Such an Injunction, also, has been awarded against proving a Will in the Spiritual Court, which on a Trial at Law has been found to be no Will (e). And these perpetual Injunctions remain notwithstanding the death of the Plaintiff; nor is it necessary for his Representative to file a Bill to continue such Injunction (f).

But, it seems, a Bill to establish a legal Title and a perpetual Injunction is never entertained, unless there are particular circumstances stated in the Bill, showing the necessity of the Court's interposition, either for preventing multiplicity of Suits, or other vexation, or for preventing an injustice irremediable by a Court of Law (g).

Perpetual Injunctions are, generally, the object for which what are termed Bills of Peace are instituted. The principles upon which these Bills are resorted to, will now be considered.

of Watson, 1 vol. p. 180. &c.] See also Cunningham's Law of Simony, and what is said in Partridge v. Whiston, 4 Ter. Rep. 359- A Bond to resign in favour of a particular person is good. See what is said as to this, and the decision of the Bishop of London and Fytche, in Dashwood v. Peyton, 18 Ves. 46, &c.; and Arthington v. Calverly, MS. In several cases a general Bond of Resignation is considered as good. See 3 Salk. 325, and Raym. 175, 3 Mod. 297, Sid. 387, cited in margin. A Bill passed in the House of Lords to declare the Law in these cases, but it was successfully

opposed in the House of Commons, as fatal in its example, by taking away the only check, restraint, and control, upon courts of dernier appeal-the public inconvenience arising from the false determinations of superior courts. The Bill was rejected.

(e) Beversham v. Springold, 1 Ch. Cas. 80; and see 2 Atk. 379.

(f) Vid. the case mentioned in Morgan v. Scudamore, 2 Ves. Jun. 313.

(g) See Arg. in William Welby, Esq. App. and Duke of Rutland, Resp. 6 Bro. P. C.

575.

VI. Bills of Peace.

Bills of Peace, as they are termed, are made use of where a Person has a Right which may be controverted by various persons, at different times, and by different Actions; and the Court will thereupon prevent a multiplicity of Suits (h), by directing an Issue to determine the Right, and ultimately an Injunction. Another occasion where a Bill of this kind is resorted to is, where there have been repeated attempts to litigate the same question by Ejectment, and repeated and satisfactory Trials; in which cases, the Court upon such a Bill, preferred by all the Parties interested, or by some of them in the names of themselves, and the rest, will grant a perpetual Injunction to restrain further litigation (i).

A Judgment in a Real Action was final, and where proceedings by Ejectment were introduced, the Judgment in which was not final, but which might be brought again and again, intolerable inconveniences would have ensued if Courts of Equity had not interfered to prevent a repetition of Ejectments (k). Where, therefore, there is an assertion of Title by a Suit at Law, in which the Party fails, but he yet asserts it frequently in the same manner, such assertion becomes oppressive to the opposite Party; and

(h) See Baker v. Shelbury, 1 Ch. Ca. 70. 2 Atk. 484. (i) See Bro. P. C. 266. 2 Bro. P. C. 217. Bunb. 158. 1 P. Wms. 671. Lord Bath v. Sherwin, Precedents in Ch.

p. 262. Finche's Edit.; and see Devonsher v. Newenham, 2 vol. of Sch. & Lefr. p. 208, and the cases there mentioned.

(k) See what is said 1 Str. 404.

as it may be made by Ejectment, a proceeding which may be repeated for ever (and which is not, as now used, part of the old Law) Courts of Equity will interfere to prevent such an oppressive proceeding, which overturns the principles of the ancient Law, whereby perpetual litigation was prevented (1).

After five Trials in Ejectment, and Verdicts in all of them, for the Earl of Bath, he brought a Bill of this description for a perpetual Injunction, and though Lord Cowper refused to grant it, yet the House of Lords, on Appeal, granted the Injunction (m). After even two satisfactory Trials of an Issue Devisavit vel non, the Court, it seems, will interpose to prevent any further Trial (n), especially if they were Trials at Bar (o).

Where several verdicts have been obtained against Trespassers, an Injunction, it seems, may on such a Bill be obtained against future trespasses; but if on such Trials the party refuses to produce documents necessary to a decision, the Court, it seems, would not grant an Injunction (p).

If a Trust Estate be devised to be sold, and a Bill is brought against the Trustees to oblige them to sell, and the Heir contests the Will, after two Trials the Court will grant a perpetual Injunction (q).

(1) See Devonsher v. Newenham, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 211.

(m) Lord Bath v. Sherwin, Prec. Ch. 261; and S. C. as it seems, in Lucas's Rep. p. 1, and 1 Bro. P. C. 266, on the appeal. See also S. C. noticed in Leighton and Leighton, 1 P. Wms. 672.

(n) Bates v. Graves, 2 Ves. Jun. 293.

(0) See 1 P. Wms. 671. S. C. 1 Str. 404, and 2 Bro. P. C. 217. Coker v. Farewell, 2 P. Wms. 563. See also on this subject Devonsher v. Newenham, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 211.

(p) Field v. Beaumont, 1 Swanst. 110.

(q) Leighton v. Sir Edward Leighton, 1 P. Wms. 671.

It appears that the Lord Keeper Guildford was of opinion that if the matter before him had been res integra, he should not have made altogether such a decree as Lord Clarendon had, whereby the Inheritance was bound after one Trial (r); and the Rule seems now to be that a right is never considered as so fully established by one Trial at Law, as to entitle the party to a perpetual Injunction, unless where the Trial has been upon an Issue sent out of Chancery for the purpose (8).

If the Court cannot fix upon an Issue that will comprehend all the subject in dispute, it will not, it seems, interfere on a Bill of this kind, but leave the Party to his remedy at common Law (†).

Bills of this kind are frequent in disputes between Lords of Manors and their Tenants, and between Tenants of one Manor and another; for in these Cases there would be no end of bringing Actions of Trespass, since each Action would determine only the particular right in question between the Plaintiff and Defendants (u).

So, where a Right of Fishing upon the River Ouse, for nine miles in extent, was claimed by the Corporation of York, who had constantly exercised that right, but which was opposed by different Lords of Manors, a Bill of this description was admitted, to establish the Right against these several opponents, for it would have been endless for the Corporation

(r) Fitton v. Macclesfield, 1 Vern. 292.

(s) Robinson v. Lord Byron, Cox 5, 6. S. C. 1 Bro. C. C. 588.

(t) Lowther v. Ray et al. Trin. 8 Geo. II. 1733, MS.

(u) Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483; and see Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 Ves. 310.

to have brought Actions at Law (x). In this case, it is observable, that whilst the Suit was pending, the Plaintiffs caused the Agent of the Defendant to be indicted for a breach of the Peace in fishing in their Liberty; and upon a motion made before Lord Hardwicke to stop the prosecution, he observed, "This Court has not originally, and strictly, any restraining power over criminal prosecutions (y); and in this case, if the Defendant had applied to the AttorneyGeneral, he would have granted a noli prosequi. For where a complaint is grounded on a Civil Right, for which an Action of Trespass would lie, the AttorneyGeneral of course grants a noli prosequi. If Actions of Trespass had been brought vi et armis, this Court would have stopped them; but though I cannot grant an Injunction, yet I may certainly make an order upon the Prosecutors to prevent the proceeding on the Indictment. Supposing it was a Suit for a right of Land where entries had been made, and the Bill was brought to quiet the possession, and after that they prefer an Indictment for a forcible entry, which is of a double nature, as it partakes of a breach of the Peace, and is also a Civil Right, this Court would certainly stop the proceedings upon such indictment. Where Parties submit their right to the Court, they have certainly a Jurisdiction, and may interpose. Therefore I will make an Order to restrain the Plaintiffs from proceeding at the Sessions till the hearing of the Cause, and further Order (≈).”

(x) Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 282; and see Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483.

(y) See ante.

(z) 1 Atk. 302. Mayor, &c. of York v. Pilkington; & see 2 Ves.

398, and what Lord Eldon says in Attorney-General v. Cleaver, 18 Ves. 220. The Chancellor has no jurisdiction to grant an Injunction to stay proceedings on a Mandamus, nor to an Indictment, nor to an Informa