machine used on one farm along the highway to another farm, where it was also to be used, and he claimed exemption from licence duty on the ground that the traction engine was used "solely for agricultural purposes." Held, the justices were wrong in convicting, and that M. was within the exemption, and was not using the locomotive as a common carrier.-March v. Baker, 55 J. P. 583.

A proprietor of locomotives to be let out for hire for agricultural purposes is not required to take out a licence for the use of such locomotives under any bye-laws requiring such licences as authorized by sect. 32 of the Highway and Locomotive Amendment Act, 1878, since the fact of any such locomotive being "used solely for agricultural purposes brings it within the exemption under the section, and the nature of the ownership of the locomotive is immaterial.-Ellis v. Hulse or Jesse v. Hales (1889), 37 W. R. 557; 58 L. J. M. C. 91; 23 Q. B. D. 24; 60 L. T. 836; 53 J. P. 598.

1887

Tramway. The steam engines authorized by statute to be used on tramways are not locomotives within the meaning of the Highways Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 77), s. 32, and therefore do not require to be licensed by the county authority.—Bell v. Stockton Tramways Co., 51 J. P. 804.

1902

Locomotives on Highways Act, 1896-Regulation made under Statutory Powers.-In a prosecution for a contravention of a regulation made by the Secretary of State for Scotland (in England, by the Local Government Board) under sect. 6 of the Locomotives on Highways Act, 1896, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the regulation has been laid before Parliament as required by subsect. 2 of that section. A prosecution is competent even if the regulation has not been laid before Parliament, in respect that the enactment does not import that presentation to Parliament is a condition precedent of the regulation coming into force.-Hepburn v. Wilson, 4 F. (Just. Cas.) 18 (Ct. of Justiciary).

Contributory Negligence. In an action for an injury to a person crossing a public highway, by driving against him and knocking him down, the jury must be satisfied that the injury was attributable to the negligence of the driver, and to that alone, before they can find a verdict for the plaintiff; and if they think that it was occasioned in any degree by the improper conduct of the plaintiff in crossing the road in an incautious and imprudent manner, they must find their verdict for the defendant.-Hawkins v. Cooper, 8 Car. & P. 473.

To sustain an action for an injury caused by the negligent driving of the defendant, the injury must have been caused by the negligence of the defendant only, without the negligence of the plaintiff contributing in any way to the accident. It is the duty of a person who

is driving over a crossing for foot passengers at the entrance of a street, to drive slowly, cautiously and carefully; but it is also the duty of a foot passenger to use due care and caution in going upon such crossing, so as not to get among the carriages, and thus receive injury.—Williams v. Richards (1852) 3 Car. & K. 81.

1891

Inability from Deafness to hear warning.-The plaintiff, who was almost deaf, was walking across a street in a diagonal direction at a place where there was no crossing. The defendant's driver turned his horse round from where he had stopped, and proceeded to drive up the same street. He saw the plaintiff for the first time a short distance off, and shouted a warning. The plaintiff, not hearing, continued on his course; whereupon the driver began to pull up and shouted again, but immediately after collided with the plaintiff, who was thereby seriously injured. The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff :-Held, that the verdict was not against the weight of evidence.-Smith v. Browne, 28 L. R. Ir. 1.

1828

Persons crossing Road.-Where a party, by his own negligent or wrongful act, deprives another of sufficient presence of mind to take

advantage of a warning given to avoid any danger or accident that may happen to him from that act, such warning will not discharge the wrongdoer from liability.-Woolley v. Scovell, 7 L. J. (O. S.) K. B. 41; 3 M. & Ry. 105.

A foot-passenger has a right to cross the carriage-road, and a person driving a carriage along the road is liable to an action if he do not take care so as to avoid driving against a foot-passenger who is crossing the road; and if a person thus driving cannot pull up in time because his reins break, that is no defence, as he is bound to have proper tackle. The rule as to a carriage being on its proper side of the road does not apply with respect to a carriage and a footpassenger; for, as regards foot-passengers, a carriage may go on either side of the road. In an action of trespass for driving a carriage against the plaintiff the defence of inevitable accident must be specially pleaded.-Cotterill v. Starkey (1839), 8 Car. & P. 691.

Where a plaintiff has died since the trial, semble that a rule for a new trial cannot be moved for without letters of administration being first taken out. The mere fact of a man's driving on the wrong side of the road is no evidence of negligence in an action brought against him for running over a person who was crossing the road on foot.-Lloyd v. Ogleby (1859), 5 C. B. (N. S.) 667.

In an action for an injury occasioned by a defendant's negligencee.g., negligent driving-the plaintiff, to warrant the judge in leaving the case to the jury, must give proof of well-defined negligence, and not merely some evidence of negligence, on the part of the defendant; and where the evidence given is equally consistent with there having been no negligence on the part of the defendant as with there having been negligence, it is not competent for the judge to leave it to the jury to find either alternative; such evidence must be taken as amounting to no proof of negligence. Foot-passengers, in crossing a highway, are bound to take due caution to avoid vehicles, and the drivers of vehicles are bound to take due caution to avoid footpassengers.-Cotton v. Wood (1860), 29 L. J. C. P. 333; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 168; 8 C. B. (N. S.) 568.

1803

Rule of the Road.-It is no justification to an action for negligently driving that the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the road, if there was room sufficient for the defendant to pass without inconvenience.-Clay v. Wood, 5 Esp. 44; 8 R. R. 827.

Although the driver of a carriage is bound to leave sufficient room on the left-hand side of the road for other carriages to pass, he is only bound to keep it so as to leave sufficient room. It is matter of evidence whether sufficient room is left or not in case any accident happens.Wordsworth v. Willan (1805), 5 Esp. 273.

There are three customary rules or directions for driving. 1st. That, in meeting, each party shall bear to the left. 2nd. That, in passing, the foremost person bearing to the left, the other shall pass on the offside. But the driver of a carriage is not bound, under all circumstances, to pass another carriage on the off side. He may, if the street be very broad, go on the near side. 3rd. That, in crossing, the driver should bear to the left hand and pass behind the other carriage.— Wayte v. Carr (1823), 1 L. J. (O. S.) K. B. 63; 25 R. R. 554; 2 D. & R.

255.

Though the rule of the road is not to be adhered to if, by departing from it, an injury can be avoided, yet, in cases where parties meet on the sudden and an injury results, the party on the wrong side should be held answerable, unless it appears clearly that the party on the right had ample means and opportunity to prevent it.-Chaplin v. Hawes (1828), 3 Car. & P. 554.

A person driving a carriage is not bound to keep on the regular side of the road; but, if he does not, he must use more care and keep a better look-out to avoid concussion than would be necessary if he were on the proper part of the road.-Pluckwell v. Wilson (1832), 5 Car. & P. 375.

The rule of the road as to keeping the proper side applies to saddlehorses as well as carriages; and if a carriage and a horse are to pass, the carriage must keep its proper side, and so must the horse. If the driver of a carriage is on his proper side, and sees a horse coming furiously on its wrong side of the road, it is the duty of the driver of the carriage to give way and avoid an accident, although in so doing he does go a little on what would otherwise be his wrong side of the road.-Turley v. Thomas (1837), 8 Car. & P. 103.

Where there is conflicting evidence on a question of fact, whatever may be the opinion of the judge who tries the cause as to the value of that evidence, he must leave the consideration of it to the jury. There is no such rule of the road as to make the left always the proper side.-Finegan v. L. and N. W. Rail. (1889), 53 J. P. 663.

1848

Excavation in Highway. The defendant, who was in possession of land which abutted on an immemorial public highway, built a house thereon, and excavated an area in front of the house and left it open adjoining the highway. A., to whom the plaintiff was administrator, walking with ordinary care along the highway, fell down the area and was killed. Held, that the defendant was liable to an action for damages by the plaintiff as administrator of A. under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93). The declaration alleged that the defendant was possessed of a messuage with the appurtenances near to a public

footway, in front of which said messuage, and parcel of the appurtenances thereof, and close to and by the side of the said footway and abutting upon the same, there was a large hole or area, which hole, &c., by reason of the possession of the said messuage with the appurtenances, the defendant ought to have fenced off so as to prevent damage to passengers, &c. Held, that the obligation of the defendant to fence off the area was properly described in the declaration. A trespasser may have a right of action for an injury sustained whilst in the act of trespassing.-Barnes v. Ward, 19 L. J. C. P. 195; 9 C. B. 392; 2 Car. & K. 661; 14 Jur. 334.

1894

Widening of Highway - Owner of Land adjoining - Dangerous condition.-The defendants, who were the owners of land on each side of a highway which was originally ten feet wide, having on one side a declivity gradually sloping down to a brook, widened the highway by increasing its width to about thirty-four feet on the side towards the brook, and it became necessary to bank up that side. The highway had never been fenced. It was in a mountainous district, and was steep. The plaintiff was leading his horse with a cart up the highway, and drew the horse across the widened part of the road to rest it. The horse staggered and fell over the embankment. The plaintiff brought an action for damages, complaining that the defendants had created a new danger alongside of the highway. Held, that the defendants were not liable.-Owen v. De Winton, 10 Times L. R. 534; 58 J. P. 833 (C. A.).

1882

Excavations in Private Road.—Defendant, while erecting houses upon land adjoining a new road which had not been dedicated to the public, had dug a trench across the road for the purpose of making drains. Plaintiff's servant, while driving plaintiff's horses along the road after dark, drove into the trench, no lights having been placed to warn persons using the road. Held, that the defendant had not been guilty of any negligence, there being no duty cast upon him to protect any one using the road without licence. Dictum of Crompton, J., in Gallagher v. Humphry, 10 W. R. 664, doubted.-Murley v. Grove, 46 J. P. 360.

1850

Extent of Liability for escape of Injurious Matter.-A railway company, by agreement under seal, engaged a contractor to execute the railway, reserving power to the company to watch the progress of the work and to dismiss any incompetent workmen employed by the contractor, In constructing a viaduct, part of the railway, over a