enacted on May 18, 1916 (39 Stat. 123-128), and approximately onehalf of the membership of the tribe have already withdrawn their pro rata shares of that fund. Practically all of the remaining shares are those of minors. There are, however, other funds to the credit of the Cheyenne River Reservation Indians which are ample to permit of a reasonable per capita payment being made. The purpose of H. R. 17151 is to grant to the Secretary of the Interior discretionary powers to make such payments as seem advisable from such funds. As some of the Indians have already withdrawn their pro rata shares, the amendment suggested by the Secretary of the Interior should be incorporated to protect those who have not made such withdrawals.

LEGAL RESERVE ON LIFE-INSURANCE POLICIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FEBRUARY 20, 1931.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. REID of Illinois, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 4325]

The Committee on the District of Columbia, to which was referred the bill (S. 4325) to amend subchapter 5 of chapter 18 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia by adding thereto a new section to be designated section 648-a, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon, with the recommendation that the bill do pass. Report of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia fully explains the object of the bill, and is appended hereto and made a part of this report.

[Senate Report No. 750, Seventy-first Congress, second session]

The Committee on the District of Columbia, to whom was referred the bill (S. 4325) to amend subchapter 5 of chapter 18 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia by adding thereto a new section to be designated section 648-a, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon, with the recommendation that the bill do pass, with the following amendment:

Page 2, line 4, strike out the word "after" and insert, in lieu thereof, "before the first day of January next following".

The object of this bill is to require life-insurance companies operating in the District of Columbia to maintain a legal reserve. The District now has no law requiring maintenance of such a reserve, which is a vitally important element in the life-insurance contract. It is the insured's only assurance that his contract will be satisfied by the company.

counsel in a recent case.

Discovery of this serious defect in the District laws was made by the corporation The District Commissioners urged the introduction of this bill, and recommend its adoption in their letter appended hereto, as part of this report. The committee knows of no opposition to the bill.

COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, May 15, 1930.

Hon. ARTHUR CAPPER,
Chairman Committee on the District of Columbia,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

SIR: The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have the honor to submit the following on Senate bill 4325, Seventy-first Congress, second session, entitled "A bill to amend subchapter 5 of chapter 18 of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia by adding thereto a new section to be designated section 648-a," which you referred to them for report as to the merits of the bill and the propriety of its passage:

This bill was introduced by you upon request of the commissioners in a letter to you dated April 29, 1930, from which the following is quoted:

There now exists no provision of law in the District of Columbia requiring the maintenance of a legal reserve on life-insurance policies. The corporation counsel in reviewing an appeal of the Federal Life Issurance Co. from the action of the superintendent of insurance suspending its license to operate in the District of Columbia for alleged impairment of capital, rendered an opinion holding that life-insurance companies now operate in the District of Columbia under the provisions of section 653 of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia. The opinion further held that section 648 of the code, supra, has been repealed by the provisions of legislation contained in section 653, supra. (Act of August 15, 1911. The outstanding point of the opinion was the holding that there now exists no provision of law in the District of Columbia requiring the maintenance of a legal reserve on life-insurance policies.

"A legal reserve is an important, as well as a necessary, element in the contract of life insurance. Its existence is the only assurance that the insured has that his contract will be satisfied at maturity. To realize that there is no authority in law requiring the maintenance of such a fund is but a harbinger of chaos so far as the insured is concerned.

"The bill proposes to grant relief in this connection, and the commissioners believe that the measure is an emergency one requiring prompt action."

The bill should be amended by striking out on page 2, line 4, the word "after" and inserting in lieu thereof the words "before the 1st day of January next following."

The bill, as introduced, used the word "after" for the reason that the reserve requirement is an essential element in a life insurance contract and it was felt that immediately upon passage of the act all companies transacting life insurance business in the District of Columbia should be required to set up the reserve required by the legislation; but the superintendent of insurance states that there are two different standards of valuation made applicable to contracts issued after the approval of the bill and no provision is made for standards for valuation of contracts issued before the approval of the bill. It is customary in other jurisdictions when setting up new standards of valuation to have the law take effect as of the first of any given year.

Very truly yours,

L. H. REICHELDERFER, President.

O

CLOSING OF BARBER SHOPS ON SUNDAY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FEBRUARY 20, 1931.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. ZIHLMAN, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 6077]

The Committee on the District of Columbia, to which was referred the bill (S. 6077), providing for the closing of barber shops on Sunday in the District of Columbia, having duly considered same, report back to the House with the recommendation that the legislation do pass.

The committee held a public hearing on this measure to-day, February 20, 1931, giving an opportunity to the opponents and proponents of the bill to be heard, and after full consideration of the arguments presented by both sides, the committee, in executive session, voted to report the bill favorably.

In recommending favorable action on this bill, the committee does so with the understanding that the proposed legislation is designed solely to protect the health of persons engaged in the occupation of barbering, who have been compelled, because of custom and competition, to work seven days a week. Members of the barbers' unions work only six days a week in the District of Columbia, but the unorganized majority are forced either to sacrifice their day of rest or lose their positions.

The bill has the indorsement of the American Federation of Labor, the Washington Central Labor Union, and the local barbers' unions. It prohibits the maintenance on Sunday of barbering and hairdressing establishments, and makes it unlawful for any persons to pursue such occupation on Sunday in any such establishment. The measure, however, specifically states that it shall not apply to persons who refrain from such work on Sunday solely because of religious beliefs.

There is appended hereto and made a part of this report a memorandum upon the constitutionality of this bill, prepared by Charles F. Boots, legislative counsel of the Senate, which furnishes an historical and legal background for the consideration of the measure.

MEMORANDUM UPON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BILL (S. 6077, 71st Cong.) TO PROVIDE FOR THE CLOSING OF BARBER SHOPS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ON SUNDAY

Hon. ROYAL S. COPELAND,

United States Senate.

FEBRUARY 6, 1931.

SIR: The opinion of this office has been requested with respect to the constitutionality, if enacted into law, of S. 6077, Seventy-first Congress, which makes it unlawful to conduct the business of barbering on Sunday in the District of Columbia and provides penalties of fine or imprisonment for violation of its provisions.

I. POWER OF CONGRESS OVER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution (Art. I, sec. 8, par. 19) "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the seat of the National Government has been construed to give to the Congress the power to exercise absolute authority and control over the District of Columbia for every purpose of government, national or local. With respect to the latter consideration, the Congress may exercise within the District of Columbia all legislative powers that the legislature of the State might exercise within the State. (Capital Traction Co. v. Hof (1899), 174 U. S. 1; Shoemaker v. United States (1893), 147 U. S. 282; Gibbons v. District of Columbia (1886), 116 U. S. 404.) The police power of the State has been defined in Mugler v. Kansas (1887) (123 U. S. 623, 661), as embracing the power "to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety," and the power to enact legislation in accordance with such measures so as to bind all within its borders.

Although it has been held that a decision concerning the operation of the fourteenth amendment will not necessarily be deemed to overrule a long and consistent construction of the fifth amendment sustaining the validity of acts of Congress relating to public improvements in the District of Columbia (Wight v. Davidson (1901), 181 U. S. 371, 379), in general it may be said that the police power of the Congress over the District of Columbia (that is, the power to enact regulations affecting the public peace, morals, safety, health, and welfare of the people) is coextensive with the police power of the legislatures of the several States over their respective States. Accordingly, it has been held that the power of Congress to enact regulations affecting the public peace, morals, safety, health, and welfare, within the District of Columbia, is no less and no greater than the power of the several State legislatures to enact such regulations for operation within their respective territorial limits. (Moses v. United States (1900), 16 App. D. C. 433.)

If S. 6077 is to be sustained, it must be as an exercise of the police power.

II. GENERAL SUNDAY OBSERVANCE LAWS

The Supreme Court has sustained the power of the States to enact Sunday observance laws of general application as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. In Hennington v. Georgia (1896) (163 U. S. 299), the Supreme Court had before it a Georgia statute forbidding the running of freight trains on Sunday. In referring to the general Sunday observance law in the State, the court said: "The legislature having, as will not be disputed, power to enact laws to promote the order and to secure the comfort, happiness, and health of the people, it was within its discretion to fix the day when all labor, within the limits of the State, works of necessity and charity excepted, should cease" (p. 304).

This statement was quoted with approval in Petit v. Minnesota (1900) (177 U. S. 164, 165), following a declaration of the court in that case that "we have uniformly recognized State laws relating to the observance of Sunday as enacted in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the State." (For collections of State cases on this subject, see Annotated Cases, 1918 E, 1168, and 20 A. L. R. 1111, 1117.)

Such statutes have also been upheld by State courts. (Frolickstein v. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725; Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476; Quarles v. State, 55 Ark. 11; State v. Linsig, 178 Iowa 484; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318; Commonwealth v. Has.. 122 Mass. 40.)