NOTE.-There are approximately 400,000 acres of lands embraced in selections by the State of California which are pending for field investigation to determine the character thereof. To investigate these lands will require the services of 20 field men for a trifle over five months. At the usual rate of compensation allowed mineral inspectors by the General Land Office it would require the full amount of this estimate to complete the work. This estimate is a very careful and conservative one.

With the present field force maintained under the appropriation for "Protecting public lands, timber," etc., in the sundry civil bill, it would be impossible to put such a force of men upon the work of these California selections. To do so would prejudice very seriously other important investigations pending, not only in the State of California but throughout all the public-land States.

The mineral inspectors at present assigned to the California field divisions could not, if placed exclusively upon this investigation, complete them in a year. It would, however, be highly prejudicial to the interests of the Government in other important lines of investigation to put these men on this work exclusively, and good administration would not permit this to be done.

One of the most important lines of work now pending before the General Land Office is the investigation of oil lands in the State of California. In a statement made by me to the department under date of January 23, 1912, in support of the estimates for the appropriation for "Protecting public lands, timber," etc., for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913, to which the Secretary called the attention of the chairman of the House Appropriation Committee by his letter of February 8, 1912, had this to say concerning this work:

"There are 3,970,429 acres of land withdrawn in eight States and Territories as oil lands. In the State of California alone the oil area withdrawn is more than a million and a half acres, and especial attention is now being given to the situation in that State, where oil operations are being conducted very extensively. Under conditions which now obtain, particularly in the California fields, the office can not defer investigation of the operations of locators in this field until application for patent is filed, for only those operators who are certain of patent will apply for the same, the others being content to rest upon their possessory rights, and these latter will continue to remove for commercial purposes the oil within the limits of their locations. As most of these companies, so I am advised, are financially irresponsible, steps must be taken looking toward a thorough investigation to determine what companies are operating according to law and in good faith so that those who are not so doing may be stopped before irreparable damage to the Government ensues by reason of their operations.

"As indicating the magnitude and expense of this work in the California fields, I would state that in a suit about to be instituted to recover lands valuable for oil and other minerals an appropriation of $3,000 was given the Department of Justice in the last urgent deficiency bill for abstracts only. The evidence in this suit and in all others which may be brought must be secured by agents of this office."

In order to meet the situation which confronts the General Land Office with respect to the oil territory in California, plans are now being considered whereby additional field men may be assigned to this important work during the next fiscal year, providing, of course, the appropriation requested from Congress for the field service is granted. In addition to the oil investigations there are various other important lines of investigation demanding the attention of the General Land Office, particularly the field work in Alaska, the Carey Act investigation work in the various States, and the various other investigations necessary by reason of coal, oil, phosphate, and waterpower withdrawals, in addition to the ordinary work of the field force in the investigation of alleged fraudulent entries, all of which are set forth in my letter of January 23, 1912.

It will, therefore, be apparent that to investigate the pending California selections with any degree of expedition will require the additional appropriation which is proposed by H. R. 22522 now under consideration. Without this additional appropriation for that purpose the examination of these selected lands will of necessity have to await the regular order of investigation, and with the force available it is problematic when the investigations would be completed.

This estimate is submitted in accordance with the suggestion of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives and is to take the place of H. R. 22522, entitled "A bill appropriating money for the purpose of making field examinations of selected lieu lands in California."

The amount asked for is the same as that provided in the said bill and is deemed imperatively necessary for the public service in order to expeditiously carry into effect the provisions thereof.

It may be stated in this connection that owing to a controversy between the Federal Government and the State of California relative to certain overcertifications of land to the State, the adjustment of the State's school land grant has been practically in a

state of suspension for some years. June 16 last a basis of adjustment of this controversy was agreed upon by the Land Department and officials of the State, and during January of this year vigorous measures were entered upon to carry out this agreement. However, the adjustment had not sufficiently proceeded to such a stage at the date of submitting the regular estimates of appropriations to intelligently permit of the submission of an estimate similar to that herewith. As a result of the vigorous measures taken by this office, the adjustment has now proceeded to such a stage as to render field examination of the selected lieu lands imperative.

Submitted April 26, 1912.

FRED DENNETT, Commissioner.

On June 27, 1912, Senator Perkins introduced an amendment to H. R. 25069 for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of bill H. R. 19344, now bill H. R. 25738, which amendment is as follows: On page 96, after line 24, insert the following:

"Examination of California lieu selection, nineteen hundred and twelve and nineteen hundred and thirteen: To enable the Commissioner of the General Land Office to make field examinations of selected lieu lands in the State of California and to adjudicate the same in the General Land Office, twenty-eight thousand dollars, to be immediately available: Provided, That agents or others employed or detailed under this appropriation shall be allowed per diem, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe, in lieu of subsistence, at a rate not exceeding three dollars per day each, and actual necessary expenses for transportation, including necessary sleeping-car fares."

The question of appropriation was referred to in connection with the bill upon which this report was made, namely, H. R. 25738, for the purpose of showing the necessity of the passage of this later bill.

The enactment of H. R. 25738 is important to the State of California. It involves over 500,000 acres of land, the title to which should be settled to the end that those who are claiming such lands may have a perfect title and the State obtain its taxes on the same, as well as the proper clearing up and straightening out the title coming from the State of California to the Government.

The committee have given this matter exhaustive consideration, and after such examination and consideration are unanimously of the opinion that the legislation is right and proper, in the interests of justice, and necessary, and should be passed at this session of Con

JURISDICTION OF COMMERCE COURT.

JULY 17, 1912.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. CLAYTON, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the

following

REPORT.

[To accompany H. R. 25751.]

The Committee on, the Judiciary, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 25751) to amend an act entitled "An act to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the judiciary," approved March 3, 1911, and for other purposes, report the same back with the recommendation that it be amended as follows and that as amended the bill do pass.

In line 4, strike out the words "and so forth."

In line 7, after the word "seven," insert the following words: “and at the end."

Amend the title so as to read: "A bill to amend an act entitled 'An act to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the judiciary,' approved March third, nineteen hundred and eleven."

The bill as thus amended will read as follows:

That the act of Congress entitled "An act to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the judiciary," approved March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, be, and it is hereby, amended by adding to section two hundred and seven and at the end thereof the following: "The court shall also have jurisdiction over all cases brought to correct any error of law made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in granting or refusing to grant relief in any proceeding before said commission."

This bill meets a defect in the law pointed out by the Supreme Court in its decision of June 7, 1912, in the case of Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States et al., No. 780, October term, 1911. Section 207 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1911, provides—

First. All cases for the enforcement, otherwise than by adjudication and collection of a forfeiture or penalty or by infliction of criminal punishment, or any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission other than for the payment of money.

Second. Cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Other clauses of the first section confer jurisdiction upon the Commerce Court to try certain cases there referred to; but so far as enforce

ment or enjoining the enforcement of orders of the commission is concerned the above-quoted paragraphs are all of the existing law. When the commission declines to grant relief requested from it by shippers or other parties, it simply notes upon its record "petition dismissed." Procter & Gamble, shippers, at Cincinnati, Ohio, made complaint before the commission, complaining of certain provisions in tariffs of the railroad companies. The commission declined to grant the relief prayed for, and the shipper promptly went to the Commerce Court and asked for an injunction against the commission so far as was necessary to correct alleged errors of law committed by the commission.

The United States moved to dismiss the petition, on the ground that the Commerce Court had no jurisdiction. In the opinion of the Commerce Court, it said:

The jurisdiction of the court is denied on the ground that the petitioner is a shipper, and the Interstate Commerce Commission having merely dismissed the complaint which was made to it, and granted no affirmative relief, that there is nothing in the order of dismissal which it entered that affords any basis for action here. Or, in other words, that it is only the carrier against which an order is made in favor of the shipper that can bring the case for review into this court, the shipper being concluded by the action of the commission, whatever it may chance to be. This is a serious question, which merits careful consideration, and is not altogether easy to solve.

*

And while the dismissal of a complaint by the commission in a case like the present one may not in strictness be an order, in that it does not require or prohibit that anything shall or shall not be done, it is so in substance and effect, in that, by refusing to interfere with the practice or the charge complained of, it virtually approves it and makes it operative. If it was required by the act to hold that a court could not interfere with such an order, however confiscatory to the shipper it might be, the shipper being thus without legal redress, the act might well be declared unconstitutional, as wanting in due process of law.

The action of the commission, if to be given any force, having thus the effect of an adverse decision with respect to the question involved, must be regarded, even though negative in character, as an order within the meaning of the statute, which the courts may enjoin or set aside if legal or equitable grounds for doing so are found to exist. The petitioner therefore correctly came into this court, as it could previously have gone into a circuit court of the United States-the requisite amount being involved and the case being one arising under the Federal law-to have the action of the commission dismissing its complaint set aside and the demurrage charge disallowed, if that should be the conclusion reached with regard to it, either by direct decree or by emanding the case to the commission with directions to sustain the complaint.

Having taken jurisdiction, the Commerce Court then entered a decree sustaining the commission's action. From this decree Procter & Gamble appealed to the Supreme Court, and that court, through the Chief Justice, in its opinion held that the Commerce Court had no jurisdiction of any save affirmative orders of the commission. After setting forth the two paragraphs of section 207 quoted above in this report, the court said:"

Giving to these words their natural significance, we think it follows that they confer jurisdiction only to entertain complaints as to affirmative orders of the commission; that is, they give the court the right to take cognizance when properly made of complaints concerning the legality of orders rendered by the commission and confer power to relieve parties in whole or in part from the duty of obedience to orders which are found to be illegal. No resort to exposition can add to the cogency with which the conclusion stated is compelled by the plain meaning of the words themselves. But if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the language of the provision is ambiguous a consideration of the context of the act will at once clarify the subject. Thus, the first subdivision provides for the enforcement of orders; that is, the compelling of the doing or abstaining from doing of acts embraced by a previous affirmative command of the commission; and the second (the one with which we are concerned) dealing with the same subject from a reverse point of view, provides for the contingency of a com