pecially if they are rejected upon presentation. This employer, indeed, further seems to have tried out this special style of envelope without believing it to have any other merit than that the employé, who thought it to be good, would thereby become a more zealous and pushing selling agent.

It is a further fact that, entertaining the opinion of the envelope which they did, the officers of the defendant company made no effort to extend the sale of this envelope, merely filling orders for them when received, but attaching no importance to the trade which might be built up in them. It was the wholly natural and to be expected consequence that the employé would take his ideas to a more appreciative market. To the extent, great or small, however, to which the envelope. was introduced to the defendant's trade, and especially to their old customers, to that extent the sale of the right to make and vend, if an exclusive one, transferred, not merely the control of the claimed invention, but also of defendant's established trade. That they should seek to hold their old trade, by continuing to supply it with what they had before supplied, is likewise natural, and their feeling that they had the right so to do is one which would also command ready sympathizers. This right we think to belong to them as a legal right.

The conclusion reached does not impair the proprietary right of the plaintiff to this invention, if it be one, except to the extent indicated. The plaintiff took the right assigned to it subject to the equities to which it was subject. Nor does the ruling affect, except to a like extent, the right of alienation which goes with his property right. He cannot, however, regrant to one what he has already granted to another. The patentee owned whatever property he had in his claimed invention. He might have withheld it entirely from his employer. He might have sold or given it absolutely. He might have sold or given a license to make and to vend. He could not, however, sell or give that which was the equivalent of such a license and withdraw it to the prejudice of his donee. When the defendant made and sold the envelope, the exclusive right to make or sell which the plaintiff now claims, the defendant either was a trespasser or had a license from the patentee so to do. That the defendant was not a trespasser is clear. The alternative proposition is likewise clear. If the patentee meant not to have granted a full license, but one which he could withdraw at will, he should have so limited it at the time. The licensee could then have determined whether it would build up a trade which might be diverted to a commercial rival, and bargained for such rights of ownership or license which would protect its trade, or refuse the limited right offered.

The proposition resolves itself into this: The patentee granted, without restriction or limitation, the right to the defendant to make and to sell to its customers this patented envelope; and, having received the consideration for the grant, he cannot now write into it limitations which were not in the bargain when made. What the patentee cannot do, his alienee with notice cannot do. That an assignee of the patent had this notice could be found as a fact, because it took the patent with knowledge of the fact of what had previously been done. The controversy relates to letters patent No. 1,125,864,

issued January 26, 1915. The question of the validity of the patent does not concern the defendant, if its rights are not affected thereby. For this reason, the other questions discussed in the argument may be left as they are.

The bill of complaint is dismissed for want of equity, with costs to the defendant, and a formal decree to this effect may be submitted.

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. INDEPENDENT LAMP & WIRE CO.

1. PATENTS

(District Court, D. New Jersey. February 4, 1915.)

292-INFRINGEMENT-DISCOVERY-EQUITY RULE.

In a suit for the infringement of a patent, containing 23 claims covering process and 11 covering a product, wherein the answer denied the infringement, plaintiff's interrogatories, under equity rule 58 of the Supreme Court (198 Fed. xxxiv, 115 C. C. A. xxxiv), whether defendant had manufactured, sold, or used "incandescent electric lamps having filaments of drawn tungsten wire," following the language of a claim of the patent, whether defendant had made, sold, or used certain forms of tungsten metal, as described in certain claims of the patent, and whether defendant, in its manufacture of tungsten filament electric lamps, had used any processes covered by certain claims of the patent, except for typographical errors, were proper, and, if amended to conform to the patent, should be answered; but an interrogatory as to whether defendant would deliver a certain tungsten filament lamp made by it to plaintiff's counsel for use in the cause is not within the rule, and will be stricken out. 2. PATENTS 292-INFRINGEMENT-DISCOVERY-FORM OF QUESTIONS. On the issue of infringement, it was no objection to plaintiff's interrogatories, propounded under such rule, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for any officer of defendant company to answer them, because they were matters for expert opinion; and it was no valid objection that the terms and words used in the interrogatories and claims were susceptible of one or more meanings, because the answer could be in the alternative, and qualified to cover all of the susceptible meanings. 3. PATENTS 292-INFRINGEMENT-DISCOVERY.

Interrogatories propounded by plaintiff, under such rule, as to facts material to the support of the action and presumably within defendant's knowledge, not seeking to discover evidence, but whether defendant's process and product was covered by the claims of plaintiff's' patent, and not seeking defendant's opinion of the construction to be given to plaintiff's patent, are proper, even though a construction may eventually be given to the claims which will make the answers useless to plaintiff.

In Equity. Suit by the General Electric Company against the Independent Lamp & Wire Company. Motion to strike out interrogatories propounded by plaintiff, under equity rule 58 of the Supreme Court, denied, and defendant ordered to answer.

Howson & Howson, of New York City, for plaintiff.

William A. Megrath and Cornelius C. Billings, both of New York City, for defendant.

HAIGHT, District Judge. This suit is for an infringement of letters patent No. 1,082,933, granted to W. D. Coolidge December 30, 1913. The answer denies infringement. One of the issues, there

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fore, is whether the defendant does infringe. The plaintiff's patent contains 34 claims, the first 23 of which cover a process and the last 11 a product.

[1] The first interrogatory asks whether the defendant had manufactured, sold, or used "incandescent electric lamps having filaments of drawn tungsten wire." It follows exactly the language of the twenty-fifth claim of the patent. The third interrogatory contains six subdivisions, all of which are, in effect, whether the defendant has made, sold, or used certain forms of tungsten metal, such as described in the twenty-eighth, twenty-fourth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, thirty-third, and thirty-fourth claims of the patent respectively. The fourth interrogatory in effect asks whether the defendant, in the manufacture of tungsten filament electric lamps, or for other purposes, has used any or all of the processes covered by claims 1 to 23, inclusive, of the patent. It contains 23 subdivisions, each of which relates to a particular claim. The language of the respective claims is followed exactly, except in two respects (both of which I conceive to be typographical errors), viz.: In the thirteenth subdivision the words "sintering the body," which appear in claim 13 of the patent, do not appear in the interrogatory; and in the eighteenth subdivision the words "lower limit" are used in the claim, but the words "lowest limit" in the interrogatory. The second interrogatory asks whether the defendant will produce a certain tungsten filament lamp made by it, and deliver it to the plaintiff's counsel for use in this cause.

I think all of the interrogatories, with the exception of the second, are proper, and should be answered, provided that subdivisions 13 and 18 of the fourth are amended to conform with the claims of the patent to which they relate. These may be amended accordingly, or otherwise they will be stricken out. The second interrogatory does not seem to me to come within the provisions of rule 58 (198 Fed. xxxiv, 115 C. C. A. xxxiv), and it will therefore be stricken out.

[2] The objection of the defendant to the other interrogatories seems to be that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for any officer of the defendant company to answer them, because the answers must be found in expert opinion. If the interrogatories are in other respects proper, this does not seem to me to be a valid objection to them. If a question cannot be answered, it is proper for the person to whom it is addressed to state that fact. In that event, if the plaintiff still pressed for an answer, the court would probably have to determine whether or not it could be answered. Manifestly, an interrogatory should not be stricken out merely because of the representation of counsel that it is difficult or impossible of answer by the person to whom it is propounded. It would also seem very unusual, indeed, if there were not some officer of the defendant corporation, which is engaged in manufacturing, who could not disclose whether or not, in the manufacture of certain articles, certain processes were used and certain products manufactured. It is also urged that the terms and words used in the interrogatories and claims are susceptible of one or more meanings; but this is not a valid objection, because the answer can be in the alternative, and qualified so as to cover all of the meanings which the term or word is susceptible of bearing. In addition, it

must be assumed that terms and words used in a patent have a welldefined meaning in the art of which the patent is a part.

[3] I think all of the interrogatories are clearly within the provisions of rule 58. They seek to elicit facts material to the support of the action. Plaintiff, in order to sustain his action, must prove infringement. The interrogatories seek to elicit facts, presumably within the knowledge of the defendant, which will tend to prove whether or not the defendant infringes. They do not seek to discover evidence, but rather the fact whether the product of the defendant and the process which it uses is that covered by the claims of the plaintiff's patent. They do not pry into the case of the defendant, except in so far as they seek to elicit facts which are necessary in support of the plaintiff's case. They do not, as counsel for the defendant seems to assume, ask for the defendant's opinion of the construction to be given to the plaintiff's patent. It may be that a construction will eventually be given to the claims which will make the answers to the interrogatories quite useless to the plaintiff; but this is no valid objection to the interrogatories, nor can the proper construction be determined in advance of the final hearing. As far as my research has extended, interrogatories such as these have uniformly been held proper by the English courts under order 31 of the English equity rules of practice, which is in substance the same as equity rule 58 of the Supreme Court. Benno Jaffé, etc., v. Richardson, 10 Reports British Patent Cases, 136, is an example. For a long while a statute, similar to this rule, has existed in the state of New Jersey, and these interrogatories, under the decisions of the courts of New Jersey construing the statute of that state, would be proper. Watkins v. Cope, 84 N. J. Law, 143, 86 Atl. 545.

The view which I entertain is not at all at variance with that expressed by Judge Sanborn in P. M. Co. v. Ajax Rail Anchor Co. (D. C.) 216 Fed. 634. The second, third, and fourth interrogatories in that case (which were propounded by the defendant) sought to elicit from the complainant its opinion as to the proper construction to be given. to its patent. The fact in issue was infringement, and the opinion which the complainant had as to the construction to be given to its own patent was not a fact material to the defense of the action. The explanation given by Judge Sanborn as to why the others were stricken out needs no comment, because it is entirely clear that they did not seek to elicit facts which were material to the defense, especially as the defense upon which they were predicated, apparently, was stricken out by the court. The interrogatories in this case ask that certain facts, which must be peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant and which are material in support of the plaintiff's case, be divulged; i. e., whether the defendant does certain things which the plaintiff's patent has given it the exclusive right to do. They do not ask for evidence in the sense in which that term is used by Judge Sanborn.

The plaintiff is therefore entitled to an order requiring such officer of the defendant corporation as may have knowledge of the facts. sought to be ascertained by the interrogatories to answer all of the interrogatories which I have above held to be unobjectionable; and,

if there be one officer who has knowledge of one set of facts, and another officer of another set of facts, then the respective interrogatories must be answered by the officers who, respectively, have the knowledge. The order will require that the answer be made within ten days from the date thereof. If the parties cannot agree upon the terms of the order, I will settle it upon two days' notice.

In re ATLANTIC BEACH CORP.

(District Court, S. D. Florida. August 28, 1917.)

1. BANKRUPTCY 140(1)-PROPERTY OF BANKRUPT-RESERVATION OF TITLE -CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.

The petitioner, owner of hotel property, contracted to sell to B., who assigned the contract to a corporation, which later contracted with the F. company to install an ice-making plant and machinery on the premises, By the contract the F. company was to retain title until the machinery was paid for, the machinery to remain personal property. Both of the contracts were duly recorded. Pursuant to the contract of purchase and assignment, petitioner conveyed all of the property, real and personal, to the corporation, and received a purchase-money mortgage. Later the corporation was adjudged a bankrupt and a trustee appointed. The trustee quitclaimed to the petitioner, and later ordered petitioner to pay to the F. company the purchase money or deliver to it the machinery, etc. Gen. St. Fla. 1906, § 2516, provides that the reservation of title under a written contract recorded is valid against purchasers or creditors. Held, that the fact that the petitioner recognized the assignment to the bankrupt and made a deed pursuant to the contract did not give it actual or constructive knowledge of the reservation of title by the F. company. 2. BANKRUPTCY 140(1)-RESERVATION OF TITLE-CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.

The recording of the contract prior to the conveyance to petitioner and the acceptance of the mortgage to secure the purchase money was constructive notice of the reservation of title and binding on petitioner. 3. NOTICE-CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE-RECORDING OF INSTRUMENTS.

The recording of an instrument not entitled to record is not constructive notice of its contents.

4. FIXTURES 22-RESERVATION OF TITLE-CONTRACT-VALIDITY,

A contract, reserving title in fixtures placed on land, is valid and binding as between the parties and any one dealing with the realty with knowledge thereof.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Atlantic Beach Corporation, bankrupt. Petition by the Florida East Coast Hotel Company to review an order of the referee. Denied.

A. V. S. Smith, Armstead Brown, and Egford Bly, all of Jacksonville, Fla, for the Florida East Coast Hotel Co., petitioner on review.

Marks, Marks & Holt, of Jacksonville, Fla., for claimant.

the

CALL, District Judge. This cause comes on for hearing upon petition of the Florida East Coast Hotel Company to review the order of the referee made upon the petition of the Frick Company.

The facts upon which the referee acted may be stated as follows: The Florida East Coast Hotel Company, being the owner of the Hotel For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes