spondent (ante, p. 52) in the knowledge of French. It is a polite acquirement, certainly; but I think merely secondary to hose branches of study which, in the ancient, historical, and poetical authors strengthen and refine, and in the pure and mixed sciences, expand the intellect. Then, as to the arrangements for the proposed change; I do not comprehend why the two examinations (legal and general) should not be conducted in separate divisions, the candidates taking either in succession, as in the University schools. If the same examiners were appointed for both divisions, care should be taken that both kinds of examination should be deemed independent and essential, and not comparative. And, although the examiners may have great trouble in reducing to a positive standard the respective merits of the candidates, yet, if the system is to be carried out at all, it should work well, and as there will be far greater incentives to emulation and energy in assigning a separate position to each in lividual according to his deserts. I incline to the view that, in each department, there should be a classification. I think the arrangement into classes, as suggested, almost as difficult in practice as a separate allocation, from the difficulty of fixing a relative standard; and the aspiration of the student should not be solely that he is ranked amongst the best of, but rather that he may distance all his competitors In addition to this consideration, the duties of the examiners, who are not a fluctuating body, would become gradually easier from repeated judgment, as the experience of the University authorities would demonstrate.

I remain yours very truly,

SERVIENS LEGEM.

MOOT POINTS.

No. 29.-Partnership—Lunacy.

In the year 1851 A. and B. entered into partnership, and the business has been carried on up to the present time by A., B. taking no active part therein. B. shortly afterwards becomes insane, and, in consequence of the disease appearing to be permanent, the friends of the lunatic are anxious to have a dissolution of the partnership. Does the fact of the lunacy dissolve such partnershlp?

No. 30.-Absent Husband-Wife's Second Marriage-Liability of Clergymen.

A., whose husband has been absent, and not heard of for upwards

of seven years, agrees to marry B.; A. and B. present themselves to the clergyman of the parish in which they reside, and request him to publish the banns, A. at the same time offering to make a statutory declaration before a proper authority that she has not heard of her husband during his absence. The clergyman refuses to comply with A. and B.'s request. Is the clergyman liable to any and what proceedings by reason of such refusal? And, assuming the clergyman to have acceded to A. and B.'s request, and married them, and the absent husband afterwards returns, is the clergyman in such a case liable to any and what proceedings, and if so at whose instance? W. A. L.

No. 31.-Legacies-Presumption of Satisfaction. Where legacies are charged upon real estate, and upwards of thirty years have elapsed since, and there is nothing (on the face of the abstract) on the sale of the estate to show that the legacies have been paid, what proof can the purchasers' solicitor insist upon as to the charges having been satisfied?

Supposing forty years to have elapsed, would the presumption be sufficient that the legacies had been satisfied? G. G. NORRis.

No. 32.-Power to Sell within Limited Time.

A., by his will, dated in February, 1853, directed his executor to sell within twelve calendar months after his decease, all his (testator's) real estate in such manner as he (the executor) should think fit, and to convey and assure the same when sold, as in such cases usual. Should the sale take place within twelve months from the death of the testator, but the conveyance be not executed within that time, would the power be well exercised? R. E.

No. 33.-Power to Appoint-Mortgage, &c.

A. being seised of freeholds in fee, married B. in 1829, and levied a fine, the uses whereof were declared by indenture to be to B. for life with power of appointment to A., and in default of appointment to her right heirs. A. and B., in exercise of her power, executed two mortgages for terms of years, and while they were existing B. again exercised the power of appointment by will in favour of Quære:-Was the power exceeded, and how often may a power

A.

be exercised?

No. 34.-Grant of Right of Way.

R. E.

A. puts up for sale by auction several plots of land in various lots; at the sale B. becomes the purchaser of several of the lots, and C. also buys several. A. reserves a right of way to some of B.'s land over part of the land purchased by C.; the following are the words

in B.'s conveyance, by which the right is granted to him by A. :And, particularly, a right of road or way for all purposes and on all occasions, over and along the lane or road, &c., for the said B., his heirs, appointees, and assigns."

In the conveyance to C. the right of way is reserved to B. n these words: " Subject, and reserving to the said B., his heirs and assigns, a right of way or road for all purposes and on all occasions for the use and enjoyment of the said closes, called, &c., but for no other purpose, over and along the lane called, &c."

One of B.'s closes adjoins the lane over which he has the right of way before mentioned, and of which C. has the fee. B. now claims the right to build upon his land close to the lane, and fronting it, and to have a right of way over the lane to the dwelling-house he may erect. When C. bought the land it was under the decided impression that B. had merely a right of way to the close as such, and had no right whatever to build in the way he now claims to do; and, as this lane is the road to dwelling-houses erected by C., the property of the latter would be seriously deteriorated in value, by the exercise of the right now claimed by B. The questions which these facts raise are: 1. Has B. the power under his deed to exercise the right he now claims? 2. If the rights of way had been reserved in B.'s deed in the same words as it is in C's (as I conceive it ought to have been), could B. build and use the way to such buildings as he now claims? 3. If the answer to the first question be in the affirmative, and the second in the negative, would C. have any cause of action against the vendor A. for compensation, by reason of A. granting the land to C. with a limited right of way to B., and having previously executed a deed granting to B. the right of way, without any limitation whatever?

Although B. and C. purchased their respective lots at the same sale, the conveyance to B. was executed a few days before that to C.

The case of Allen v. Gomm (11 Adol. and Ell. 759) is most in point of any I can find. See also Akroyd v. Smith, 19 Law Journal Rep. (C. P. 315). W. E. (Leeds).

NOTES OF RECENT LEADING CASES.

Dower-Gift of Personalty to Widow-Election [Parker v. Sowerby, 17 Jur, 752].-The above case illustrates the rule that a person cannot be allowed to accept a benefit under a will and at the

same time reject another portion of it, and applies the same to the case of a widow to whom personal estate and an annuity are given by will and a devise is made of the real estate to trustees with a power to lease (the decision was on a case not within the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105; see sect. 10). The widow was put to her election. V. C. Kindersley in his judgment said:" In all cases in which the question has been discussed we find it laid down as a recognised principle, that in order to put the widow to her election, we must, from the terms of the will itself, collect an intention to dispose of the estate in a manner which would be wholly inconsistent with the allowance of the claim for dower, and that it is not enough merely to shew that there was no intention that the widow should enjoy both her dower and take the benefit conferred upon her by the will. As I previously observed, there have been decisions on that point, about the propriety of which there might be much argument. But however that may be, I feel myself bound by them. There is a series of cases which decide, that although a devise of all a testator's estates is no proof that the testator did not mean his wife to enjoy dower also, inasmuch as all his estates meant only what was his own to devise, yet a devise to trustees upon trust to manage a farm, or the giving a power to lease lands, has been considered indicative of an intention to deprive the widow of her rights, which, in the absence of such a power or trust, she would be entitled to claim. The cases on this subject are too numerous and uniform, and their authority is too high to allow me to hold at the present day that the principles to be deduced from them are not the established law. . . . The present case, then, comes within the authorities referred to; subject, however, to this observation, that the right to dower arose out of a particular freehold estate, while the benefit the widow received was derived out of the personal estate, and from an annuity charged on an estate different from that out of which the dower is claimed. Now, the rule is this -if a testator devises any portion of his real estate in such a manner that the claim of dower would defeat that intention, then the widow is put to her election, if there were any, even the slightest benefit -a gold watch, for instance-conferred upon her by the same instrument. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the widow in this case was put to her election."

...

WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS.

We are happy to inform those of our subscribers who have expressed their anxiety about the appearance of the promised "First Series" of the "LIBRARY," that they need not be under any apprehension about it, for that the first work, viz., LITTLETON'S TENURES, will certainly make its appearance in the course of the present month of March. We cannot say the exact day, but so soon as it appears it shall be forwarded to those who have already, or may before then, send up orders for the same. We may as well mention, that we feel some little doubt about the orders received for the original (now the second) series prior to the announcement of the First Series, and since such announcement, without any specification of which series was intended. Are these orders to stand good for the "First Series" also? Will those gentlemen who have sent up orders, without specifying the First Series, be good enough to let us hear from them respecting this matter? We shall feel obliged

if all orders hereafter sent will state that it is for the "First Series" (when so meant) in order that there may be no mistake.

Having made some progress with Littleton, we are able to state that there will be some interesting and novel points raised, besides those older ones relating to the descent of the share of a coparcener (which may now be considered as settled), and the right of dower and courtesy as affected by the Inheritance Act. We allude, in the first place, to the point whether a feoffment, without livery, will pass more than an estate at will, which, as most of our readers are aware, was the old doctrine; and as incidental thereto, whether, on a grant of lands without any express limitation of estate, a life estate will now pass, as formerly it did, on a feoffment with livery. As a feoffment always contains the word "grant," there can now be no reason, so far as we can see, why it should not operate as a grant if it cannot operate as a feoffment.

In the second place, we refer to a point respecting exchanges. An exchange was an exception from the rule that no freehold could, at the common law, pass without livery; but then, to compensate for this, it was requisite that the parties should each enter into the exchanged part before death; for if either party died before entry, his heir might have avoided the exchange (See Co. Litt. 50 h, 51 a ; 2 Black Com. 323; 4 Jarman by Sweet, 2). Now this entry was evidently in lieu of the livery which otherwise would have been required; but as now lands, as regards the conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, lie in grant as well as in livery (8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2), and as, on a grant, nothing is required for its perfection (not even attornment being required where the grant was of a