The remedy by appeal to United States Supreme Court was not available to review the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court in mandamus proceeding to compel a proper record of action of Kansas Legislature on proposed Child Labor Amendment to the Federal Constitution, where validity of a state statute was not assailed. Id. Where Congress has provided no limitation of time for ratification of proposed constitutional amendment, question of what constitutes reasonable time for ratification is an open one for consideration of Congress when in presence of certified ratifications by three-fourths of states, time arrives for promulgation of adoption of amendment. Id. Duly authenticated official notice to the Secretary of State (now the Administrator of General Services) that certain state legislatures, having power to adopt a resolution ratifying a proposed Amendment to the Federal Constitution, have done so, is conclusive upon him, and, when certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts. Leser v. Garnett, 1922, 42 S.Ct. 217, 258 U.S. 130, 66 L.Ed. 505. "The remaining contention is that the ratifying resolutions of Tennessee and of West Virginia are inoperative, because adopted in violation of the rules of legislative procedure prevailing in the respective states. The question raised may have been rendered immaterial by the fact that since the proclamation the legislatures of two other states-Connecticut and Vermont-have adopted resolutions of ratification. But a broader answer should be given to the contention. The proclamation by the Secretary certified that, from official documents on file in the Department of State, it appeared that the proposed Amendment was ratified by the legislatures of thirtysix states, and that it has become valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution of the United States.' As the legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to adopt the resolution of ratification, official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they had done so, was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts. The rule declared in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, N.Y.1892, 143 U.S. 650, 669673, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294, 302-304, 18 applicable here." Id. § 107. Parchment or paper for printing enrolled bills or resolutions Enrolled bills and resolutions of either House of Congress shall be printed on parchment or paper of suitable quality as shall be determined by the Joint Committee on Printing. July 30, 1947, с. 388, § 1, 61 Stat. 633. Library references: Statutes 37; C.J.S. Statutes § 60 et seq. § 108. Repeal of repealing act Whenever an Act is repealed, which repealed a former Act, such former Act shall not thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided. July 30, 1947, c. 388, § 1, 61 Stat. 633. Library references C.J.S. Statutes §§ 307, 310. 1. Implied repeal of repealing act Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored, and intention of Congress to repeal, modify or supersede must be clear and manifest. In re Bear River Drainage Dist., C.A.Utah 1959, 267 F.2d 849. Repeals by implication are not favored, and where two acts cover the same subject matter both should be given effect if possible. Lietz v. Flemming, C.A.Mich. 1959, 264 F.2d 311, certiorari denied 80 S. Ct. 66, 361 U.S. 820, 4 L.Ed. 2d 66. To repeal a prior act there must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and those of the old, and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy. Id. coverage of an act matters which in terms expressly include, on theory that another act whose general purpose seems inconsistent has impliedly repealed or limited the act under review, and only where it is found that it is not possible for both acts to co-exist can an act be held to repeal or limit another, and then only in respect to precise point of conflict. U. S. v. 24 Cans Containing Butter, C.C.Ala.1945, 148 F.2d 365, certiorari denied 66 S.Ct. 90, 326 U.S. 752, 90 L.Ed. 450, rehearing denied 66 S.Ct. 166. 326 U.S. 808, 90 L.Ed. 493. Implied repeal or repeal of one act by another is not favored. Id. The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and of Title 27 which by implication repealed the provisions of R.S. 3279, now incorporated in section 2831 of Title 26. Internal Revenue Code, requiring distiller to post a sign showing that his place of business is a distillery did not have the effect of reviving that statute in view of this section since it applies to repeals by implication as well as by express language. Bender v. U. S., C.C. A.N.J.1938, 93 F.2d 814. In order for an amending statute to operate as a repeal of an earlier act, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment. Id. Courts will not, unless conflict between two acts is inescapable, exclude from Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored, especially when implication is a strained and dubious one. Sunbeam Corp. v Gem Jewelry Co.. D.C.Hawaii A repeal by implication of either a stat- ute or a franchise is not favored. U. S. v. 85,237 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Zapata County, Tex.. D.C.Tex.1957. 157 F Supp. 150, affirmed 252 F.2d 116. Repeal by implication is not favored, and to work an implied repeal of earlier law, a newer statute must involve a posi- tive repugnancy; and even then the old- er law is repealed by implication only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnan- су. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius. D.C.Pa. Repeals of statutes by implication are National Mfg. Co. v. U. S., C.A.8, 1954, 210 F.2d 263, certiorari denied 74 S.Ct. 778, 347 U.S. 967, 98 L.Ed. 1108; Brown Paper Mill Co. v. C. I. R., C.A. La.1958, 255 F.2d 77, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 229, 358 U.S. 906, 3 L.Ed.2d 227, rehear- ing denied 79 S.Ct. 344, 358 U.S. 942, 3 L.Ed.2d 350; Vann v. Jackson, D.C. A subsequent act does not repeal a former one not specifically mentioned un- less the provisions of the latter are nec- essarily inconsistent with the former, especially when the former act dealt with a specific aspect of the subject and the subsequent act dealt with the subject in general. Bourquin v. U. S., 1947, 72 F. Supp. 76, 108 Ct.Cl. 700, certiorari de- nied 68 S.Ct. 66, 332 U.S. 762, 92 L.Ed. § 109. Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extin- guish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or lia- bility incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. July 30, First general saving provision was en- acted to abolish common-law presumption that repeal of criminal statute results in abatement of all prosecutions which have not yet reached final disposition in high- est court authorized to review them. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Mar- rero, Pa.1974, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 417 U.S. 653, 41 L.Ed.2d 383, rehearing denied 95 S.Ct. 334, 419 U.S. 1014, 42 L.Ed.2d 288. Congress by enacting this section with respect to the effect of repeal of any statute on any penalty, forfeiture or lia- bility incurred under such statute re- versed the common-law rule that the re- peal of the statute abates all incomplete prosecutions thereunder unless repealer prosecuted after its repeal unless there is an express provision to the contrary in the repealing statute. U. S. v. Jackson, C.A.Iowa 1972, 468 F.2d 1388, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 1391, 410 U.S. 935, 35 L. Ed.2d 599, rehearing denied 93 S.Ct. 1551, At common law, where criminal statute is amended. lessening punishment, de- tendant is entitled to benefit of new act, although offense was committed prior thereto, if there is no general saving At common law, where statute is re- pealed, and there is no savings clause or general statute limiting effect of the repeal, no penalty could be enforced nor punishment inflicted for violations such statute committed while it was in force. U. S. v. Elam. D.C.W. Va.1948, 76 F.Supp. 723. At common law and until enactment The common-law rule was that on re- peal of an act without any reservation of its penalties all criminal proceedings taken under it fell, and the basis for the rule was a presumption that the repeal was intended as a legislative pardon for past acts. U. S. v. Hark, D.C.Mass. 1943, 49 F.Supp. 95, reversed on other grounds 64 S.Ct. 359, 320 U.S. 531, 88 The object of this section is to prevent the expiration of a temporary statute This section providing that repeal of any statute shall not have effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under said section unless repealing act shall so expressly provide, furnishes a rule of construction applicable, when not otherwise provided, as a general saving clause to be read and construed as a part of all subsequent repealing statutes in order to give effect to the will and intention of Congress. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., D.C. Mont.1958, 163 F.Supp. 274. V In absence of a contrary Congressional intent, a statutory amendment operating as a substitute for an earlier statute falls within purview of this section. U. S Taylor, D.C.N.Y.1954, 123 F.Supp. 920. affirmed 227 F.2d 958, certiorari denied 77 S.Ct. 870, 353 U.S. 961, 1 L.Ed.2d 912. 2a. Purpose This section was enacted to obviate mere technical abatement, as in case where substitution of new statute with greater schedule of penalties was held to abate previous prosecution. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, Ark. & S.C.1964, 85 S.Ct. 384, 379 U.S. 306. 13 L.Ed.2d 300. rebearing denied 85 S.Ct. 698, 379 U.S. 995, 13 L.Ed.2d 614. This section providing that repeal of any statute shall not have effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless repealing acts shall expressly so provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty was not intended to prevent only technical abatement. U. S. v. Ross, C.A.N.Y.1972, 464 F.2d 376, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 1507, 410 U.S. 990, 36 L.Ed.2d 188, rehearing denied 93 S.Ct. 2151, 411 U. S. 977, 36 L.Ed.2d 700. This section was intended to obviate the abatement of a penalty upon repeal of the statute imposing the penalty under the common law. Sullivan v. Day, D.C. Ky.1974, 372 F.Supp. 359. 3. General effect of section By this section, Congress did not merely save from extinction a liability incurred under a repealed statute, but it saved the statute itself "for the purpose of sustaining any proper action the enforcement of such * * * for liabil ity". De La Rama S. S. Co. v. U. S., N.Y. 1953, 73 S.Ct. 381, 344 U.S. 386, 97 L.Ed. 422. While this section may preserve an accrued right, it does not preserve the right to have a claim heard by any particular tribunal. Barthelemy v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., C.A. La.1976, 537 F.2d 168. General savings statute is not limited in its application to those statutes the repeal of which, at common law, would have abated a prosecution, but extends to statutes prescribing penalty or elaborat ing on the nature of the penalty to be imposed. U. S. v. Bradley, C.A.Mass.1972, 455 F.2d 1181, affirmed 93 S.Ct. 1151, 410 U.S. 605, 35 L.Ed.2d 528. This section saves existing substantive rights and liabilities from repeal, but does not preserve remedies or procedure prescribed in repealed statute. U. S. v. Obermeier. C.A.N.Y.1950, 186 F.2d 243, certiorari denied 71 S.Ct. 569, 340 U.S. 951, 95 L.Ed. 685, certiorari denied 71 S.Ct 573, 340 U.S. 951, 95 L.Ed. 685. Statutes of limitation were not intended to be included in rights and liabilities saved by either this section or by Act June 25, 1948, § 21 preserving any rights or liabilities existing under repealed sections of former Title 18. Id. Under this section providing that repeal of a statute shall not extinguish penalty incurred under the statute unless repealing Act expressly so provides, prosecution may be maintained after repeal for acts occurring prior to repeal if neither statute nor repealing Act contain express provision to contrary. Bowen v. US.. C.A.Tex.1949, 171 F.2d 533. At common law, after a statute creating an offense was repealed without a saving clause, there could be no further criminal prosecution for its violation, and even prosecutions pending at date of repeal were abated, and this included repeal by implication; but this has been changed by this section. Landen v. U. S., C.C.A.Ohio 1924, 299 F. 75. Even if this section, providing that repeal of statute does not extinguish any penalty, forfeiture of liability incurred thereunder unless repealing Act expressly so provides, might otherwise have been applicable to impose liability upon government for denial of plaintiffs' alleged prior rights to repurchase surplus government property, it could not be so applied in face of express provision in repealing Act for extinguishment of preferences given in repealed statute to former property owners. Mason v. U. S., 1959, 169 F.Supp. 507, 144 Ct.Cl. 579. Where statute is repealed, a general saving statute such as this section operates to save any substantive right of private nature, liability, right of action, penalty, forfeiture or offense which has accrued under the repealed statute. Hutton v. Autoridad Sobre Hogares De La Capital. D.C.Puerto Rico 1948. 78 F.Supp. 988. This section, being an exception to the common law, must be strictly construed in a criminal case. U. S. v. Auerbach, D.C.Cal.1946, 68 F.Supp. 776. The effect of this section was to prescribe a rule of construction different from the common law rule, and the section must be strictly construed and limited to the repeal of statutes and not to the repeal of regulations promulgated by an administrator under legislative authority. U. S. v. Hark, D.C.Mass. 1943, 49 F.Supp. 95, reversed on other grounds 64 S.Ct. 359, 320 U.S. 531, 88 L. Ed. 290, rehearing denied 64 S.Ct. 517, 321 U.S. 802, 88 L.Ed. 1089; Rodgers v. U. S., C.C.A.Tenn.1947, 158 F.2d 835, reversed on other grounds 68 S.Ct. 5, 332 U.S. 371, 92 L.Ed. 3. Aircraft Co., Cal.1954, 74 S.Ct. 745, 347 U.S. 535, 98 L.Ed. 933. This section is not applicable where a statute is not itself repealed but becomes inoperative by the repeal of the constitutional authority of Congress to enact it. U. S. v. Chambers, N.C.1934, 54 S.Ct. 434, 291 U.S. 217, 78 L.Ed. 763; Green v. U. S., C.C.A.Idaho 1933 67 F.2d 846; foll Resuam v. U. S., C.C.A. Wash. 1933, 67 F. 2d 850; Smallwood v. U. S., C.CС.А.Тех. 1933, 68 F.2d 244; U. S. v. Borke, D.C. Mich. 1933, 5 F.Supp. 429; U. S. v. Smith, D.C.Okl. 1933, 5 F.Supp. 470; U. S. v. Oliver, D.C.Pa. 1933, 5 F.Supp. 500; Massey v. U. S., Ind. 1934, 54 S.Ct. 532, 291 U.S. 608, 78 L.Ed. 1019; Kajander v. U. S., C.C.A. Fla.1934, 69 F.2d 222; Shelton v. U. S., C.C.A.Fla.1934, 69 F.2d 223, certiorari denied 55 S.Ct. 85, 293 U.S. 574, 79 L.Ed. 672. Repealed statute, section 7237 of Title 26, which provided mandatory ten-year minimum term of imprisonment for second offenders was the type of statute saved by this section providing that repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute and that such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty. U. S. v. Ross, C.A.Ν.Υ. 1972, 464 F.2d 376, certiorari denied 93 S. Ct. 1507, 410 U.S. 990, 36 L.Ed.2d 188, rehearing denied 93 S.Ct. 2151, 411 U.S. 977, 36 L.Ed.2d 700. Unless the repealing statute explicitly provides otherwise, the repeal of a criminal statute neither abates the underlying offense nor affects its attendant penalties with respect to acts committed prior to repeal. U. S. v. Bradley, C. A.Mass.1972, 455 F.2d 1181, affirmed 93 S.Ct. 1151, 410 U.S. 605, 35 L.Ed. 2d 528; Sullivan v. Day, D.C.Ky.1974, 372 F.Supp. 359. This section, providing that repeal of statute shall not release or extinguish any penalty or liability incurred under such statute unless repealing Act expressly so provides, and that such statute shall be treated as remaining in force for sustaining action or prosecution for enforcement, does not apply only in case of repeal but applies to amendment changing time within which conditional parole can be revoked under section 4164 of Title 18. Moorehead v. Hunter, C.A. Kan.1952, 198 F.2d 52. Where prosecution against petitioner for unlawful possession and sale of cocaine was commenced on July 16, 1969, superseding information against petitioner, dated August 31, 1971, in no way changed the fact that he was being prosecuted for an offense which occurred prior to May 1, 1971, when statutes were repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, so that acceptance of petitioner's guilty plea was valid and proper in all respects. Maceri v. U. S., D.C.Mich.1972, 342 F.Supp. 505. Repeal of statute does not, unless statute expressly provides otherwise, extinguish any liability which was incurred while statute was in effect. American President Lines, Limited v. S. Woolman, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1964, 239 F.Supp. 833. Later general statute will not be held to repeal by implication prior special statute. U. S. v. Com. of Pa., D.C.Pa. 1963, 220 F.Supp. 144. Repeals by implication are not favored. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, D.C.N.Y.1963, 214 F.Supp. 106. Repeal of any statute does not release or extinguish any penalty, forfelture, or liability incurred under statute, unless repealing act expressly so provides. U. S. Note 8 v. Segelman, D.C.Pa.1953, 117 F.Supp. 507, affirmed 212 F.2d 88. Congress may repeal statute granting gratuities and imposing penalties, and, unless a saving clause is included, all prior liability thereunder is thereby terminated. Role v. J. Neils Lumber Co., D.C.Mont.1947. 74 F.Supp. 812, affirmed 171 F.2d 706. This section is applicable only in case of repeal of a statute as distinguished from expiration of the statute. U. S. v. Auerbach D.C.Cal.1946. 68 F.Supp. 776. Repeal or amendment of federal statutes does not release or extinguish any liabilities having accrued under the repealed or amended provision. Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., Pa.Cmwlth.1975, 330 A.2d 264. a or 5. "Sustaining" any action or prosecution This section providing that after expiration of temporary statute, it should be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of "sustaining" any proper action or prosecution for enforcement of penalty, forfeiture, liability incurred thereunder, used quoted word as meaning that any defense was available to one who might be proceeded against after expiration of such statute except the defense that action was not commenced before its expiration. U. S. v. Auerbach, D.C.Cal.1946, 68 F.Supp. 776. 6. Prosecution under repealed statute authorizing imprisonment Rule that if prosecution continues, law must continue to vivify it does not depend on imputation of specific intention to Congress in any particular statute but takes more general form of imputing to Congress intention to avoid inflicting punishment at time when it can no longer further any legislative purpose and would be unnecessarily vindictive, and the general principle is to be read wherever applicable as part of the background against which Congress acts. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, Ark. & S.C.1964, 85 S.Ct. 384, 379 U.S. 306, 13 L.Ed.2d 300, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 698, 379 U.S. 995, 13 L.Ed.2d 614. The repeal of a criminal statute after final judgment does not arrest or interfere with execution of the sentence. Welch v. Hudspeth, C.C.A. Kan. 1942, 132 F.2d 434. Fact that section of statute under which defendant was convicted was repealed prior to date of sentencing, did not release defendant from liability from prosecution thereunder in absence of express provision so stating in repealing act. U. S. v. Segelman, D.C.Pa.1953, 117 F.Supp. 507. affirmed 212 F.2d 88 7. "Incurred under such statute" Estate tax "accrued," within meaning of saving clause of repealing act, immediately on death, though not payable until one year thereafter. Ewbank v. U. S. (C. C. A. Ind. 1931) 50 F.2d 409, certiorari denied 52 S.Ct. 35, 284 U.S. 657. 76 L. Ed. 557. 8. Saving clauses in repealing acts, as making inapplicable this section Exceptions in repealing statute could not be enlarged, by adding thereto provi sion of this section in conflict therewith. Wilmington Trust Co. v. U. S. (D.C.Del. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 205. Upon repeal of statutes solely conferring jurisdiction, a plaintiff's rights still remain but the jurisdiction conferred on a particular tribunal by the statute to enforce the right is taken away and saving statute does not apply. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., D.C.Mont.1958, 163 F.Supp. 274. Note 8a 8a. Saving clauses in repealing acts, as supplementing this section Fact that Colorado statutes, C.R.S. '63, 40-10-7 to 40-10-9, making it a misdemeanor to maintain a gambling parlor, keep a gaming table or wager on games were repealed prior to commencement of federal prosecution did not preclude prosecution under federal gambling statute, section 1955 of Title 18, for events occurring prior to repeal, in view of savings provisions of federal and Colorado law. U. S. v. Smaldone, C.A.Colo.1973, 485 F.2d 1333, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 1934, 1960, 416 U.S. 936, 951, 40 L.Ed.2d 286, 301, rehearing denied 94 S.Ct. 2414, 416 U.S. 1000, 40 L.Ed.2d 777, rehearing denied 94 S.Ct. 2635, 417 U.S. 926, 927, 41 L.Ed.2d 230, rehearing denied 95 S.Ct. 163, 419 U.S. 888, 42 L.Ed.2d 133. Where section 1708 of Title 18 limiting imprisonment to one year for offense of possessing mail known to be stolen was in effect at time of prosecution for such offense, but former section 317 of Title 18 authorizing greater sentence had been in effect when alleged crime was committed, defendants could be sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year where repealing statute, Sec. 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 862, provided that any existing rights or liabilities would not be affected by U. S. v. Kirby. C.A.N.Y. the repeal. 1949, 176 F.2d 101. 8b. Saving clauses in repealing acts, as affecting penalties Earlier general saving clause was not superseded by later specific one, where there was no conflict between them. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, Pa.1974, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 417 U.S. 653, 41 L.Ed.2d 383, rehearing denied 95 S.Ct. 334, 419 U.S. 1014, 42 L.Ed.2d 288. Where "prosecution" for engaging in conspiracy to sell heroin was saved by savings clause of subsequently enacted statute or by general savings clause, the penalty of the prior statute would necessarily be saved. U. S. v. McGarr, C.A. I11.1972, 461 F.2d 1. Under general savings clause, penalties accruing while statute was in force may be prosecuted after its repeal, unless there is express provision to contrary in the repealing statute. U. S. v. Brown, C.A.La. 1970, 429 F.2d 566. Repeal of statute under which prisoner convicted of narcotics-related offense was sentenced and under which prisoner was not afforded the opportunity for early parole provided by Criminal Code for most criminal offenders upon satisfactory completion of one-third of their sentence did not render prisoner eligible for parole. Sullivan v. Day, D.C.Ky.1974, 372 F.Supp. 359. Savings section of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 includes both prosecution and sentencing. Maceri v. U. S., D.C.Mich.1972, 342 F. Supp. 505. 9. Miscellaneous Illustrations General saving clause does not ordinarily preserve discarded remedies or procedures. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, Pa.1974, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 417 U.S. 653, 41 L.Ed.2d 383, rehearing denied 95 S.Ct. 334, 419 U.S. 1014, 42 L.Ed.2d 288. This section would not nullify abatement of a federal conviction resulting from enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 2000a et seq. of Title 42, before conviction had become final removing conduct from sphere of punishable activities. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, Ark. & S.C.1964, 85 S.Ct. 384, 379 U.S. 306, 13 L.Ed.2d 300, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 698, 379 U.S. 995, 13 L.Ed.2d 614. Jurisdiction of District Court to hear and decide libel which was filed December 22, 1944, to recover loss allegedly covered by war risk policy which had been issued under War Risk Insurance Act, section 1128d of Title 46, continued by virtue of this section, notwithstanding repeal of the War Risk Insurance Act on July 25, 1947. De La Rama S. S. Co. v. U. S., N.Y.1953, 73 S.Ct. 381, 344 U.S. 386, 97 L.Ed. 422 This section providing that repeal of a statute shall not release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred thereunder did not save jurisdiction of District Court over action against United States for overtime compensation allegedly due a civilian fire chief at army camp pending at time 1951 amendment became effective with drawing jurisdiction of District Court over actions for compensation brought by employees of the United States, since 1951 amendment did not alter the nature or validity of fire chief's rights of the Government's liability, but merely reduced the number of tribunals authorized to hear and determine such U. S rights and liabilities. Bruner Ga.1952, 72 S.Ct. 581, 342 U.S. 112, 96 L.Ed. 646. Though most of price controls had been lifted, Emergency Price Control Act, 50 App. § 901 et seq., was still in effect, and liabilities incurred prior to lifting of controls were not thereby washed out. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., Mich.1947, 67 S.Ct. 1129. 331 U.S. 111. 91 L.Ed. 1375. Though deputy commissioner had held first part of a two-part administrative hearing on claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, section 901 et seq. of Title 33, before effective date of amendment vesting hearing powers of deputy commissioners in hearing examiners, the deputy commissioner was thereby divested of authority to continue the hearing, since the amendment taking away jurisdiction was not entwined with substantive rights, despite contention that Congress, despite the language of the amendment, did not intend to take away the authority of to pending deputy cases, and despite contention that commissioners' powers were preserved as to pending cases by this section. Barthelemy v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., C.A. La.1976, 537 F.2d 168. as commissioners This section providing that repeal of any statute shall not have effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under statute unless repeal shall so expressly provide was intended to obviate common law's technical abatement of a prosecution by repeal of statute under which it proceeded and was not intended to preclude a consideration of eligibility for parole. Garza v. Sigler, C.A.111.1974, 491 F.2d 825. Where federal court's jurisdiction to review decision of Administrator of Veterans' Affairs as to claim for compensation consequent upon veteran's death in wartime service had rested wholly upon court construction of section 211 of Title 38 and amendment section 211 of Title 38 annulled that construction, jurisdiction to reinstate benefits and to award counsel fees out of restored benefits was lost and appeals with respect to award of counsel fees did not survive amendment on basis of this section. De Rodulfa v. U. S., 1972, 461 F.2d 1240, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 154, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 270, 409 U.S. 949, 34 L. Ed.2d 220. In light of this section and section 1103 of Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention and Control Act of 1970 [set out as 14 |