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which was only an amalgamation, was dissolved into its original elements. In 1900 Ito's new party, the Seiyukai, of which the old Liberals formed the nucleus, was suddenly called on to form a Ministry, which was also short-lived. These attempts at party government seem to have been premature; but they served to indicate the trend of events. Moreover, as Uyehara puts it, concerning the first attempt, "its real importance lies in the fact that it had completely disposed of the prejudice that a person directly connected with a political party could not become a Cabinet minister." 1 The second Saionji and the Yamamoto ministries were strongly "party cabinets"; and Okuma's is still more so, albeit it is also a "personal cabinet", in which Okuma is indisputably "Premier".

And this is a reminder of one of the peculiar features of Japanese political parties. That is the personal element by which factions and parties have rallied around men more than measures, persons rather than principles. This feature is, of course, a survival of the feudal system, as has been pointed out by Ozaki (now Minister of Justice) in an article in a magazine called Shinseiki (New Century). He said: "The fact is that the majority of our politicians are still subject to feudal notions. Their attitude to the president of a party is precisely that of the retainers of a daimyo to their lord."

Another peculiarity is that party ties are loose and party principles are indefinite. Individuals do not find it difficult to shift allegiance from one party or faction to another, often without sacrificing their principles, if they have any! This is largely due to the indefiniteness and generalities of party platforms, or the lack of positively distinguishing principles separating parties. For instance, the same party has been found, according to circumstances, either in support of or in opposition to an increase of the land-tax. Okuma and Ozaki, now "in", have put through the army increment scheme, which they vigorously opposed, when "out"; and they do not mind the charge of inconsistency. They seem to agree with Emerson that "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds ".

1 Op. cit., p. 241.

Japanese political parties, in spite of their faults, have certainly made great progress. The Japan Times, on October 12, 1911, wrote that party government would be welcome "notwithstanding all the evils of the party system, because it will get rid of a self-bureaucracy, assuming the leadership of the nation". Satoh says:

The formation of the Okuma Government thus proves to be a ictory of the principle of party government, and the Premier, Count Okuma, has now the satisfaction of having come out triumphant over his enemies after his many years' fight for the constitutional progress of his beloved country.1

It now seems quite evident that the Japanese political parties, imperfect though they are, have behind them the people of the Empire.

1 Op. cit., p. 106.

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IX. PUBLIC OPINION

One of the most significant phases of the political progress made in New Japan during the past twenty-five years of constitutionalism has been the development of an expressive public opinion. During the feudal system there was, from one point of view, no public opinion; or at the best, it was very narrow and local in its sphere of action. But along with the granting of popular rights and privileges, with the spread of education, with the growing importance and power of the press, there has been a most gratifying evolution of public opinion. It is true," and pity 'tis 'tis true ", that often the most evident manifestation of that opinion has been in mob violence. But in spite of that unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, concomitant, public opinion, as expressed in the press and on the platform, can no longer be ignored, but must always be taken into consideration. And the Japanese press, in spite of the existence of "yellow journalism", is a creator and expresser of sound public opinion.

There can be little if any doubt that it was nothing but the power of public opinion which overwhelmed the Katsura Ministry in February, 1913, after less than two months of official life. And it was likewise the fact that public opinion held the Yamamoto Ministry responsible for the naval scandals which forced that Cabinet out of power in March, 1914, in spite of the fact that it was supported by the Seiyukai with a big majority in the House of Representatives. And it was public opinion which upheld the Okuma Cabinet for several months against that hostile Seiyukai majority and finally, in the election of March, 1915, completely turned the tables and gave Okuma a big majority. Of course, public opinion is likely to be more or less fickle and sometimes even unjust. In 1913, the Seiyukai members of the House of Representatives were the popular idols on account of their resolute opposition to Katsura: in

1914, because they supported the Yamamoto Cabinet, they were in danger of suffering personal indignities at the hands of a mob, and had to be specially protected from violence. Verily, the populace are iconoclasts as well as hero-worshipers.

It goes without saying that public opinion in Japan would be less violent and more regular, and so more powerful, if a larger number of people possessed the electoral franchise. The number of electors has, it is true, increased considerably in twenty-five years, as may be seen from the following statistics: 1

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The increase in 1902 was due to the lowering of the property qualification. The decrease in 1904 was due to the lowering of the land-tax. The increase in 1908 was due to the extension of the electoral franchise to the Hokkaido and several new urban districts. The increase in 1915 was due to the extension of the franchise to the Okinawa prefecture.

One discouraging feature has been that so many of the electors did not exercise their privilege. An improvement in this respect would doubtless follow the complete establishment of party government and a wider extension of the franchise. The election in March, 1915, indeed, showed a marked improvement. Whereas the average rate of non-voters among the electors was almost 12 per cent in 1898, almost 14 per cent in 1903 and 1904, over 14 per cent in 1908, and about 10.1 per cent in 1912, in 1915, it was only 8 per cent. These figures are eloquent.

1 Japan Year Book for 1912 and 1914.

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The following are the full statistics of the election of 1915:

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These figures show that a larger proportion of the electors than ever before appreciated the value of the "precious one vote".

Woman suffrage is fortunately not yet an issue in Japan; but universal male suffrage has been discussed. A bill to that effect once passed the House of Representatives but was shelved in the House of Peers. Indeed, it may not be wise to pass too suddenly to such an extreme as universal suffrage; it may be better to extend the franchise gradually by reducing the amount of the tax qualification required for eligibility to vote. It is expected that the Okuma Cabinet, if it survives till the next regular session of the Diet in the winter of next year (1916), will introduce an electoral reform bill to round out the quarter century of constitutionalism in Japan.

1 Furnished by Hon. Sho Nemoto, M. P.

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