will easily store up and recal, as occasion may require, every important Case which has been presented to the mind either by reading or experience.

"I am inclined to believe," says an accurate observer of the human mind, " both from a theoretical view of the subject, and from my own observations, as far as they have reached, that if we wish to fix the particulars of our knowledge very permanently in the memory, the most effectual way of doing it is to refer them to general principles" (p).

In the execution of this Work I have confined myself to the consideration of matters which exclusively fall under the cognizance of the Chancellor, or concurrently with other Courts of Equity. It is true, that a question

of

mere Law is often discussed in Courts of

Equity, and this is frequently necessary, before equitable relief can be administered; but whenever such points arise, the Chancellor follows the Law, and such points are determined in conformity with the Decisions of the Common Law Courts. But though such questions do often collaterally arise, and almost every point of Law is occasionally brought into discussion, and our Equity Re

(p) Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, P.425.

ports abound with them, yet I think it unne cessary to detail the principles of the Decisions of the Chancellor on points of Law, and this for several reasons : Because, though the opinion of the Chancellor, even on a point of Law, must always be looked up to with great respect, yet, certainly, such points are decided with more of weight in the Common Law Courts, since the Judges are numerous, and their studies have been peculiarly devoted to the learning on such subjects. The opinion of the Chancellor on a point of Common Law cannot be put in competition with an express Decision of the Common Law Courts on the same subject. It is therefore to the Decisions of the Common Law Courts that reference should be made on such points. Indeed, if the Chancellor has any doubt on a mere point of Law, if the point has not been clearly settled by Common Law Determinations, it is his constant habit to refer to a Court of Common Law for its opinion; and though, strictly speaking, the Chancellor is not bound to act upon the answer of a Court of Law (q), yet that opinion always governs the Chancellor ; a plain proof this of its pre-eminent authority in Common Law Science.

Of questions of Law, the Judges are the (9) 14 Ves. 32.

sworn and proper Judges. "If," says the Lord Keeper Bridgman, who had called some of the Judges to his assistance, "I were of another opinion, yet I would be bound by the opinion of my Lords the Judges" (r).

In a case in which Lord Hardwicke had received the opinion of a Court of Common Law on a case sent by him, he observed, "I shall not send it again to Law; and however I might have doubted, if I had sat in the King's Bench, on the argument in point of Law, yet I shall not depart from the opinion of those learned Judges” (s).

And in another Case, where the Chancellor had called upon some of the Judges to assist him in a case before the Court, he observes, "If I had even now a doubt concerning it, I should have held myself bound by the opinion of the Judges as a matter within their conusance, in like manner as if I had sent this to be tried at Law, in which case, the Court always decrees consequentially to the Trial" (t). A plain proof this, of the binding effect of the Decisions of Courts of Common Law upon the Chancellor.

(r) Fry v. Porter, 1 Mod. 313.

(s) Ekins v. Macklish, Ambl. 185.

(t) See Chesterfield v. Janson, 2 Ves. 153; and what Lord Eldon says in Dashwood, v. Peyton, 18 Ves. 97.

To introduce questions of pure Law in a Treatise on Equity, renders the Work incapable of system, confused, and immethodical, and is an amalgamation which tends only to embarrass the reader. It is, I believe, one of the principal causes that has obstructed the reduction of Equity Principles to system and method. I have, therefore, as much as possible, avoided any notice of Common Law doctrines in the ensuing Work, and must refer my readers to Common Law Writers for such learning.

I originally intended to prefix to this Work, An Historical View of the Rise and Progress of the Chancellor's Authority; conceiving it be a natural and proper introduction. The inquiry cost me great Labour, and much antiquarian research; but as I had mixed with it the characters of the Chancellors; the anecdotes concerning them, connected with the administration of Justice; the various disputes respecting the Chancery; the progress from arbitrary discretion to fixed Rules; a vindication of the Jurisdiction from the cavils of various Writers; a sugges, tion of possible improvements, and other matters incidentally relating to it, my materials extended so much beyond what I originally intended, (a short dissertation) that

they amounted to a Volume; and as inquiries of this description are suitable only to the taste of a few, and the Publication would have very considerably increased the size and price of the Work, without contributing much to its utility, I dropped this part of my design, though not without some reluctance, as the subject was a favourite one.

Many persons have conceived a prejudice against the Court of Chancery, and have considered it as an huge overgrown excrescence, which called for the pruning knife of the Legislature; but this is the language of presuming ignorance. Some defects it has; the machinery of the great System has, till lately, been too slow in its motions; but after contemplating it in all its parts, visiting its foundations, and witnessing its benefits, it is, in my humble apprehension, a most beneficent Judicature, and of unparelleled wisdom and utility; exhibiting, occasionally, all the subtlety of the disciples of Loyola, but employing it to aid the sacred cause of Justice.

To some, the numerous citations of Cases may seem like an ostentation of reading; but every professional Man is fully aware, that the greatest merit in a legal Writer will not compensate for the want of Cases in support