By the court. It is an important circumstance in the present case, that the town of Baltimore possessed no mayor, or chief magistrate in 1779. The words of the act are "before any mayor, chief magistrate or officer of the cities, towns or places, where the deed was made," &c. If it should even be admitted, that the terms of the law have not been literally pursued, the acknowlegment is the same in substance, as if it had been taken by any mayor, &c. The Supreme Court has received in evidence the records of courts in North Carolina and Georgia, without public seals, where it has been proved, that none such existed. Under the circumstances of this case, we do not feel ourselves authorized to refuse the deed in evidence, though we do not deem it necessary to express any opinion of its legal operation.

The plaintiff's counsel expected to the opinion of the court; but some difficulties arising, concerning the time when William Neil died, and the improvements made on the premises since, concerning which the counsel were not prepared with testimony, it was mutually agreed, that the jury should be discharged without giving a verdict.

This cause came on again to trial on the 17th November 1803, together with another suit, between the same plaintiff and Thomas Feree and Robert Cameron, depending on the same title. To the certificates before produced by the defendant, annexed to the deed objected to be received in evidence, another certificate was added by Ninion Pinckney, esq., clerk of the Executive Counsel of Maryland, under the great seal of the state, dated 8th November 1802, certifying, that in the year 1779, there were no magistrates or peace officers in Baltimore county, superior to James Calhoon and Peter Shepherd

esqrs.

The argument respecting the admission of the deed from Neil and wife to Todd, was again fully gone into; and Yeates, J. delivered the opinion of the court, to the following effect:

We are bound to construe the law of 24th February 1770, according to the true intention of the legislature. The act of 1715, respects the proving of deeds; out of the state; that of 1770 the acknowledgment of deeds, granting the estates of femes covert. The words of the latter law, must be construed, reddendo singula singulis.“Mayor " refers to "cities," "chief magistrate" to "towns," "officers" to "places." What definite idea have we of places as contradistinguished from cities and towns, unless the term embraces such a case as the

present? Must they necessarily relate to corporations? It cannot be supposed, that a public seal is necessary, where there is no such thing.

The law intended to facilitate the transfers of lands out of the state. But if the plaintiff's doctrine obtains, no deeds executed out of the state can be put on record unless made in a corporate place, or acknowledged or proved within the state. Necessity must justify the acts it imposes. The vendee has done all he could be reasonably expected to do. Extracts of records of courts, which have no public seals, have been given in evidence repeatedly and without hesitation.

On the whole, we see no reason to alter the opinion we delivered on the former trial, but adhere thereto, by allowing the deed to be given in evidence to the jury.

The plaintiff's counsel then tendered a bill of exceptions, which the court sealed, and the jury gave their verdicts for the defendants.

Lessee of Dr. ROBERT JOHNSON against CHRISTOPHER ECKART.

Vendor of an improvement right without warranty, may be a witness to the title in an ejectment.

EJECTMENT for 170 acres of land in Air township.

The plaintiff claimed under a patent.

The defendant claimed under a warrant and survey, and under an improvement right derived from Adam Linn and John Linn. The latter had given a bill of sale of this improvement to Daniel Besshore, dated 30th March 1790, in consideration of 37. without any covenant of warranty.

The deposition of John Linn, taken in pursuance of a rule of court, was offered in evidence by the defendant to establish his improvement right.

This was objected to by the plaintiff's counsel. It will be highly dangerous and inconvenient to permit persons to receive money for lands, and allow them to be sworn afterwards in defence of the title they have sold. Perjury must be the result. Besides, Linn is in fact swearing in his own cause; because, if the lands are recovered from the defendant, he may oblige Linn to repay back the 37. as received without consideration.

Sed per curiam. It has been long settled, that a vendor who

has made no covenant for good title or warranty, may be allowed to prove the title of the vendee. 1 Stra. 445. The Supreme Court has, in so many instances, adopted the principles of evidence, laid down in the case of Bent v. Baker et al. that they cannot now be questioned. 3 Term Rep. 27. Courts of justice endeavor, where they legally can, to restrain objections to the credit, rather than the competency of witnesses, and the ends of justice are best promoted thereby. The only difficulty here is, whether the verdict in this cause may at a future day be given in evidence for or against the witness; (Ib. 32, 34, 36, 309, 310) and we incline to think it cannot at the present moment. Should it hereafter appear that we are mistaken in admitting the evidence to go to the jury, and a verdict should pass for the defendant, we will grant a new trial without costs.

Messrs. Duncan and Brown, pro quer.

Verdict for the plaintiff.

Messrs. Hamilton and S. Riddle, pro def.

GEORGE FUNK against PETER ARNOLD.

Nuisance in obstructing the waters in D creek, by which plaintiff's lands where overflowed; the nuisance was by erecting a dam in the waters of J. Variance held fatal.

THE plaintiff declared, that the defendant had obstructed the waters of Dunning's creek, by raising a dam therein, and overflowing the plaintiff's lands.

It turned out in evidence, that the dam was erected in the Ray's town branch of Juniata, near the mouth of Dunning's creek, where it falls into Juniata, and the court ordered the plaintiff to be called on account of the variance.

Messrs. Hamilton and Dunlop, pro quer.
Messrs. Duncan and Clark, pro def.

Plaintiff nonsuit.

MEMORANDUM.

The report of the case of the attorney general and the grantees, under the acts of assembly of 3d April 1792, would follow here; but the author having furnished Mr. Dallas with his report of the case, which is printed totidem verbis in 4 Dallis 237, it is therefore omitted in this publication.

DECEMBER TERM, 1802.

CORAM SHIPPEN, CHIEF JUSTICE, YEATES AND SMITH JUSTICES.

RESPUBLICA against BENJAMIN GIBBS, junior.

[S. C. 4 Dall, 253.]

Under the election law of 15th February 1799, the inspector has no right to exact an oath of a citizen claiming to vote, that he did not join the British forces during the late war, or was not attainted of high treason.

The maxim, no one is bound to accuse himself, extends to such cases where the answer may involve one in shame or reproach.

To constitute the offence of intimidation, threats, violence or inturruption, under the 17th section of the election law, there must be a preconceived intention for the pur pose of intimidating the officers, or interrupting the election.

An indictment was found against the defendant, and removed by him from the Mayor's Court into this court.

It contained five counts; the first three of them, under a law passed 15th February 1799, (4 St. Laws 332,) "to regulate the general elections within this commonwealth;" the two last at common law. The first count charged the defendant with designing and intending to obstruct the due execution of the laws, and that be on the 13th October 1801, at the city of Philadelphia, did threaten and use violence to one John Beckley, then and there being one of the judges of the election, and in the due execution of his office, and with threats and opprobrious language, did interrupt the said John Beckley in the execution of his duty. The second count charged him with threatening and using opprobrious language to the said John Beckley one of the judges, &c., thereby designing and intending to interrupt the election. The third count contained some alteration of the first, and varied the charge as to the node of interrupting Beckley in the execution of his office. The fourth count charged an assualt on Beckley as a judge of the election, in the exection of his duty. And the fifth charged an assault on him generally.

The facts in evidence appeared as follow:

Benjamin Gibbs, the elder, the father of the defendant, a blind and aged man, entitled as an elector, (both as a native and resident above thirty years, who had paid taxes many years,) was led to the election ground by his son, and offered his vote. He was told, that previous to his vote being received, he must answer upon oath or affirmation the following questions, to wit: "Did you at all times, during the late revolution, continue in allegiance to this state, or some other of the United States? Or did you join the British forces, or take the oath

of allegiance to the king of Great Britian; and if so, at what period? Have you ever been attainted of high treason against this commonwealth; and if you have, has the attainder béen reversed, or have you received a pardon?"

Old Gibbs thereupon asked, by what authority or law these questions were put to him, and was informed by the inspector of the ward, that they were proper, and unless he took the oath or affimation thereon, his suffrage would not be received. The aforesaid John Beckley was then called upon and proposed the questions, saying the measure had been agreed upon by the judges of the election. Gibbs, senior, enquired of him by what law they were justified, and observed, that unless the questions were authorized, the law was paramount to their judgment. The necessity of answering the questions was again repeated, and Gibbs, by the advice of a friend, at length took the affirmation required of him, and answered the questions proposed, and then was permitted to give his suffrage. But previous thereto, both he and his son used intemperate language and insulting expressions. The defendant in particular said they were all a set of villains and scoundrels, and holding up his fist to Beckley in an angry and threatening manner, said he would see him at another time. One of the witnesses, swore, that the defendant was within reach of Beckley when he held up his fist, but two others who were present also, swore that he was distant from him three or four yards, and did not seem as if he intended at the time to strike. The election was interrupted for some time by the violent and intemperate conduct of the father and son, and a tumul: arose. It appeared that the same questions were asked of other elec tors at other windows of the court house, who were alleged to have been on what was called the black list of suspected persons, said to have been copied from Towne's Evening Post, of persons prescribed by the executive authority of this commonwealth.

Messrs. Ingersoll and Lewis for the defendant, after premising that every question concerning the right of suffrage was peculiarly interesting to the citizens of a representative government, made two points.

1st. The conduct of the judges and inspectors of the election was illegal, when they exacted answers to their questions, before they would admit the parties to vote; and if any interruption was occasioned thereby to the election, it arose from their own improper conduct. And, 2d. Though the defendant may not be justifiable in all he has said or done, still he cannot be convicted on any count in this indictment.

1. The law of 13th June 1777, first directed, that all persons who had not taken the oath or affimation of allegiance to the state, should be incapable of electing or being elected. Loose