Misc.] Court of General Sessions, New York County, May, 1908. of decision whether such section applies, where the possessor of a pawn ticket is a bailee of the ticket, as in the case at bar, as distinguished from an owner of the same. The question may be novel, but, applying the ordinary canons of construction to the section in question, one seemingly not difficult of decision. It is urged that such a question is presented in connection with each of the petit larceny charges, for the reason that it is asserted that in each the larceny, if committed, consisted in the obtainment of money by false pretenses, and that the alleged false pretenses related merely to the value of the article pawned, and amounted to nothing but an expression of opinion, and was of a character which did not subject the defendant to criminal liability, and that this contention by the defendant presents a difficult question of law. An examination of the informations leads me to think that one representation, among others alleged to have been false, was the representation that some article had in fact been pawned with the defendant and that such pawned article was represented by the given pawn ticket. So construed, the petit larceny charges against the defendant present no difficult question of law. As stated, it is also urged that property rights would be affected by a judgment of conviction and that, for this reason, the cases should be removed. Where the decision of a charge of misdemeanor prosecuted by information will affect a property right the current of decisions is to the effect that such circumstance presents a ground for granting the certificate now applied for. Within the principle upon which these decisions rest is a property right involved in these cases. The defendant is a licensed pawnbroker. The license to him is issued under the provisions of chapter 339, Laws of 1883, as amended by chapter 240, Laws of 1890, and subsequent amendments. The original act provides in substance that all pawnbrokers in cities having 200,000 inhabitants or more must be licensed by the mayor, and the penalty of $100 for each day is pro Court of General Sessions, New York County, May, 1908. [Vol. 59. vided for the transaction in any such city of a pawnbroking business without such a license. The license is fixed at $500 yearly, and a bond in the penal sum of $10,000 is required to be given in addition. Various regulations are made respecting the interest pawnbrokers may charge, the books they must keep and other matters. The mayor is given power to impose fines of not less than $25 or more than $100 for violations of the provisions of the act, except for not procuring the license. Section 2 of the act (Laws 1883, chapter 339) gives the mayor "full power and authority to revoke such license for cause." By the Greater New York charter power is given to the board of aldermen to regulate the business of pawnbrokers (§§ 44 and 51), and a certain general supervision over pawnbrokers is given to the police commissioner and the mayor (SS 121, 316, 317). The right which a person has to pursue a lawful occupation or calling is, using the term in its broadest sense, a property right. See Slaughter-House Case, 16 Wall. 116 and 122, where Bradley, J., in his dissenting opinion, says: This right to choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling when chosen is a man's property and right." A license to a person to follow any particular trade or business is not an appointment to office, nor does it confer any of the powers or privileges of a public officer. Its ob ject is for the purpose of controlling the business and preventing its being conducted in a manner injurious to the public welfare. People v. Acton, 48 Barb. 524. The defendant, by the payment of a license fee and the giving of a bond, has acquired the right to pursue for a stated time a certain calling. This right is evidenced by a license and is revocable by the mayor "for cause.” "for cause." While, doubtless, large discretion is vested in the mayor, the license is not held wholly at his pleasure. It cannot be arbitrarily revoked. The defendant not only has rights under the license which the court would protect, but the courts would in a proper case enjoin or give damage for a wrongful revocation. of the license. A conviction in the case at bar would seem Misc.] County Court, Monroe County, May, 1908. ingly, prima facie, present good cause for the revocation of the defendant's license; but such a conviction would not necessarily and as a matter of law work such a revocation. In this respect the cases at bar are different from convictions for violations of sections 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30 or 31 of the Liquor Tax Law (§ 34, subds. 2, 3), chapter 112 of the Laws of 1896, as amended, which convictions, ipso facto, work a forfeiture of the license (People ex rel. Frank Brewery v. Cullinan, 168 N. Y. 258; People v. Gantz, 41 Misc. Rep. 542); and it is in part because of this distinction that a property right cannot be said to be involved in the present case in the sense in which such a right is involved in certain cases under the Liquor Tax Law. As the applications in these cases for certificates, certifying that it is reasonable that they should be prosecuted by indictment, do not fall within any of the classes of cases in which such certificates are properly granted the applications are denied. Applications denied. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. ROCHESTER RAILWAY & LIGHT COMPANY, Defendant. (County Court, Monroe County, May, 1908.) Corporations - Liability for torts and criminal liability — Criminal liability-For manslaughter. A corporation cannot commit the crime of manslaughter, and a demurrer to an indictment of a corporation for that crime should be sustained. DEMURRER to indictment. Charles B. Bechtold, assistant district attorney, for the people. Daniel M. Beach, for the defendant. BARHITE, J. The defendant was indicted by the grand jury for the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, it County Court, Monroe County, May, 1908. [Vol. 59. being alleged that one Ernie Oppenheimer was killed by the culpable negligence of the defendant, the particulars of the charge being that a water heater was installed in the home. of the deceased by the defendant, and that a proper vent to the open air from the heater for the escape of obnoxious and dangerous gases was not provided, and that the gases furnished by the defendant for use in the heater were of a kind dangerous to human life and health. The defendant is a corporation, and the sole question presented for the consideration of the court is whether a corporation can commit the crime of manslaughter. The claim is made that the definition of that crime in the Penal Code necessarily excludes an artificial being, existing only by permission of law, from the operation of the statute, and, further, that the crime of manslaughter is of such a character that a corporation cannot be guilty of committing it. The question is exceedingly important and is one of difficulty, not alone on account of the language used in the Code, but because, so far as the briefs of counsel indicate or personal research discloses, the courts of this State furnish no precedent. Homicide is defined in the Penal Code as "the killing of one human being by the act, procurement or omission of another." Homicide is further defined to be either: First, murder; Second, manslaughter; Third, excusable homicide; or, Fourth, justifiable homicide. Manslaughter is one of the different kinds of homicide. If homicide is the killing of one human being by another "human being," and manslaughter is one kind of homicide, then only a human being can commit that crime. Obviously a corporation is not and cannot be a human being. If the words quoted were the only ones that need construction the task would be simple; but the Code, in defining manslaughter, uses the term "person" and not "human being." This is the definition: "Such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree when committed without a design to effect death either: "1. By a person committing or attempting to commit, etc., or "2. In the heat of passion, etc., or Misc.] County Court, Monroe County, May, 1908. "3. By any act, procurement or culpable negligence of any person which, according to the provisions of this chapter, does not constitute the crime of murder in the first or second degree nor manslaughter in the first degree." The indictment is based upon the third subdivision, and the learned district attorney contends that the word " person" must have its usual broad legal signification, and must, therefore, include not only natural but artificial beings. If his contention is correct the indictment is justified. When we consider the active part which corporations take, in the affairs of the community, and how largely the great business enterprises of the day are owned and controlled by these legal but artificial beings, and how often the agents and employees of such corporations are charged with crime and indicted for acts which result in the death of human beings and committed while engaged in the business of the corporation, it is significant that the district attorney and courts of this State charged with the interpretation of the criminal law have not seen fit to lay the crime directly at the door of the corporation itself, but have apparently assumed that it was not chargeable with crimes which include the element of violence to the person. In construing the law under consideration it should be remembered that the different sections of the Penal Code are to be construed together and effect given to each, if possible. In People v. Moran, 123 N. Y. 254, the court, in referring to the enactment of the Penal Code, says: "The design was to codify the criminal laws of the State and embrace them all in a single enactment under a uniform system." In Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330, we find this language: "One part of an act of the legislature may be referred to in aid of the interpretation of other parts of the same act;" and, again, Statutes enacted at the same session of the legislature should receive construction, if possible, which will give effect to each. Each is supposed to speak the mind of the same legislature, and the words used in each should be qualified and restricted, if necessary, in * * * |