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common law principles only, are not constitutional powers, and therefore fit objects of legislation.

as it was intended he should absolutely exercise; and also have expressly vested in the general assembly, such appointing power as was designed to be absolutely exercised by that body, leaving the appointment of officers not specially provided for, to be regulated (as had before been done,) by act of the legislature. Constitution, Art. 5, Sec. 4, he shall appoint in each county, not fewer than three nor more than four judges, &c."— Same Art. Sec. 10, "The governor shall appoint a comArt. 6, Sec. 5, "The state treasurer shall be appointed annually by the joint vote of the members of both houses," &c. In those cases the convention left nothing to the discretion of the legislature, nor even to the people, during the continuance of the constitution, however great the progress of information and political knowledge might be among the citizens in future times. But your committee trust, that they will be able to convince every candid, intelligent, unbiassed mind, that all appointments, not specially provided for in the constitution, were intended by the convention to be left to the future vention, the second day of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety; and on the 7th day of December next following, the general assembly convened pursuant to the provisions of said constitution. In this legislature, there were 14 members, who had been members of the convention; combining as much general information, as much political knowledge, and as great a quantum of integrity, as we ever have seen, or ever expect to see our general assembly adorned with, in an equal number of members.

It appears by a full examination of the constitution of 1790, and of several acts of the legislature, passed imWe now proceed to the examination of the only con- mediately thereafter, that the convention have expressstitutional provision relied on by the advocates of exec-ly vested such power of appointment in the executive, utive patronage: it is contained in the 8th section of the 2d article of the constitution of 1790. By this article the governor is authorised to "appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for." Preparatory to the construction of this provision of the constitution, it may not be improper to take a review of long established and well settled principles of construction in all cases relative to vested rights. In every case where it divid-petent number of justices of the peace," &c. ual rights are legally and absolutely vested, they are supposed to remain secure and unimpaired, until it can be clearly and conclusively shown, that those rights bave been expressly transferred. While your committee entirely approbate the cautionary and scrupulous manner in which a transfer of individual rights is examined and decided upon, they earnestly, though respectfully, recommend to the legislature, in construing the powers delegated by the constitution, at least to use as great caution and strictness in favor of the rights of the great body of the people. It is not only acknowledged by all republican politicians, but it is also positively de-regulation of law. The constitution was done in con clared by the constitution, that all power is inherent in the people." It is therefore incumbent on every of ficer of the government, and agent of the people, who claims to have been invested by the constitution with the exercise of any power, to show that such power has been expressly vested in him by the constitution: if he fail to do this, it would be great remissness in the legislature, (who are the immediate agents and representatives of the people,) to indulge him, contrary to the public interest, in the exercise of a doubtful power. History affords us abundant proof, that the great dan- This opinion will be responded by all who are acger to be apprehended, as well in republican govern- quainted with the public characters and private virtues ments as all others, is the engrossment of power by a of those gentlemen-their names we insert in the folfew, and its exercise by them, to the injury of the ma-lowing alphabetical order, viz: James Boyd, John ny. Usurpation is the very marrow, the bone and the sin- Breckbill, Lindsey Coates, William Findlay, Albert ew of despotism—assumption freely indulged in by an Gallatin, John Gloninger, Sebastian Graff, Joseph Hiesindividual, and quietly acquiesced in by the people,ter, John Hoge, Thomas Jenks, James M'Lene, Thomas will, in time, bring upon the community, all the poison- Mawhorter, John Sellers, John Smiley. The above ous effects of usurpation in its most terrific form. facts are stated, and the names of those gentlemen are But to return to the words of the constitution of 1790, introduced for the purpose of showing what their opinwhich are relied on by the friends of executive patron-ion was respecting the powers that had been vested in age, as justifying the executive in the extent of the appointing power, which he has been in the exercise of: "He shall appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution, or shall be established by law." Is it reasonable to suppose, that the convention in speaking of the offices established by this constitution, had reference to offices which had long before been established, and the incumbents whereof, had long been aiding in the labours of the government? The correctness of such a construction, when viewed in connection with all the circumstances which are connected with this provision of the constitution, might well be doubt ed. The isolated word ESTABLISH is significant of, found, erect and confirm; as well as, to, settle and fix firmly that which has been founded and erected. It would appear that the former of these two constructions, is the sense in which the convention had used the word establish in the constitution; because it is used in connection with "shall be," evidently referring to offices that might "be established by law" subsequently to the confirmation of the constitution, and had, beyond question, in view the appointment of officers to fill offices thereafter to be created and confirmed. But your committee in drawing their conclusions of the sense in which the convention used the word "establish," do not rely wholly, nor indeed so much upon the definition it bears, even as used in connection with the words "shall be," as they do upon other important facts which have a direct bearing upon the construction given to this provision of the constitution, by the friends of executive patronage.

the governor, by the constitution, as near as can be judged of by the enactment of various laws while they were members of the legislature; and the significant language made use of in those laws. It will be proper, however, before we proceed to an examination of those laws, to state that Thomas Mifflin, (the president of the convention) was declared to be duly elected governcr of this commonwealth, on the 18th day of December, 1790. That on the twenty-eighth day of the same month he addressed a message to the legislature, inviting the attention of the members to certain important duties, requiring their immediate attention under the new structure of the government.

In detailing at considerable length, the objects of most pressing necessity, the governor observes, (Journal of the House of Representatives of that session, page 46,) "as to the laws, which require an immediate revision, on account of the new structure of our state gov ernment, you will find that they principally relate to the exercise of the executive authority under its former modification." After specifying many official duties that were to be performed by the executive authority, under the former modification of the government; the message remarks: "In short, to the president and executive council, so great a variety of appeals and reports were directed to be made by them so great a variety of commissioners and other officers were to be appointed for specific services-before them, so great a variety of official qualifications and sureties were to be taken-and on them the superintendance of so great a variety of pub

1829.}

REPORT ON EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE.

fic objects devolved, that a particular recapitulation would, at this time, be impracticable." It will be observed, by an examination of the above extracts from governor Mifflin's message, that he in a particular man. ner notices the great power of appointing officers that had been vested in the executive authority, under the former structure of government, to regulate the exercise of which power thereafter, legislative interposition was immediately necessary; consequently, in the opinion of the governor, the power of appointing many of the officers which had been vested in the executive authority under the former structure of government, had not been provided for by the constitution; and were purposely left to the future regulation of law, in such manner as propriety and experience should dictate.

Therefore,

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SECT. 2. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, That all and every duty, which by any of the laws of this state, was directed to be done and performed by the president, or by the president and supreme executive council, not inconsistent with the constitution of this commonwealth, and not otherwise directed by the act passed in the present session, entitled "An act for instituting a board of property, and for other purposes therein mentioned," shall be executed by the governor of this commonwealth; and that every of the laws relative to the duties first herein before mentioned, shall be, and they are hereby so far forth, and nofurther, repealed and made void: Provided nevertheless, That this act shall continue in force until the end of the present session of the General Assembly, and no longer."

Your committee are fully apprized, that some of our state politicians are disposed to give the most liberal and extensive construction to delegated powers, that the words of the constitution will possibly bear; while they construe in the most scrupulous and limited manner, those powers which are reserved by the people, or (which is the same thing,) the powers that they have not delegated. The anxiety with which some people labor in this cause, is much easier seen, than accounted for. Will they in this case attempt to say, that the governor was ignorant of the extent of those provisions of the constitution, which had vested the powers that had been formerly exercised by the executive authori-ject, "to answer the immediate pressing exigencies," ty, in the governor? Will it be said by them, that the governor in this case, was unadvisedly calling on the legislature to provide by law for the exercise of powers, that had been previously provided for by the constitution? Charges of this kind may be made, but among persons free from bias, and being acquainted (as most Pennsylvanians are) with the accuracy of his discernment-the soundness of his judgment-the independence of his sentiment, and the extent of his political in. formation, they will fall lifeless to the ground, as fast as they can be uttered.

The character of governor Mifflin stands too high to be tarnished by an allegation, that in the year 1790, he was unacquainted with his duties as governor of the commonwealth-that he was ignorant of the powers which had been vested in the executive by the constitution, which instrument he had so shortly before, not only assisted in the formation of, but also, was president of the convention, who had conceived, moulded and given to it their final finish.

So tenacious was that legislature of the rights of the people; so well did they know that the constitution had not vested the powers which had been formerly exercised by the executive authority in the governor; and so well were they convinced of the propriety of vesting them elswhere, as soon as the legislature should "have leisure, to enumerate and define the executive powers with more precision," that when legislating on this subthey only vested those powers in the governor to the end of that session. But it appears that the legislature did not at that session, obtain "leisure to enumerato and define the executive powers;" therefore, on the thirteenth day of April, 1791, (in the same session) a law was passed, similar in substance, and varying but little in form, by which act, the powers that had been formerly vested in the supreme executive council, were vested in the governor, "until the end of the next session of the general assembly, and no longer.' This temporary law was continued in force, by temporary exten sions, until the 22d day of April, 1794, at which time it was re-enacted without limit or duration of time, as ale most every other law is.

The above fact shews most clearly and conclusively, that the general assembly in each of the sessions refer red to, were fully confident, that the powers which had not been expressly vested in the governor, by the constitution, still remained with the people to be disposed of, and regulated by law, in such manner as prudence A committee was immediately appointed, to arrange and experience should dictate, Any other conclusion the subject matter of the governor's message, from would be a direct charge of the grossest ignorance of which the above quotations have been taken, and on the provisions of the constitution, in the legislature of the 30th day of the same month made report. In de- 1790-91 and those who annually succeeded them, up to tailng the subject matter of the address that required the the session of 1793-94 inclusive; as well as in the gover immediate attention of the legislature, the report says: nor, who had in his message called the attention of the "That part of the address which enumerates the pow-legislature to the necessity of providing by law, for the ers formerly vested in the president and supreme exec- exercise of the powers which had formerly been vested utive council, and which now cease to be operative, in the executive authority, and which had not been pro your committee conceive ought to be referred to a com-vided for by the constitution.

mittee to bring in a bill for the purpose of transferring A charge of this kind your committee are not prepar those powers generally to the governor, until the ended to make, nor do they believe (when it is recollected, of the present session, in order to answer the immediately pressing exigencies, until the legislature shall have leisure to enumerate and define the executive powers with more precision." A committee for this purpose was accordingly appointed, a bill reported, and became a law, by receiving the signature of the governor on the 14th day of January following, which law is in the words following, viz:

"An act for transferring certain powers exercised by the late president and supreme executive council, to the governor of this commonwealth."

SECT. 1. Whereas by the present constitution of this commonwealth, the executive powers of government are vested in the governor, and it is proper and necessary, that such laws as directed any duties to be performed by the former executive authority of this state, should be made conformable to the new organization of the powers of government.

that besides the fourteen members who had assisted in framing the constitution, there were many others, of eminent talents and well versed in political and legal knowledge,) that any informed persons will have the hardihood to charge those different assemblies with being ignorant of the constitution, and of doing a work, year after year, of supererogation.

William Bingham, was speaker of the House of Rep. resentatives, at the passage of the first law, and Richard Peters, speaker of the Senate. Richard Peter's natural talents, his literary acquirements and his legal knowl edge, have procured for him the confidence of the Union, and the situation of a Judge of the United States Court, for the eastern district of Pennsylvania: in the discharge of which duties, he has reflected much honor on himself, and great credit on the bench. Many others who served in these sessions, have richly merited the

common law principles only, are not constitutional powers, and therefore fit objects of legislation.

It appears by a full examination of the constitution of 1790, and of several acts of the legislature, passed imWe now proceed to the examination of the only con- mediately thereafter, that the convention have expressstitutional provision relied on by the advocates of exec-ly vested such power of appointment in the executive, utive patronage: it is contained in the 8th section of the as it was intended he should absolutely exercise; and 2d article of the constitution of 1790. By this article also have expressly vested in the general assembly, such the governor is authorised to "appoint all officers whose appointing power as was designed to be absolutely exeroffices are established by this constitution, or shall be cised by that body, leaving the appointment of officers established by law, and whose appointments are not not specially provided for, to be regulated (as had beherein otherwise provided for." Preparatory to the fore been done,) by act of the legislature. Constitution, construction of this provision of the constitution, it may Art. 5, Sec. 4, "he shall appoint in each county, not not be improper to take a review of long established fewer than three nor more than four judges, &c."— and well settled principles of construction in all cases Same Art. Sec. 10, "The governor shall appoint a comrelative to vested rights. In every case where individ-petent number of justices of the peace," &c. Art. 6, ual rights are legally and absolutely vested, they are supposed to remain secure and unimpaired, until it can be clearly and conclusively shown, that those rights have been expressly transferred. While your committee entirely approbate the cautionary and scrupulous manner in which a transfer of individual rights is examined and decided upon, they earnestly, though respectfully, recommend to the legislature, in construing the powers delegated by the constitution, at least to use as great caution and strictness in favor of the rights of the great body of the people. It is not only acknowledged by all republican politicians, but it is also positively declared by the constitution, that all power is inherent in the people." It is therefore incumbent on every of ficer of the government, and agent of the people, who claims to have been invested by the constitution with the exercise of any power, to show that such power has been expressly vested in him by the constitution: if he fail to do this, it would be great remissness in the legis-ral information, as much political knowledge, and as lature, (who are the immediate agents and representatives of the people,) to indulge him, contrary to the public interest, in the exercise of a doubtful power. History affords us abundant proof, that the great danger to be apprehended, as well in republican governments as all others, is the engrossment of power by a few, and its exercise by them, to the injury of the many. Usurpation is the very marrow, the bone and the sinew of despotism-assumption freely indulged in by an individual, and quietly acquiesced in by the people,ter, John Hoge, Thomas Jenks, James M‘Lene, Thomas will, in time, bring upon the community, all the poisonous effects of usurpation in its most terrific form.

Sec. 5, "The state treasurer shall be appointed annually by the joint vote of the members of both houses," &c. In those cases the convention left nothing to the discretion of the legislature, nor even to the people, during the continuance of the constitution, however great the progress of information and political knowledge might be among the citizens in future times. But your committee trust, that they will be able to convince every candid, intelligent, unbiassed mind, that all appointments, not specially provided for in the constitution, were intended by the convention to be left to the future regulation of law. The constitution was done in con vention, the second day of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety; and on the 7th day of December next following, the general assembly convened pursuant to the provisions of said constitution. In this legislature, there were 14 members, who had been members of the convention; combining as much gene

great a quantum of integrity, as we ever have seen, or ever expect to see our general assembly adorned with, in an equal number of members.

the governor, by the constitution, as near as can be judged of by the enactment of various laws while they were members of the legislature; and the significant language made use of in those laws. It will be proper, however, before we proceed to an examination of those laws, to state that Thomas Mifflin, (the president of the convention) was declared to be duly elected governor of this commonwealth, on the 18th day of December, 1790. That on the twenty-eighth day of the same month he addressed a message to the legislature, inviting the attention of the members to certain important duties, requiring their immediate attention under the new structure of the government.

This opinion will be responded by all who are acquainted with the public characters and private virtues of those gentlemen-their names we insert in the fol lowing alphabetical order, viz: James Boyd, John Breckbill, Lindsey Coates, William Findlay, Albert Gallatin, John Gloninger, Sebastian Graff, Joseph HiesMawhorter, John Sellers, John Smiley. The above facts are stated, and the names of those gentlemen are But to return to the words of the constitution of 1790, introduced for the purpose of showing what their opinwhich are relied on by the friends of executive patron-ion was respecting the powers that had been vested in age, as justifying the executive in the extent of the appointing power, which he has been in the exercise of: "He shall appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution, or shall be established by law." Is it reasonable to suppose, that the convention in speaking of the offices established by this constitution, had reference to offices which had long before been established, and the incumbents whereof, had long been aiding in the labours of the government? The correctness of such a construction, when viewed in connection with all the circumstances which are connected with this provision of the constitution, might well be doubt ed. The isolated word ESTABLISH is significant of, found, erect and confirm, as well as, to, settle and fix firmly that which has been founded and erected. It would appear that the former of these two constructions, is the sense in which the convention had used the word establish in the constitution; because it is used in connection with "shall be," evidently referring to offices that might "be established by law" subsequently to the confirmation of the constitution, and had, beyond question, in view the appointment of officers to fill offices thereafter to be created and confirmed. But your committee in drawing their conclusions of the sense in which the convention used the word "establish," do not rely wholly, nor indeed so much upon the definition it bears, even as used in connection with the words "shall be," as they do upon other important facts which have a direct bearing upon the construction given to this provision of the constitution, by the friends of executive patronage.

In detailing at considerable length, the objects of most pressing necessity, the governor observes, (Journal of the House of Representatives of that session, page 46,) "as to the laws, which require an immediate revision, on account of the new structure of our state gov ernment, you will find that they principally relate to the exercise of the executive authority under its former modification." After specifying many official duties that were to be performed by the executive authority, under the former modification of the government; the message remarks: "In short, to the president and executive council, so great a variety of appeals and reports were directed to be made-by them so great a variety of commissioners and other officers were to be appointed for specific services-before them, so great a variety of official qualifications and sureties were to be taken-and on them the superintendance of so great a variety of pub

1829.)

REPORT ON EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE.

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hic objects devolved, that a particular recapitulation Therefore, would, at this time, be impracticable.” It will be ob- Sect. 2. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of served, by an examination of the above extracts from Representatives, of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, governor Miffin's message, that he in a particular man. in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by ner notices the great power of appointing officers that the authority of the same, That all and every duty, had been vested in the executive authority, under the which by any of the laws of this state, was directed to former structure of government, to regulate the exer- be done anıl performed by the president, or by the prescise of which power thereafter, legislative interposition ident and supreme executive council, not inconsistent was immediately necessary; consequently, in the opin- with the constitution of this commonwealth, and not ion of the governor, the power of appointing many of otherwise directed by the act passed in the present ses. the officers which had been vested in the executive au- sion, entitled “An act for instituting a board of properthority under the former structure of government, had ty, and for other purposes therein mentioned,” shall be not been provided for by the constitution; and were executed by the governor of this commonwealth; and purposely left to the future regulation of law, in such that every of the laws relative to the duties first herein manner as propriety and experience should dictate. before mentioned, shall be, and they are hereby so far

Your committee are fully apprized, that some of our forth, and nofurther, repealed and made void: Provided state politicians are disposed to give the most liberal and nevertheless, That this act shall continue in force until extensive construction to delegated powers, that the the end of the present session of the General Assembly, words of the constitution will possibly bear; while they and nc longer.” construe in the most scrupulous and limited manner, So tenacious was that legislature of the rights of the those powers which are reserved by the people, or people; so well did they know that the constitution had (which is the same thing;) the powers that they have not vested the powers which had been formerly exer. not delegated. The anxiety with which some people cised by the executive authority in the governor; and labor in this cause, is much easier seen, than accounied so well were they convinced of the propriety of vesting for. Will they in this case attempt to say, that the them elswhere, as soon as the legislature should “have governor was ignorant of the extent of those provisions leisure to enumerate and define the executive powers of the constitution, which had vested the powers that with more precision," that when legislating on this subhad been formerly exercised by the executive authori- ject, “to answer the immediate pressing exigencies, ty, in the governor? Will it be said by them, that the they only vested those powers in the governor to the governor in this case, was unadvisedly calling on the le- end of that session. But it appears that the legislature gislature to provide by law for the exercise of powers, did not at that session, obtain "leisure to enumerate that had been previously provided for by the constitu- and define the executive powers;" therefore, on the tion? Charges of this kind may be made, but among thirteenth day of April, 1791, (in the same session) a law persons free from bias, and being acquainted (as most was passed, similar in substance, and varying but little Pennsylvanians are) with the accuracy of his discern- in form, by which act, the powers that had been foriner ment-the soundness of his judgment-the indepen- ly vested in the supreme executive council, were vestdence of his sentiment, and the extent of his political in. ed in the governor, “until the end of the next session formation, they will fall lifeless to the ground, as fast as of the general assembly, and no longer.” This tempo. they can be uttered.

rary law was continued in force, by temporary exten. The character of governor Mifflin stands too high to sions, until the 22d day of April, 1794, at which time it be tarnished by an allegation, that in the year 1790, he was re-enacted without limit or duration of time, as ale was unacquainted with his duties as governor of the most every other law is. commonwealth-that he was ignorant of the powers The above fact shews most clearly and conclusively, which had beer. vested in the executive by the consti- that the general assembly in each of the sessions refer, tution, which instrument he had so shortly before, not red to, were fully confident, that the powers which had only assisted in the formation of, but also, was president not been expressly vested in the governor, by the con: of the convention, who had conceived, moulded and giv- stitution, still remained with the people to be disposed en to it their final finish.

of, and regulated by law, in such manner as prudence A committee was immediately appointed, to arrange and experience should dictate. Any other conclusion the subject matter of the governor's message, from would be a tlirect charge of the grossest ignorance of which the above quotations have been taken, and on the provisions of the constitution, in the legislature of the 30th day of the same month made report. In de. 1790–91 and those who annually succeeded them, up to tailng the subject matter of the address that required the the session of 1793-94 inclusive; as well as in the gover. immediate attention of the legislature, the report says: nor, who had in his message called the attention of the “That part of the address which enumerates the pow- legislature to the necessity of providing by law, for the ers formerly vested in the president and supreme exec- exercise of the powers which had formerly been vested utive council, and which now cease to be operative, in the executive authority, and which had not been pro. your committee conceive ought to be referred io a com- vided for by the constitution. mittee to bring in a bill for the purpose of transferring A charge of this kind your committee are not prepar. those powers generally to the governor, until the end ed to make, nor do they believe (when it is recollected, of the present session, in order to answer the immedi- that besides the fourteen members who had assisted in ately pressing exigencies, until the legislature shall have framing the constitution, there were many others, of leisure to enumerate and define the executive powers eminent talents and well versed in political and legal with more precision.". A committee for this purpose knowledge,) that any informed persons will have the was accordingly appointed, a bill reported, and became hardihood to charge those different assemblies with a law, by receiving the signature of the governor on the being ignorant of the constitution, and of doing a work, 14th day of January following, which law is in the words year after year, of supererogation. following, viz:

William Bingham, was speaker of the House of Rep: “An act for transferring certain powers exercised by resentatives, at the passage of the first law, and Richard the late president and supreme executive council, to the Peters, speaker of the Senate. Richard Peter's natural governor of this commonwealth."

talents, his literary acquirements and his legal knowl. Sect. 1. Whereas by the present constitution of this edge, have procured for him the confidence of the Ucommonwealth, the executive powers of government nion, and the situation of a Judge of the United States are vested in the governor, and it is proper and neces. Court, for the eastern district of Pennsylvania: in the sary, that such laws as directed any duties to be per discharge of which duties, he has reflected much honor formed by the former executive authority of this state, on himself, and great credit on the bench. Many others should be made conformable to the new organization of I who served in these sessions, have richly merited the the powers of government.

highest encomiums; but your committee forlear to say | tempt, nor is it necessary to draw a fancifullfigure, any thing further on this point.

or give an exaggerated view of the extent of exec. The opinions of Jarerd Ingersoll, Alexander J. Dal-utive patronage; but they hope that they may be per. las and Thomas Elder, Esqrs. on the subject of appoint. mitted to state, what is the undeniable fact, viz. that ments to, and removal from office, remain to be examin- the officers in the appointment of the governor, who ed. The two former gentlemen have argued the case are removable at his pleasure, (agreeably to the conat some length, and although they do not positively say, struction given to the constitution, by the advocates of that the exercise of all power not specially provided executive patronage,) are in the annual receipt of for by the constitution, is, by the nature of our system

thousand dollars. of state government, constructively vested in the exec- What would the people say-What would the legisutive; yet from the manner in which they have discuss- lature think-were the friends of executive patronage, ed the subject it would appear that such were their to propose to give the governor the annual sum of - views of the constitution. This view of the subject thousand dollars to secure his popularity with? would be indisputably correct, provided, the natural Would they not all revolt at the idea? Would it not be original power of appointing all officers was inherent in said with much propriety, that an artful, intrigueing the governor; for this plain reason, that wherever right governor, with that sum at command, for this purpose, or power is naturally inherently vested, it must and might commit many acts of tyranny and oppression, and does naturally remain, until it has been voluntarily di- still have it in his power to stifle investigation, and conYested, by him or them in whom it was originally and tinue his popularity, while he continues his office, by naturally vested.

the liberal distribution of presents? Such suspicions The basis of all republicanism is, that all power is in- would doubtless be abroad among the people, were it herent in the people, and consequently remains in attempted to appropriate. Yet that sum, in money disthem, until they, by their free and voluntary act do tributed for that purpose by donations, in the most ad. delegate their power to some person or persons to be vantageous manner, could not so effectually shield a exercised for their use and benefit. That the people person's character, or secure his popularity, as a politic have delegated their power, must be clearly and une- distribution of the numerous offices in the gift of the quivocally shown by those who claim the possession of governor, would do; because, every person who would them, before they can be justified in the exercise there receive a fee from the governor, to spread abroad and of, by the friends of freedom. Again, these two gentle exaggerate his virtues, to conceal, deny and extenuate men lay it down as a political maxim, that the power to his vices, would be viewed, not only with suspicion, by remove, is a necessary incident to the power to appoint. the public, but with real contempt by all who knew In this opinion also, your committee beg leave to differ the fact. The case is very different with officers who from the learned gentlemen, as well as from all others are appointed by the governor; instead of detracting who attempt to support this doctrine. From what has from, it adds to their respectability; instead of lessening already been said, it will be seen, that whatever pow. their influence, it gives it a more extensive range; iners of appointing to office, the governor may be vested stead of preventing them from, it enables them more efwith, have been delegated to him by the people, or by fectually to support the character of the governor, to their immediate agents to be exercised, not for his, but for whom many of them are as completely devoted, as they their benefit: to discharge the duties of this delegation possibly could be, were they paid by the year for their is not a matter of personal choice, but a matter of official services. duty, therefore ministerial. But to remove at pleasure, Your committee have spoken plainly and freely on is the height of despotic tyranny—the two principles this subject; because, under all the circumstances of the are as opposite as the poles, and can no more be incor- case, freedom and plainness appeared to them necessary porated into the same political principles, than the most but they do not wish to be understood as attaching blame bitter, abject tyranny, can with the purest and most to any particular person, The gigantic growth of exrational unrestrained political freedom.

ecutive patronage, can be easily and rationally accounts The constitution provides only two methods of re-ed for without individual condemnation. It is in some moving civil officers--one by impeachment, the other, degree owing to the principles of our government, as by address--the former of which depends entirely on well as to human nature generally. The governor is the general assembly, and the latter so far as to form, elected for three years, and may when elected, look a. Agree to, and present the address to the governor, who round him with the purest intentions, to see what pows may, or may not comply with the request therein con- ers he has been vested with, that can be called into op. tained. But, it is not any where in the constitution, eration for the benefit of the people, and the advance. recognized that the governor, may remove any officer ment of his own character, a matter never lost sight of, at pleasure. The latter gentleman, "assured the com- nor should it ever be; but we often mistake the means mittee, that he knows of no appointment to, or removal that will lead us to the end. He meditates, reflects and from office by any governor of Pennsylvania, since the fancies public advantages, and enquires whether he has adoption of the present constitution, which, in his opi- within his power the means to promote them. If he nion, was not constitutional.' Your committee, how has any doubts in his own mind, of his powers to provide ever, cannot resist the idea, that this learned gentleman a salutary remedy in the case, he takes the council of has in the formation of his opinion, adopted what they learned and influential friends, by whom from the na. believe to be a very common course, viz. he has yielded ture of his situation, he is generally surrounded. his judgment, in this case, to the common prevailing o- Those friends may very probably have a greater persons pinion, without having strictly examined all the facts ne al interest in an extensive executive patronage, than cessary, to a full understanding of the subject, the governor himself has; consequently the greatest

Your committee, in this place, would merely observe, possible range of construction is given to his powers.-that the legislature so far from leisurely enumerating if this was only to happen once, during the continuance and defining the executive powers with more precision, of the constitution, the danger to be apprehended (as was proposed by the first report made on the sub- would not be so great;but every new case produces a new ject) have been extending the powers that were vested cause for construction; and every new governor has á by the constitution, in such manner, that the executive new set of advisers. In this way, executive patronage, department does at this time exercise a patronage to an has been swelled and extended to the enormous size in extent, unknown in any other state of the union; and which it now exists. Very different is the case with the (as your committee verily believe they have clearly legislature, many of whose members are elected to efshown) inconsistent with the fundamental principles of fect some particular local objects, which employ their our state government. Your coinmittee will not at whole attention, during the session, at the end of which,

they return to their constituents perfectly satisfied with See Nos. 1, 2 and 3, attached to this report. havingeffected the purposes for whichthey were elected.

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