Is A. justified in so doing? The mooter apprehends not, but that he must account for the damages so recovered to his ward (Hale on F. N. B. 139). C. C. ELLIS (Ruthin).

No. 59.-Attorney's Lien for Costs.

A. employs B., a solicitor, in some business. He had never but once employed him before. A. refuses to pay B.'s bill. B. has in his hands certain papers and deeds belonging to A., which he had obtained possession of in consequence of having to make an abstract of them a short time previous.

Upon these he claims a lien. Is his claim a good one?

No. 60.-Lien.

C. C. ELLIS (Ruthin).

A. has a simple contract debt against B. of seven years' standing, so that of course it is barred by the statute of limitations. Can A. obtain payment of his demand through the medium of a lien which he holds on the property of the debtor ? The mooter will contend that he can (Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. and Ad. 413).

C. C. ELLIS (Ruthin).

No. 61. Endangering Neighbour's Foundations.

A. is entitled to a field, at the bottom of which is another field, containing a chalk-pit, which has been worked a considerable timeindeed, many years. The proprietors of the chalk-pit have dug so close to A.'s field that, although he wishes to build a wall at the bottom of his field, he cannot do so, the chalk being too loose to support it. Has A. any and what remedy? E. J. H.

No. 62.-Lien.

A. sends a quantity of goods to the works of B. to be bleached, who thereupon bleaches and returns the same to A. A. sends a second quantity of goods to B. for the like purpose as the first, who, on receipt of the same, informs A. that before they can be bleached the charges for bleaching the first quantity must be paid.

In the event of A.'s refusal to pay those charges, can B. claim a lien upon the second quantity of goods remaining at his works unbleached for securing the payment of his charges for bleaching the first quantity of goods? T. W. M.

No. 63.-Liability of Retired Partners.

In the year 1834, certain persons, trading under the firm of C, W- and Co., or the "L- Co-operative Association," purchased buildings, which were conveyed to A., B., C., and

D., in trust for the several members of the said firm, and their assigns, &c. Since then there hath been upwards of twenty persons who have been partners, and have gone out of the firm; and the remaining partners, being insolvent, assigned all their estate and effects, both real and personal (not including their private property), unto E. and F., their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, upon certain trusts therein mentioned. And as the assets of the remaining partners are insufficient to meet the demands of their creditors, cannot the persons who have gone out of the firm during the last twenty years be made to contribute equally towards the deficiency, along with the remaining partners? No deed of copartnership was ever prepared, or any notice of dissolution given. A SUBSCRIBER.

No. 64.-Barrister's Privilege from Arrest.

A barrister, as such, is not privileged from arrest merely because he is attending in the ordinary manner at the sessions (Newton, Esq., v. Constable, Bart., T. T. 1841, Q. B. F. J.)

Quære. Would he be privileged if previously retained to attend the sessions?

This is a point of great importance. I should be glad if any gentleman would point me to a more recent case upon the subject.

No. 65.-Estate Tail-Conveyance not Enrolled.

JUNIUS.

A. by his will, made in 1786, gives a certain estate unto his nephew, P., and his assigns, for life; then to trustees, to preserve contingent remainders, with remainder to the use of P.'s eldest son, and his assigns, for life, with remainder to the use of the first and every son, and sons of the said P., the son, successively in tail male, with remainder, unto all and every the daughters, and daughter, of his said nephew, P., lawfully begotten or to be begotten, and the heirs of the body and bodies of such daughters, and daughter respectively, as tenants in common; and in default of such issue, to his own right heirs for ever.

The nephew left three sons, all of whom died bachelors, and three daughters, A., B., and C. A. married, and has since died, leaving a son and several other children. B. married, but had no lawful issue living at her death; and, prior to her death, she conveyed her onee-third of the estate to her illegitimate son, but did not enrol the deed. C. is still living, and is married, and has several children living, the eldest of whom is of age. The three daughters, when living, were the right heirs of the testator.

Can the eldest son of A., and the illegitimate son of B. and C.. and her husband, together with their eldest son, execute a good

conveyance to a purchaser, without enrolling the deed under the Abolition Act?

If any of your correspondents will favour me with an answer per post, I shall feel particularly obliged. J. REDFERN (Leek).

No. 66.-Copyholds-Inrolment of Surrender.

A. being seised in fee of a dwelling-house, and forty-six acres of land of copyhold tenure, held of the Manor of E——, surrendered the same, on the 26th of July, 1842, to B., in mortgage for securing £800 and interest; and on the 2nd of August, 1843, surrendered the same to C., in mortgage for securing £450, but subject to the prior mortgage to B. for £800. On the 6th of November, 1847, A. (in consideration of the £450 due to C., also in consideration of the further sum of £130 then due from A. to C., also in consideration of C. having agreed to comfortably maintain A. for life, and to pay to A. an annuity of £10 for life, and after A.'s decease to pay certain legacies, amounting to £100, bequeathed to certain persons by the will of A., then executed) surrendered the same copyholds to C., his heirs and assigns, for ever, subject to the mortgage to B.

for £800.

Shortly before the 6th of November, 1847, the property was advertised for sale by auction, and there was an offer made for it, which would leave £411, after discharging the £800, £450, and £130, and which surplus of £411 would have purchased a handsome annuity for A., she being at that time nearly seventy years of age.

At the time of the transfer by A., in 1847, the premises realised a rental of £69 annually, and the annual out-goings at that period amounted to £58, leaving £11 as a surplus for the surrenderor, and to provide the definite annuity of £10, and the indefinite one of "a comfortable maintenance."

A. received the £10 regularly for several years, and lived with, and as a part of the family of, C., until two years ago, when A. left C.'s house, since which period A. has had much difficulty in obtaining money from C.

Was it necessary, under 53 Geo. 3, c. 141, to enrol the surrender of the 6th of November, 1847, in the Court of Chancery? And what effect has that surrender against the surrenderor?

J. J. HANDLEY (Mansfield)...

232

ANSWERS TO MOOT POINTS.

No. 30.-Bankruptcy-Trader (antè, p. 160).

Cannan v. Smith appears to me to have been very properly de. cided. The exception in sect. 65 of the Consolidation Act extends only to companies established by charter, or by Act of Parliament, whilst the East of England Banking Company falls within neither of these clauses; but is a Joint Stock Banking Company, carrying on business under the provisions of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 46. The difference between a member of a trading corporation being made bankrupt as such, and a shareholder in a joint stock company being so made bankrupt, is manifestly very great, inasmuch as the individuality of the former is merged in the corporation at large, whilst the latter is actually and personally a member of a trading partnership, and therefore as much a trader as a partner in a private firm. I may mention, that several cases have lately occurred within my own knowledge, in which persons have been adjudged bankrupts, as shareholders in the Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Joint Stock Banking Company, which was recently wound up in Chancery under the Winding-up Acts. LUCAS CORDES (Newport).

No. 23.-Tenancy in Common, or Joint Tenancy (antè, p. 103).

I am much obliged to the gentlemen who have given this question their consideration, but I nevertheless retain my original opinion. The cases of Rigden v. Vallier, Doe v. Vaughan, and Clayton v. Lowe, cited by F. D., are all inapplicable to the present question; the first being a decision upon a limitation under the Statute of Uses, and the two latter upon limitations contained in wills, whilst ours is the case of a limitation by deed operating at common law, and for the same reason Junius's quotation from "Powell on Devises" is likewise irrelevant. Now, it is firmly settled, that many expressions which in a will or in a deed operating under the Statute of Uses, would suffice to create a tenancy in common, would, nevertheless, not have that effect if they occurred in a common law limitation, for the common law favoured joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common, because the divisible services issuing from the land (e. g. rent,) were not divided, nor the entire services (e. g. fealty,) multiplied by the former as they were by the latter. Accordingly, it was admitted by all the judges in Fisher v. Wigg, 1 P. Wms. 17; S.C. 1 Salk, 391; and was also decided in a case reported, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 291, that the words " equally to be divided" in a limitation at com.

mon law, are insufficient to turn what would otherwise be a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common; those words, as Lord Holt observed in the former of those cases, implying no more than that divisibility which the law has already annexed to an estate in joint tenancy. See also 1 Inst. 186, a; Furse v. Weeks, 2 Rolle. Abr. 91; and Burton's Compend., 7th edition, p. 50, which completely bear me out in the opinion I have expressed.

LUCAS CORDES (Newport).

No. 38.-Settlement by Woman about to be Married (antè, p. 162).

If a woman. during the course of a treaty of marriage with her, makes, without notice to the intended husband, a conveyance of any part of her property, such conveyance will be set aside in equity as a fraud upon the husband's marital right (per Lord Thurlow, L. C., in Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves. 22; S.C. White and Tudor's Equity, L. C. i. 276-7). But if the husband had notice of the settlement prior to the marriage, he will be bound by it; for in such a case he has no deception to complain of, and volenti non fit injuria. (St. George v. Wake, I Mylue and Keen, 610; S.C. White and Tudor's Equity, L. C. i. 282). As the husband in the case under consideration had due notice of the settlement, it will therefore be binding upon him, and be as valid in all respects as if he had been a party to it. In connection with this subject, see also Macqueen on Husband and Wife, 35, 36; Story's Com. on Equity Jurispr. 2nd edition, i. 221; and 1 Fonbl. Eq. Tr. Lib. 1, c. 4, s. 11. LUCAS CORDES (Newport).

No. 16.-Lien-Innkeeper-Carriage (antè, p. 101).

This question, besides being discussed in the case cited by the mooter, was also raised in Smith v. Dearlove, 17 Law Jour., C. P. 219, but it did not become necessary to decide that case on the merits. There can, however, I think, be no doubt but that the innkeeper has no lien upon the carriage. Mr. J. F. Crump has ingeniously shown at p. 169 suprà, that the innkeeper's lien on his guest's carriage is precisely similar to that upon his horse, and that he has no lien upon the horse for the guest's personal expenses, whence it follows as a necessary deduction that he has no lien upon the carriage for such expenses. The rule laid down in Bac. Abr. "Inns," to the effect that the innkeeper has a lien upon the horse for the horse's charges only has been so strictly adhered to, that it has been ruled that if the guest brings several horses to the inn, each is a pledge for its own keep only, and not for that of the others (Moss v. Townsend, 1 Bulstr. 207; Addison on Contracts, 3rd edition, i. 486), à fortiori, it would not be a pledge for the keep of its owner, nor by parity of reasoning would the carriage. This, if