There were other questions certified in the case, but as we answer the one which has been particularly stated, in the affirmative, and nothing more is needed to sustain the decree, the others will not be considered further than has already been done incidentally. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited 107 U. S., 596. debt. Under such circumstances, it is a matter of no importance that the original creditor has parted with the claim. The right is one that attaches to the debt and not to the person of the original creditor. Consequently, the right passes with an assignment of the debt. The decree is affirmed. True copy. Test: James H.McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-111 U. S., 783. THE UNION TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, States for the Southern District of Illinois. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: The facts and questions certified in this case AUGUSTUS COCHRAN ET AL., Survivors, etc., Plffs. in Err., V. SCHELL, Late Collector of Customs. further than by reference to what has been AUGUSTUS SCHELL, Late Collector of said in that case, we affirm the decree. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Customs, Piff. in Err., v. THOMAS COCHRAN AND WILLIAM BAR BOUR, Survivors, etc. (See S. C., "Barber v. Schell," 17 Otto, 617-624.) UNION TRUST COMPANY of New York, Duty Act, construction of-meaning of words— Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This case differs from that of Union Trust Co. v. Souther [ante, 488], only in the fact that Walker, the present intervener and appellee, is collector's fee. *1. By schedule D to the Act of July 30, 1846, 9 Stat, at L., 46, a duty of 25 per cent ad valorem was im posed on cotton laces, cotton insertings, and manufactures composed wholly of cotton, not otherwise provided for. By section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1857, 11 Id., 192, the duties on the articles enumer ated in schedules C and D of the Act of 1846 were fixed at 24 and 19 per cent, respectively, with such of the Act of 1857, "All manufactures composed exceptions as are hereinafter made. By section 2 wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed, painted or dyed, and delaines," were transferred to schedule C; held, that laces and insertings composed wholly of cotton, and bleached or dyed, were duitable at 24 per cent, under the Act of 1857. 2. The designations qualified by the word "cotton," in the Act of 1846, are designations of articles by special description, as contradistinguished from trade, and are designations of quality and material. the assignee by purchase from the original hold-IN Fates for the Southern District of New ers of the claims he seeks to have paid, and one of the questions certified is, whether, being an assignee and not an original holder, he is entitled to payment. We have no hesitation in answering this question in the affirmative. As was said in Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S., 253 [XXV., 342], these creditors are paid, not because they have in law a lien on the mortgaged property or the income, but because in equity the earnings of the Company constitute a fund for the payment of the expenses which their claims represent, before any income arises which ought to be applied to the discharge of the mortgage York. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. George Bliss, for Cochrane et al., plaintiffs. Mr. S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-Gen., for Schell, defendant. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court: This is a suit commenced in 1863, by the mem*Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD. bers of the firm of S. Cochran & Co., against duty of thirty per centum, "And upon those the Collector of the Port of New York. As enumerated in schedules C, D, E, F, G and H tried in the circuit court it involved the recov- of said Act," the duties of twenty-four, nineteen, ery back of duties paid on cotton laces and fifteen, twelve, eight and four per centum, recotton insertings imported from abroad in 1857, spectively, "with such exceptions as are here1858, 1859, 1860 and 1861, and of fees paid at the inafter made." The schedules above mentioned custom-house. The laces and insertings were respectively imposed duties of one hundred, composed wholly of cotton, and were either forty, thirty, twenty-five, twenty, fifteen, ten bleached or dyed. The collector charged a duty and five per centum. on them of 24 per cent ad valorem, the importers claiming that the proper duty was 19 per cent ad valorem. At the trial the court instructed the jury that the duty was correctly assessed and that the plaintiffs could not recover. The question as to the fees involved four items. On the presentation of an invoice and an entry, the Collector, before he would receive them as Collector, impressed on each invoice, for the convenience and security of himself and the government, a stamp or certificate, certifying in the name of a deputy-collector that the invoice was presented on entry on such a day. On each entry, one of the plaintiffs' firm was required to make and subscribe before the Collector or his deputy the owner's or consignee's oath. For each of such stamps the Collector exacted twenty cents, and for each of such oaths twenty cents. He also exacted a fee of twenty cents for each permit to land the merchandise embraced in each entry on which the duties had been paid or secured, such permit being signed by the Collector and the naval officer. Said three fees of twenty cents were paid with the duties, and otherwise no permit for the landing and delivery of the goods could be obtained. The permit to land covered all the goods embraced in the entry, but at least one package of each invoice and one package in every ten packages of each invoice, were, by order of the Collector, designated on each invoice and each entry and also on the permit, to be sent, and were sent, to the public store for examination and appraisement; and, after they had been examined and appraised and reported on, an order was required by the plaintiffs' firm, signed by the Collector alone, to the storekeeper, to deliver such examined packages to the plaintiffs' firm. For every such order, without which the examined packages could not be obtained, the Collector exacted a fee of twenty cents. At the trial, the plaintiffs conceded that the fee for the permit was legal. The court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs for the amounts exacted for the other three fees, with interest, being $1,734.80, and after a judgment for the plaintiffs therefor, with costs, the plaintiffs sued out a writ of error based on their failure to recover the alleged excess of duty exacted on the laces and insertings, and the defendant sued out a writ of error based on the recovery for the three alleged illegal fees. By schedule D of the Act of July 30, 1846, 9 Stat. at L., 46, a duty of twenty-five per cent ad valorem was imposed on cotton laces, cotton insertings, cotton trimming laces, cotton laces and braids, and manufactures composed wholly of cotton, not otherwise provided for. By section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1857, 11 Stat. at L., 192, it was enacted that after July 1, 1857, ad valorem duties should be imposed in lieu of those then imposed on imported goods, as follows: "Upon the articles enumerated in schedules A and B" of the tariff Act of 1846, a Thus far cotton laces and cotton insertings, being in schedule D of the Act of 1846 at twentyfive per cent, were reduced by the Act of 1857, with the other articles in schedule D, to nineteen per cent. But section 2 of the Act of 1857 provided "That all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed, painted or dyed, and delaines, shall be transferred to schedule C." Under this provision, it would seem very plain that the goods in the present case were subject to a duty of twenty-four per cent, and not of nineteen per cent. If section 1 of the Act of 1857 had merely reduced from twentyfive per cent to nineteen per cent, the duty on the articles specially mentioned in schedule D of the Act of 1846, without exception, the duty on the goods in question would have been reduced to nineteen per cent. But the enactment was distinct that there should be excepted out of the reduction "all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed, painted or dyed, and delaines," and that they should go into schedule C, the twenty-four per cent schedule. The contention for the plaintiffs is, that as cotton laces and cotton insertings were made dutiable by those names in the Act of 1846, they are not to be affected by the subsequent general provision as to manufactures composed wholly of cotton. Schedule C of the Act of 1846 imposed a duty of thirty per cent on cotton cords, gimps and galloons, and on "manufactures of cotton ** * if embroidered or tamboured in the loom, or otherwise, by machinery, or with the needle, or other process." Schedule E imposed a duty of twenty per cent on "Caps, gloves, leggins, mitts, socks, stockings, wove shirts and drawers, made on frames, composed wholly of cotton, worn by men, women and children," and on "velvet, in the piece, composed wholly of cotton." These provisions, and the one in schedule D as to cotton laces, etc., relate to goods made of cotton entirely. Those goods are all of them goods to which, as manufactures composed wholly of cotton, section 2 of the Act of 1857 applies, transferring them, when bleached, printed, painted or dyed, to the twenty-four per cent schedule, schedule C. The duty on them had been thirty, twenty-five and twenty per cent respectively. But for such transfer the new duty on those in schedules D and E would have been nineteen and fifteen. A new uniform rate of twenty-four was imposed, and while the thirty was reduced by six per cent, the twenty-five was reduced by only one, and the twenty was increased by four. This indicates an intention, in the Act of 1857, to impose, in general, on manufactures composed wholly of cotton, when bleached, printed, painted or dyed, a relatively higher duty as compared with other articles named in the Act of 1846. " The expression manufactures composed wholly of cotton" is not found in the Act of 1846. It is in that Act qualified by the words | Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of this "not otherwise provided for." In the Act of court. It was a case under these same statutes. 1857 the expression is "all manufactures com- Almonds were dutiable, by that name, at forty posed wholly of cotton, which are bleached," etc. If the words "manufactures composed wholly of cotton," unqualified, and the words "cotton laces" and "cotton insertings," had all of them been found in the Act of 1846, as the general expression would not have embraced the specific terms in that Act, for dutiable purposes, though including them in general language, it would be reasonable to say that the general expression in a later Act would not include the specific terms, for dutiable purposes. But the fact that the general expression, as used in schedule D of the Act of 1846, is qualified by the words "not otherwise provided for," shows that there were manufactures composed wholly of cotton otherwise provided for; that is, in other items in that Act. Thus, besides the embroidered and tamboured manufactures of cotton provided for in schedule C of that Act there are cords, gimps, galloons, laces, insertings, trimming laces, laces and braids, each with the word " cotton prefixed, indicating manufactures composed wholly of cotton; and there are also the articles composed wholly of cotton named in schedule E. The material "cotton" is the thing of special mark, as the sole material in the manufacture. In this view it cannot properly be said that these manufactured articles, manufactures of cotton composed wholly of cotton, designated in the Act of 1846 always by the epithet "cotton" applied to them, are not embraced, for dutiable purposes, in the terms "all manufactures composed wholly of cotton," in section 2 of the Act of 1857. The designations qualified by the word "cotton," in the Act of 1846, are designations of articles by special description, as contradistinguished from designations by a commercial name or a name of trade. They are designations of quality and material. The articles referred to, named in schedules C, D and E of the Act of 1846, are all of them manufactures wholly of cotton; but under that Act they were not all subject to the same duty, and so that Act designates them substantially as manufactures wholly of cotton which are gimps at thirty per cent, manufactures wholly of cotton which are laces or insertings at twenty-five per cent, manufactures wholly of cotton which are stockings, made on frames and worn by human beings, at twenty per cent, and so on. But for the exceptions provided for by section 1 of the Act of 1857 the duties on those articles, if bleached, printed, painted or dyed, would have been reduced to twenty-four, nineteen and fifteen per cent respectively, but section 2 of that Act says, in substance, that manufactures wholly of cotton which are gimps or laces or insertings or stockings, and so on, shall, all of them, be subject to twenty-four per cent duty. This was the view applied by Mr. Justice Nelson, in Reimer v. Schell, 4 Blatchf., 328, in 1859, to colored cotton hosiery, under the provisions in question, and we think it a sound one. It was the view adopted by the circuit court in this case. There is no question of commercial designation. Hence, the cases cited and relied on by the importers, are not cases in their favor. Homer v. Collector, 1 Wall., 486 [68 U. S., XVII., 688], in 1863, was a case in which Mr. per cent, in schedule B of the Act of 1846. Under the Act of 1857 the duty on the articles in said schedule B was reduced to and fixed at thirty per cent, and the collector exacted that duty on almonds. It was contended that as, by section 2 of the latter Act, "fruits, green, ripe or dried," were transferred to schedule G, and so made subject to only eight per cent duty, almonds were so transferred, as being "fruits, green, ripe or dried." An attempt was made, at the trial, to show that at the time the Act of 1857 was passed, almonds were fruit, green, ripe or dried, according to the commercial understanding of those terms in the markets of this country, and questions were certified to this court, on a division of opinion in the circuit court, as to the proper duty on almonds, and as to the admissibility of such evidence. It was contended, for the importer, that the term "dried fruits," in popular meaning, included almonds. The government claimed that the term "almonds" was a specific name and, therefore,commercial nomenclature had no application. This court held that inquiry as to whether, in a commercial sense, almonds were dried fruit, had nothing to do with the question, as a duty had been imposed on almonds, eo nomine, almost immemorially; and that, as almonds were charged specifically with a duty of forty per cent in the Act of 1846, and were not named as almonds in the changes in the Act of 1857, and full effect could be given to the term "fruit, dried," without including almonds in it, it followed that almonds were dutiable at thirty per cent. There is nothing in this decision that overrules that in Reimer v. Schell, or that aids the importers in the present case. The Act of 1846, in substance, mentions manufactures wholly of cotton which are laces or insertings, bleached or dyed, and section 2 of the Act of 1857 mentions them in naming manufactures composed wholly of cotton, bleached or dyed. Nor does the case of Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall., 162 [80 U. S., XX., 566], as to birds, apply. That case was decided on the ground that the word “ animals," in the Act of 1861 [12 Stat. at L., 193], did not include birds, and so could not include them in the Act of 1866 [14 Stat. at L., 48]. There is nothing in Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall., 374 [90 U. S., XXIII., 47], or in Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U. S., 108 [XXIV., 764], which applies to this case. The case of Movius v. Arthur, 95 U. S., 144 [XXIV., 420], was decided on the same view as that of Homer v. Collector. Patent leather had been dutiable by that name in the Acts of 1861 and 1862. The Act of 1872 [17 Stat. at L., 230], imposed a less duty on skins dressed and finished, of all kinds. This court held that patent leather continued subject to the former duty, on the view that, although patent leather was a finished skin, something was done to it after it could be called a finished skin to make patent leather of it, and that it could not have been intended to include patent leather in the general designation of "finished skins.” In Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S., 112 [XXIV., 766], the subject of duty was laces, manufactures of silk, on which a duty of sixty per cent was exacted, under the Act of 1864 [13 Stat. at L., 210], as silk laces. It was contended that they were dutiable at thirty per cent as thread laces, under the Act of 1861 [12 Stat. at L.,190], as amended by the Act of 1862 [12 Stat. at L., 550]. The question being submitted to the jury whether they were commercially known as thread laces, although made of silk, it was found that they were, and the plaintiffs had a verdict. This court held that the question was one of commercial designation and that the prior specific designation of thread laces must prevail over the words silk laces, it appearing that there were thread laces of cotton and thread laces of silk, and articles commercially known as silk laces, the designation of thread lace depending on the mode of manufacture. The principle of that case, and of kindred cases, such as Arthur v. Rheims, 96 U. S.,143 [XXIV., 813], is, that the specific designation of an article by a commercial name will prevail over a general term in a later Act, and has no application to the present case, which is not, as to cotton laces and cotton insertings, one of designation by a commercial name. issued and paid for, and the duties paid or se- The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. GEORGE W. HILL, Piff. in Err., v. GEORGE F. HARDING ET AL. (See S. C., 17 Otto, 631-635.) Action against bankrupt―effect of discharge. *A state court, in which an action against a bankrupt upon a debt provable in bankruptcy is pending, must, on the bankrupt's application under secings to await the determination of the court in tion 5106 of the Revised Statutes, stay all proceedbankruptcy on the question of his discharge, unless unreasonable delay on his part in endeavoring to obtain his discharge is shown, or the court in bankruptcy gives leave to proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due; even if an The bill of exceptions in the present case states that previously to about 1879 there were no cotton laces printed or dyed, and that from 1850 to 1861 there were many goods composed wholly of cotton, and bleached, printed, painted, colored or dyed, such as calicoes (prints), lawns, handkerchiefs, velvets and velveteens, and cot-attachment has been made in the action more than ton piece goods generally. If, when section 2 of the Act of 1857 [11 Stat. at L., 192], was enacted, the words "printed" and "painted" were not applicable to laces, it does not follow that the provision is to be limited to such cotton articles as were then printed or painted as well as bleached or dyed. It includes any article which, as then known, satisfied any one of the conditions. We see no warrant for the view that the Act of 1857 applies only to piece goods. It results from these views that the goods in question were subject to the duty imposed. As to the three disputed fees, we are of opinion that they were none of them allowed by the law in force, section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1799, 1 Stat. at L., 706. The stamp or certificate on the invoice was one for the convenience and security of the collector and the government, and was not an official certificate, in the sense of the statute. It was not an official document required by the merchant, nor was it given to him. It was a memorandum between officers in the customhouse, as a part of their system of checks and authentications. its administration, was not named in the statThe fee for the oath to the entry, as a fee for ute. As a fee for the jurat to the oath, although the oath was required by the statute and its form was prescribed and it was to be taken before the collector, the jurat was not an official document required by the merchant or given to him. The bill of exceptions states that the order to the storekeeper, to deliver examined packages, was an order required by the plaintiffs' firm from the Collector. But we do not think it was an official certificate or an official document re quired by the merchant, in the sense of the statute. The permit to land the goods having been four months before the commencement of the pro- Submitted Mar. 7, 1883. Decided Mar. 19, 1883. error. and C. E. Mayer, for defendants in error. Messrs. Adolph Moses, Wm. H. Barnum Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: The material facts, as appearing by the record of this case in the Supreme Court of Illinois, are as follows: On the 16th of March, 1877, the original plaint defendant was indebted to them in the sum of iffs, in accordance with the statutes of Illinois, and upon the affidavit of one of them that the $8,264 for services as attorneys at law, and that he was a resident of Illinois, and was about fraudulently to conceal, assign or otherwise disdelay his creditors, sued out from the Circuit pose of his property or effects so as to hinder or Court of Cook County a writ of attachment tached. On the 28th of March, 1877, in accordagainst him, upon which his real estate was atment by giving bond with sureties to pay to the ance with those statutes, he dissolved the attachplaintiffs, within ninety days after judgment, *Head note by Mr. Justice GRAY. the amount of any judgment which might be rendered against him on a final trial in the suit. On the 12th of April, 1878, a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs in the sum of $3,500, and the defendant moved the court to set it aside and grant a new trial. On the 7th of May, 1878, he filed in the cause a duly attested copy of an order, dated the first of May, 1878, adjudging him a bankrupt under the Bankrupt Act of the United States. On the 11th of May, 1878, before judgment on the verdict, the defendant suggested the adjudication in bankruptcy, which was admitted, and applied to the state court, under section 5106 of the Revised Statutes, for a stay of proceedings to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy upon the question of his discharge. On the same day, the court denied this application, as well as the motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment against him on the verdict, and afterwards allowed a bill of exceptions, which stated the facts above recited. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois on the 19th of November, 1878, and by the Supreme Court of Illinois on the 18th of November, 1879. The opinion of the Supreme Court is reported in 93 Illinois, 77. On the 6th of January, 1880, the defendant sued out this writ of error. At October Term 1880, of this court, the defendants in error moved to dismiss the writ of error, because at the time it was sued out the plaintiff in error had been discharged from the obligation of the debt to them; and the assignee in bankruptcy moved to substitute his name for that of the bankrupt as plaintiff in error. By the papers submitted with these motions, it appeared that the assignment in bankruptcy was made on the 17th of June, 1878, and a certificate of discharge granted to the bankrupt on the 15th of September, 1879. The court overruled both motions; but granted leave to the assignee to be heard by counsel at the argument on the merits, as to all matters affecting the estate of the bankrupt. The record clearly shows that a privilege under section 5106 of the Revised Statutes was claimed by the original defendant, and was denied by the highest court of the State. There can, therefore, be no doubt of the authority of this court to revise the judgment. The section in question is as follows: " 'No creditor whose debt is provable shall be allowed to prosecute to final judgment any suit at law or in equity therefor against the bankrupt, until the question of the debtor's discharge shall have been determined; and any such suit or proceedings shall, upon the application of the bankrupt, be stayed to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy on the question of the discharge; Provided, There is no unreasonable delay on the part of the bankrupt in endeavoring to obtain his discharge; and Provided, also, That if the amount due the creditor is in dispute, the suit, by leave of the court in bankruptcy, may proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due, which amount may be proved in bankruptcy, but execution shall be stayed." The terms of this enactment are as broad and as peremptory as possible. "No creditor whose debt is provable shall be allowed to prosecute to final judgment" any suit thereon against the bankrupt; and such suit "shall, upon the application of the bankrupt, be stayed." This provision, like all laws of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, binds the courts of each State, as well as those of the Nation. Upon the application of the bankrupt to the court, state or national, in which the suit is pending, it is the duty of that court to stay the proceedings "to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy on the question of the discharge," unless there is unreasonable delay on the part of the bankrupt in endeavoring to obtain his discharge, or unless, the amount of the debt being in dispute, the United States Court sitting in bankruptcy gives leave to proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining that amount. If neither the bankrupt nor his assignee in bankruptcy applies for a stay of proceedings, the court may of course proceed to judgment. Doe v. Childress, 21 Wall., 642 [88 U. S., XXII., 549]; Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S., 521 [XXIII., 403]; Norton v. Switzer, 93 U. S., 355 [XXIII., 908]. The stay does not operate as a bar to the action, but only as a suspension of proceedings until the question of the bankrupt's discharge shall have been determined in the United States Court sitting in bankruptcy. After the determination of that question in that court, the court in which the suit is pending may proceed to such judgment as the circumstances of the case may require. If the discharge is refused, the plaintiff, upon establishing his claim, may obtain a general judgment. If the discharge is granted, the court in which the suit is pending may then determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a special judgment for the purpose of enforcing an attachment made more than four months before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, or for the purpose of charging sureties upon a bond given to dissolve such an attachment. But, so long as the question of the discharge in bankruptcy is undetermined, the suit cannot, against the objection of the bankrupt or of his assignee in bankruptcy, proceed for any purpose, except in one of two events, an unreasonable delay of the bankrupt in endeavoring to obtain his discharge, or an order of the court in bankruptcy granting leave to proceed for the single purpose of ascer taining the amount due. The result required by the very words of the statute is confirmed by a consideration of the easons upon which it rests. Its purpose is not merely to protect the bankrupt, in case he obtains a certificate of discharge, from hav ing the original cause of action against him merged in a judgment, the right of action upon which might not be barred by the discharge; but to prevent him, so long as the question of his discharge is undetermined, from being har assed by suit upon any debt provable in bankruptcy, whether it would or would not be barred by a certificate of discharge, and whether the attachment or other security obtained in the suit would or would not be affected by the proceedings in bankruptcy; and also to afford to the assignee in bankruptcy, to whom all the property of the bankrupt has passed, opportunity to assume the defense of the suit, and to contest the existence and amount of the plaintiff's claim, and the validity of his attachment. |