ings of fact that: "The loss under the risk taken in favor of Charles S. Pennell, both on the ship and Rotterdam charter, was paid by The Sun Company, without objection, October 23, 1865, and May 5, 1866." These losses were paid on the two insurances effected contemporaneously with that sued on in this proceeding, in which the voyage described was," At and from New York, to, at and from San Francisco and (to) Callao to Chinchas." But, at most, this only gives rise to an inference that these two insurances were intended to cover some charter, other than the one from New York to San Francisco, and indeed, is not conclusive as to that. It certainly does not establish, even in respect to them, that they were understood, at the time the insurances were effected, to cover a risk upon an interest in the Rotterdam charter, or any charter in force during the voyage from New York to San Francisco; much less, can it be said, that any admission can be implied, from such payment, that the risk, described as upon ship and charter during the extended voyage to Callao and the Chinchas, although described as commencing at New York, was identical, so far as the charter was concerned, with that in the policy sued on, in which the voyage is described as from New York to San Francisco. In any aspect, the circumstance relied on is merely argumentative. The Sun Company may have made the payment inadvertently, without consideration of its strict rights. It certainly is not conclusive as an admission of liability in this case, for it has no element of estoppel, and to justify the conclusion of law sought to be drawn from it, would be to give it that effect. be no salvage of freight applicable to the second charter. Melcher was master, and owner of one eighth of the ship. On March 20, 1864, he instructed his agent, Sawyer, by letter shown to The Ocean Company, to effect insurance on his behalf against war risk on ship, and generally on his interest in both charters specifically, besides primage, and on his personal effects, amounting in all to $19,425, and in the same letter said: "I think you had better put $5,000 or $6,000 more marine risk in case I should lose the ship." The Ocean Company accepted the risk on the Rotterdam charter, primage, and personal effects to San Francisco, and on the same day insured the master for $3,000 on his interest in the ship during the whole of her voyage, describing the duration and locality of the risk as "At and from New York, to, at and from San Francisco and Chinchas, with usual liberties at Callao, to her port of advice and discharge in Europe." This latter insurance was not made known to The Sun Company, nor was it informed of any of the communications that had taken place between The Ocean Company and Melcher, including the contents of the letter to Sawyer. It thus appears that, at the time of the loss, Melcher had insurance on two concurrent charters and his primage thereon during one voyage, being insured, besides his interest in the ship, on double the amount of its possible earnings of freight for one voyage. This fact was known to The Ocean Company at the time, and was not communicated by it to The Sun Company, which was without other knowledge upon the subject, and executed its policy to The Ocean Company in ignorance of it. The fact that The Sun Company participated in the defense of the Ocean Company in the ac- That knowledge of the circumstance was mation brought by Melcher, and the communica- terial and important to the underwriter as liketions between the Companies in respect to it, so ly to influence his judgment in accepting the far as they are set out in the findings of fact, risk, we think, is so manifest to common reaare, in our opinion, equally without effect, and son as to need no proof of usage or opinion do not amount either to an admission of liability among those engaged in the business. It was a or to an agreement to be bound by the result of flagrant case of over insurance upon its face, that litigation; and having carefully considered and made it the pecuniary interest of the master all the circumstances found and relied on, with-in charge of the ship to forego and neglect the out further special mention of them, we are constrained to say that they do not, either singly or together, sustain the conclusion that "The Sun Company's policy covers the Rotterdam charter." This conclusion is, in our opinion, greatly strengthened by the consideration of other facts set out in the finding, which, while they tend to show that, as a matter of fact, The Sun Company did not intend to re-insure Melcher's interest in the Rotterdam charter, furnished also a distinct ground of defense, as matter of law, if the fact had been otherwise, and negative the second conclusion of law announced by the circuit court, that "The policy is not void because of any concealment by The Ocean Company." The situation was this: there were two concurrent charters on the ship, both which were treated as in force during the one voyage from New York to San Francisco, in the course of which she was lost. The first charter covered a full cargo, and no additional freight could be simultaneously earned under the second, for no part of the cargo contemplated by it could be on board till after the voyage under the first charter had been completed. In case of loss during that voyage, consequently, there could duty which he owed to all interested in her safety. Had it been known, it is reasonable to believe that a prudent underwriter would not have accepted the proposal as made, and, where the fact of the contract is in dispute, as here, corroborates the denial of the appellants. The concealment, whether intentional or inadvertent, we have no hesitation in saying, avoids the policy, if actually intended to cover the risk for which the claim is made. In respect to the duty of disclosing all material facts, the case of re-insurance does not differ from that of an original insurance. The obligation in both cases is one uberrimæ fidei. The duty of communication, indeed, is independent of the intention, and is violated by the fact of concealment even where there is no design to deceive. The exaction of information in some instances may be greater in a case of re-insurance than as between the parties to an original insurance. In the former, the party seeking to shift the risk he has taken, is bound to communicate his knowledge of the character of the original insured, where such information would be likely to influence the judgment of an underwriter, while in the latter, the party, in the language of Bronson, J., in the case of the N. Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co. v. N. Y. Fire Ins. | and Mr. Justice Bradley concur with me in Co., 17 Wend., 359-367, is Not bound, nor this dissent. could it be expected that he should speak evil of himself." Mr. Duer (Lect. 13, pt. 1, sec. 13; 2 Ins., 398) states as a part of the rule, the following proposition: "Sec. 13. The assured will not be allowed to protect himself against the charge of an undue concealment, by evidence that he had disclosed to the underwriters, in general terms, the information that he possessed. Where his own information is specific, it must be communicated in the terms in which it was received. General terms may include the truth, but may fail to convey it with its proper force and in all its extent. Nor will the assured be permitted to urge, as an excuse for his omission to communicate material facts, that they were actually known to the underwriters, unless it appears that their knowledge was as particular and full as his own information. It is the duty of the assured to place the underwriter in the same situation as himself; to give to him the same means and opportunity of judging of the value of the risks; and when any circumstance is withheld, however slight and immaterial it may have seemed to himself, that, if disclosed, would probably have influenced the terms of the insurance, the concealment vitiates the policy." This statement is sustained by the authorities cited: Ely v. Hallett, 2 Cai., 57; Moses v. Ins. Co., 1 Wash. (C. C.), 385 and, in our opinion, is a necessary deduction from the nature and spirit of the contract of insurance. It applies with peculiar force in the present case, as every sentence of the rule is a condemnation of The Ocean Insurance Company in imposing upon the appellant the whole risk of the insurance, without communicating its knowledge of the circumstances, which might have made the latter as unwilling to assume it as they seem to have made the former unwilling to retain even a share of it. For these reasons and without passing upon other questions discussed, the decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree dismissing the libel; and it is, accordingly, so ordered. Mr. Justice Miller dissenting: I do not concur in the opinion of the court. It proceeds, as I think, upon an erroneous view of the principles of re-insurance. It places the re-insurer in the exact condition of a joint insurer, or of an original insurer of the risk of the party first insured. In point of fact, The Sun Company insured The Ocean Company against the risk which the latter incurred by its policies, and unless there was misrepresentation, fraud or intentional concealment by the Ocean Company, The Sun Company should pay the loss which the other sustained, and against the hazard of which it agreed to insure The Ocean Company. The long course of dealing between the two Companies showed that The Sun Company was in the habit of re-insuring for The Ocean Company without inquiry into the particulars of the risk, and in this case there was no reason for any special communication of the circumstances of the risk by The Ocean to The Sun Company. I am authorized to say that the Chief Justice True_copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U.S. Cited-108 U. S., 359. JAMES H. EMBRY, Admr. of R. J. ATKINSON, Deceased, Piff. in Err., v. WILLIAM L. PALMER AND THOMAS W. PALMER, Admrs. of J. W. STANTON, Deceased, ET AL. (See S. C., 17 Otto, 3-20.) Injunction on judgment-Courts of District of Columbia-reviewable decision-equity jurisdiction-judgment refusing new trial- -restraining same. 1. Where a party is perpetually enjoined from suing on a judgment on being paid a certain sum of money, he is not estopped from prosecuting a writ of error by receiving the money. 2. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is a court of the United States, and its judgment the parties, in every State and in every forum in upon matters litigated before it is conclusive upon which the same matters may be drawn in question, except for such causes as would be sufficient to set it aside in the courts of the district. 3. Where a state court refuses to give effect to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, rendered with jurisdiction of the case and the parties, such decision of the state court is a denial of the title and right claimed under an authority exercised under the United States, and is reviewable by this court. ments at law, unless the complainant has an equi 4. A court of equity does not interfere with judgtable defense, of which he could not avail himself at law, because it did not amount to a legal defense, or had a good defense at law, which he was prevented from availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence of himself or his agents. 5. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the in a case, is final, and not subject to be reviewed on District of Columbia refusing to grant a new trial an appeal or a writ of error in any superior jurisdiction and, for that reason, it cannot be reviewed elsewhere. 6. Where, after a judgment at law, defendant fails to obtain a new trial for newly discovered evidence, a court of equity will not for that reason restrain the enforcement of the judgment, there having been no fraud or unfairness on the part of plaintiff in procuring it. [No. 144.] Argued Jan. 5, 8, 1883. Decided Jan. 29, 1883. the State of Conecticut. The history and facts appear in the Statement of the case by Mr. Justice Matthews: The plaintiff in error, in January, 1872, brought his action in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, against Stanton and Palmer, to recover compensation for professional services alleged to have been rendered, in their behalf and at their request, by his intestate, Robt. J. Atkinson, in prosecuting and recovering for them the amount of certain NOTE.-Conclusiveness of judgments. See note to Bk. of U. S. v. Beverly, 42 U. S. (1 How.), 134. Estoppel by judgment. See note to Aspden v. Nixon, 45 U. S. (4 How.), 467. claims in their favor against the United States. I made out the account as originally presented at In this action the defendants appeared and defended, and judgment was rendered against them upon a verdict for $9,185.18. Upon a writ of error, issued out of this court, this judgment was affirmed, upon grounds which appear in the report of the case. Stanton v. Embry, 93 U. S., 548 [XXIII., 983]. Subsequently, in 1877, the plaintiff in error brought his action upon this judgment against the defendants, in the Superior Court for New London County, Connecticut, where they resided, in order to obtain judgment and execution thereof in that State. Thereupon Stanton and Palmer, the defendants thereto, filed their petition in equity in the same court, the object and prayer of which were to obtain a perpetual injunction, restraining the plaintiff from prosecuting his action upon that judgment, or from in any manner enforcing it against the petitioners, upon the payment by them of $2,296.29, which they allege was as much as he was equitably entitled to on account of the causes of action, on which the judgment had been rendered. the rate of five per cent on the amount collected, to conform to any agreement between the parties, but because he found from Atkinson's books that he had charged at that rate in other cases, and without considering the difference of value in the services rendered in them; and that Atkinson kept no copies of the letters written to the petitioners. He claims that the questions, whether there was any contract between the parties and, if so, what were its terms, were fully tried and finally decided in the action which resulted in the judgment complained of, and which he sets up as an estoppel. He denies that he then or at any time knew of any contract between the parties as to fees, and claims that if the defendants failed in that action to substantiate a defense, it was through their own laches, and not by reason of any fraud on his part. In accordance with the practice in that State, the cause was referred to a committee, whose report of the facts constitutes part of the record, from which the following extract is taken: "At (the time of) the trial of this case at WashThe grounds of relief, alleged in this petition, ington, neither Mr. Stanton nor Palmer were may be shortly but sufficiently stated, as fol- present in court. Mr. Palmer was at Stoninglows, viz. that the claim in question was for ton; his attendance might have been secured by collecting from the United States the sum of reasonable diligence, if such attendance had $45,925.91, under a special written agreement been deemed very important. Mr. Stanton was for a compensation to Atkinson of five per cent ill at his hotel in Washington, too ill to attend on that amount, the existence of which was well the trial. His counsel asked for a postponeknown to the plaintiff in error when he brought ment on that account, but no affidavit was ofhis suit in the Supreme Court of the District fered in support of the motion, and it was deof Columbia; that when Embry, as adminis- nied. The petitioner's counsel appears to have trator of Atkinson, first presented the account been content to proceed with the trial in the abto the petitioners for payment, it was for sence of his clients. He had full, and as it $2,296.29, being at that rate; that Stanton and turned out, undue confidence in the legal dePalmer, claiming to have a good defense against fenses, which appear by the record to have been it, declined to pay it, when Embry thereupon set up at the trial, and took it for granted that brought suit for that amount, in Connecticut, in no event could more be recovered than in 1871, which he discontinued in 1872, and, $2,296.29. The letters of Mr Atkinson of Febduring its pendency, brought the action in ruary 18, 1870, and May 7, 1870, recognizing which the judgment complained of was ren- the special agreement for five per cent on claim dered, in which he ignored the special agree-D were not in Washington at the trial there; ment, and sued upon a quantum meruit; that they were received by Mr. Stanton, the active Palmer, one of the defendants, at the time of partner, at a time when his mind was much dethe trial, was absent from the District of Co- pressed; they were stored for safe-keeping at lumbia, and was not notified of the day of trial his home in Stonington, Connecticut, and the in time to be present; that Stanton, though pres- contents had escaped his recollection; they were ent in Washington at the time, was unable to not found by him until after the trial and disattend the trial on account of sickness; that posal of the case at the General Term. since the trial, Stanton, on examination, had found among his papers two letters from At-ington, he made search for all letters and pakinson, in which the latter expressly acknowledged the existence of the special contract for fees at five per cent, as claimed, but they were discovered too late for use on the trial; and that Embry, in suppressing his knowledge of the existence of this contract and in procuring a judgment for a larger sum, was guilty of fraud, which made it inequitable in him to enforce the judgment to its full extent. A general demurrer to this petition was reserved to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut for its advice and was overruled; that court being of opinion that the petition was sufficient. Its decision is reported in 46 Conn., 65, treating the case made in the petition as one of fraud in procuring an unjust judgment, admitted by the demurrer. The defendant, Embry, then filed his answer to the petition, in which he denied that he made After the commencement of the suit at Wash pers relating to the case, and placed in possession of his counsel such as he found; and he then supposed that he had found and placed in the hands of counsel all the letters and papers pertaining to the matters in suit. As bearing on the question how it happened that these letters escaped the recollection of Mr. Stanton, it appears that, for several reasons, the attention of the petitioners was not alive to the importance of being prepared at the trial in Washington with the proof of the special agreement which the letters furnished: 1. Because the petitioners took it for granted that the full extent of the plaintiff's claim at the trial would be $2,296.29, that being the amount of the claim D, presented through Mr. Pratt; and it did not occur to them that a larger amount might be claimed under the quantum meruit count. 2. Because their counsel had undue confidence in legal defenses against the entire demand and, therefore, did not apprehend the full importance to the interests of his clients of being prepared with proof of the special agreement. As to specification 7th in the petition, Mr. Atkinson, while living, had full knowledge that the amount due him was but $2,296.29, on a special contract for that amount, and he, if living, could not, with a good conscience, have presented a claim for a greater amount. Mr. Embry, the administrator, knew that Messrs. Stanton and Palmer claimed a special contract and was willing, before trial was brought, to settle on that basis; but his claim in court on & quantum meruit was not on his part an intentional suggestio falsi. He did not know that the claim was unfounded; the full proof of the special agreement was not in his possession, and had not been fully brought to his knowledge." What decree should be passed in the cause upon this report was reserved for the action of the Supreme Court of Errors, which court, after argument, advised that the prayer of the petition be granted, on condition that the petitioners pay to the respondent the sum of $2,296.29, within a reasonable time to be fixed, with interest thereon from March 10, 1871, which was accordingly so ordered, and the said sum of money having thereupon been paid by the petitioners to the attorney of the respondent, and received by him, with the interest thereon, it was ordered and decreed by the Supreme Court that Embry be enjoined, under a penalty of $20,000, payable to the petitioners, to abstain and desist from the further prosecution of his suit upon the judgment, and from instituting any other suit or action thereon, or from executing or in any manner enforcing the same against the petitioners. Without enter that this is a release of errors. ing upon a discussion of the general question, it is sufficient for the present purpose to say a bar to the further prosecution of an appeal that no waiver or release of errors, operating as or writ of error, can be implied, except from conduct which is inconsistent with the claim of a right to reverse the judgment or decree, which it is sought to bring into review. If the release is not expressed, it can arise only upon the principle of an estoppel. The present is not such a case. accepted constitutes no part of what is in conThe amount awarded, paid and troversy. Its acceptance by the plaintiff in er ror cannot be construed into an admission tha the decree he seeks to reverse is not erroneous; nor does it take from the defendants in error anything, on the reversal of the decree, to which not deny that this sum, at least, is due and paythey would otherwise be entitled; for they canable from them to the plaintiff in error. But in every point of view, the objection is met and answered by the decision of this court in the case of U. S. v. Dashiel, 3 Wall., 688 [70 U. S., XVIII., 268]. writ of error is conferred by section 709, ReThe jurisdiction of the court invoked by this vised Statutes, it being a case in which a title or right is claimed under an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision of the state court being in denial of the title or right so asserted. It was decided in Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall., 130 [88 U. S., XXII., 588], that such a question is undoubtedly raised whenever a state court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute, and with jurisdiction of the case and of the parties. The judgtion, is that of the Supreme Court of the Disment, which is the subject-matter of the litigatrict of Columbia, which is a court of the United States. The question we have to determine is, whether the Supreme Court of Errors of the State of Connecticut, in the decree complained of, gave to that judgment its due effect. Proceedings in error were taken in due form to review this judgment in the Supreme Court of Errors of the State, it being assigned for error "That the judgment and decree is in contravention of article 4, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and section 905, chapter 17, title 13, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in that it enjoins the prose-ies the original Act of 1790 [1 Stat. at L., 122], cution of a suit on a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia," and "that the decree enjoins the collection of a judgment of a court of the United States.' Section 905, Revised Statutes, which embodand the supplement thereto of 1804 [2 Stat. at L., 298], provides that the records and judicial proceedings, not only of the courts of any State, The opinion of the Supreme Court of Errors, ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, aubut also of any Territory or of any country subin passing upon the case as presented by the re-thenticated as therein prescribed, "Shall have port of the committee, and advising as to the decree to be rendered thereon, is reported in 46 Conn., 595. The final decree entered in pursuance thereof, and affirmed by that court, is now brought into review in this court by writ of error. Messrs. A. L. Merriman and E. Lander, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. J. Halsey, Charles W. Hornor and T. J. Durant, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court: A suggestion is made in argument that the plaintiff in error is estopped to prosecute this writ to the reversal of the decree below, because it appears that the amount of money ordered by it to be paid to him as a condition of relief granted has been accepted by him. It is said 348 such faith and credit given to them, in every So far as this statutory provision relates to the effect to be given to the judicial proceedings tion 1, of the Constitution, which, however, of the States, it is founded on article IV., secthe statute. The power to prescribe what efdoes not extend to the other cases covered by fect shall be given to the judicial proceedings of the courts of the United States is conferred by other provisions of the Constitution, such as those which declare the extent of the judicial power of the United States, which authorize all negligence in himself or his agents, will justify an application to a court of chancery. On the other hand, it may with equal safety be laid down as a general rule that a defense cannot be set up in equity, which has been fully and fairly tried at law, although it may be the opinion of that court that the defense ought to have been sustained at law. In the case under consideration the plaintiffs ask the aid of this court to relieve them from a judgment, on account of a defense, which, if good anywhere, was good at law, and which they were not prevented, by the act of the defendants or by any pure and unmixed accident, from making at law." legislation necessary and proper for executing the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, and which declare the supremacy of the authority of the National Government within the limits of the Constitution. As part of its general authority, the power to give effect to the judgments of its courts is co-extensive with its territorial jurisdiction. That the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is a court of the United States, results from the right which the Constitution has given to Congress of exclusive legislation over the District. Accordingly, the judgments of the courts of the United States have invariably been recog- This was held to be the law prevailing in the nized as upon the same footing, so far as con- District of Columbia, not by reason of any local cerns the obligation created by them, with do- peculiarity, but because it was a general princimestic judgments of the States, wherever ren-ple of equity jurisprudence. It was repeated in dered and wherever sought to be enforced. Bar- Hendrickson v. Hinckley, 17 How., 443 [58 U. ney v. Patterson, 6 Har. & J., 182; Niblett v. S., XV., 123], where the rule was condensed by Scott, 4 La. Ann., 246; Adams v. Way, 33 Conn., Mr. Justice Curtis into the following statement: 419; Womack v. Dearman, 7 Porter, 513; Pepoon "A court of equity does not interfere with judgv. Jenkins, 2 Johns. Cas., 119; Williams v. ments at law, unless the complainant has an Wilkes, 14 Pa., 228; Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. equitable defense, of which he could not avail 8., 418 [XXIV., 437]; Cage v. Cassidy, 23 himself at law, because it did not amount to a How., 109 [64 U. S., XVI., 430]; Galpin v. legal defense, or had a good defense at law, Page, 3 Sawy., 93–109. which he was prevented from availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence of himself or his agents." Creath v. Sims, 5 How., 192; Walker v. Robbins, 14 How., 584. It was re-affirmed in Crim v. Handley, 94 Ú. S., 652 [XXIV., 216], and in Brown v. Buena Vista Co., 95 U. S., 157 [XXIV., 422]. The rule for determining what effect shall be given to such judgments, is that declared by this court, in respect to the faith and credit to be given to the judgments of state courts in the courts of other States, in the case of M'Elmoyle | V. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312-326, where it was said: "They are record evidence of a debt or judgments of record, to be contested only in such way as judgments of record may be; and, con sequently, are conclusive upon the defendant in every State, except for such causes as would be sufficient to set aside the judgment in the courts of the State in which it was rendered." The question then arises: what causes would have been sufficient in the District of Columbia, according to the law then in force, to have authorized its courts to set aside the judgment recovered there by Embry against Stanton and Palmer? This is the doctrine recognized and applied by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in the case of Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn., 544. That was a bill in equity to restrain the collection of a judgment recovered in New York, upon the ground that the complainant had a good defense at law to the action, which he was prevented from making by the fraud of the defendant. It was there said by that court: "It is well settled that this jurisdiction will be exercised, whenever a party, having a good defense to an action at law, has had no opportu nity to make it, or has been prevented by the This is answered by the decision of this court, fraud or improper management of the other upon the point, in the case of Ins. Co. v. Hodg-party from making it, and by reason thereof a son, 7 Cranch, 332. That was a bill in equity, filed in a court of the District of Columbia, perpetually to enjoin the collection of so much of a judgment at law recovered in the District as was in excess of an amount claimed to be the sum equitably due. The grounds of relief alleged were, that a fraud had been practiced upon the underwriters in a valued policy of marine insurance, by an overvaluation of the ship, and that the complainant had been prevented from making the defense at law. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the court, affirming the decree of the court below dismissing the bill, stated the rule as follows: "Without attempting to draw any precise line, to which courts of equity will advance and which they cannot pass, in restraining parties from availing themselves of judgments obtained at law, it may safely be said that any fact which clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not have availed himself in a court of law or of which he might have availed himself at law but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or judgment has been obtained which it is against conscience to enforce." Then stating that the action was founded on an alleged contract, on which the complainant was not personally liable, having been made by him as agent for a corporation, and that this was known to the party suing, the court continue: "If this was all, the plaintiff would have no remedy, however unjust it might be to compel him to pay that judgment. Still, as he was duly served with process in that suit, it was his duty to make defense in it; and an injunction ought not to be granted to relieve him from the consequences of his own neglect." The court then proceeds to show that he not only had a good defense, but that it was his intention to make it, which he would have done had he not been led by the assurances of the attorney for the plaintiff in the action to believe that it had been abandoned, so that its subsequent prosecution, without further notice, operated as a surprise, tantamount to a fraud; and that, consequently, there was no ground on which to impute laches to the complainant in not defending himself at law. |