not cases pending in the appellate court, are within the statute. (Lowe v. Williams, 94 U. S. 650.

Amount in controversy.—If the value of the matter in dispute is only five hundred dollars, the cause cannot be removed (Ladd v. Tudor, 3 Wood. & M. 325; West. U. Tel. Co. v. Levi, 47 Ind. 552); yet if the defendant makes it more than that amount at the time he files his petition, it may be removed (McGinnity v. White, 3 Dill. 350); though the right depends on the facts as they exist when the suit is instituted. (Roberts v. Nelson, 8 Blatchf. 74.) The sum claimed in the declaration is the amount in dispute, in an action of damages, until shown otherwise by the record (Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 97; Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198; Desbrow v. Driggs, 8 Abb. Pr. 305, note; contra, Rush v. Cobbett, 2 Yeates, 275); but in assumpsit the amount shown in the declaration is presumptively the amount in dispute (People v. The Judges, 2 Denio, 197); and an action that sounds altogether in damages may be removed, although the damages are uncertain. (Muns v. Dupont, 2 Wash. C. C. 463; contra,

Rush v. Cobbett, 2 Yeates, 275.) The presumption that damages laid in the declaration is the amount in dispute is not conclusive (Ladd v. Tudor, 3 Wood. & M. 325; People v. The Judges, 2 Denio, 197; Culver v. Crawford Co., 4 Dill. 239); and where the practice is not to file the declaration until after the return of the writ, the ad damnum in the writ is the prima facie sum claimed, or value in dispute (Muns v. Dupont, 2 Wash. C. C. 463; Ladd v. Tudor, 3 Wood. & M. 325), unless the declaration is inserted in the writ. (Ladd v. Tudor, 3 Wood. & M. 325). If the declaration and the ad damnum varies, the State court may institute an inquiry as to the true amount. (Ladd v. Tudor, 3 Wood. & M. 325.) The affidavit of the petitioner is not conclusive of the amount in dispute. (Rush v. Cobbett, 2 Yeates, 275.) In a controversy as to the validity of an attachment, it must appear that the attachment suit presents a claim of more than five hundred dollars damages. (Keith v. Levi, 2 Fed. Rep. 743; 1 McCrary, 343.) So where the suit is to prevent a corporation from entering into some enterprise, the value of the right must be shown to exceed five hundred dollars. (Hatch v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., Blatchf. 165. "In dispute" refers to the matters in dispute, though the claim may be incapable of proof, or be only in part well founded (Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198); and no reduction of the amount of the claim after removal will deprive the defendant of his rights. (Roberts v. Nelson, 8 Blatchf. 74; Zinckersen v. Huffschmidt, 1 Cent. L. J. 144.) The amount in controversy must be affirmatively shown. (Keith v. Levi, 2 Fed. Rep. 743; 1 McCrary, 343.) It is sufficient that it exceeds five hundred dollars at the time when the removal is applied for; and interest may be regarded in determining the amount or value. (McGinnity v. White, 3 Dill. 350; Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Peters, 32; Merrill v. Petty, 16 Wall. 338; Clarkson v. Manson, 18 Blatchf. 443.) A party cannot, by releasing a part of his demand, oust the jurisdiction of the Federal court. (Wright v. Wells, Peters C. C. 220; Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 97; Roberts v. Nelson, 8 Blatchf. 74.) In actions sounding in tort, the damages laid constitute the amount in dispute. (Hulsecamp v. Teel, 2 Dall. 258; Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 97;