(vid. Pinsker, Einl. p. xxii. f.); the punctuation 2 Sam. xiii. 16, Jer. li. 3, gives no support to the opinion that here is vocalized thus in the sense of, and it is not to be thus corrected. Nothing is more natural than that the Chokma in its constant contrast between life and death makes a beginning of expressing the idea of the ȧlavaoía (vid. p. 42), which Aquila erroneously read from the -, Ps. xlviii. 15. It has been objected that for the formation of such negative substantives and noun-adjectives

(e.g.

also may be in close אל is used; but that אַל and not (לֹא־עָם לֹא־אֵל is אַל־טל There

אל

connection with a noun, 2 Sam. i. 13 shows. equivalent to, according to which it may also be explained in the passage before us, with Luther and all the older interpreters, who accepted in its negative signification: and on (the governing) the way... is no death. The negative frequently stands as an intensifying of the objective ; but why should the Chokma, which has already shown itself bold in the coining of new words, not apply itself to the formation of the idea of immortality?: the idol name is the result of a much greater linguistic boldness. It is certain that is here not equivalent to; the Masora is therefore right in affirming that n is written with He raphatum pro mappicato (vid. Kimchi, Michlol 31a, and in the Lex.), cf. 1 Sam. xx. 20, vid. Böttcher, § 418. Thus: the way of their step is immortality, or much rather, since is not a fixed idea, but also denotes the going to a distance (i.e. the journey), the behaviour, the proceeding, the walk, etc.: the walking (the stepping over and passing through) of their way is immortality. Rich in synonyms of the way, the Hebrew style delights in connecting them with picturesque expressions; but always means the way in general, which divides into s or man (Job vi. 18, Jer. xviii. 5), and consists of such (Isa. iii. 16). The distich is synonymous: on the path of righteousness (accentuate ) is life meeting him who walks in it, and giving itself to him as a possession, and the walking in its path is immortality (cf. iii. 17, x. 28); so that to go in it and to be immortal, i.e. to be delivered from death, to be exalted above it, is one and the same thing. If we compare with this, xiv. 326, it is obvious that the Chokma begins (vid. Psychol. p. 410) to break through the limits of this present life, and to announce a life beyond the reach of death.

The proverb xii. 28 is so sublime, so weighty, that it manifestly

forms a period and conclusion. This is confirmed from the following proverb, which begins like x. 1 (cf. 5), and anew stamps the collection as intended for youth:

xiii. 1 A wise son is his father's correction;

But a scorner listens not to rebuke.

The LXX., which the Syr. follows, translate Tiòs Tavovpyos ὑπήκοος πατρί, whence it is not to be concluded with Lagarde that they read pi in the sense of a Ni. tolerativum; they correctly understood the text according to the Jewish rule of interpretation, "that which is wanting is to be supplied from the context." The Targ. had already supplied from 16, and is herein followed by Hitzig, as also by Glassius in the Philologia sacra. But such an ellipse is in the Hebr. style without an example, and would be comprehensible only in passionate, hasty discourse, but in a language in which the representation filius sapiens disciplinam patris audit numbers among the anomalies is not in general possible, and has not even its parallel in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 56: deesse nobis terra, qua vivamus-in qua moriemur, non potest, because here the primary idea, which the one expression confirms, the other denies, and besides no particle, such as the of this passage before us, stands between them. Böttcher therefore maintains the falling out of the verb, and writes before ; but one says not, but

in

1 yw, i. 8, iv. 1, xix. 27. Should not the clause, as it thus stands, give a sense complete in itself? But can hardly, with Schultens and Ewald, be taken as part. Hoph. of "D': one brought up by his father, for the usage of the language knows only as part. Hoph. of D. Thus, as Jerome and the Venet. translate: a wise son is the correction of his father, i.e. the product of the same, as also Fleischer explains, "Attribution of the cause, the ground, as elsewhere of the effect." But we call that which one has trained (vegetable or animal) his Zucht (=Taidela in the sense of Taidevμa). To the wise son (x. 1) who is indebted to the (iv. 1), stands opposed the r? (vid. i. 22), the mocker at religion and virtue, who has no ear for my, strong and stern words which awaken in him a wholesome fear (cf. xvii. 10, Jude 23: év φόβῳ).

TT:

Ver. 2 From the fruit of the mouth of a man he himself enjoys good;

But the delight of the godless is violence.

2axii. 14a, where a for. A man with a fruit-bringing mouth, himself enjoys also the blessing of his fruit-producing

speech; his food (cf. Bowμa, John iv. 34) is the good action in words, which in themselves are deeds, and are followed by deeds; this good action affords enjoyment not merely to others, but also to himself. Ewald and Bertheau attract 5 to 2b; so also does Fleischer: "the violence which the D wish to do to others turns back upon themselves; they must eat it also, i.e. bear its evil consequences." The thought would then be like x. 6: os improborum obteget violentia, and "to eat violence" is parallel to "to drink (xxvi. 6) violence (injury)." But wherefore then the naming of the soul, of which elsewhere it is said that it hungers or satiates itself, but never simply (but cf. Luke xii. 19) that it eats? On the contrary, means also appetitus, xxiii. 2, and particularly wicked desire, Ps. xxvii. 12; here, as Ps. xxxv. 25, the object of this desire (Psychol. p. 202). Regarding D, vid. above, p. 85. There are such as do injury in a cunning deceitful manner to their neighbour to their own advantage. While the former (the righteous) distributes to his neighbour from the inner impulse without having such a result in view, yet according to God's direction he derives enjoyment himself therefrom: the desire of the latter goes to D ȧSiría, and thus to the enjoyment of good unrighteously and violently seized.

Ver. 3 He that guardeth his mouth keepeth his soul;

He that openeth wide his lips, to him it is destruction.

3a is extended in xxi. 23 to a distich. Mouth and soul stand in closest interchangeable relation, for speech is the most immediatel and continuous expression of the soul; thus whoever guards his mouth keeps his soul (the Venet., with excellent rendering of the synonym, ὁ τηρῶν τὸ στόμα ἑαυτοῦ φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ), for he watches that no sinful vain thoughts rise up in his soul and come forth in words, and because he thus keeps his soul, i.e. himself, safe from the destructive consequences of the sins of the tongue. On the contrary, he who opens wide his lips, i.e. cannot hold his mouth (LXX. ó dè πρOπETǹS XEiλeow), but expresses unexamined and unconsidered whatever comes into his mind and gives delight, he is destruction to himself (supply ), or to him it is destruction (supply л); both interpretations are possible, the parallelism brings nearer the former, and the parallel xviii. 7 brings nearer the latter. P means to spread (Schultens: diducere cum ruptura vel ad rupturam usque), here the lips, Pih. Ezek. xvi. 25, the legs, Arab. fashkh, farshkh; vid. regarding the R. v, to extend, to

spread out, Fleischer in the supplements to the A. L. Z. 1843, col. 116. Regarding the Mishle word nnn, vid. under x. 14.

Ver. 4. The three proverbs (1-3) which refer to hearing and speaking are now followed by a fourth which, like vers. 2 and 3, speaks of the wa.

The soul of the sluggard desires, yet has not;

But the soul of the industrious is richly satisfied.

The view that the o in by ip is the cholem compaginis, Böttcher, § 835, meets with the right answer that this would be the only example of a vocal casus in the whole of gnomic poetry; but when on his own part (Neue Aehrenlese, § 1305) he regards was the accus. of the nearer definition (=), he proceeds inadvertently on the view that the first word of the proverb is , while we read, and is thus the nom. of the subject. yi means "his (the sluggard's) soul" (for by occurs as explanatory

means its branches סְעִיפֶיהָ פּרִיָה as ,(נפש עצל permutative briefly for

(i.e. of the fruitful tree)," Isa. xvii. 6.

One might, it is true, add to the following word here, as at xiv. 13; but the similar expression appertaining to the syntax ornata occurs also 2 Sam. xxii. 33, Ps. lxxi. 7, and elsewhere, where this is impracticable. Meîri appropriately compares the scheme Ex. ii. 6, she saw him, viz. the boy. With reference to the here violently (cf. xxviii. 1) introduced, Böttcher rightly remarks, that it is an adverb altogether like necquidquam, xiv. 6, xx. 4, Ps. lxviii. 21, etc., thus: appetit necquidquam anima ejus, scilicet pigri. 4b shows the meaning of the desire that has not, for there occurs, a favourite strong Mishle word (xi. 25, xxviii. 25, etc.) for abundant satisfaction (the LXX. here, as at xxviii. 25, èv èπɩμedeía, sc. čσovrat, instead of which, Montfaucon supposed tμeλeía, which is, however, a word not authenticated). The slothful wishes and dreams of prosperity and abundance (cf. xxi. 25 f., a parallel which the Syr. has here in view), but his desire remains unsatisfied, since the object is not gained but only lost by doing nothing; the industrious gain, and that richly, what the slothful wishes for, but in vain.

Ver. 5. Two proverbs of the character of the righteous and of the effect of righteousness:

A deceitful thing the righteous hateth;

But the godless disgraceth and putteth to shame.

Within the sphere of an intelligible generality (as here of falsehood, or Ps. xli. 9 of worthlessness) a concrete event is in

་

view, as with " in the following plur. a general fact is separated into its individual instances and circumstances (vid. at Ps. lxv. 4); for 777 means not only the word in which the soul reveals itself, but also any fact in which an inner principle or a general fact or a whole comes forth to view. The righteous hateth all that bears in it the character of a falsehood (punctuate p with Gaja, cf. xii. 19), but the godless... Should we now, with Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, translate "acteth basely and shamefully"? It is true that both Hiphs. may be regarded as transitive, but this expression gives no right contrast to 5a, and is pointless. We have seen at x. 5 that, like, has also a causative signification to put to shame, i.e. bring shame upon others, and that xix. 26, where are connected, this causative signification lies nearer than the intrinsically transitive. Thus it will also here be meant, that while the righteous hateth all that is false or that is tainted by falsehood, the godless on the contrary loves to disgrace and to put to shame. But it is a question whether is to be derived from N = via, and thus is of the same meaning as ; an, Isa. xxx. 5, which there signifies pudefactum esse, is pointed, and is thus derived from a wa=via, vid. 2 Sam. xix. 6. But 7 occurs also as Hiph. of N, and means transitively to make of an evil savour, Gen. xxxiv. 30, cf. Ex. v. 21, as well as intransitively to come into evil savour, 1 Sam. xxvii. 12. In this sense of putidum faciens, bringing into evil savour, occurs here as at xix. 26, suitably along with '; xix. 26 is the putidum facere by evil report (slander), into which the foolish son brings his parents, here by his own evil report, thus to be thought of as brought about by means of slander. The old translators here fall into error; Luther renders both Hiphils reflexively; only the Venet. (after Kimchi) is right: doel (from an oçoûv as trans. to ὀζεῖν) καὶ ἀτιμώσει, he makes to be of ill odour and dishonours. Ver. 6 Righteousness protecteth an upright walk,

And godlessness bringeth sinners to destruction. The double thought is closely like that of xi. 5, but is peculiarly and almost enigmatically expressed. As there, and лy? are meant of a twofold inner relation to God, which consists of a ruling influence over man's conduct and a determination of his walk. But instead of naming the persons of the 7 and D' as the objects of this influence, the proverb uses the abstract expression, but with personal reference, and лs, and