still resorted to. Applications to the Chancellor relating to original writs, are, for the most part, executed by inferior officers, and are so much of course, that they seldom come before the Chancellor in Court for his consideration; but when they do, the Court, as officina brevium, judge according to the rules of law (b).

Whilst Tenures remained as they were at the common law, they occasioned much business on the common-law side of the court of Chancery, and previous to the erection of the Court of Wards, in the reign of Henry the Eighth, a great part of the business concerning wardships was transacted in the Court of Chancery; and after the institution of the court of wards, and before the taking away of wardships from the Crown, by the statute, (12th of Charles II.) considerable business relating to tenures remained in the Court of Chancery by reason of inquisitions returned there, and proceedings upon them (c).

So little is to be found in the Chancery Reports respecting the exercise of the Chancellor's commonlaw authority, that scarcely any thing remains to be added on this head, except some few detached remarks.

I. The writ de ventre inspiciendo is obtainable of common right, on petition (d); it is to be found in the Register, though not in Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, and is issued for the security of the next heir (i. e. verus hæres, not hæres apparens) (e), or in

(6) See ex parte Vennor, 3 Atk. 770.

(c) See Judicial Authority,

(d) Ex parte Bellat, 1 Cox, 299.

(e) See 6 Ves. 260, and

behalf of a tenant in tail (ƒ), or hæres factus (g), as a devisee in fee, in tail, or for life (h), to guard them against supposititious births. In the Civil Law there was a similar writ (i); and it was introduced into the English Law previous to the Reign of Edward I (k).

The general effect of the cases is, that the Court has considered this as a Writ for the furtherance of justice, and that it ought to issue whenever the justice of the case requires it (7).

The writ, it appears, has been issued in cases of personal estate (m); but such an application of it has been considered as a stretch of power (n).

If the widow marry again, yet still the writ may issue; but instead of being placed in the custody of the sheriff, she is permitted to remain with her husband, on his entering into a recognizance that she should not remove from his house, and that some of the women returned by the sheriff should see her every day, and three or more be present at her delivery (o).

The first writ issued on these occasions is to see whether the widow be with child, and quando paritura; and if the jury (which is composed of men and women, though the search is made by the latter) (p) find her with child, then she is (in strictness) removed

(f) Ex parte Aiscough, 2 P. Wms. 592. S. C. Mos. 391. (g) See ex parte Wallop, 2 Dick. 707.

(h) See the cases mentioned by Mr. Cox in note (1) to Aiscough's case; and see ex parte Bellat, 1 Cox 297.

(i) Halifax's Anal. of civil law, p. 14.

(k) Hargr. jurisc: Exerc: 1 vol. 413.

(1) Ex parte Wallop, 4 Bro. C. C. 98.

(m) See case cited in Mos. p. 391.

(n) Co. Lit. 8 ° n. 3.
(0) Cro. Jac. 685.

(p) Bract. 69. Brit. 165. Flet. lib. 1. c. 15. Reg. Br. Orig. 227".

by a second writ issuing out of the Common Pleas, (where the first is returnable,) to a castle (so are the old authorities), where the sheriff is to keep her safely (q); but it has been held that there is no occasion to execute the writ in that strict manner, provided people of skill have, from time to time, free access to the widow, and might be present at the birth (r).

II. A supplicavit (s) has often been granted by the Court, upon articles filed on oath (an affirmation will not do) (t), of assault and battery, and that the party goes in fear of her life (u). In some cases the writ has been refused, and the party grieved directed to apply to the justices of the peace (x). In a very early case (in 1631) where exceptions were taken to the articles as being too general, and production of a certificate of good behaviour, the Court referred it to two justices of the peace to examine the truth of the articles and certificate, and that the question of the supplicavit should be stayed in the mean time (y). To ground the Writ, the articles should not be in general forms, as "fearing," "being threatened," &c.; but some fact must be shown on which the fear is grounded (2). The Court, it seems, uses a discretion on the subject (a); but in general, the Court of Chancery and also the King's Bench, in case of

(q) Cro. Jac. 685, 6.

(r) See ex parte Aiscough, 2 P. Wms. 594. S. C. Mos. 391.

(s) As to this writ, see F. N. B. 183.

(t) Ex parte Grumbleton, 2 Atk. 70.

(u) Dobbyn's case, 3 Ves. and Bea. 182.

(x) Clavering's case, 2 P.

Wms. 202. As to the authority of justices of the peace in these cases, see F. N. B. 187. (y) Snelley v. Flatman, 1 Dick. 6.

(z) King v. Brinlow, Mich. 7 Geo. 2. 1733. MS.

(a) Ex parte King, Ambl. 334. See the order in this case from Register Book, Heyn's case, 2 Ves, and Bea. 182, no.

articles of the peace, at the end of a year, if nothing new happens, discharge a party committed for want of finding sureties (b). Sometimes the security is lessened (c), and the master is directed not to be strict as to the abilities of the sureties (d); but the Court will not discharge a supplicavit on an affidavit denying the facts, for it will not try them on affidavit; but where combination or contrivance appear, the supplicavit will be discharged (e).

III. With respect to the Writ of Certiorari (f), it has been holden, that where a replevin is in a court of record it may be removed by a certiorari, issuing either out of the Court of King's Bench, or the Court of Chancery (g). Where a certiorari issues with a view to use the record as evidence, the tenor, if returned, is sufficient, and countervails the plea of nul tiel record; but when the record is to be proceeded upon, the record itself must be returned (h): and there is no difference when the proceeding upon the record is to be removed, whether it be before judgment, or after, for in both cases the record itself must be removed (i).

IV. As to Writs of Prohibition (k), it has been determined, that if one be sued in an inferior court, for a matter out of its jurisdiction, the defendant may either have a prohibition from one of the common-law

courts of Westminster-hall, or, as this may happen in a vacation when only the Chancery is open, that Court may be moved for a prohibition (1), upon a petition (m), and affidavit (n), that the fact arose out of the jurisdiction, and that the defendant tendered a foreign plea, which was refused (o). But if it appears on the face of the declaration, that the matter is out of the jurisdiction of the Court, then a prohibition will be granted without an oath of having tendered the foreign plea (p).

The Court of Chancery, according to some cases, will not entertain a motion for a prohibition in Termtime, when the other Courts are open. Lord Thurlow refused to do so, on the ground of the public inconvenience, produced by interrupting the proper business of the Court when recourse might be had to other courts. Lord Redesdale, in a case very strongly calling for the interposition of the Court, as it was too late to apply elsewhere, adopted this resolution, observing that, "the habits of this Court were not adapted to this sort of business" (q). But in a more recent case, the objection that there had been time to apply to a court of law was considered as untenable; and it was said that, "in applications of this nature the Court has no discretion whether or not it will hear the party; it is bound to grant the Writ, on a

(1) Iveson v. Harris, 7 Ves. 257.

(m) See Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 516. Newhouse v. Mil

bank, 1 Vern. 276.

(n) Walker v. Fanderheide, 1 Dick. 336.

(0) Ib. and Anon. 1 P. Wms.

ject, Iveson v. Harris, 7 Ves 251.

(p) Anon. 1 P. Wms. 476. & see Salk. 549.

(q) See Blackborough v. Davis, 1 P. Wms. 43, and Anon. ib. 475. Montgomery v. Blair,