may still support an action in our courts (d). And where a trading with an enemy for specie to be brought from the enemy's country in his ships into our colonial ports, was licensed by the king's authority, it was held, that an insurance on the enemy's ship, as well as on the goods and specie put on board for the benefit of British subjects, was incidentally legalized; and that it was competent for a British agent of both parties, in whose name an insurance had been effected, to sue upon the policy in time of war; the trust contravening no rule of law, or of public policy, and there being no personal disability in the plaintiff on the record to sue (e).

A British subject (and, as it seems, a neutral) residing in a hostile country, and carrying on trade there, is an alien enemy (ƒ).

In the case of Ricord v. Bettenham (g), it was held, that an action would lie by an alien enemy, who was the captain of a French privateer, against the captain of an English ship, on a ransom bill, given by him for the ransom of his ship which had been taken by the privateer; and Cornu v. Blackburne (h), was a decision on the same point, with this difference, that in Ricord v. Bettenham, the action was brought after a peace, but in Cornu v. burne, during the continuance of the war. later case (i), however, the court of King's Bench was divided in opinion on the same point, and it was

(d) Wells v. Williams, 1 Ld. Raym. 282, and 1 Salk. 46. (e) Kensington v. Inglis, 8 East, 273

(f) Mc Connell v. Hector, 3 Bos. & Pul. 113. O'Mealey v.

Wilson, 1 Campb. 482:

Black

In a

(g) 3 Burr. 1734, and 1 W. Bla. 563.

(h) Dougl. 640.

(i) Anthon v. Fisher, Dougl. 649, note.

ultimately decided in the Exchequer Chamber, that an alien enemy cannot sue for a right claimed to be acquired by him in actual hostility. Ransom bills have since been declared illegal by statute (k).

It seems not to be settled whether an alien enemy, residing in this country during war, may support an action on a mere civil contract not founded on a right acquired by actual hostility. There does not appear to be in the books any distinct explanation of what is meant by an alien residing here by the license and under the protection of the King. It has been stated by high authority, that there is a protection arising from situation, as in the case of a prisoner at war, or an officer upon his parol (1). In support of a replication to a plea of alien enemy, that the alien resided here by the license and under the protection of the King, Lord Ellenborough held that it was necessary either to produce a protection granted to the alien, or to show in some other way that his stay after the commencement of hostilities had been sanctioned by the King (m). It has also been held not enough to prove that an alien resided here with a license granted under statute 38 Geo. 3. c. 77, (which was a temporary act) till that act expired, and continued afterwards to reside without molestation (n). It seems from these cases that an alien, who, having resided here in time of peace, should continue to do so after the breaking out of a war between this country and his own, would not be protected by the mere

(k) 22 Geo. 3. c. 25. (See 1 Bos. & Pul. 171. 1 Taunt. 36,7.

(m) Boulton v. Dobree, 2 Camp. 163.

(n) Alciator v. Smith, 3 Campb. 245.

circumstance of such residence without disturbance by the government.

There does not appear to be any objection to an alien under such circumstances suing, after the return of peace, on a contract made during the war (o).

A native of a neutral state taken fighting on board an enemy's ship, and afterwards working his way to England as a seaman on board a British ship, was held entitled to sue for his wages (p). Two of the Judges (Heath and Rooke), in giving their judgments, laid it down generally, that a prisoner may contract; but Lord Chief Justice Eyre gave no opinion on that point. The same point came afterwards expressly in discussion in the Common Pleas, but the Judges being divided in opinion, no judgment was given (q).

If a neutral country be taken possession of by the forces of a state at war with this country, but the civil authorities of the invaded country continue to exercise their functions, though such country commit hostile acts against us, yet if our government do not act with hostility towards them, or show by any act that it considers them as standing in a relation of hostility, the subjects of such invaded country are not alien enemies (r).

Though the subjects of states are in general to be considered as parties to the acts of their respective governments (s), yet if the Crown grant a license to

(0) See Lord Kenyon's judgment in Brandon v. Nesbitt, 6 T. R. 28. Antoine v. Morshead, 6 Taunt. 237.

(p) Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne, 1 Bos. & Pul. 163.

33.

(q) Maria v. Hall, 1 Taunt.

(1) Hagedorn v. Bell, 1 Ma. & Selw. 450.

(s) Conway v. Grey, 10 East,

536.

trade to an alien enemy, he may sue in our courts for any cause of action arising out of such trading (t).

The next subject for our consideration will be the right which one partner has to bind his partners in a contract of sale entered into by him for the firm. In general a contract made by one partner binds the whole firm; and not only are all the partners liable collectively to fulfil the terms of such contract, but each individual partner is liable to the whole amount of the goods sold, or the price stipulated to be paid, such contracts being deemed by the law to be joint and several (u). And it makes no difference that a partner who purchases goods buys them with an intention of cheating his partners, and actually applies them to his own use; for, unless the seller is guilty of collusion with the partner who makes the purchase, a sale to one partner is a sale to the partnership, with whatever view the goods may be bought, and to whatever purposes they may be applied (x).

The acceptance or indorsement of a bill of exchange by one partner binds the firm (y); and if one partner accept a bill in the name of the other it binds both (*): but where one partner indorsed a bill with the partnership firm, but at the same time told the indorsee that he wished it to be kept a secret from his partner, Lord Kenyon held that the indorsee could

not sue the partnership (a); and the implied authority of one partner to draw bills of exchange and promissory notes to bind the firm, may be rebutted by proof of express previous notice having been given to the party taking the security, that the other partners would not be liable for it; though it was represented to the holder by the partner signing the security, that the money advanced on it was raised for the purpose of paying the partnership debts, and though the greater part of it was in fact so applied. And he cannot even recover the amount of the money so applied to the payment of the partnership debts (b). Money lent to one of the partners while employed in partnership transactions, and on account of the firm, binds the partnership to the payment of the debt so contracted (c).

One partner is not authorized to bind the partnership by guaranteeing the debt of a third person, without a special authority from his partners (d); neither can he bind the others by deed (e); but where a deed was executed by one partner for both, in the presence and by the authority of the other, the deed was held valid against both, though only sealed once (ƒ).

Acts subsequent to the delivery of goods on a contract may be admitted as evidence to show that the goods were delivered on a partnership account, if it

(a) Arden v. Sharpe, 2 Esp.

524.

(b) Lord Gallway v. Mathew, 10 East, 264. See Ridley v. Taylor, 13 East, 175.

(c) Rothwell v. Humphreys, 1 Esp. 406.

(d) Duncan v. Lowndes, 3 Campb. 478.

(e) Harrison v. Jackson, 7 T. R. 207.

(f) Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313.