a-a. Line due north-of compromise. a....o. Boundary claimed by Pennsylvania. 000. Curves originally claimed by Virginia. a a e. Mason's and Dixon's line.

a avv. Ceded to Virginia under agreement. eee. River Delaware.

The zig zag of a western boundary, parallel with the meanders of the Delaware on the east, would have been diffià cult, or impossible to ascertain, with mathematical exactness. The curve consisting of irregular arches reducible to no segment of the sphere, could with no convenience, at least, be traced upon the ground in ascertaining the western boundary. What would justify the taking the chord of an irregular arch, would warrant that for which Pennsylvania contended, the taking the chord of the whole curved line of the Delaware, connecting the two extreme points of the north and south longitude. That is, from the Delaware at the place of beginning on the south running five degrees in longitude, and from the place of beginning on the north running the same distance from the Delaware, and connecting their terminations with a right line. This would seem by far the most likely to have been intended in the grant of the charter to Penn. It is totally improbable that any thing else could have been in contemplation in designating the extent, because the carrying it into effect by measurement, would have been impracticable. The court of justice would have put a construction on a writing which would have led to such inconvenience, because it would have been unreasonable, if not absurd. The claim of Virginia would therefore appear to me not to have been well founded. This independent of the principle of law, that every thing is to be taken most strongly against the grantor. And the whole of the soil, both of Virginia and Pennsylvania, was in the king of England when he granted the charter to Penn. So that this principle applied, and bound Virginia as to the right of soil at least, if it did not as to jurisdiction.

By the compromise Pennsylvania obtained the jurisdiction, or rather the claim of Virginia was withdrawn so far as respected this. She quieted her possession, and title also so far as respected the state of Virginia, but subject to rights of individuals who claimed under Virginia. These if prior to Pennsylvania titles, must come in. It was then in fact ceding the rights of individuals under Pennsylvania; or rather taking them away; for the courts of justice bound by the

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law ratifying the agreement, sustained ejectments under Virginia claims where they were prior. General Washington after the peace of 1783, instituted ejectments, and succeeded in recovering under a prior Virginia claim, a large tract of country containing a number of settled plantations which had been defended and cultivated during the Indian depredations upon that quarter, at the expence of life in many instances. It was sufficiently distressing to be obliged to leave their cultivated fields, meadows, orchards, and buildings. The general did not offer to make compensation for these. Nor in strict law, was he bound to do so. He could not be considered as under more than an imperfect obligation. It is possible he might have thought of this, had he not taken it for granted, as he had a right to do, that the state of Pennsylvania who had taken away the property from the settlers, by ceding to Virginia, would have provided a compensation. This by strict law the state was bound to do. For though the ceding the jurisdiction is at all times a right of the society; yet the exercise of the dominium eminens, could not, under the constitution of 1776, or under the present, be justifiable without providing a compensation. This was the case some years afterwards in the adjustment of the Wyoming controversy, with Connecticut. But nothing of this was heard of with regard to lands taken away by the Virginia claims in this disputed territory. And at this late period, it is not probable that we shall hear more of it. It remains now, not a matter of legal discussion, but of history.

"Whether a sale of defendant's lands, under a younger judg"ment, affects the lien of an older one, remains undecided." I Smith. 68, referring to a dictum of Judge Yates, 2 Bin. 218.

I am not able to name the case, nor can I say with certainty that it became necessary to decide the case expressly on this point, and that the opinion expressed was not a dic tum of the court, and what might be called in strictness, ex

tra-judicial. But this I well recollect that C. J. Shippen, Yeates, Smith and myself on the bench, it was expressed, Yeates, as I understood it, of a contrary way of thinking, that the sale of a defendant's lands under a younger judgment, could not affect the lien of an older one. It might have been perhaps the case of a mortgage that brought the principle into view. But if it had never been decided, can there be any doubt about it?

A gives a pledge to B; say a piece of plate. Can A selling that pledge, give the purchaser a right to take it, or do more than put him in his place and enable him to take it paying B? What has B to do with A selling the pledge, or C purchasing it? It cannot change his interest in the thing pledged. The money advanced still remains due upon it. Will it avail the purchaser C to say the pledge was sold to me for so much, and I will pay you that? Might not B say, I will have the whole of the money advanced upon it, or my interest in the pledge must remain.

If a judgment is a lien, must not the land liened, or tied, remain bound until the debt for which it is bound be discharged? Can it make any difference whether it is land that is pledged, or a chattel? I cannot comprehend how the idea could have arisen, that it makes any difference. If land is pledged under a mortgage, that mortgage must be satisfied, before any other can come in. What is it to the first mortgagee, whether the land is sold under a second mortgage or, what it may be sold for under a second mortgage? He is safe, and his mortgage must be paid off, before the purchaser under a second mortgage can take it freed from the encumbrance. What is the difference between a mortgage, which is a specific lien upon one or more tracts, and a judgment, which is a general lien, and binds what lands the debtor has at the time of the judgment. I do not enter into the question why it may not bind lands after purchased by the debtor.. But it is not questioned but that it will bind all the lands he has at the time. It binds as perfectly as in the case of a mortgage of a single tract. The only difference is in the manner of foreclosure, and the proceeding to a sale. I think it pro

bable the case decided in the supreme court was that of a mortgage; but it decides the principle; and if land sold under a second mortgage, for less than the mortgage money on the first, could not affect the right of the first to have it sold again, how should the sale under a younger or second judgment affect? It may have been the case of a mortgage that was decided in the supreme court, but the principle went the whole length; and the case of a sale under a younger judgment, could not but be spoken of, and considered the same. Who ever heard of a sale under a younger mortgage, cutting out the lien of a prior? There must have been something special in the circumstances of the case, that could have raised the question, or brought it before the court.

The purchaser at sheriff's sale takes it cum onere of every encumbrance by the debtor prior to the date of the judgment on which the sale is made. It is his business to look into every encumbrance, and the sheriff who is the mere agent of the law in selling has nothing to do with the encumbrances. It is the business of the purchaser to examine into this, and to bid no more than he thinks proper to give, taking the encumbrance into view. He obeys the exigence of his writ and sells, and out of what money comes to his hands he pays off the judgment under which the land is sold if so much is obtained, and the surplus to the debtor as directed by the act of assembly in the case of chattels. As to the notion of the sheriff being liable to see how the purchase is applied, he has nothing to do with it.

Am I bound who am a judgment creditor, to do more than to watch my own lien, and the sale under it, if I choose to have a sale made? I am not bound to attend the sale under a younger judgment, or to see what it will bring, as I cannot be affected by it. It is the younger creditor to attend to this, knowing that his judgment cannot come in until the other is satisfied. If the money bid will not amount to what will discharge the prior judgment, or will amount to no more, he gets nothing. Unless the land is of sufficient value to answer prior encumbrances, the purchaser loses by so much. This is a doctrine which younger judgment cre