THE EDUCATION OF LAW STUDENTS.

We now give the "Prospectus of Lectures" during the Educational Term, in and after Hilary Term, 1854, by the readers of the various inns of court, in continuation of those ante, pp. 72-75.

EQUITY.

The Reader on Equity proposes to give, during the ensuing Educational Term, a course of nine public lectures on the Relief afforded by the Court of Chancery, which depends upon Principles not recognised or applied by Courts of Common Law.

I. In Matters of Trust:1. On the Creation of Trusts. 2. On the Relation between Trustee and Cestui que Trust. 3. On the Qualities of Trust Estates in general. 4. On Trusts for the Benefit of Married Women. 5. On Trusts for Charities.

II. In respect of Penalties and Forfeitures :-1. The General Doctrine of Equity on this subject. 2. Application of the Doctrine to Mortgagees.

ment.

III. In Cases of Mistake and Accident :-In matters of Agree2. In the Execution of Powers. 3. In other instances. In addition to the public lectures, it is proposed that two classes shall be formed, as during the preceding terms, for the study of the principles and practice adopted by Courts of Equity; each class to meet for one hour three times a-week. The junior class will read Smith's Manual of Equity Jurisprudence, commencing with the chapter on 'Express Charitable Trusts;" portions of Fonblanque on Equity; the Act for the Improvement of the Practice and Course of Proceeding in Chancery, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 86.

The senior class will read Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. II., commencing with the chapter on Assignments; White and Tudor's Leading Cases, Vol. II., commencing with Woollam v. Hearn; Mitford's Pleadings in Chancery, commencing with the chapter on Demurrers, at the second ground of Demurrer. Each student will be expected, in the intervals between the meetings of the class, to peruse portions of these and other works pointed out by the reader, and to be prepared, at the ensuing meeting of the class, to answer and discuss questions arising out of the subjects of their reading.

The Reader on Equity will deliver his public lectures at Lincoln'sinn-hall, on Thursday in each week during the Educational Term, commencing at two o'clock p.m. (the first lecture to be delivered on the 19th January). The Reader will receive his private classes

on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday evenings in each week, from seven to nine o'clock, in the Bencher's Reading-room at Lincoln'sinn-hall.

The Reader on the Law of Real Property, &c., proposes to deliver, in the ensuing Educational Term, a course of nine public lectures on the Construction of Deeds and Wills.

I. The Construction of Words in a Will importing an Indefinite Failure of Issue; . Vict. c. 26, s. 29.

II. The Estate taken by Trustees under a Devise; sections, 30, 31. III. The Doctrine of Lapse; sections, 32, 33.

IV. The General Rules of Construction applicable to Deeds and Wills-Estates by Implication; Cross Remainders; Doctrine of Cy-Près; Rule in Shelley's Case; Effect of Recitals; Conditions; Mistake; Falsa Demonstratio non nocet; Verbal Alterations and Transpositions; Influence of Intention.

V. The Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence with Reference to"The Subject and Object of Disposition;" Cumulative and Substitutional Legacies: Double Portions; Satisfaction; Resulting Trusts.

The lectures to be delivered to the private classes will comprise the following subjects:-With the senior class, the text of Sugden on Powers will form the basis of the lecture; and the latest decisions, illustrating the principles there laid down, will be examined and commented on. With the junior class, the subject of the lectures will be Uses and Trusts, and the text-book, 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. xii.

The public lectures will be delivered at Gray's-inn-hall, on Friday in each week, at two p.m. (the first lecture to be delivered on the 20th of January). The private classes will be held in the North Library of Gray's-inn, every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday morning, from a quarter to twelve to a quarter to two o'clock.

COMMON LAW.

The reader on Common Law proposes to deliver during the Educational Term, commencing the 11th January, 1854, a course of nine public lectures, on Practice, Pleading, and the Law of Torts. The subjects to be discussed in these lectures will be as under :

Lectures 1 and 2.-In these lectures will be exhibited a concise view of the Proceedings in an Action at Law, from the issuing of the writ of summons down to final judgment and execution thereupon.

Lectures 3 and 4.-The Principles of Pleading considered; with some remarks upon the evidence necessary to support par. ticular pleas; and an inquiry respecting the alterations in the

science of pleading effected by the Common Law Procedure Act, and by the Pleading Rules of Trinity Term, 1853.

Lectures 5 and 6.-The Fundamental Principles of the Law of Torts, or wrongs independant of Contract, examined and contrasted with those leading Rules by which the law of Contracts is governed. Lecture 7.-Specification of the various Forms of Action er delicto Inquiry how far the Forms of Action have been effected by recent changes.

Lecture 8.-The Actions of Trespass, Trover, and on the Case considered, with reference more especially to the classes of facts out of which they ordinarily originate.

Lecture 9.-Ejectment-For what it lies-The mode of Procedure in this action.

With his private class the Reader proposes to follow out in detail the course of inquiry indicated by the above prospectus. He will examine the various steps in an Action at Law-the Rules of Pleading and the nature of remedies ex Delicto, showing under what circumstances those remedies are respectively available. books to be used with the private class will be the following:-The Common Law Procedure Act (Ed. by Holland); Stephen on Pleading; Selwyn's Nisi Prius; and Smith's Leading Cases.

The

The public lectures on Common Law during the ensuing term will be delivered, and the private classes will meet in the Hall of the Inner Temple as under :

The public lecture on Monday in each week, at two p.m., the first lecture to be delivered on Monday, January 23rd.

The private class on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday in each week, from a quarter to twelve to a quarter to two o'clock.

LANDS, TENEMENTS, AND HEREDITAMENTS."

The above words are in continual use by lawyers and students, and yet it is not too much to say that their precise meaning is but little apprehended, which may be partly accounted for by their being used indiscriminately, and applied together to subject matters, so as to make sure of one of the expressions being applicable. Hence the common expression, that such or such a thing must be land, or a tenement, or an hereditament; and then the words are either used together, or the larger one is applied thereto, so as to save the trouble of fixing on the correct expression.

We shall have occasion, in our Analysis of, or Questions on, Preston on Estates, to notice that writer's views on the subject, and,

as a preparation thereto, we present a few remarks to the reader. The most elementary of our writers appear to have very confused ideas on the exact meanings to be attached to the above words. Thus we are told by Blackstone, that property is distributed into things real and things personal. This is a division peculiar to the law of England, though not very dissimilar to the one used in the civil law, namely, moveables and immoveables, and which, indeed, was used in our own law in former times, as appears from Glanville (lib. 10, cap. 6; lib. 7, cap. 16, 17). Things real, we are told, are such as are permanent, fixed, and immoveable, which cannot be carried out of their places, as lands and tenements: things personal are goods, money, and all other moveables which may attend the owner's person wherever he thinks proper to go (2 Black. Com. 16). And, again, the same learned author states that things real are usually said to consist in lands, tenements, or hereditaments. Tenement signifies, he adds, everything that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature; hereditament is by much the largest and most comprehensive expression, for it includes not only lands and tenements, but whatsoever may be inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal, or mixed (2 Black. Com. 17). Thus, then, we have it plainly stated that property is distributed into things which are either real or personal; that real property comprises lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and that the latter is of so extensive a nature, that though classed under things real, it comprises hoth things real and personal! Surely, it is not saying too much to assert that there is here a sad jumble and confusion of ideas, and it will be our task to endeavour to set the matter right. How came the expression "lands, teneinents, and hereditaments," to be adopted in the English law? We cannot account for it, except that it is a corruption of a more expressive and correct expression. It will be observed that Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 16) says that the objects of property are things: now, how can an hereditament be called a thing? Land may be a thing, so may a tenement, but surely an hereditament is not; it is a 'word expressive of the quantity of estate which a person may have in a thing. It is a gross abuse then of language, and a confusion of logical terms, to class hereditaments with lands. In fact, instead of expressing a thing, it actually expresses a property or quality of a thing, namely, that something, as land, is transmissible to a man's heirs. that we are not aware how the expression, "lands, hereditaments," came to be introduced in our law; that our old writers do not make use of it. Thus Glanville (lib. 10, c. 5) says, "Quandoque res mobiles, ut cattalla * * quandoque res immobiles, ut terrae, tenementa, et redditus." This extract will also serve to show that the division of property was formerly into move.

We have said enements, and nd certain it is

ables and immoveables. It is observable that the only word used in the statute De Donis (13 Edw. 1, c. 1) is tenements. We con ceive that the division of property into real and personal, and the former into lands, tenements, and hereditaments, is illogical, and without the warranty of our old writers. We trust to give an explanation that will not be without some authority in its favour, and which will be more logical than the one in common use. We find that Coke (1 Inst. 1 b (6), and see 6 a [n]) divides property into real, mixed, and personal. It is, indeed, true that he sometimes classes both lands and tenements as real property, whilst sometimes he classes tenements as mixed property. We also find that, by the erroneous sense in which hereditament is used, he has committed the absurdity of asserting that a man may have a fee-simple in an hereditament-in other words, an hereditament in an hereditament. Nothing can more forcibly illustrate the impropriety of the use of the word "hereditament" in juxta-position with "lands and tenements." Taking the hint from what Coke has stated, we think that property should be distinguished as being real, mixed, or personal. Under real we would place land and houses; under mixed, uses, estovers, commons, titles of dignities, &c.; under personal, money, goods, annuity, &c. We have now but to find proper terms to express the estate or interest which a person may have in those classes of property, and those we find already in use. They are inheritances (including thereunder, fees simple and fees tail), freehold (estates for life) and estates or interests less than freeholds (otherwise non-freeholds, otherwise chattels, that is, such an estate or interest as will go to a man's executors). We may here observe that, in fact, lawyers have always used one of the terms in the same way as we now propose. We allude to "chattels real," which is not properly applicable to distinguish the species of property, but to mark the quantity of estate in a thing real (see 1 Steph. Com. 156, note (a), 262; 2 Id. 65, 66). Thus, if a man have a term of years in lands, he is said to have a chattel real-that is, an interest in realty (lands) transmissible to his executors. It is true that the word "chattels" is used frequently as meaning goods, in particular by Coke (see 1 Inst. 118), yet he himself affords, in more than one instance, an antidote to his errors. Thus, at the page above quoted, he says, by the common law no estate of inheritance or freehold is comprehended under the words bona or catalla-that is, the word chattel is expressive of an estate which, being less, cannot, of course, comprehend the words inheritance or freehold. Without further detaining our readers, we may now state that the proper modes of expressing the species of property, and the estates which may be had therein, may be as follows;-A. may have an inheritance, a freehold, or a chattel interest in property real (as lands and houses),