obliges them either to accept or reject the same (Key, div. "Bankruptcy," pp. 70, 71, 2nd edit.),

CRIMINAL LAW.

I. Indictment.-An indictment is a written accusation, at the suit of the Queen, against a party, of some crime or misdemeanor, presented on oath by a grand jury, and upon which, if found by them, the party is eventually tried (4 Steph. Com. 398; Key, div. "Criminal Law," p. 87, 2nd edit).

II. Indictable offences.-The three classes of indictable offences are treason, felonies, and misdemeanors (Key, div. " Criminal Law," p. 114).

III. Proceedings to commitment.—When a complaint is made before a justice of the peace of an indictable offence having been committed within the county, or other district to which his commission extends, it is his duty to have the offender brought before him; and for this purpose he issues a summons or warrant (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 1; First Book, 418). As soon as the party appears before him, he examines the witnesses produced, hears whatever the accused party may say in his defence, and then discharges the party or commits him to prison, according as he judges that a sufficient case has been made out against him or not; or, instead of committing him, he may take bail for his appearance at the next sessions or assizes. A magistrate, however, frequently acts without either warrant or summons: as when a party has been taken by a constable or policeman, in any of those cases in which they are authorised to arrest parties without warrant or summons.

IV. Proceedings before justices—Late act.-The act of Parliament now in force for regulating the proceedings of justices of the peace with reference to persons charged with indictable offences is the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42.

V. Courts. The only court for the trial of indictable offences in each county is the court of general or quarter sessions, which are held four times in the year (1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 35). In Middlesex, there are more than four courts in the year (7 & 8 Vict. c. 71; First Book, 472, 473).

VI. Jurisdiction of sessions.-By the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, the justices of the peace at sessions are not to try any person for any treason, murder, or capital felony, or for any felony, which, when committed, by a person not previously convicted of felony, is punishable by transportation beyond the seas for life, or for any of the following offences:-1. Misprision of treason. 2. Offences against the Queen's title, &c., or against either House of Parliament. Offences subject to the penalties of præmunire. 4. Blasphemy, and

3.

14.

offences against religion. 5. Administering or taking unlawful oaths. 6. Perjury, or subornation of perjury. 7. Making, or suborning any other person to make, a false oath, affirmation, or declaration, punishable as perjury, or as a misdemeanor. 8. Forgery. 9. Unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to crops of corn, grain, or pulse, or to any part of a wood, coppice, or plantation of trees, or to any heath, gorse, furze, or fern. 10. Bigamy, and offences against the laws relating to marriage. 11. Abduction of women and girls. Endea vouring to conceal the birth of a child. 13. Offences against any provision of the laws relating to bankrupts and insolvents. Composing, printing, or publishing blasphemous, seditious, or defamatory libels. 15. Bribery. 16. Unlawful combinations and conspiracies, except such over which such justice or recorder respectively have or has jurisdiction to try, when committed by one person. 17. Stealing, or fraudulently taking, or injuring, or destroying records or documents belonging to any court of law or equity, or relating to any proceeding therein. 18. Stealing, or fraudulently destroying or concealing, any wills or testamentary papers, or any document or written instrument, being, or containing, evidence of the title to any real estate, or any interest in lands, &c.

VII. Principal and accessory.—A principal in the second degree is one who is present constructively, at least, aiding and abetting the illegal act; an accessory before the fact is one who, being absent at the time of the commission of the felony, procures, counsels, or abets another to commit it (Com. Dig. tit. "Justices,” T. 1; 4 Black. Com. 34; Key, div. " Criminal Law," p. 76).

VIII. Accessories-None.-There are no accessories in treason or in misdemeanors; for in cases of treason all are principals, propter odium delicti; in trespasses all are principals, because the law does not descend to distinguish the different shades of guilt in such petty matters as misdemeanors (4 Black. Com. 36; Key, div. Criminal Law," p. 77, 2nd edit.)

IX. Murder-Manslaughter-Homicide.-Murder is a killing with malice either express or implied. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice, as upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally, whilst doing an unlawful act. Justifiable homicide is where there is no fault, as by an officer having a warrant for arresting another who resists such arrest and cannot be taken without such means as, being employed, lead to his death. Excusable homicide is where one kills another in defence of his life (4 Steph. Com. 133; Key, div. "Criminal Law," pp. 22, 23, 2nd edit.).

X. Indictment, form of.—In an indictment for murder or manslaughter, it is not now necessary to set forth the means by which

the death of the deceased was occasioned. This is by the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, which is the act for simplifying the forms of such indictments (Key, div. "Criminal Law," p. 23, 2nd edit.).

XI, Larceny.-Larceny, at the common law, is the unlawful taking and carrying away of things personal, with intent to deprive the right owner of the same, and not being committed under the circumstances constituting the offence burglary (4 Steph. Com. 152, 153, 1st edit.; Key, div. "Criminal Law," pp. 30, 31, 2nd edit..

XII. Embezzlement.-The servant would be guilty of embezzlement (see antè, pp. 180-182; Key, div. "Criminal Law," pp. 37-39; 4 Steph. Com. 194, 2nd edit.; 14 Jur. 513; 18 Jurist, 66).

XIII. Perjury.-Perjury is the crime of false swearing, which arises when a lawful oath is administered in some judicial proceeding to a person who swears wilfully, absolutely, and falsely in a matter material to the issue or point in question. The punishment by the common law was fine and imprisonment, with an incapacity of bearing testimony (see 3 Coke's Inst. 168; Com. Dig. tit. "Justices of Peace," B. 106; 4 Black. Com. 138). By statute this latter is taken away, but in lieu the party may be transported or imprisoned with hard labour (Key, div. "Criminal Law," p. 54, 2nd edit.).

XIV, Forgery and uttering.-Forgery is the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing, to the prejudice of another man's right, with a view to put it off as a genuine document, so as to defraud some one (Reg. v. Marcut, 2 Car. and Kirw. 356); but by s. 8 of the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, the intent to defraud particular persons need not be alleged or proved. It was a misdemeanor at common law, and was punishable with fine and imprisonment only; but now by statute it is in many cases felony (Clarke v. Newsam, 1 Exch. Rep. 131), and punishable with transportation or imprisonment (4 Steph. Com, 205, et seq. 2nd edit.). The uttering of a forged instrument, the forgery of which is only a forgery at common law, is no offence, unless some fraud was actually perpetrated by it (Reg. v. Boult, 2 Car. and Kirw. 604).

XV. Uttering-Evidence.-The ordinary evidence to prove guilty knowledge in uttering a forged instrument is that the defendant has passed other forged notes, and even proof that at the time of uttering he gave a false name or address raises a probable presumption of guilty knowledge (see Archb. Crim. Plead. and Evid. 358, 8th edit.).

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PARSONS ON WILLS.

A Treatise on the Law of Wills, embodying the latest decisions in relation thereto; with an Appendix containing The Succession Duty Act. By ARTHUR PARSONS (Nottingham), one of the Attorneys, &c. London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co.

THE profession is already in possession of more than one standard work on the Law of Wills, but the chief of these are now rather out of date, and besides are very expensive works. We e suppose (for the author, unlike most of his fellow-labourers, has given no Preface or Introduction), that Mr. Parsons has felt that there was an opening for a work, which, without great pretensions to originality or completeness, should give a summary of the law as it is, and a notice of the more modern decisions. Presuming this to have been Mr. Parson's aim, we can say that he has not failed. In ten chapters, occupying upwards of 150 pages, the following subjects are treated of:1. Wills and Testaments generally; 2. Wills of Seamen and Soldiers, Nuncupative Wills and Wills of Foreigners; 3. The Construction of Wills generally; 4. Codicils; 5. The Revocation of Wills; 6. Donationes mortis causa and Legacies; 7. Executors; 8. Administration; 9. Assets and Chattels Real; 10. Charitable and Void Bequests, and the Administration of Charitable Trusts. This enumeration does not, by any means, give a complete notion of the various contents of the work: thus, for an example, from p. 142 to p. 155, we have a full and accurate statement of the Act of the last Session relating to Charities, and also of the orders issued in pursuance thereof. And beyond the immediate objects of the work we have, by way of Appendix, The Succession Duty Act, with an Index

thereto.

An extract from the work will give the reader a better notion of the mode in which it is edited, than any description of ours can. The following is extracted from Chapter V. on the revocation of wills:

"" HOW REVOKED WILL REVIVED.

"No will or codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be in any manner revoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the re-execution thereof, or by a codicil executed in manner before required, and showing an intention to revive the same; and when any will or codicil which shall be partly revoked, and afterwards wholly revoked, shall be revived, such revival shall not extend to so much thereof as

shall have been revoked before the revocation of the whole thereof, unless an intention to the contrary shall be shown (1 Vic. c. 26, sec. 22).

་་

And no conveyance or other act, made or done subsequently to the execution of a will of or relating to any real or personal estate therein comprised, except an act by which such will shall be revoked as aforesaid, shall prevent the operation of the will with respect to such estate or interest in such real or personal estate as the testator shall have power to dispose of by will at the time of his death. (sec. 23).

"The mere fact of a testator having destroyed his last will and preserved the first, has been held not sufficient per se to revive the first (Hooton v. Head; Phill. 31), for it must be ascertained whether it was or was not the intention of the deceased that the first will should stand-the presumption of the courts inclining against rather than in favour of the revival of a former instrument (Wilson v. Wilson; 3 Phill. 554).

"Where one entire part of a will, in duplicate, in the possession of the testator, was undestroyed, but the other part, in the possession of his solicitor, was destroyed by the testator on the executing of a subsequent will made in 1838, in terms revoking the prior will, the first was held to be revived by a codicil made subsequently to the second will, though referring to the first will merely by date; and that such reference was sufficiently indicatory of the intention to revive, as required by the 22nd section of the 1 Vic. c. 26, and that moreover parol evidence was not admissible to establish a mistake in the date (Payne v. Trapps, 11 Jur. 155). And where a married lady, having under her settlement freehold property settled to her separate use, with power to dispose of it by will, exercised that power by devising a certain part of the property to A. for life, with remainder to her nephew, and gave all the other freehold tenements which she had in anywise power to dispose of, to her nephew for life, with remainder to his children. She afterwards purchased some leasehold tenements out of her separate property, and had them assigned to M. in trust, as she should by deed, will, or codicil appoint; and in exercise of that power, she by a codicil bequeathed the leasehold to her nephew, and confirmed her will. Some time afterwards she purchased the reversion in fee of the leaseholds, and had it conveyed to A. in trust, as she should by deed or will appoint. She then made another codicil, in exercise expressly of the power reserved to her by the settlement and of all other power, and thereby, after reciting the specific devise made by her will, she gave the property which was the subject of that devise to A. in fee. The second codicil was not deemed a re-publication of the will, and therefore the reversion did not pass by the residuary devise in the will, but the