and in this respect our government is as democratic as is possible short of the people exercising the executive power immediately by themselves which in a great community is impracticable. Nevertheless we have seen a struggle to break in upon this part of our constitution by the local delegates, by taking away the appointment of officers from the people through the state representative, and exercising it themselves.

The third and intermediate, the law expounding power, is but one remove from the immediate appointment of the whole people, and to a qualified extent, is in the power of the parts in the legislative body.

All this distribution is the result of much thought and long experience in the affairs of men. Our constitution has been framed with great deliberation.

The tenure of judicial office has been a subject of complaint. The stay here may support men who ought to be displaced, but there may be occasion for it when the attempt may be to bear down, and remove those who ought not to be displaced. The constitution is not made for a day. But the will of the people ought at all times to have effect. But the thing is to get at the will of the people; and even if they could assemble as one man to express their will, there is such a thing as rashness in a multitude. They would find it necessary to restrain themselves by taking time to deliberate. Perhaps to provide that in the case of those who administer their laws which subjects to much odium; and requires proportionable fortitude, it should be necessary that in the case of a change two thirds among themselves should be agreed.

It will be said this is a new idea, that the governor is the immediate and only immediate representative of the people. Is it not the fact? The local delegate is the actual representative of a district, and it is in contemplation of law only that he is the representative of the state. He is chosen annually, because it can conveniently be done. The governor is chosen with the solemnity of a triennial, and general election. He is a representative elected with more concern, and is of longer duration, Ephemeral productions in nature, are less

the objects of attention, than those which are of more impor tance in the scale of being, and of greater longevity. Not that I mean to undervalue the local delegate, and virtual representative. He may be in fact the far superior personage; but it is in a political point of view, and representative capacity, that I consider the characters. But, in proportion as a man is removed from local interests, his horizon is enlarged, and his mind embraces the interests of the whole community. The local delegate is charged with the accomplishment of local objects, and for thése he is under the necessity oftentimes of bartering his vote upon a general question. At all events he is under the temptation of doing it. The general representative is charged with the interests of the whole, and has no local objects to accomplish. In this particular alone, independent of all others, the constitution presents a noble scheme of wisdom, and democratic equality.

It is contemplated in the nature of the case that an opposition of sentiments will arise between the local delegate and the general representative. As is natural to the human mind it may produce warmth, and mutual accusations of a mistake of the true interests of the people. Even a contempt may be alleged and contumelious expressions adduced as a proof of it. But it is to the conduct that a wise people will look for the proof of this. Does the man slight their interests by neglecting his duty? This will be the subject of enquiry with rational men, when it is to their passions, and not to their understandings. Nay, when the recurrence is to this it is a presumption that passion prompts the movers more than reason, or that self-love in some shape is at the bottom.

Certain it is that the whole body politic have not the means of information upon a great scale. It is in contemplation of law only that they are supposed to be infallible, and whatever the people do is right. Individuals in their respective occupations have not the leisure nor the opportu nity to investigate great questions. It is the part of a faithful representative, to respect the rights, but to distrust the impulses of the people.

But there are always ingenious men who will wish to try their hands at making a constitution, and the passion of constitution-making will not be satisfied with one essay. Hence it is that no constitution will be lasting; and there is such a thing as a habit of instability. A bone that is often out of joint is not easily retained in the socket.

It is an axiom that the people have a right to change their constitution; and a majority constitutes the people; and the motion towards a change must begin somewhere. Hence the right of any individual to propose a change. An oath to support the constitution is subject to the exercise of this right. But though the vote of a majority gives the right to change, yet it supposes the vote of every one to be taken; and therefore any attempt to change without having taken the previous question, convention or no convention, must be contrary to oath and right both. The existing legislature for the time being would seem to be the most expedient organ of communication with respect to this object, who, by way of resolution, not law, for they have no authority, could fix upon the ways and means of taking the sense of the people, and this ought to be by a universal vote of the citizens qualified to vote, and not, by proposing the choice of re presentatives in a convention without a vote by the whole people on the previous question. Where the sense of the necessity of a change pervades the whole community, it may not be attended at the time with an immediate convulsion? but where that is not the case, it may produce a civil war. For the man who from a surprise upon him, and exclusion in fact, by defect of ways and means of giving him an opportunity to make his will known, is not bound by what is done, and may resist, and it will depend upon the event whether it shall be stiled a rebellion, or a revolution. The taking the sense of the people therefore by the signatures, sent forward to the house, is not fair, or safe, and ought not to produce more than the devising ways and means to take the sense of the people. For can the executive authority do less than to issue his proclamation against a convention on any other ground, and in case of its taking place, calling on the

civil authority and militia to suppress the insurrection. It would be his duty, and on his oath he could not dispense with it; and if in this respect he is not vigilant, our established governments and liberty will be of short duration.

All the greatness of man is derived from his gregarious nature, his love of association; yet of all things how difficult to retain him under any form of government but that which of all others is the least favourable to his happiness, and the great improvement of his nature. Tyranny in some shape he will have. It is that which he constantly exclaims against; and most of all hates, and fears, and yet as if under the dominion of witchcraft, he will run into his embraces. This mighty giant, this monster feeds on human flesh; and yet in vain you warn against the approaches to his den.

We will suppose that a revolution is brought about, and a new constitution is formed, with all peace and quietness. This constitution must want the stays, the braces of the present; because these very stays, or braces are the impediments of which complaint is made, and which has brought about the revolution. Will not that occur which has always occurred, that the many first, the few next, but in a short time the one will govern? Is the nature of man changed? Is our air less elastic? Or is there a spirit in the atmosphere less favourable to discord, that we should trust ourselves more than experience has shewn it behoved, where man has planted himself in all other climates and countries?

It is not the boy that applies the flambeau that causes that mighty burning. The inflammable materials of the city supply food. It is in the veins of the timber that the latent sparks are found; that the flames are engendered, and burst out. It requires no talents to set a town on fire. It is the work of audacity alone.

Whence is it that some men have become great upon the earth? Some by forming establishments, and doing good; others by the greatness of the mischief they have accomplished. Rarely do even the actors find their account in what is done. Ingratitude is in the way of the good man,

and is the reward of all his labours. Vain glory or the love of spoil prompts the bad, but it is in the nature of things that his own mind torments him at the present, and the revenge, and execration of mankind pursues him at the last.

It behooves men to weigh well before they begin a revolution. It may terminate short of a civil war, with great discretion, and wise conduct; but a great deal is put to risk. Legislators have been at all times aware of the unstable disposition of the multitude, and the use that is made of it by ambitious men. Solon exacted an oath from the Athenians, not to change his laws, for at least a period. Lycurgus, of the Lacedemonians that they would preserve his system, until his return, determining previously never to return. The legislator of the Jews an inspired lawgiver, saw, in the nature of his people, the propensity to change. He denounced curses on those who should subvert his institutions." Cursed let them be in their basket and cursed in their store."

Executive patronage under our constitution, is thought to put the Governor beyond the reach of the people; that when he has fenced himself with appointments under him, it is difficult, if not impossible to prevent his re-election. So far is this from being the fact, that it is his appointments which give him all his trouble, and lay the foundation of an opposition. We need not recur to a saying of Lewis 14th to prove this; that when he had conferred an office or an honour," he made many dissatisfied, and one man ungrateful." He is ungrateful, either because it is the nature of an obligation to produce ingratitude; or because the man thinks himself injured in getting less than his due. If I am to administer a government, and wish a continuance in office, or to escape enmities, let me have no appointments in my gift. It is invidious to select the qualified, or bestow emoluments. What a host does not a Governor raise up against himself, in the exercise of such a trust; there can be but one man in many appointed to office? and yet all, or most expect offices. So blind is self-love that few men suspect their incapacity, or call in question their desert.

I will not say; it would be unjust to say that there are

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