On the 26th of January, 1880, Schwed & Newhouse confessed a judgment in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, against themselves and in favor of Henry Heller, for $9,512.50. Execution was at once issued on this judgment, and levied by Bailey, sheriff of the county, on a stock of goods. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin- | being dismissed, each fails in obtaining payion of the court: ment of his demands. If it had been sustained, and a decree rendered in their favor, it would only have been for the amount of the judgment of each." In the present case, the judgment creditors did succeed and, in effect, each recovered a decree against Heller, setting aside his judgment so far as it affected them individually. Had they been defeated they could not have appealed, because, although allowed in equity to join in their suit, they had "separate and distinct interests depending on separate and distinct judgments," as well as separate and distinct attachments. But if the decree is several as to the creditors, it is difficult to see why it is not as to their adversaries. The theory is, that, although the proceeding is in form but one suit, its legal effect is the same as though separate suits had been begun on each of the separate causes of action. On the 12th of February, 1880, William Smith & Co. had a suit pending in the same court, in their favor, against Schwed & Newhouse for the recovery of $3,829.71, and William C. Greene & Co., another suit for the recovery of $1,012.93. In both the suits, attachments were issued and levied on the same goods taken under the execution in favor of Heller, and then in the hands of the sheriff. Smith & Co. and Greene & Co. thereupon began a suit in the same court against Schwed, Newhouse, Heller and the sheriff, the object of which was to set aside the judgment in favor of Heller on the ground that it was confessed without any consideration, and for the purpose of covering up the property of Schwed & Newhouse, and hindering and delaying creditors in the collection of their debts. This suit was afterwards removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri. Afterwards judgments were rendered in the attachment suits; that in favor of Smith & Co. being for $4,174.38, and that in favor of Greene & Co. for $1,104.09. In the meantime other creditors of Schwed & Newhouse got attachments and judgments against them, to wit: The Seth Thomas Clock Company for $1,518.49, The E. N. Welch Manufacturing Company for $455.58, and F. Quayle for $356. The attachments in these cases were also levied on the goods in the hands of the sheriff. All the later attaching creditors were admitted as parties to the original suit begun by Smith & Co. and Greene & Co., to set aside the judgment in favor of Heller, and in proper time a supplemental bill was filed in which all the attaching creditors appeared as complainants, setting up the recovery of their respective judgments. Pending the suit, the property levled upon was sold, and the proceeds, being $7,405.55, paid into the registry of the court. At the final hearing, a decree was rendered declaring the judgment confessed in favor of Heller, void as against the attaching creditors. From this decree Schwed, Newhouse, Heller and Bailey, the sheriff, took an appeal, which the appellees now move to dismiss on the ground that the value of the matter in dispute between the appellants and the several appellees is less than $5,000. It is impossible to distinguish this case in principle from Seaver v. Bigelow, 5 Wall., 208 72 U. S., XVIII., 595], where an appeal by creditors who had joined in a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by their debtor, was dismissed because the amounts found due the appellants, respectively, were less than our jurisdictional limit. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Nelson said: "The judgment creditors who have joined in this bill have separate and distinct interests, depending upon separate and distinct judgments. In no event could the sum in dispute of either party exceed the amount of their judgment. *** The bill The appeal in Seaver v. Bigelow was from a decree against the creditors, but, in deciding the case, the court, in express terms, adopted the analogous practice in admiralty, where, under certain circumstances, separate and distinct causes of action may be united in one suit; and in that practice it has always been held that the ship-owner cannot unite the separate decrees against him in a suit, to make up the amount necessary for our jurisdiction on appeal. That question has been fully considered at the present Term in Ex parte Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company [ante, 78]. Although the effect of the decree is to deprive Heller in the aggregate of more than $5,000, it has been done at the suit of several parties on several claims, who might have sued separately, but whose suits have been joined in one for convenience and to save expense. The motion to dismiss is granted. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-106 U. S., 582; 108 U. S., 548, 549; 110 U. S., 399; 113 U. S., 686. PETER W. GEEKIE, Sheriff of OCONTO v. THE KIRBY CARPENTER COMPANY. (See S. C., 16 Otto, 379-390.) Wisconsin Statute of Limitations-deed on tax sale-sheriff, when not bound by judgment against his deputy-review on agreed statement of facts. Laws of Wisconsin, of 1861, providing that "No ac*1. Under section 5 of chapter 138 of the General tion shall be commenced by the former owner or owners of any lands, or by any person claiming under him or them, to recover possession of land payment of taxes, or to avoid such deed, unless which has been sold and conveyed by deed for nonsuch action shall be commenced within three years next after the recording of such deed," land is to be regarded as having been sold for non-payment of *Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD. with the statute necessary. See note to Williams v. NOTE.-Sale of lands for taxes; strict compliance Peyton, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.), 77. taxes, although the sum to raise which it was sold | defendant; that whatever the defendant did in included five cents for a United States revenue stamp, to be put and which was put on the certificate issued to the purchaser on the sale. 2. A deed on a tax sale recited that "S. A. Coleman, assignee of Oconto County," had deposited certificates of sale showing that five parcels, each of which sold for so much, were sold to the said Oconto County, and by its treasurer assigned to S. A. Coleman," for so much "in the whole," the total being the sum of the five several sums. The statute, chapter 50, section 22, of the General Laws of Wisconsin, of 1859, prescribed a form of deed, and provided that it should be "substantially in that or "other equivalent form," showing that the land was sold for a sum named "in the whole." Held, that the deed followed the form substantially. regard to the logs was done under writ of replevin issued in a suit brought by it, as plaintiff, in the Circuit Court for Menominee County, Michigan, to the sheriff of that county, commanding him to take said logs and deliver them to it; and that said Sheriff took said logs into his custody under said writ in said County of Menominee, in the State of Michigan, and delivered them to said Company. 66 The case was tried before a jury. The record states that the jury "Rendered a special verdict in answer to the questions propounded by the 3. A sheriff, having possession of property under court, said questions and the answers of the jury a writ of attachment, is not bound by a judgment in a replevin suit to which he was not a party, and thereto being as follows." There is no other or in which he was not served with process and did further special verdict than the eight questions not appear, and which he did not defend, although and answers which then follow, and there is no his under sheriff, as an individual, was a party to general verdict for either party. Afterwards, the replevin suit. 4. Quere: are the waters of the Menominee River, the plaintiffs moved the court upon the spewhich is the boundary between Michigan and Wis- cial verdict" and on "the records and evidence consin, within the concurrent jurisdiction of both in said cause" "for judgment in their favor for Wisconsin and Michigan? 5. Although there was no general verdict of a jury $6,791.56, with interest at the rate of seven per in this case, and no special verdict in any form cent per annum from April 24, 1876, and costs." known to the common law, and no waiver in writ- The defendant also moved for judgment in its ing of a jury trial, and no such finding of the court below upon the facts as is provided for by section favor on the "special verdict" "and because in 649 of the Revised Statutes, this court, on a written law the plaintiffs established no cause of action." stipulation filed in this court by the parties, agree The court ordered judgment in favor of the deing upon the facts, reviewed the case on a writ of error, and reversed a judgment below for the de- fendant and overruled the motion of the plaintfendant, and directed a judgment for the plaintiffs for judgment in their favor. Judgment iff, in an action of trover. [No. 93.] was rendered for the defendant, against the plaintiffs, for $186.02 costs. This writ of error Argued Nov. 20, 21, 1882. Decided Dec. 4, 1882. | is brought by the plaintiffs, to review and reverse this judgment. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United At the trial, as appears by the bill of excep I States for the Eastern District of Wiscon- tions, the plaintiffs, to show title in Klass to sin. The history and facts of the case fully appear in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Samuel D. Hastings, Jr., George G. Green and T. O. Howe, for plaintiffs in er ror. Messrs. L. S. Dixon and B. J. Brown, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinfon of the court: 100 the logs, offered in evidence a tax deed from the State of Wisconsin and Oconto County to one S. A. Coleman, dated and acknowledged April 27, 1867, and the certificate of its record indorsed on it, showing that it was recorded in the office of the register of deeds for said county, on the same day. The defendant objected to the reception of the deed in evidence: (1) because it was not in the form prescribed by statute; (2) because it was not executed and acknowledged as required by law; (3) because it was void upon its face. The court reserved its rulings on said This suit was brought in a court of the State objections, and received said deed and certifiof Wisconsin, by Peter W. Geekie, Sheriff of cate in evidence, subject to said objections. Oconto County, Wisconsin, and William Klass, Like objections and a like ruling were made in citizens of Wisconsin, against The Kirby Car- respect to a certified copy of the record of said penter Company, an Illinois Corporation, and deed, showing the date of its recording. The was removed into the Circuit Court of the Unit- deed covered 795 acres of land, in section 13, ed States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in town 33, of range 22, and 120 acres in secbefore answer. The cause of action set forth tion 14, in town 33, of range 22; being five sevin the complaint was, that the plaintiff, Klass, eral tracts, all in Oconto County. The sale was was the owner of certain saw-logs lying in the for $12.20, which was the amount of the taxes waters of the Menominee River, in Oconto Coun- and costs of sale. The plaintiffs then proved ty, Wisconsin; that, in April, 1876, the plaint- that Klass purchased from Coleman the timber iff Geckie, as such Sheriff, levied on and attached standing on the premises described in the deed; said logs under a writ of attachment issued that all the logs in controversy were cut by against said Klass by the Circuit Court of said Klass from the premises during the winter of County; that the defendant, by its employés, took 1875 and 1876, and put into the river; that the in Wisconsin, a large quantity of saw-logs from premises remained vacant and unoccupied dur the Sheriff, and converted them to its own use, ing the whole of the three years next after the to the value of $8,500; and that the Sheriff ex- recording of the deed; that the logs were held pended $940 in endeavoring to safely keep the by Geekie, as Sheriff, under a regular and valid logs so wrongfully taken, and as increased ex-attachment and levy; and that the Company pense in keeping what logs the defendant did not succeed in taking. The claim made is for treble damages, with interest. The answer sets up that the logs were not the property of Klass, but were the property of the claimed to own the logs and sought to take them from the custody of Geekie. After the plaintiffs had rested, the defendant offered to show by certified copies of the records from Oconto County, that the county treasurer of that which each of the tracts of land was sold was, that, in being sold to raise the five cents, the land was sold for that which was not a tax; that the amount assessed against the land for a tax was less than the amount for which it was sold; that, although a tax was included in that amount, there was also included in it, that for which the land could not be sold; and that this fact deprived the officer of the power to sell, and made the tax deed void. * * county, in making the sale of the lands on which the said tax deed to Coleman was based, added to the amount of all legal taxes and charges for which each of said tracts was liable to be sold, the sum of five cents to pay for a United States' revenue stamp, to be placed on the certificate is sued to the purchaser on such sale; that said illegal excess of five cents was included in the amount for which each one of said tracts was sold; and that a five cent United States' internal revenue stamp was affixed to each one of The Statute of Wisconsin applicable to this said certificates of sale. The plaintiffs objected subject is found in chapter 138 of the General to the reception of said evidence, as incompe- Laws of 1861, sections 5 and 6: "Sec. 5. No tent and immaterial, because said tax deed was action shall be commenced by the former owner regular and valid on its face, and had been re- or owners of any lands, or by any person claimcorded more than three years before the com- ing under him or them, to recover possession mencement of the action and the cutting of the of land which has been sold and conveyed by timber. The court reserved its ruling on said deed for non-payment of taxes, or to avoid such objection until the close of the case, and received deed, unless such action shall be commenced said testimony subject to said objection. It was within three years next after the recording of then admitted by the plaintiffs that the facts such deed. Sec. 6. The limitation for bringing relative to said sale were as the defendant of- actions prescribed in the last preceding section fered to show them to be, but not waiving their shall not apply * where the taxes, for objection to said evidence, or consenting to its the non-payment of which the land was sold being received. The defendant then gave evi- and the tax deed executed, were paid prior to dence showing that it owned in fee simple, at the sale or where the land was redeemed from the time the tax deed to Coleman was executed the operations of such sale, as provided by law, and recorded, the premises from which said nor where the land was not liable to taxation." timber was cut. After the close of the evidence, The sole question presented under these prothe questions to be answered by the jury were visions is, whether the land in this case can be submitted to them by the court, and they were said not to have been sold for non-payment of answered by the jury. The bill of exceptions taxes, because in the $12.20 for which it was states as follows: "Both said plaintiffs and said sold, was included twenty-five cents for the defendant filed motions for judgment on the five stamps, in addition to $11.95 for taxes pleadings, records and evidence in said cause, proper. It is admitted that the land could not and, upon the argument of said counter motions properly be sold to raise the five cents as a tax, and said objections to testimony reserved, the and that, if the question had been raised on becourt overruled said defendant's objections to half of the original owner of the land, in a suit the admissibility of said tax deed in evidence, commenced within three years next after the and said plaintiffs' objection to said defendant's recording of the deed on the sale, he could have testimony, showing the illegal excess of five had relief against the sale; but it is contended cents in the amount for which each of said tracts for the plaintiffs in error, that the lapse of the of land was sold by said county treasurer, and three years prevented the questioning of the overruled said plaintiffs' motion for judgment, validity of the deed, because of the irregularity and ordered judgment for said defendant; to complained of. We are of opinion that the cireach of which said rulings against said plaint- cuit court erred in its construction of the statiffs said plaintiffs then and there duly excepted." ute. The exceptions in section 6 do not apply To obviate any objection that this court to this case, and the land was sold for non-paycould not review the judgment in this case be- ment of taxes, although an improper item was cause there was no general verdict of the jury, included in the amount for which the sale was and no special verdict in any form known to had. It matters not whether such item was five the common law, and no waiver in writing of cents for a revenue stamp, or an illegal excess a jury trial, and no such finding of the court for fees, or any other illegal excess. below upon the facts as is provided for by secute applies whenever there has been an actual tion 649 of the Revised Statutes, the parties attempt, however defective in detail, to carry have filed in this court a written stipulation, out a proper exercise of the taxing power. As agreeing "That the facts appearing from the against the grantee in the tax deed, the statute special verdict and stated by the bill of excep- puts at rest all objection raised, after the time tions to have been proved, shall be taken and specified, against the validity of the tax proconsidered as the facts in this case for all pur- ceeding, from and including the assessment of poses, and as fully as if they had been specifi- the land, to and including the execution of the cally found by the circuit court"; and "That deed. If the deed is valid on its face, and purthe circuit court submitted certain questions to ports to convey the land on a sale for the nonthe jury by agreement of the parties, and that payment of taxes, it is, during the three years, the other facts were to be found and stated as prima facie evidence of the regularity of the shown by the bill of exceptions; and that upon tax proceeding; and, after the statute has run in the whole case, as thus shown, judgment was favor of the grantee, the deed becomes concluto be pronounced by the court below, as they sive to the same extent. The general authority should determine the law." of the taxing officers and the liability of the land to taxation having existed, there was no want of authority to put the taxing power in motion. That being so, the lapse of time establishes conclusively the validity of the tax and The ground upon which the circuit court overruled the objection of the plaintiffs to the testimony on the part of the defendant, to show the illegal excess of five cents in the amount for The stat $12.20 was the amount for which the land was sold in the whole, for the non-payment of taxes. We think this view was correct. A like construction was given to a recital in the same language, by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Milledge v. Coleman (ubi supra). It is manifest that the words "and by its treasurer assigned to S. A. Coleman," are to be read as if they were in a parenthesis. In connection with the prior words "Whereas, S. A. Coleman, assign of the sale, as against the irregularity in question. There having been jurisdiction, all error was conclusively barred by the statute. This construction is that held by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in regard to this statute, in Oconto Co. v. Jerrard, 46 Wis., 317, and Milledge v. Coleman, 47 Wis., 184; and it is said and correctly, in the latter case, that that is the view which has been uniformly taken of that statute by that court, and that to adopt a contrary view would disturb numerous titles. Such construc-ee of Oconto County, has deposited," etc., they tion was, therefore, always a rule of property in respect to land in Wisconsin, and is one which this court will follow. Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How., 427 [65 U. S., XVI., 742]. In Milledge v. Coleman, the illegality alleged was the including of five cents for a United States' revenue stamp in the amount for which the land was sold. That case was decided some four months after the decision in the present case was made by the court below. The deed in question was not open to the other objections taken to it at the trial. One of those objections was that the deed was not substantially in the form prescribed by statute, or any equivalent form, and was void upon its face. The form is given in chapter 50, section 22, of the General Laws of Wisconsin, of 1859, and the statute says that the deed "shall be substantially in the following or other equivalent form." There is no doubt that the form must be substantially pursued, or the deed will be invalid. Part of the form is a recital that the purchaser or his assignee has deposited a certificate, whereby it appears that certain lands, describing them, were, for the non-payment of taxes, sold by the officer named, at public auction, at a place and time named, to the said purchaser, for a sum named, "in the whole, which sum was the amount of taxes assessed and due and unpaid," on said tracts of land, etc. The deed in the present case recites that "S. A. Coleman, assignee of Oconto County," has deposited five certificates, whereby it appears that five certain parcels of land, describing them, three containing 40 acres each, each sold for $2.43, one containing 395 acres, sold for $2.43, and one containing 40 acres, sold for $2.48, were, for the non-payment of taxes, sold by the officer named, at public auction, at a place and time named, "To the said Oconto County, and by its treasurer assigned to S. A. Coleman, for the sum of $12.20, in the whole, which sum was the amount of taxes assessed and due and unpaid," on said tracts of land, etc. The objection made is, that the recital is not that the lands were sold for so much in the whole, but that they were sold "To the said Oconto County, and by its treasurer assigned to S. A. Coleman for so much in the whole; that the words "the sum of", in the recital relate to the word "assigned;" that the meaning is that the lands were assigned to Coleman for the $12.20 in the whole, or were sold and assigned for that sum in the whole, and not that they were sold for that sum in the whole. The circuit court held that it clearly enough appeared, taking the whole deed together, for what sum, in dollars and cents, the land was sold in the whole, as required by the statute; and that, taking the statement as to the $12.20 with the preceding statement as to the sum for which each parcel of land sold, the inference was irresistible that the are put in to indicate that Oconto County was the purchaser, and Coleman was its assignee, of the purchase, by assignment from the treasurer of the county. Everything required by the statute, as to form, is found in the deed, with added facts as to the assignment. The objection as to the form of the acknowledgment of the deed does not seem to be insisted on by the defendant in error. We think the circuit court was correct in its ruling that the acknowledgment was in proper form. The same form was upheld as proper by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Milledge v. Coleman (ubi supra). The defendant offered in evidence at the trial a copy of a judgment in an action in the Circuit Court for the County of Menominee, Michigan, in which The Kirby Carpenter Company Was plaintiff and the Menominee River Manufacturing Company, Charles J. Ellis and Millard F. Powers, were defendants, in which action a writ of replevin was issued to the sheriff of said county, commanding him to forthwith take into his custody the goods and chattels therein mentioned, which were the logs in controversy, and deliver them to said Kirby Carpenter Company; which action was commenced on the 31st day of May, 1876, and process therein served on said parties, therein named as defendants, on said day; and in which action judgment was entered as by default against the defendants therein named, on the 24th day of September, 1878, adjudging the title to said logs to be in said Kirby Carpenter Company." The plaintiffs objected to the admission of said record in evidence, as incompetent and immaterial, "because neither of the plaintiffs in this action were parties to said action." The court reserved its ruling upon said objection, and received said testimony subject to said objection. The record does not show that the objection was afterwards either overruled or sustained. As the court held that Coleman acquired no title under the tax deed, it was unnecessary for it to make any ruling as to the effect of the judg ment in the replevin suit. But, under the stipulation so made in this court, the question is here to be passed upon. The bill of exceptions states that the defendant showed that the Millard F. Powers named as one of the defendants in said replevin suit, was the under sheriff of Oconto County; that process in said suit was served on said Powers on an island in the Menominee River, near its mouth, on the Michigan side of the main channel of said river, near the head of which island are situated what are called the dividing piers; and that at the time of the service of said process upon said Powers, he was on said island, assisting the plaintiff Geekie in his endeavors to retain said logs under said writ of attachment, under which they were levied on by said Powers; that all of said logs that were taken from said plaintiffs, after the issuing of said writ of replevin, were taken by said sheriff and his posse, acting under the authority of said writ; that not to exceed twenty of said logs came to the possession of said defendant before the issuing of said writ of replevin; and that the point in said Menominee River, at which said dividing piers are located, and at which said defendant took from said Geekie said logs, was on the Michigan side of the main channel of said river. The bill of exceptions states that the plaintiffs showed that Geekie, by and through Powers, his under sheriff, levied on said logs on April 24, 1876, in the Menominee River, about one mile above said piers; that the piers were managed and controlled by the Menominee River Manufacturing Company, a corporation; that Powers, after making the levy, remained in charge of the logs for some days, and then turned the writ over to Geekie, the sheriff, on or about May 9, 1876, it not being shown on the trial that the defendant had notice of that fact; that the defendant claimed to own said logs and sought to take them from the custody of said sheriff, as they passed through said dividing piers; that, from the time they commenced running through said piers until they had all passed through, said Geekie and others acting for and under him, and parties acting for and under the direction of the defendant, were struggling with each other for the possession of the logs; that the Menominee River runs between the States of Michigan and Wisconsin; that when said logs were levied upon by said sheriff, they were in a bend in said river and on the Wisconsin side of the channel; and that the expense of executing said writ of attachment by said sheriff, if he had not been interfered with by said defendant, would have been not more than $240. The questions and answers forming the socalled special verdict were as follows: 1. "Did the defendant take or cause to be taken, from the possession of the plaintiffs, and convert to its own use, the logs in question, or any part thereof: Answer. Yes. 2. If you answer the preceding question in the affirmative, then, when were said logs so taken from the possession of the plaintiff? Answer. On the 24th day of April, 1876. 3. What quantity of logs, if any, were so taken and converted to its own use by the defendant? Answer. 1,040,238 feet. 4. What was the value of the logs so taken and appropriated by the defendant? Answer. Six dollars per thousand feet. * ** 6. What was the amount of expenses necessarily incurred and paid by the plaintiff, Geekie, in endeavoring to retain possession of said logs? Answer. $538.14. 7. What number of days was the plaintiff Geekie necessarily engaged in endeavoring to keep possession of said logs, and what was the value of his services per day? Answer. Forty-nine days, at $3 per day, $147.00. 8. What number of days was M. F. Powers necessarily engaged in attempting to keep possession of said logs, and what was the value of his services per day? Answer. Fifteen days, at $3 per day, $45.00." It is contended for the defendant in error, that Geekie was concluded by the judgment in the replevin suit, and that, although he was not a party to it, the judgment against Powers, his under sheriff, bound him. But it clearly appears, from the foregoing facts, that Powers did See 16 OTTO. U. S., Book 27. not have possession of the logs when the replevin suit was commenced, and that Geekie did. Powers was sued as an individual. Geekie was not served with process in the suit nor did he appear in it or defend it; and, so far as appears, no defense was made to it. It is further contended for the defendant in error,that the conversion, by the defendant, took place in Michigan and not in Wisconsin, as alleged in the complaint, because it is shown that the place where the defendant took the logs from Geekie was on the Michigan side of the main channel of the river. This is not equivalent to a finding that the taking was wholly or exclusively in Michigan, so as to make, as against Geekie, a taking at a place where the lien of the attachment did not exist. It is contended that, the Menominee River being, as found, the boundary between Michigan and Wisconsin at the locus in quo, Wisconsin has, by section 3 of the Act of Congress, of August 6, 1846, 9 Stat. at L., 57, concurrent jurisdiction, with Michigan, over the waters of the Menominee River. But it is unnecessary to determine that question. Klass, having the general property in the logs, and Geekie a special property in them, and the logs having been taken by the defendant from the possession of Geekie, who held them as sheriff, under the attachment against Klass, it was proper for both to join in the suit. The damages found to have been sustained by each may be added together and awarded to them as plaintiffs. The damages to Klass are the value of the logs, 1,040,238 feet at $6 per thousand feet, being $6,241.42. The damages to Geekie are the $538.14 expenses, less the $240, being $298.14 extra expenses, and the $147 and the $45. The sum of the whole to Klass and Geekie is $6,731.56. The date of the conversion, found by the jury, was April 24, 1876. There appears to be some confusion in the record. It is stated that the replevin suit was commenced May 31, 1876; that all of the logs which were taken from the plaintiffs, after the issuing of the writ of replevin, were taken by the sheriff under that writ; and that not to exceed twenty of such logs came to the possession of the defendant before the issuing of said writ. Yet the jury found that the defendant took all the logs or caused them to be taken from the possession of the plaintiffs, and converted them to its own use, on the 24th of April, 1876. But, the attachment levy was made on the 24th of April by Powers, and the record states that he remained in charge of the logs for some days, and turned the writ over to Geekie on May 9th. The bill of exceptions states, however, that there was other evidence tending to show the time of the conversion of the logs by the defendant and the manner in which the defendant and the Sheriff of Menominee County took possession of them. On the whole, we think that, as to the damages to Klass, interest should be given from the 24th of April, 1876, the date of conversion found by the jury; and as to those to Geekie, interest should be given from the bringing of this suit, November 21, 1876. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, with costs, and the case is remanded to that court, with directions to it to enter a judgment for the plaintiffs for $6,731.56, with lawful interest on $6,241.42 thereof, from April 24, 1876, |