Prior to these statutes (except the statute of Hen. 8), several mariners on board a ship lying near the Groyne seized the captain, he not agreeing with them; and, having put him on shore, carried away the ship, and afterwards committed several piracies. This force upon the captain, and the carrying away the ship, which was explained by the use of it afterwards, was adjudged piracy (9) But where the master of a vessel loaded goods on board at Rotterdam, *consigned to [*148 Malaga, which he caused to be insured, and after he had run the goods on shore in England the ship was burned, when he protested both the ship and cargo as burned, with intent to defraud the owner and insurers; the judges of the common law, who assisted the judges of the Admiralty, directed an acquittal upon an indictment for piracy and stealing the goods; because being only a breach of trust and no felony, it could not be piracy to convert the goods in a fraudulent manner until the special trust was determined. (r)

It is an offence within the 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, s. 9, to make a revolt in a ship, or to endeavor to make one, though the object was not to run away with the ship, or to commit any act of piracy, but to force the captain to redress supposed grievances. The prisoners were charged by the first count of the indictment with betraying their trust and turning pirates, and with confederating piratically and feloniously to steal and run away with the ship; by the second with piratically and feloniously attempting to corrupt other persons of the crew so to steal and run away with the ship; by the third, with piratically and feloniously inciting a revolt in the ship, the master being on board; and, by the fourth, with endeavoring to make such revolt. It appeared clearly that there was a revolt in the ship, and that the prisoners participated, refusing to obey orders, and being guilty of many acts of insubordination and violence. The counsel for the prisoners endeavored to show, that the prisoners and their adherents had in view a redress of supposed grievances, and not the intention of assuming the command for the purpose of carrying off the ship; and there was some evidence that the prisoners had an ulterior object than that of redressing ill-usage, of which it appeared they had complained, yet their acquittal upon the two first counts led to the conclusion that the jury did not impute to them any other real intention than that of redressing their supposed grievances. The point submitted to the judges was, that in order to satisfy the intent of the statute, and the words of the indictment, " piratically and feloniously revolted," the object of the revolt must have been to take possession of or to run away with the ship, or to enable the prisoners to commit some act of piracy, and not merely to resist the captain's authority in order to force him to redress alleged grievances. But the judges present were unanimously of opinion, that making or endeavoring to make a revolt, with a view to procure a redress of what the prisoners thought grievances, and without any intent to run away with the ship, or to commit any act of piracy, was an offence within the 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, s. 9, and that the conviction was therefore right.(s)

Where one count charged the prisoners with making, and another with endeavoring to make a revolt in a ship, it appeared that great complaints had been made by

viction, be subject to the same punishments, whether of death or otherwise, as if such offences had been committed upon land." See also the Criminal Law Consolidation Acts of 1861, ante, p. 2. By the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36 (post, p. 158) piracy may now be tried at the Central Criminal Court. By some writers piracy at common law is defined to be the committing those acts of robbery and depredation on sea which, if committed on land, would have amounted to felony: 1 Hawk. c. 37, s. 4; 4 Bla. Com. 72; 2 East P. C. c. 17, 8. 3, p. 796; Mason's case, post, note (r). By others it seems to be considered the same offence as robbery on land: Archb. Vict. Act 72; 2 Hale 369; 1 Hale 354; 3 Inst. 113, where Lord Coke calls a pirate "a robber upon the sea." On the whole it seems that each act of piracy at common law is now a felony of the same kind, and liable to the same punishment, as if the same act had been done upon land, and the offender is triable either under a commission founded on the 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, or at the Central Criminal Court, or at the assizes, post, p. 158. C. S. G.

(9) Rex v. May, Bishop, and others, Nov. 1796, MS. Tracy, 77; 2 East P. C. c. 17, s. 3, p. 796.

(7) Mason's case, Old Bailey, 9 Geo. 1, on a special commission: 8 Mod. 74; 2 East P. C. c. 17, s. 3, p 796, s. c. (8) Rex v. Hastings and Meharg, East. T. 1825, Ry. & Mood. 82.

the sailors in the course of the voyage about the provisions and the great heat of *149] * the cabin where the men had to sleep, which, on account of the fire for *cooking, &c., being close to it, was unsupportable in the warm latitudes. On the 30th of September the prisoner M. refused to go on duty, and remained off duty till the following day, when he was again desired to work, and again refused, using at different times violent and threatening language. The captain in conse quence ordered the crew to put M. in irons, but instead of obeying him they walked away forward. The prisoner S. had the same morning refused to go to his duty, and he and one G. went towards the captain, who was endeavoring, with the assistance of his officers, to put M. in irons. Violent language was used by both, and threats uttered against the captain, to induce him to alter his determination, and G. rushed to a boat where spears used in the whale-fishery were kept, with the evident intention of seizing one of them, and releasing M. by force. The captain shot G. in the act of laying hold of a spear. Lord Abinger, C. B.: “By revolt I understand something like rebellion or resistance to lawful authority, and if the crew of a ship combine together to resist the captain, especially if the object be to deprive him of his authority altogether, it will in my opinion amount to making a revolt. I think upon the construction of this Act of Parliament that the resistance of one person to the authority of the captain would not be a revolt. Revolt means something more than the disobedience of one man. I think it would be straining the evidence rather too far to say that the conduct of these men amounted to a revolt; and the charge of making a revolt, if my construction of the Act be correct, will fall to the ground. The question of whether the ship was properly fitted up and found is not material; for it has been decided that, although there be real grievances to redress, yet it is not an answer to a charge of attempting to make a revolt. If G. and the prisoners were united in some common design to prevent the captain from putting M. in irons, which, on the evidence he had a sufficient justification in doing, and calling upon others of the crew to assist them in resisting the captain's authority, then I think it was an attempt to excite a revolt." (t)

On an indictment upon the 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, s. 9, it appeared that the prisoners were two of the mates and the others mariners of a merchant ship, and the captain seeing something in the manner of a sailor which displeased him spoke sharply to him and ordered him to leave the helm, and called to some one else to take his place, and he ordered the sailor to go and grease the masts, which the captain thought necessary to be done. The sailor peremptorily refused, and the captain on that ordered all hands up: he desired the mates to have the masts greased, which the men refused to do, and said that it was the duty of the boys, and that whilst there were boys on board they would not. The captain positively insisted, and the men as positively refused. He then said, "If that's the case, I'll put you on short commons; that beef which is lying there you shan't have," and ordered it to be taken below, on which there was a peremptory refusal to let him have it. The captain, who saw that this did not meet with the slightest opposition from the mates, perceived the disposition to mutiny, and that he must act at once or there would be no *authority, went down and armed himself with a cut*150] lass, came again on deck and said, "Give me that beef!" and speaking to the steward said, "Take it below, and the first man who interferes, I will exercise my authority, and cut him down with the instrument with which I am armed." The steward, seeing the captain was not to be trifled with, obeyed; the beef was taken down and the captain put away his cutlass, and, after staying on deck some time, went down, and had his dinner, and then believing he had done sufficient to assert his authority, he sent the beef back, and allowed the crew to have their dinners. After the beef was taken away, the men all refused to do anything, and went below; however the captain thought that all this had passed away. After this the steward requested the captain to come on deck, as the men wanted to speak to him. He went on deck, was made prisoner, and confined in his cabin, the vessel put about, and brought to Plymouth by the mate and crew, and there the crew made a complaint against the captain. Williams, J., told the jury that in con

(t) Reg. v. M'Gregor, 1 C. & K. 429 (47 E. C. L. R.).

sidering the meaning of the terms used in the statute he must tell them that confederating together and making a revolt constituted the offence charged, unless they were satisfied that there was some justifiable cause. The great question for their consideration was, whether or not there was any justification for this unquestionable confinement of the captain. Did, therefore, his conduct afford any justification for that step? He was bound to tell them that, according to the authorities, a seaman was not justified in making a revolt in a ship, or in imprisoning his captain, by reason of that captain having been unjust or unreasonable; it was not to be allowed that seamen should take the law into their own hands, because the captain had issued an unjust order, or had conducted himself in a harassing or embarrassing manner. If the rule of law was that whenever the seamen considered the captain's conduct unreasonable and rash, they could take charge of the ship, there would be an end to all maritime discipline. It was necessary, for the due maintenance of discipline that mutiny and revolt, if not justifiable, should be punished as a crime in the merchant service as well as in the royal navy. In his opinion, .in point of law, it was justifiable in one view only, namely, if the conduct of the captain had been such as to afford reasonable ground for concluding that, unless the men had imprisoned him, the crew, or some one or more of them, would have been in danger of their lives, or of suffering some grievous bodily harm from his conduct. If they thought that was made out, and that the conduct of the captain was such that the lives of the crew were in danger unless he were imprisoned, then there was a justification. But if they should not come to the conclusion that there was reasonable ground for this belief, then, in point of law, they ought to find the prisoners guilty.(u) On an indictment on the 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, s. 9, for making a revolt in a merchant ship, it appeared that the prisoners formed *part of a crew of a [*151 steam vessel trading between London and Holland; their register tickets were deposited with the captain, but no agreement in writing had been entered into with them previously to their sailing on the voyage during which the revolt was made, and the Recorder held that the prisoners were not mariners, or seamen ; the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, s. 2, (v) made any contract other than the agreement thereby required illegal, and therefore the relation of commander and mariner did not exist.(w)

Upon an indictment on the 18 Geo. 2, c. 30, a question was made whether adhering to the King's enemies in hostilely cruising in their ships could be tried as piracy under the usual commission granted by virtue of the 28 Hen. 8, c. 15. The 18 Geo. 2, recites that doubts had arisen whether subjects entering into the service of the King's enemies on board privateers and other ships, having commissions from France and Spain, and having by such adherence been guilty of high treason, could be deemed guilty of felony within the intent of the 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, and be triable by the Court of Admiralty appointed by virtue of the said Act; and then enacts that persons who shall commit hostilities upon the sea, &c., against his Majesty's subjects by virtue or under color of any commission from any of his Majesty's enemies, or shall be any otherwise adherent to his Majesty's enemies upon the seas, &c., may be tried as pirates, felons, or robbers, in the said Court of Admiralty in the same manner as persons guilty of piracy, felony, and robbery, are by the said Act directed to be tried; but it does not say that they shall be deemed pirates, &c., as in the 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7. The prisoner having been convicted, the question was reserved for consideration of the judges; and it was agreed by eight who were present, (x) that the prisoner had been well tried under the commission. For that taking the 11 & 12 Will. 3, and 18 Geo. 2 together, and the doubt raised in the latter, and also its enactment that in the

(u) Reg. v. Rose, 2 Cox C. C. 329. As reported, this direction is open to the objection that it did not inform the jury that the captain might lawfully use any force that was reasonably necessary to retain the command of the vessel and stop the revolt, and that the crew would not be justified in imprisoning him for using such force for that purpose; but, no doubt, the very learned judge did so direct the jury.

(r) Repealed by the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 120.

(w) Reg. v. Smith, 3 Cox C. C. 443.

(z) Lord Loughborough, Lord C. B. Skynner, Gould, J., Willes, J., Ashurst, J., Eyre, B., Perryn, B., and Heath, J., who met Nov. 11, 1782.

VOL. I.-9

instances therein mentioned, and also in case of any other adhering to the King's enemies, the parties might be tried as pirates by the Court of Admiralty according to that statute, it was substantially declaring that they should be deemed pirates; and that it was a just construction in their favor to allow them to be tried as such by a jury.(y)

Accessories to piracy were triable only by the civil law if their offence was committed on the sea, and were not triable at all if their offence was committed on land, until the 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, s. 10, which enacts, "that every person and persons whatsoever, who shall either on the land, or upon the seas, knowingly or wittingly set forth any pirate; or aid and assist, or maintain, procure, command, counsel, or advise, any person or persons whatsoever, to do or commit any piracies or robberies upon the seas; and such person and persons shall thereupon do or commit any such piracy or robbery, then all and every such person or persons *whatsoever, so as aforesaid setting forth any pirate, or aiding, assisting,

*152] maintaining, procuring, commanding, counselling, or advising, the same

either on the land or upon the sea, shall be and are hereby declared, and shall be deemed and adjudged to be accessory to such piracy and robbery, done and committed; and further, that after any piracy or robbery is or shall be committed by any pirate or robber whatsoever, every person and persons, who, knowing that such pirate or robber has done or committed such piracy or robbery, shall on the land or upon the seas, receive, entertain, or conceal, any such pirate or robber, or receive or take into his custody any ship, vessel, goods, or chattels, which have been by any such pirate or robber piratically and feloniously taken; shall be, and are hereby likewise declared, deemed, and adjudged to be accessory to such piracy and robbery." And then the statute directs, "that all such accessories to such piracies and robberies shall be inquired of, tried, heard, determined, and adjudged, after the common course of the laws of this land, according to the 28 Hen. 8, as the principals of such piracies and robberies may and ought to be, and no otherwise: and being thereupon attainted, shall suffer such pains of death,(z) losses of lands, goods, and chattels, and in like manner, as such principals ought to suffer, according to the 28 Hen. 8, which is thereby declared to continue in full force.

The 8 Geo. 1, c. 24, however, makes an alteration with respect to the accessories described in 11 & 12 Will. 3, and declares them to be principals, and that they shall be tried accordingly. Sec. 3, reciting that "whereas there are some defects in the laws for bringing persons who are accessories to piracy and robbery upon the seas to condign punishment, if the principal who committed such piracy or robbery is not or cannot be apprehended and brought to justice," enacts, "that all persons whatsoever, who by the 11 & 12 Will. 3, are declared to be accessory or accessories to any piracy or robbery therein mentioned, are hereby declared to be principal pirates, felons, and robbers, and shall and may be inquired of, heard, determined, and adjudged, in the same manner as persons guilty of piracy and robbery may, according to that statute; and being thereupon attainted and convicted, shall suffer death(z) and loss of lands, &c., in like manner as pirates and robbers ought by the said act to suffer."

One who knowingly received and abetted a pirate within the body of a county was not triable by the common law, the original offence being cognizable alone by another jurisdiction (b) But see now the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 9.(c)

(y) Evans's case, MS. Gould, J.; 1 East P. C. c. 17, s. 5, pp. 798, 799. The 18 Geo. 2, c. 30, s. 3, provides that the Act shall not prevent any offender who shall not be tried according thereto from being tried for high treason within this realm according to the stat 28 Hen. 8, c. 15.

(z) See 1 Vict. c. 88, s. 4, as to the punishment of accessories, ante, p. 147.

(b) Admiralty case, 13 Co. 53. And a little before this case the law appears to have been so considered in the case of one Scadding, who was committed by the Court of Admiralty for aiding a pirate to escape out of prison; and, on a return to a habeas corpus, the prisoner was remanded, though it appeared that the fact was committed by him within the body of a county. The Court of King's Bench holding, that because Scadding's offence depended on the piracy committed by the principal, of which the temporal judges had no cognizance, and was, as it were, an accessorial offence to the first piracy which was determinable by the admiral, it was sufficient ground for remanding him: Yelv. 134; 2 East P. C. c. 17, s. 14, p. 810. (c) Ante, p. 71.

*Sec. II. Of the Place in which the Offence may be committed.

[*153

THE 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, s. 1, enacts, that all treasons, felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies, committed in or upon the sea, or in any haven, river, creek, or place, where the admiral has, or pretends to have power, authority, or jurisdiction, shall be inquired, tried, &c., in such shires and places as shall be limited by the King's commission, as if any such offences had been committed upon the land.

In a case at the Admiralty session of a murder committed in a part of Milford Haven, where it was about three miles over, about seven or eight miles from the mouth of the river, or open sea, and about sixteen miles below any bridges over the river, a question was made whether the place where the murder was committed was to be considered as within the limits to which commissions granted under the 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, do by law extend. Upon reference to the judges, they were unanimously of opinion that the trial was properly had. And it is said that during the discassion of the point the construction of this statute by Lord Hale(d) was much preferred to the doctrine of Lord Coke;(e) and that most, if not all, of the judges, seemed to think that the common law has a concurrent jurisdiction with the Admiralty in this haven, and in all other havens, creeks, and rivers in this realm (ƒ) It appeared to them that the 28 Hen. 8 applied to all great waters frequented by ships; that in such waters the admiral, in the time of Hen. 8, pretended jurisdiction; that by havens, &c., havens in England were meant to be included, though they are all within the body of some county; and that the mischief from the witnesses being seafaring men was likely to apply to all places frequented by ships.(g)

If a robbery be committed in creeks, harbors, ports, &c., in foreign countries, the Court of Admiralty indisputably has jurisdiction of it, and such offence is, consequently, piracy.(h)

It is clear that upon the open sea-shore the common law and the Admiralty have alternate jurisdiction between high and low-water *mark ;() but it is some[*154 times a matter of difficulty to fix the line of demarcation between the county and the high seas in harbors, or below the bridges in great rivers. The question is often more a matter of fact than of law, and determinable by local evidence; but some general rules upon the point are collected by Mr. East. He says, that "in general it is said that such parts of the rivers, arms, or creeks, are deemed to be within the bodies of counties where persons can see from one side to the other. Lord Hale, in his treatise De jure maris, says that the arm or branch of the sea which lies within the fauces terræ, where a man may reasonably discern between shore and shore, is, or at least may be, within the body of a county. Hawkins, however, considers the line more accurately confined, by other authorities, to such parts of the sea where a man, standing on the one side of the land, may see what

(e) 3 Inst. 111; 4 Inst. 134.

(d) 2 Hale 16, 17. (f) Bruce's case, 2 Leach 1093; Russ. & Ry. 243. This was a case of murder. The stat. 15 Rich. 2, c. 3, gives the admiral jurisdiction to inquire of the death of a man, and of a mayhem done in great ships hovering in the main stream of great rivers, beneath the bridges of the same rivers nigh to the sea, and to none other places in the same rivers; which jurisdiction is only concurrent with, and not in exclusion of, the common law: 1 East P. C. 368. It is most probable that pountz in the 15 Rich. 2, c. 3, means points and not bridges. In "A description of the River Thames" (Longman, 1752), it is said that the Lord Mayor of London used to summon a jury four times a year to make inquisition after all offences committed on the Thames and Medway up the river as far as Staines Bridge, and down the river as far as the points of it next the sea," and that "the jurisdiction of the City of London in the river of Thames from Staines Bridge westward unto the points of the river next to the sea eastward, appeareth to belong to the City." All this appears to be taken from old charters. In 1347, it appears that persons setting kiddels ultra Grenland (Yantlett) versus mare were fined: P. 94, 95, 96. In later times Yendall or Yentlet seems from old charters to be the limit: P. 139. All this seems to show that pountz means points, not bridges.

(9) MS. Bayley, J.

(h) Rex r. Jemot, Old Bailey, 28th Feb. 1812; MS. Jerv. Arch. 366, edit. 15.

(i) 3 Inst. 113; 2 Hale 17; and see 2 Hawk. c. 9, s. 14, as to the jurisdiction of the coroner in offences on the sea-shore: Anonymous, 1 Lewin 242.